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Papers included in the current volume were prepared in the 
framework of the HAS and BAS joint international research project 
entitled “Shared Pasts in Central and Southeast Europe: New 
Sources, New Approaches”. They present research results and 
understandings of scholars from Hungary and Bulgaria (and Russia 
as an invited guest) of a shared past in contexts of contacts and 
conflicts, from the standpoint of the historical events behind the 
curtains, parallelisms and difference concerning social, economic, 
religious and cultural aspects, mentality. Some of them participated 
in the Hungarian-Bulgarian history conference carried out within the 
abovementioned project on the topic of “Contacts and Conflicts in 
Central and Southeast Europe: Hungarian and Bulgarian 




Congratulatory Address by H. E. Mrs. Biserka Benisheva, 
Ambassador Extraordinary and Plenipotentiary of Bulgaria 
to Hungary to the Participants in the Conference  
 
Dear Director General of the Reserch Center for the Humanities 
at the Hungarian Academy of Sciences, 
Dear Chairs of the Hungarian and Bulgarian Parts of the Joint 
Academic Commission of Historians, 
Dear members and researchers of the National Academies 
and Universities in Hungary and Bulgaria, 
I am honoured to be here today for the opening of the 
International Conference “Contacts and Conflicts in Central and 
Southeast Europe: Hungarian and Bulgarian Approaches”. Indeed 
the conference is a timely opportunity to again and again exchange 
scientific research and findings regarding the historical past of 
our neighbouring regions – Southeast and Central Europe. Both 
regions, being part of the pan-European cultural heritage, poses 
specific identity, based on the lessons learnt during historical 
periods of glory and unfortunately of troubles. The archives, 
researched by historians, reveal that shared understanding of the 
past, define the development of a common future of two brave 
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nations, willing to guarantee the prosperity of their people. In 
regional context the archives reveal that the two neighbouring 
regions have influenced each other, have developed an extensive 
network of contacts economically, culturally and people–to–people, 
have tried to assist each other at difficult historical times. 
And I wish to extend acknowledgments to the researchers of 
both Academies of Science for their dedicated work in the frame of 
the joint academic project “Shared Pasts in Central and Southeast 
Europe: New Sources, New Approaches” and in particular to the 
members of Hungarian – Bulgarian Joint Academic Commission 
of Historians. The track record of the Joint Commission over the 
years has been impressive and have testified to the need of such 
type of studies for the benefit of the next generations. 
At present Bulgaria and Hungary share common values and 
are two champions of peace and stability in their respective regions. 
Both states share the view that unification of Europe will only be 
completed once all the countries in the Western Balkans join the 
European Union.  
I avail of this opportunity to congratulate the organizers of 
the conference and to wish all of you every success in your 
scientific endevours. I will be delighted to host you at the 
Bulgarian Embassy in Budapest for a closing reception at the end 





Congratulatory Address by Prof. DSc. Pál Fodor, Director 
General of the Research Centre for the Humanities at the 
HAS to the Participants of the Conference  
 
Her Excellency, Dear Colleagues, dear guests! 
I am delighted and very proud to greet you all in the 
international scientific conference entitled “Contacts and Conflicts 
in Central and Southeast Europe: Hungarian and Bulgarian 
Approaches”, which is realized within the frame of the joint 
academic project “Shared pasts in Central and Southeast Europe. 
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New Sources, New Approaches”. The event is organised by the 
Hungarian Academy of Sciences, Research Centre for the Huma- 
nities, Bulgarian Academy of Sciences, Institute for Historical 
Studies and the Bulgarian-Hungarian Joint Academic Commission 
of Historians, and kindly supported by the Bulgarian Cultural 
Institute in Budapest and the Embassy of the Republic of Bulgaria 
in Hungary for which I would like to express my gratitude to Her 
Excellency Biserka Benisheva, ambassador of the Republic of 
Bulgaria. 
The communication between the historical institutes of the 
two academies is mainly realized through the activity of the 
Bulgarian-Hungarian Joint Academic Commission of Historians 
which was (re)established in 2006, and has an unquestionable 
role in coordinating the scientific activities and tasks. In the 
recent years the cooperation of the two institutions resulted in the 
publication of three books (two of them were published last year 
containing the collected studies of the last joint conference held in 
Sofia in 2012, entitled „Regions, Borders, Societies, Identities…‟) a 
separate volume of studies in the peer-reviewed Bulgarian Historical 
Review and several online publications. Beyond this, the bilateral 
agreement promoted the realization of two Bolyai Scholarships in 
Hungary by providing accomodation and research possibilities in 
the Bulgarian archives, which resulted in two volumes on the 
society and economy of the Balkan peninsula. The cooperation also 
enhances the opportunity for Hungarian doctoral students to finish 
their dissertation. 
Being so fruitful, the bilateral agreement for the cooperation 
has been renewed several times. The recent project lasts till the 
end of 2015. The Hungarian partner in its project plan – beyond 
the research on social and diplomatic history of the peninsula – 
outlined a methodological workshop for academic researchers for 
the last project year and lectures on history in Hungarian language 
for the students of the Sofia University. 
The significance of this event and this cooperation can be 
underlined by the fact that this is the only operating academic-level 
cooperation of the HAS RCH Institute of History with any of the 
Balkan countries. This is true even if last year our institute 
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established very good direct relations with both Croatian Institutes 
of History and in February this year we organised a big joint 
conference on the historical contacts of the two nations during the 
800 years of common statehood. To this I can now add another 
promising development: in March this year we got in touch with 
the Institute for Balkan Studies of the Serbian Academy of 
Sciences and Arts and agreed to publish a volume in English on 






Devoted the improvement of the international relations a new 
department has just been founded at our institute to undertake 
scientific research related to Balkan affairs and to coordinate other 
public activities including the promotion of the implementation of 
Balkan studies in higher education.  
Our future goal is to move on creating either bilateral or even 
multilateral agreements with the academies of the peninsula, as 
well as to elaborate a joint strategy of historical research enabling 
us to create a network of cooperation with western research centers 
and that way promoting the accessibility to financial sources 
(through international applications and scholarships). In this regard 
our institution tries to function as a link between the peninsula 
and Western Europe. 
And finally, let me recall a personal memory. It was maybe at 
the end of 2011 that Penka Peykovska came to see me and asked 
me to do my best in order to keep the joint academic commission 
of our historians alive. She visited me because by that time it had 
already become public that I would be appointed the new director 
of the institute. She deemed it necessary to draw my attention to 
the work of the commission and asked for my support because 
she was worrying about the future of the common projects 
already under way. During our talk I promised her to do my best 
and I emphasised my commitment to the Bulgarian-Hungarian 
cooperation. I hope that since then I have been able to live up to 
her expectations. As I mentioned we published two volumes 
recently. We spared no efforts and means that this conference has 
really come true. And I hope that due to our joint efforts we will 
be able to continue our common projects in the future, too.  
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I would like to conclude by thanking all of you for having 
accepted our invitation and contributed to the realization of this 
meeting either by giving a lecture or by doing hard organization 
work. My special thanks go to my colleague Gábor Demeter for 
the excellent scientific and organisational work he has done. I 
wish You, I wish us a very good and fruitful conference. Welcome 




Congratulatory Address by Prof. DSc. Valery Stoyanov, 
Chairman of the Bulgarian Part of the Joint Academic 
Commission of Historians 
 
Your Excellency Benisheva, Ambassador of the Republic of 
Bulgaria to Hungary, 
Dear Professor Pál Fodor, Director General of the Research 
Centre for Humanities at the Hungarian Academy of Sciences, 
My dear Professor Imre Ress, Chairman of the Hungarian 
Part of the Joint Academic Commission of Historians, 
Dear Colleagues, 
Ladies and Gentlemen! 
First of all let me say that I am very glad to be here with you.  
There are almost ten years since we renewed our scientific 
cooperation. The first joint project between both Institutes of 
History started in the year of 2004 – the one at the HAS and the one 
at the BAS, at the end of which we agreed with the need of re- 
creating the Joint Hungarian-Bulgarian Commission of Historians. 
In the year of 2006 the Commission was born – we have 
already had three joint projects behind us, which unified the 
efforts of many colleagues of both sides – specialists in the 
history of the Ottoman and the Hapsburg empires, as well as in 
contemporary history of Central and Southeastern Europe, 
including the ones of Hungary and Bulgaria. We have already 
investigated some aspects of the Ottoman Balkan past, the 
peculiarities of the National revival and the National state building, 
some problems of war and peace, of the demographic development, 
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the minority issue, of some auxiliary sciences of history, and so on. 
In this sense, the work of the Joint Commission is very useful. 
And perhaps the greatest contribution to that came from the 
secretaries of the Commission – now Dr. Gábor Demeter from 
Hungarian side and Assoc. Prof. Dr. Penka Peykovska from the 
Bulgarian side. They are the living flame of our Commission. Let us 
thank them cordially for their dedicated work. 
Their latest success is the preparation of the two books that 
will be presented today at the Bulgarian Cultural Institute in 
Budapest. These beautiful editions could not have been realized 
without the kind support of the Director General of the Research 
Centre for Humanities, Prof. DSc. Pál Fodor. Thank you very 
much indeed for these two splendid works and for all that you 
have done for us. 
Finally, let me express my very hope, that despite of all 
difficulties of the time in what we live and work, the Hungarian- 
Bulgarian Joint Commission of Historians will further continue 
doing its useful work in clearing different aspects of the joint 
historical processes in Central and Southeastern Europe, bringing 






Begrüssungsworte des Vorsitzenden der Ungarn-Sektion in 
der Bulgarisch-Ungarischen Historikerkommission  
Hon. Dozent Dr. Imre Ress 
 
Ihre Exzellenz Frau Botschafterin Benisheva, verehrter Herr 
Generaldirektor Fodor, lieber Freund Stoyanow, werte Kolleginnen 
und Kollegen!  
Die beiden Vorredner/in würdigten schon ausführlich die 
neuartigen regionalen Problemstellungen und die methodischen 
Erneuerungen der Tagungen der Bulgarisch-Ungarischen 
Historikerkommission und hoben besonders hervor, dass die 
wissenschaftlichen Erträge der Aufsätze unserer Konferenzbände 
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sich vor allem auch durch die Erschließung und Einbindung neuer 
Quellen auszeichneten. Um ihre Gedankengänge weiterzuführen, 
erlauben Sie mir auf die unerläßliche Edition einer bedeutenden 
Quellengruppe aufmerksam zu machen, die eine fachliche 
Herausforderung und moralische Pflicht für die ungarische 
Geschichtswissenschaft darstellt und an der sich auch wichtige 
Intressen der bulgarischen Kollegen/innen knüpfen. Es handelt sich 
um die allgemeine Zugänglichmachung der Schriftennachlässe 
von drei ungarischen historischen Persönlichkeiten, István Burián, 
Lajos Thallóczy und Mihály Jungeth-Arnóthy, die sich im Prozess 
der nationalstaatlichen Umgestaltung und der mehrmaligen 
machtpolitischen Neuordnungen Südosteuropas im 19. und 20. 
Jahrhundert in Bulgarien, Bosnien-Herzegowina und Serbien als 
Zeitzeugen und aktive Mitgestalter beteiligten. Als Diplomaten 
und beamtete Wissenschaftler verbrachten sie eine lange Zeit in 
den Balkanländern und ihre Erfahrungen und Erlebnisse wurden 
von ihnen in Jahrzehnte überwölbenden Tagebüchern verewigt, 
die für die regionale Erforschung der Politik-, Mentalität- und 
Kulturgeschichte von eminenter Bedeutung sind. Die Tagebücher 
sind für die Forschung zwar nicht unbekannt, doch in ihrer 
wissenschaftlichen Wertung überwiegen die sporadischen und 
zufälligen Momente. Obwohl ausgewählte Kapitel der Tagebücher 
schon in deutscher, bulgarischer und ungarischer Sprache 
veröffentlicht wurden, entsprechen diese Teileditionen wegen ihrer 
einseitigen Auswahlkriterien und oft mangelder Texterläuterungen 
nur in beschränktem Maße den Ansprüchen der komplexen 
regionalen Forschung. Die neuen medialen technischen 
Errungenschaften unserer Epoche, die Digitalisierung und die 
elektronische Erreichbarkeit im Internet erleichtern zwar ohne 
Zweifel den physichen Zugang zu einem kompletten 
handschriftlichen Quellenkorpus, doch die Erschließung der 
speziellen Inhalte und die Klärung der regional-nationalen 
Zusammenhänge erfordern unverändert, dass die Tagebücher mit 
erläuterndem Anmerkungsapparat versehen werden. Auch in der 
internationalen Praxis wird dem Grundsatz immer mehr Geltung 
verschafft, dass die historischen Grundforschungen der 
Quelleneditionen nicht durch die medialen Erneuerungen ersetzt 
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und erspart werden können. 
In diesem Zeichen wurden die Editionsarbeiten der 
Kriegstagebücher des Balkanexperten und der grauen Eminenz 
der ungarischen Politik in Wien, Lajos Thallóczy, aus den Jahren 
1912–1916 in unserem Institut nach gründlicher technischer 
Vorbereitung in Angriff genommen. Das Schiksal der 
Veröffentlichung der Tagebücher von István Burián aus den 
Jahren 1886–1922 ist ein aufschlußreicher Abdruck der 
ungarischen Geschichtpolitik des vergangenen halben Jahrhunderts. 
Die vollständige Textrekonstruktion der in mehreren Anstalten 
verstreuten Tagebüchern wurde von dem Mitglied der 
Vorgängerorganisation unserer Historikerkommission, dem 
emeritierten Universitätsprofessor István Diószegi fertiggestellt, 
doch die Veröffentlichung wurde damals verhindert, weil die 
Eintragungen in Sofia, die im Zeitraum des ausgehenden 19. 
Jahrhunderts verfasst wurden, als nicht zeitgemäß betrachtet 
wurden, weil sie russenfeindliche Bemerkungen beinhalteten. Im 
Jahr der osteuropäischen Wende 1989 berichtete das 
ungarischsprachige Nachrichtenmagazin „Bulgária” darüber, dass 
die politischen Hindernisse der Publikation nicht mehr bestehen 
und es wurde eine baldige Veröffentlichung angekündigt. Zehn 
Jahre später erschien wirklich eine Teilpublikation der 
Burián-Tagebücher, doch die gründlichen Vorarbeiten und die 
fertiggestellte Textrekonstruktion wurden überhaupt nicht in 
Betracht gezogen. Die ganze Edition beschränkte sich bloß auf 
die Quellen eines enizigen Archivs, so kamen die wichtigsten 
bulgarischen Bezüge der Burián-Tagebücher nicht zur 
Veröffentlichung. Die erlangte Forschungs- und Publikationsfreiheit 
ist also ebenso wenig ein Garant für die fachlich relevante 
Editionsarbeit, wie die technischen Neuigkeiten. Sei es mir 
erlaubt die bulgarischen Teilnehmer unserer Tagung in der 
Hoffnung herzlich begrüssen zu dürfen, dass wir bestimmt noch 
erleben werden, dass die vollständige Edition dieses einmaligen 
Quellengutes an einer zukünftigen gemeinsamen Konferenz 
unserer Historikerkommission präsentiert wird. 
Държавата и хората в процеса на 
съхраняване на паметта за военни 
конфликти: гражданите на Силистра в 
края на ХVІ –ХVІІ век 
 
 
Стефка Първева  
 




През 1593 г. започнала поредната война между Хабсбургската 
монархия и Османската империя, която продължила до 1606 г. 
На страната на Австрийската империя застанали като 
съюзници князете на васалните на султана княжества 
Трансилвания, Влашко и Молдова. Войната се водела 
предимно на територията на Унгария с променлив за 
воюващите армии успех. През 1594 г. активни военни 
действия започнали и долнодунавските княжества, чиито 
войски били водени от войводите Михай Витязул, Арон Вода 
и техни военни командири. В периода от края на 1594 г. до 
1599 г. многократно били нападани градовете и крепостите по 
крайбрежието на Долния Дунав, както и селищата на юг от 
реката до Стара планина и София. Според някои източници 
войските на Михай Витязул достигнали дори районите в 
близост до Пловдив и Одрин. Бойните действия на военните 
отряди, в които участвали освен власи също и сърби, българи, 
маджари, албанци и др., били следвани от многократни 
разрушения, ограбване и опожаряване на селищата, избиване, 
заробване, отвличане или принудително преселване на 
населението. Същото поведение имала и османската войска 
заедно със съюзните й татари на влашка земя.1  
                                                        
1
 Велики, К. Походите на Михай Витязул на юг от Дунав. – ИПр, 1973, 
№3, 63-72; Димитров, Стр., Н. Жечев, В. Тонев. История на Добруджа. 
Стефка Първева 
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Войната, която достигнала селищата и домовете на 
хората, оставила дълбоки следи в колективната памет на 
поданиците на султана. Това изследване си поставя за цел да 
обърне внимание на някои аспекти на проблема за пътищата 
и механизмите за съхраняване на паметта за травматичните 
събития в хода на военни конфликти сред поданиците на 
султана. Тези аспекти са свързани с функционирането на 
османските бюрократични, съдебни и военни институции на 
местно и централно ниво и осъществяваните контакти с 
местното население. За тази цел ще бъде анализиран казусът 
с гражданите на Силистра и тяхното поведение, както и това 
на османската власт по време и след войната със Свещената 
лига от 1593–1606 г. и края на ХVІІ в. 
 
ХРОНОЛОГИЯ НА СЪБИТИЯТА 
 
Опирайки се на разказите на свидетели и участници в 
събитията или на техните хроникьори, ще се опитаме да 
проследим някои акценти от военните действия между 
християнската и османската войски. Те представляват 
красноречиви свидетелства за създалата се военновременна 
обстановка, в която били принудени да живеят хората от 
крайдунавските селища и тези в равнината чак до Стара 
планина и София.  
Началото на военните действия на васалните на 
Османската империя княжества, било сложено след 
вероломните действия на Михай Витязул спрямо неговите 
османски кредитори, извикани в Букурещ, за да бъдат 
изплатени дълговете на войводата. На 13 ноември 1594 г. 
той наредил сградата на държавната хазна, в която се 
намирали въпросните османци, да бъде запалена. В тази 
                                                                                                          
Т. 3. С., 1988, 82–84; История на България. Т. 4. С., 1983, 126–127, 
196–197; De Hammer, J. Histoire de l’Empire Ottoman Depuis Son Origine 
Jusqu’à Nos Jours. Vol. 7 (Première edition, Paris, 1836), Istanbul, 1999, 
146, 157–158, 162, 180–181; Olteanu, Şt. Les Pays Roumains à l’Époque de 
Michel le Brave (l’Union de 1600). Bucureşti, 1975, 91–105.  
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акция бил нападнат и унищожен и еничарският отряд, 
разположен в града. След това на 15 ноември отрядите на 
Михай се насочили към Гюргево, нападнали града, без да 
успеят да превземат крепостта. 2  Османският хронист 
Мустафа Наима 3 решил да опише това събитие чрез 
съчинената или преразказаната лична история на някой си 
Алиджан, помощник (наиб) на кадията в Гюргево. 
Алиджан бил изпратен в Букурещ с цел да регулира 
проблема между Михай и неговите османски кредитори по 
съдебен път. Когато си тръгнал от съда и напускайки града, 
очевидно преди трагичните за османците събития, той 
срещнал негов стар познат немюсюлманин. Той го 
посъветвал да не замръква там, нито да отсяда в Гюргево, 
а колкото се може по-бързо да се отправи към Русчук. 
Забелязвайки странна суматоха и движение на войски в 
посока към Гюргево, наибът Алиджан се качил на своята 
каруца и се отправил към дома. Оттам преплувайки Дунав 
срещу Русе, едва успял да се спаси от нападателите. По 
думите му, той и още един човек, който плувал редом с 
него, били единствените жители на Гюргево, които успели 
да избягат. Останалите 4000 мъже, жени и деца били убити 
или пленени. След това войниците на Михай Витязул 
изгорили града. Виждайки това, което се случва на отсрещния 
бряг, русенци се разпръснали, търсейки убежище в Балкана.4 
След Гюргево били нападнати и други селища и 
крепости: на 10 декември – крепостта Флоч, на 30 
декември бил нападнат и изгорен Свищов; следвали 
Оряхово и Никопол; на 1 януари 1595 г. – Хърсово, на 8 
                                                        
2 De Hammer, J. цит. съч., 146; Olteanu, Şt., Op. cit., 92–93; Димитров, 
Стр., Н. Жечев, В. Тонев, цит. съч., 82; Велики, К., цит. съч., 64. 
3 Повече за Мустафа Наима вж. в: Woodhead, Ch. Naimaл – In: Encyclopaedia 
of Islam (EI2), CD-ROM Edition, Brill NV, Leiden, Vol. 1, 2001, 917–918. 
4 Annals of the Turkish Empire from 1591 to 1659 of the Christian Era by 
Naima. Translated from the Turkish by Charles Fraser. Vol. 1, London: Printed 
for the Oriental Translation Fund of Great Britain and Ireland, 1832, 37–39. 
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януари – Силистра, на 25 януари – Русчук, след това 
отново Силистра, Никопол, Тутракан, Браила и др. 5 
Многобройните османски войски и гарнизони, както и 
стратегическите планове на влашкия войвода го принудили 
да раздели войската си на няколко походни единици, 
командвани от него или негови капитани. През пролетта 
на 1595 г. около 2000 хайдути, които представлявали 
обособени части от влашката войска, нападнали и огра- 
били София.6 След нападенията над дунавските градове и 
крепости отрядите на Михай Витязул достигнали Разград, 
Варна, чак до полите на Стара планина. Влашките летописи 
отбелязват, че „колкото турски села и градове срещали 
по пътя, изгорили, ограбили и взели в робство турци, 
туркини и деца и ги откарали във Влашко.”7  
Молдовският войвода Арон също пристъпил към военни 
действия паралелно с нападенията на войските на Михай 
Витязул над дунавските градове. В съюз с казашките водачи 
Лобода и Наливайко, те разорили османските владения в 
Буджака, а след това нападнали и опостошили Исакча и 
района около града. Войските им успели да отведат като 
плячка 100.000 глави говеда и 400.000 овце.8  
Жителите от селищата в земите между Дунав и Стара 
планина страдали и от действията на кримските татари, 
които били съюзни на османските войски. Придвижването 
на техните отряди през 1596 г. носело същите опустошения 
за населението, както и действията на влашката войска. 
Свидетелства от това време разказват, че: „Тази народност 
[българите] е силно развълнувана, понеже татарите 
преди да се съберат на бойното поле в Сърбия с турците, 
минавайки през България, оплячкосали почти цялата тази 
                                                        
5 De Hammer, J. Op. cit., 157–158; Велики, К., цит. съч., 64–65; 
Olteanu, Şt., Op. cit., 93. 
6 Велики, К., цит. съч., 65; История на България, 186. 
7 Велики, К., цит. съч., 65; De Hammer, J. Op. cit., 162. 
8 Димитров, Стр., Н. Жечев, В. Тонев, цит. съч., 82.  
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страна... И нанесли огромни щети на цялото й население, 
макар че българите са поданици на Турската империя.”9  
Боевете между османската и влашката войска 
продължили и през 1596 г. На страната на Михай Витязул 
се сражавал и Баба Новак, който стоял начело на 
хайдушки отряди. Самият влашки владетел разказал, че 
когато изпратил Баба Новак срещу войските на Хасан 
паша, които се готвели да минат Балкана на път за София, 
той го „нападнал, разбил го, обърнал в бягство войската 
му, изклал мнозина от нея и им взел камилите, конете, 
оръжието и всичкото богатство, което притежавали.”10 
Унгарската хроника на Самошкьози добавя, че Баба Новак 
опожарил крепостта Враца, близо до планината Новак 
(Стара планина), а после бродил из нея, като стигнал близо 
до София. Навръщане от похода той стигнал Дунав при 
Флорентин с многобройна плячка от роби и добитък. 
Навярно на път към Дунава хайдутите нападнали Плевен 
като пленили много негови жители. Сред тях се оказали 
жената и децата на местния бей Михалоглу, който заплатил 
500.000 жълтици като откуп за тяхното освобождаване. Един 
доклад от Прага свидетелства, че сред пленниците на 
хайдушките дружини се оказали също 70 евреи и 400 
турци, за откупа на които те получили 400.000 талера. 
Този доклад приписвал нападението над Плевен на Дели 
Марко, но изследователят на събитията Константин 
Велики твърди, че хайдушките отряди, трябва да са били 
ръководени именно от Баба Новак, тъй като по това време 
Дели Марко се сражавал с войските на трансилванския 
княз Сигизмунд Батори някъде в Банат. Навръщане Баба 
Новак разбил още веднъж турците при Никопол.11  
Този град пострадал от влашките нападения и през 
1598 г., когато на 10 септември Михай Витязул минал с 
                                                        
9 История на България, 185. 
10 Велики, К., цит. съч., 66–67. 
11 Пак там, 67. 
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войските си Дунав при Никопол. Влашкият войвода описал в 
писмо до ерцхерцога Максимилиан от 16 октомври 1598 г. 
бойните действия при укрепения град, както и резултатите 
от по-сетнешните си походи: 
„[…] При Никопол се срещнахме с 13000 турци заедно с 
двама паши и 12 санджакбея и се сражавахме с тях; 
най-после с Божия помощ ги разбихме, така че много от 
тях останаха в рова, а пашите успяха да избягат. След 
това изгорихме до основи град Никопол, в който имаше 
около 6000 къщи, а жителите му, [колкото се намираха в 
града], всички убихме. 
След това тръгнахме към Видин. Тъй като отново 
срещнахме 2 бея с 1000 турци, пак се заехме с отбрана, 
така че те многократно бяха бити от нас, а знамената 
им отнехме и взехме в плен знатни турци. Скоро след 
това в деня на битката, подпалихме град Видин, в който 
имаше 12000 къщи; от нашите паднаха малцина. Освен 
това такива известни градове като Плевен, Враца, 
Флорентин и Оряхово всички бяха изгорени, а жителите 
турци бяха избити. Що се отнася до областта от 
Трансилвания чак до София ние изгорихме над 2000 села, а 
жителите им, които се намираха там християни или 
българи, бяха доведени заедно с нас през Дунава, мало и 
голямо, по моя сметка над 16000 души, заедно с имущес- 
твото им, и бяха заселени там, където бяха най-бедните 
в моята страна, и където можеше да бъдат настанени, 
като им беше дадено и предоставено толкова място, че 
те да могат да се прехранват. И оставихме областта 
[на юг от Дунава] напълно обезлюдена и опустошена.”12  
Опожарени и опустошени градове и села и цели райони, 
избито, заробено или принудително изселено население – 
                                                        
12  Hurmuzaki, E. D. Documente privitoare la Istoria Românilor. Vol. 12. 
Bucureşti, 1903, 411. Документът се цитира по български превод на В. 
Паскалева: Христоматия по история на България. Т. 1. Съст. Проф. Ал. 
Бурмов и доц. П. Петров, С., 1964, с. 398-399; Велики, К., цит. съч., 70–71. 
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това била равносметката от действията на двете враждуващи 
войски. Дали числата, упоменати в изложението на Михай 
Витязул, са близки до действителността, или са силно 
преувеличени, не бихме могли да знаем. Във всеки случай 
те са красноречиво свидетелство за разрухата в следтвие 
на военните действия, за ужаса, загубите и повратните 
моменти в живота на хората от засегнатите райони. 
През годините на войната българите, направили 
възможното да организират въстание срещу султана, което 
избухнало през септември 1598 г. с център Търново, но 
скоро било потушено от многобройна османска войска.13 
Неговите водачи - търновският митрополит Дионисий 
Рали, никополският първенец Тодор Балина и дубров- 
нишкият търговец Павел Джорджич положили много 
усилия, за да осигурят за българското начинание военната 
подкрепа на християнските войски. В същото време обаче, 
те дали да се разбере, че с действията си срещу селищата 
и тяхното население въпросните войски отблъсквали 
българите. По този повод Павел Джорджич в свое 
изложение от 5 януари 1595 г. си позволил да посъветва 
трансилванския княз следното: 
„... Нека В.В. да даде заповед и разпореждане на своите 
офицери и войници да поласкаят българите с всякакъв вид 
любезности и да не позволяват в никакъв случай те да 
бъдат ограбвани [...]. А за да си спечелите сърцата на 
българите и с по-малко трудност да ги докарате до 
преданост към Вас, ще бъде целесъобразно плячката, която 
те ще съберат, да остане за тях и по такъв начин те ще 
посрещнат опасности и по-големи дела. В това отношение 
не бива Вашите офицери да проявяват алчност, тъй като 
много често тя причинява големи пакости: ако християните 
останат възмутени, те биха могли да се оттеглят в 
планините и там да пазят проходите в полза на турците, 
които ще дойдат през лятото, за да могат те да навлязат 
                                                        
13 Повече за въстанието вж.: История на България, 189–196. 
Стефка Първева 
 - 26 - 
в България без други затруднения.”14  
Думите на Павел Джорджич показват колко пагубни 
можело да бъдат действията на християнските войски 
срещу домовете, селищата и поминъка на единоверните им 
поданици на султана. За прозорливостта на организаторите 
на въстанието, които предвидили възможните опасни 
последствия от нападенията на християнската войска, 
свидетелства поведението на немюсюлманите – жители на 
Силистра, които се съюзили с османските защитници на 
града по време на трикратните нападения на влашката 
войска, проблем на който ще се спем по-късно. 
Походите на Михай Витязул продължили и през 1599 г. 
Тогава военни отряди, командвани от влашкия войвода или от 
негови капитани, водили боеве с османски военни части при 
Силистра, Русе, Видин и други места. Но принуден от 
създалата се конюнктура и отношения с неговите съюзници, 
той сключил мир с османците на 6 октомври 1599 г.15 
 
СИЛИСТРА, НЕЙНИТЕ ГРАЖДАНИ И ВОЙНАТА 
 
Пъвоначално град Силистра бил център на санджак. След 
средата на ХVI в. Силистренският санджак започнал да се 
превръща в еялет. Преходът продължил вероятно до 
времето на Мехмед III (1595–1603), когато трансформацията 
завършила окончателно и за негови управители били 
назначавани лица с ранга на паша.16 През 1651 г. в града 
пребивавал за известно време османският пътешественик 
Евлия Челеби. Той оставил едно от най-подробните 
описания на крепостта, жилищните зони, джамиите и 
други обществени постройки, дунавските рибници, воде- 
ниците над Дунав, разкази за някои от известните 
                                                        
14 Гюзелев, В. Българската държавност в актове и документи. С., 
1981, 118–119.  
15 Велики, К., цит. съч., 71. 
16 Димитров, Стр., Н. Жечев, В. Тонев, цит. съч., 12–15. 
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силистренски граждани, техните делници и празници. 
Първият обект на неговия интерес била крепостта на 
Силистра. За нея той разказва, че е една здрава крепост на 
брега на реката, изградена от изсечени камъни във 
формата на лък. Откъм сушата крепостта била опасана от 
голям, широк и дълбок вал, през който тече водата на 
Дунав. Над вала имало дървен мост. Всяка вечер войници 
от гарнизона вдигали моста и затваряли вратата на кре- 
постта. Тогава тя се превръщала в един вид дунавски остров. 
Вътре в крепостта се намирали джебехането, хамбар за 
храни и 20 помещения за редници. Артилерията се 
състояла от 40 големи и малки оръдия. Повечето от тях 
били обърнати към Дунава. Само няколко топа били 
поставени откъм сушата и гледали към сарая на пашата 
край вала, защото той се намирал на дунавския бряг пред 
крепостта. Всяка нощ стражата бдяла по ред, тъй като 
отвъд била страната на „влашките неверници” и когато през 
зимата Дунавът замръзнел, опастността ставала голяма.17 
Производствено-търговската част на града – чаршията 
включвала множество дюкяни, част от които покрити с 
керемиди, един безистен, едно сарачхане и два хана. 
Отделно от тях е спомената и рибарската чаршия. Достойни 
за отбелязване, според османския пътешественик, били 
ахтарските дюкяни, кожухарските и златарските работилници. 
Лете и зиме, по думите на Челебията, ставали такива големи 
пазари, че там се събирало море от хора.18  
Десет от махалите в жилищната зона на града били 
християнски, една еврейска и останалите мюсюлмански. 
Част от къщите в мюсюлманските махали били покрити с 
керемиди, докато тези в християнските махали били покрити 
                                                        
17 Пътуване на Евлия Челеби из българските земи през средата на ХVІІ 
в. Превод Д. Г. Гаджанов. – Пер. Сп. на БКД в София (Пловдив), 1909, 
LXX, 661–662; Български средновековни градове и крепости. Т. 1. 
Градове и крепости по Дунав и Черно море. Варна, 1981, 177–195. 
18 Пътуване на Евлия Челеби, 665–668. 
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с тънки дъски. През 1621 г., по сведение на Евлия Челеби, 
около Вароша бил прокопан ров, запълнен с вода от Дунав. 
Там имало и поизоставена по негово време крепост, вътреш- 
ността на която била запълнена с камъни и пръст. Извън 
валовете се намирали обширни площи с ливади и зелени 
равнини.19 Данъчните регистрации на града добавят, че 
там били овощните и зеленчуковите градини, лозята и 
нивите на силистренските граждани.20   
 
МЮСЮЛМАНИТЕ – ЖИТЕЛИ НА СИЛИСТРА 
 
Серия от регистри (дефтери) от 70-те година на ХVІ и от края 
на ХVІІ век дават богати сведения за жителите на Силистра. 
През 1573/74 г.,21 две десетилетия преди войната мюсюлма- 
ните в Силистра обитавали 20 махали 22  и наброявали 
общо 1071 мъже глави на домакинства, неженени мъже и 
такива, на които не бил отбелязан семейния статус - всички 
те принадлежали към групата на раята или аскерите (военни, 
административни служители и улема).23 Освен тях в регис- 
търа били записани и 32 мъже цигани мюсюлмани.24 Силис- 
                                                        
19 Пак там, 663–664. 
20 Първева, Ст. Земята и хората през ХVІІ – първите десетилетия на ХVІІІ в. 
Овладяване и организация на аграрното и социалното пространство на 
Централните и Южните Балкани под османска власт. С., 2011, 416–439.  
21 Последният дефтер от типа тапу тахрир, който съдържа информация за 
населението на Силистра, е съставен през първата десетдневка на джемази 
юл еввел 1022 г. / 19-28.06.1613 г. Başbakanlık Osmanlı Arşivi [по-нататък: 
BOA], Istanbul, TТ 688. Той обаче е препис (suret) на дефтер, съставен 
през 981 / 3.05.1573 – 22.04.1574 г. BOA, TT 701. Затова тук ще цити- 
раме данните от оригиналния докумет от 1573/74 г. 
22 По принцип махалите в данъчните дефтери представляват укропнени 
структури, които обединяват по-големи и по-малки махали, разположени в 
близост една до друга. Имената на последните понякога се откриват в 
документи, записани в кадийските сиджили или подробни джизие регистри.   
23 BOA, TT 701, р. 230–239. В сурет дефтера от 1613 г. (TT 688) са записани 
19 мъже мюсюлмани по-малко, от тези в оригиналния дефтер. 
24 BOA, TT 701, р. 245. 
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тренските мюсюлмани със статут на рая имали задължението 
да обслужват крепостта, в замяна на което били освободени 
от извънредни данъци и държавни повинности (авариз-и 
дивание и текялиф-и йорфие).25  
През последното десетилетие на ХVІІ в. за силистренс- 
ките граждани са съставени два подробни авариз дефтера, 
първият от които носи дата 1107 г./12.04.1695 г. – 27.04.1696 г., 
а вторият – 1109 г. /20.07.1697 г. – 8.07.1698 г.26 На основание 
на записани уточняващи дати в маргиналните бележки на 
втория дефтер, приемаме, че те са били съставени през 1696 г. 
и 1697 г.27  
Според информацията на въпросните дефтери, в града 
били обособени 17 мюсюлмански махали. В тях и в 
крепостта живеели 719-947 мъже (нефери) от категорията 
на раята и на аскерите.28 Късните описи на града допълват 
някои щрихи към картината, отнасяща се до специалните 
ангажименти на силистренските мюсюлмани. Те били 
задължени да обслужват крепостта като извършват джера- 
хорлук, т. е. поправка, когато това било необходимо. В 
                                                                                                          
24 BOA, TT 701, р. 230. 
25 Пак там, 701, 230. 
26 BOA, K. Kepeci, Mevkufat Kalemi, N. 2770; N. 2785. 
27 И трите бележки, които съдържат дати, се намират върху маргиналните 
полета на дефтера от 1107 от Егира. Датите са споменати във връзка с 
цитираните доклади (arz), направени от кадията. С тях той потвърждавал 
необходимостта мюсюлманите и немюсюлманите в града да бъдат 
освободени от определени групи данъци, тъй като изпълняваните от тях 
задължения били необходими. Тези кадийски доклади носят дати: 24 и 
28 рамазан 1107 г. / 27.04. и 1.05.1696 г. и очевидно са подготвени по време 
на първата регистрация, която се състояла именно през 1696 г. Същата 
роля изиграли те и при следващата регистрация от 1109 г. от Егира. 
Обяснителните маргинални бележки за освобождаването на мюсюлмани и 
немюсюлмани от съответните групи данъци в тази по-късна регистрация са 
вписани в дефтера на първия ден от месец сафер 1109 г. / 19.08.1697 г. На 
основата на последната цитирана дата приемаме, че вторият дефтерът е 
съставен през 1697 г. BOA, K. Kepeci, Mevkufat Kalemi, N. 2785, р. 1, 6. 
28 BOA, K. Kepeci, Mevkufat Kalemi, N. 2770, р. 2–11; N. 2785, р. 1–5. 
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замяна били освободени от държавни аваризи и ангарии и 
местни данъци и такси (авариз-и дивание, текялиф-и 
йорфие и шакка). Същевременно обаче силистренските 
жители мюсюлмани били задължени да изпълняват и 
мензилска служба (мензил хизмет). В потвърждение на своите 
специфични ангажименти и съответно на освобождаването им 
от определени групи данъци те притежавали височайши 
заповеди със султанско послание (хатт-ъ хюмаюн). По повод 
на ангажиментите на силистренските мюсюлмани и на 
извършваната нова регистрация на населението кадията 
направил проверка и докладвал на столичните власти в 
специално донесение (арз) от 24 рамазан 1107 / 27.04.1696 г., 
че службата им била необходима. При тези обстоятелства 
техните задължения, които съществували от „стари времена”, 
били потвърдени и записани в регистрацията от 1696 г. 
Същите кадийски проверка и донесение, направени през 1696 
г., били използвани и по време на регистрацията от 1697 г.29 
 
НЕМЮСЮЛМАНИТЕ – ЖИТЕЛИ НА СИЛИСТРА 
 
През 1573/74 г. домовете на българите били разположени в 
осем християнски и една мюсюлманска махали. Те набро- 
явали общо 646 глави на домакинства и неженени мъже.30 
Седем души от тях формирали общност (джемаат) на 
дърводелци, железари и ковачи към крепостта на Силистра. 
На основание на свещени заповеди (хюкм-и шерифлери) в 
отплата за службата им споменатите занаятчии били 
освободени от десятък (юшюр), поземлен данък (испенче), 
държавни аваризи и ангарии (авариз-и дивание и текялиф-и 
йорфие), но плащали поголовен данък (джизие).31  
Освен българите в града била регистрирана общност 
(джемаат) на евреи, които наброявали общо 20 глави на 
домакинства и неженени мъже. В Силистра живеели и 
                                                        
29 Пак там, N. 2770, 2; N. 2785, р. 6. 
30 Пак там, TT 701, р. 239–245. 
31 BOA, TT 701, р. 245. 
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дубровничани, чиято колония (джемаат) включвала 12 мъже. 
И най-сетне в града били регистрирани 8 мъже глави на 
домакинства и неженени цигани (къптиян) – християни.32  
В края на ХVІІ в. българите, жители на Силистра 
намалили чувствително своя брой. Според двете авариз 
регистрации от 1696 и 1697 г. във Вароша имало пет махали, в 
които живеели 181–214 мъже (нефери) вероятно глави на 
домакинства. Част от тях били ангажирани в корпуса на 
войнуците – през 1696 г. те били 30 души, а през 1697 г. броят 
им достигнал 37 души. 33  Според един по-ранен джизие 
регистър от от 1102 г. от Егира / 5.10.1690 г. – 23.09.1691 г. 
немюсюлмани живеели не само в петте махали на Вароша, но 
и в много от мюсюлманските махали.34 
Сред градските жители – немюсюлмани са регистри- 
рани и евреи, чиято колония през 1696 г. се състояла от 9 
мъже, вероятно също глави на домакинства.35 В края на века 
основен източник за демографски растеж на евреите в града 
била миграцията на хора от Белград и Видин заради 
превземането на двата града от австрийска войска по 
време на войната със Свещената лига (1683–1699). Евреи, 
дошли от Видинска каза, са вписани още в джизие регистъра 
от 1690/91 г. Според тази регистрация в града са установени 
14 местни и други 13 мъже, които се преселили в града 
навярно със своите семейства.36 Няколко години по-късно, 
на страниците на авариз дефтера от 1697 г. регистра- 
торът е записал за заварените в Силистра 18 мъже евреи 
следното: „Даде се разяснение, че [членовете на] споме- 
натата еврейска общност (яхуди тайфеси) повечето са 
ябанджии. След нашествието над Белград и Видин са 
дошли в споменатата касаба. Тъй като [скоро] са се 
                                                        
32 Пак там. 
33 BOA, K. Kepeci, Mevkufat Kalemi, N. 2770, р. 12–14; N. 2785, р. 5–6. 
34 BOA, MAD (Malliyeden Müdevver) 4023, р. 131–133. 
35 BOA, K. Kepeci, Mevkufat Kalemi, N. 2770, р. 12. 
36 BOA, MAD (Mal. Müd.) 4023, р. 121. 
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установили, нямат свои собствени имоти, всички са 
бедни и наематели.”37 
От авариз регистрациите на населението от периода 
1696–1697 г. разбираме, че в града съществувала и трайно 
установена арменска колония. Тогава тя се състояла от 
общо 24–31 мъже. Става ясно също, че арменците в 
Силистра били разделени на две групи – едните живеели 
във Вароша – в махалата “Поп Васил”, а другите в две 
мюсюлмански махали.38 Освен това в джизие регистър 
от 1690/91 г. са регистрирани и други 18 души арменци 
търговци (аджемлер базаргян), които се настанили по 
хановете и които пребивавали в града по причина на 
търговските си ангажименти.39  
*** 
През ХVII в. и най-вероятно още от самото му начало 
настъпила съществена промяна в данъчното облагане на 
жителите на Вароша на Силистра. Първоначално тази 
промяна била свързана с тяхното поведение по време на 
нападенията на влашките войски над града. За да се опитаме 
да създадем известна представа за обстановката, в която 
живеели силистренци в тези времена, ще приведем няколко 
кратки описания на събитията, свързани конкретно с град 
Силистра. Тези описания са излезли изпод перото на пред- 
ставители от враждуващите лагери или представляват откъси 
от по-късни османски хроники и документи, които удиви- 
телно съвпадат по отношение на разказа за действията на 
воюващите сили и последствията от военния конфликт. 
На страниците на своето „Кратко и истинно описание 
на делата, извършени от Йоан Михай, владетел на Влахия”, 
                                                        
37 BOA, K. Kepeci, Mevkufat Kalemi, N 2785, 6; Gradeva, R. Jews and 
Ottoman Authority in the Balkans: the Case of Sofia, Vidin and Rusçuk, 
15th-17th Centuries. – In: Gradeva, R. Rumeli under the Ottomans, 15th–18th 
Centuries: Institutions and Communities. Istanbul, 2004, р. 245–246. 
38 BOA, K. Kepeci, Mevkufat Kalemi, N. 2770, р. 12–13; N. 2785, р. 1, 5, 6. 
39 BOA, MAD (Mal. Müd.) 4023, р. 121. 
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полският пратеник в княжеския двор Балтазар Валтер 
отбелязал, че: „След като си възстановиха малко силите, 
отслабнали от студа и трудностите, на 8 януари, 40 
минавайки отново реката, [войската на Михай Витязул] 
нападна град Дръстър [...], наричан и Силистра, където е 
седалището на санджака [...] голям град, прочут с търго- 
вията си и много красив. След като спечелиха важната 
битка, с ярост го подпалиха и съсипаха с топовете, изби- 
вайки по-голяма част от жителите му.”41  
В Хрониката на Бузещите (влиятелен болярски род) е 
добавено следното: „И след тази битка42 Михай вода 
изпрати един от своите боляри, и по-точно Михалча бана, 
при други боляри, а именно Преда спатар и Раду комис, 
които с войските си бяха срещу Силистра. И тези боляри 
подпалиха града и го изгориха.”43  
За едно от нападенията над Силистра османският 
хронист Мустафа Наима написал: „Проклетият Михал [...] 
ходел навсякъде, подбуждал непокорство и бунт и грабел, 
и убивал, където можел. С 4000 [войници] от своята 
парцалива войска той проникнал в Силистра, но управи- 
телят Мустафа бей му се противопоставил толкова твърдо 
и ефективно, че само около 100 от неговите 4000 скитници 
се изплъзнали от острието на меча.”44 
А ето каква е информацията, оставена от османската 
данъчна администрация за действията на християнската 
войска. Много красноречив в това отношение е тексът, 
предхождащ регистрацията на жителите на Вароша на гр. 
                                                        
40 1595 г. 
41  Бешевлиев, Б., П. Бойчева. Историкогеографски сведения в три 
документа, посветени на Михай Храбри (края на ХVI – началото на 
ХVII в.). – В: Общото и специфичното в балканските култури до края 
на ХIХ в. Сборник в чест на проф. В. Тъпкова-Заимова. С., 1997, 260. 
42 25.02.1595 г., когато войводата Михай Витязул напада и опожарява Русе. 
43 Бешевлиев, Б., П. Бойчева, цит. съч., 262. 
44 Annals of the Turkish Empire, 50; De Hammer, J. Op. cit., 157. 
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Силистра в авариз дефтера от 1696 г. Той разказва, че:  
„Преди, през 1003 година (16.09.1594 – 5.09.1595), 
поради бунтовни действия влашкият войвода Михал, заедно 
с неверниците (kefereler) трансилванци, власи, немци и 
маджари дойде в касаба Силистра. Когато три пъти 
палиха, опустошаваха и грабиха споменатата касаба, 
неверническата рая (kefere reaya), която живее в града, 
воюва и се сражава заедно с мюсюлманското население 
(ehl-i islam). По-голямата част от хората бяха поробени и 
избити. Освобождаването на силистренската крепост и 
Вароша станаха причина за проявената милост към 
тяхното положение. [Неверниците] бяха освободени и 
опростени от авариз-и дивание и останалите текялиф-и 
йорфие, и шакка. [Така е било] от старо време до този 
момент. При все това, според височайш ферман, [тъй 
като се намира на брега] на Дунав раята от самата 
Силистра със собствени средства издържаше и екипираше 
2 шайки с кюрекчиите, [които] да са налице всяка година 
за служба в султанския поход (sefer-i humayun). В замяна на 
сборните им задължения, с изключение на джизието бяха 
освободени и опростени от авариз-и дивание и другите 
текялиф-и йорфие и шакка, заради което притежаваха 
многобройни свещени заповеди (evamir-i şerifeleri). Изясни 
се, че старото им освобождаване беше отново регис- 
трирано.”45 
Почти същият текст е записан и по време на регистра- 
цията на града, направена година по-късно, през 1697 г.46 В 
него се допълва, че християните освен от авариз-и дивание и 
други текялиф-и йорфие и шакка не издължават също нюзюл 
(?),
47
 джелепкешан,48 джамус (биволи), мубая49 и други (sair) 
                                                        
45 BOA, K. Kepeci, Mevkufat Kalemi, N. 2770, р. 12. 
46 Първи ден на месец сафер 1109 г. 
47 Nüzül – натурални вземания. 
48 Джелепкешан-и агнам – данък върху овцете, който от началото на 
ХVІІ в. станал паричен данък. 
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данъци (текялифи). Като аргумент за запазване на старото 
положение се изтъква и донесението (aрз) на кадията от 
1.05.1696 г., в което се твърдяло, че службата им е необходима 
и че за нея са им дадени свещени заповеди.50 
Текстовете от двата османски данъчни регистръра 
потвърждават съобщените факти и допълват с нови 
детайли информацията от цитираните хроники. От тях 
разбираме за времето и причината за нападенията над 
Силистра, за коалиционните партньори на разбунтувалия 
се войвода и състава на неговите войски, за злощастната 
участ на града – трикратно пален, разрушаван и опустошаван 
и за съдбата на неговото население – избивано или заробвано. 
Текстът информира и за поведението на немюсюлманите – 
българите заедно навярно с хората от еврейската общност по 
време на защитата на Силистра. Със сигурност действията на 
християнската войска били основната причина те да се съюзят 
с мюсюлманите и с общи усилия да защитят живота, домовете 
и поминъка си. Това не останало незабелязано от османската 
власт. В отговор на помощта, оказана на защитниците на града, 
немюсюлманите били освободени от извънредни данъци и 
държавни повинности. За да разберем степента на данъчното 
облекчение, което получили силистренските немюсюлмани, 
трябва да отбележим, че най-вероятно именно по време на 
войната от 1593–1606 г. данъците от групата на държавните 
аваризи (авариз-и дивание) станали регулярни парични 
данъчни сборове.51 С въвеждането през ХVІІ в. на задъл- 
жението местното население да покрива вилаетските 
разходи (текялиф-и шакка),52 силистренските немюсюлмани 
били освободени и от това данъчно перо.  
                                                                                                          
49 Закупуване на продукти от страна на държавата на специално 
определени цени. 
50 BOA, K. Kepeci, Mevkufat Kalemi, N. 2785, р. 6. 
51 Inalcık, H. Military and Fiscal Transformation in the Ottoman Empire, 
1600–1700. – Arhivum Ottomanicum, 1980, № 6, 314–315. 
52 За тях вж. Inalcık, H., Op. cit., 317–322. 
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Тази информация, както споменахме, е записана в 
началото на два поименни авариз дефтера на мъжете, жители 
на Силистра. Но те били съставени сто години след описаните 
в тях събития – през 1696 г. и 1697 г., навярно заради 
възшествието на новия султан Мустафа ІІ, Гази (1695–1703) 
на престола. Това означава, че един век по-късно османската 
администрация чрез своите бюрократични практики все още 
съхранявала и предавала информацията за военновременните 
събития, от които силистренските граждани били пряко 
засегнати. Изпълнявайки своите функции, административните 
служби направили възможно чрез съставяните от тях 
документи, което ще рече чрез писменото слово, да бъде 
съхранена паметта за травматичните събития сред една 
общност, по-голямата част от членовете на която били неуки и 
неграмотни хора. Споменаваме по-голямата част, тъй като 
изворите са запазили сведения за съществуването в Силистра 
в края на ХVІІ и началото на ХVІІІ в. на учители и съответно 
за функционирането на едно или повече училища вероятно 
към митрополията или самостоятелно от нея. Те давали на 
своите ученици първоначална грамотност и познания за 
основните богослужебни книги на “гръцки диалект”.53 
Нека сега се опитаме да възстановим реда на 
предприетите действия, които довели до въпросните 
данъчни отстъпки след войната, както и до съхраняването 
и пренасянето във времето на информацията за тях чрез 
османската документация. Тази реконструкция е възможна 
благодарение на натрупаното знание за функционирането 
                                                        
53 Един от техните възпитаници бил роденият в Силистра Партений 
Павлович (ок. 1695-1760 г.). За обучението си там той е записал в 
своята Автобиография, че: „На граматика се научих още в моето 
отечество Доростол на Дунава или Дристра, или Силистра от 
дидаскала Палеолог Константинополитанеца, а първото си учение до 
октоиха и псалтира, и апостола започнах на гръцки диалект в 
споменатия град при поклонника при светия Христов гроб на име 
Тетради.” Димитров, Стр., Н. Жечев, В. Тонев, цит. съч., 107–108; 
Ангелов, Б. Съвременници на Паисий. С., 1964, 11. 
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на османските институции – бюрократични, съдебни и 
военни – на централно и провинциално ниво.  
И така, войната приключила през 1606 г., когато бил 
подписан договорът от Ситварок.54 Както показва устано- 
вената практика, след края на войната султанът изпращал 
до провинциите ферман, с който уведомявал своите поданици 
за нейния успешен край, като нареждал да се провеждат 
тържества в чест на победата.55 Възможно е именно тогава 
силистренските граждани да са повдигнали въпроса за 
освобождаването им от споменатите данъци и ангарии, заради 
положението, в което били изпаднали след разрухата на града. 
Институцията, с която те най-бързо и лесно можели да влязат 
в контакт, и пред която да обявят проблема и претенциите си, 
се явявал кадийският съд. Кадията не бил упълномощен да 
променя статуквото, но в неговите пълномощия влизали 
представителство на султана и контрола по провинциите.56 
                                                        
54 История на България, 127. 
55 За изпращаните по провинциите фермани по повод на военните 
победи на османската армия, успешния край на войните и празниците, 
устройвани в селищата по тяхна поръка вж. Турски документи за 
историjата на македонскиот народ. Cериjя прва, том 3, Скопjе, 1969, 
145–146, док. 196; Димитров, Стр. (Съставил, превел и редактирал), 
Османски извори за историята на Добруджа и Североизточна България. 
София, Издателство на Българската академия на науките, 1981, 67 (док. 
92), 257 (док. 488); Иванова, Св. Предаване на вести в Османската 
империя и управлението на поданиците. – В: Иванова, Св. (Съст.). 
Етнически и културни пространства на Балканите. Ч. 1. Миналото - 
исторически ракурси. Сборник в чест на проф. Цветана Георгиева. С., 
2008, 444–450; Odorico, P. Conseils et mémoires de Synadinos, prêtre de 
Serrès en Macédoine (XVII siècle). Avec la collaboration de S. Asdrachas, T. 
Karanastassis, K. Kostis, S. Petmézas. Paris, 1996, 117, 119. 
56 Градева, Р. Налагането на кадийската институция на Балканите и мястото ѝ 
в провинциалната администрация (ХIV – нач. на ХVI в.). – Балканистика, 
1989, № 3, 33–53; Gradeva, R. The Activities of a Kadi Court in Eighteenth- 
Century Rumeli: the case of Hacioğlu Pazarcik. – In: Gradeva, R. Rumeli under the 
Ottomans, 53–66; Jennings, R. C. Kadı, Court and Legal Procedure in 17th C. 
Ottoman Kayseri. – In: Studia Islamica, 50, 1978, 151–184; Faroqhi, S. Land 
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Ето защо данъкоплатците очаквали и изисквали от него да 
информира столичните власти за техните проблеми и 
прошения.57  
Освен за контактите на просителите на местно ниво с 
кадията, изворите свидетелстват и за предприеманите от тях 
действия на централно ниво – имперската столица. 58 
Възможно е, силистренските немюсюлмани да са отправили 
своята молба за данъчни облекчения директно до султана и до 
подчинените му от Дивана. И както изисквало правилото, 
силистренският кадия е трябвало да изпрати свое становище 
(arz) по случая,59 потвърждавайки истинността на инфор- 
мацията за поведението на християните по време на 
трикратното нападение на града от войските на Михал 
Витязул. Възможно е също, молбата на силистренските 
данъкоплатци да е била подкрепена от градските първенци и 
най-вероятно от страна на санджакбея на Силистра и 
останалите военни командири на крепостта и гарнизона.60 
                                                                                                          
Transfer, Land Disputes and Askeri Holdings in Ankara (1592–1600). – In: 
Mémorial Ömer L. Barkan. Paris, 1980, 88 и цит. там лит.; Singer, E. Palestinian 
Peasants and Ottoman Officials. Rural Administration Around Sixteenth-Century 
Jerusalem. Cambridge University Press, 1994, 24–131; Ergene, B. Local Court, 
Provincial Society and Justice in the Ottoman Empire. Legal Practice and Dispute 
Resolution in Çankırı and Kastamonu (1652–1744). Leiden–Boston, 2003, 33–56; 
Demirci, S. Complaints About Avarız Assessment and Payment in the Avarız-Tax 
System: an Aspect of the Relationship Between Centre and Periphery. A Case 
Study of Kayseri, 1618–1700. – Journal of the Economic and Social History of the 
Orient, 2003, №4, 437–474.  
57 Darling, L. Revenue – Raising and Legitimacy. Tax Collection and Finance 
Administration in the Ottoman Empire 1550-1650. Leiden–N.Y.–Köln, 1996, 
254, 258, 260; Ergene, B., Op. cit., 45–56; Димитров, Стр. Ямбол в 
епохата на феодализма. – В: История на град Ямбол. С., 1976, 102. 
58 Darling, L., Op. cit., 253-254, 258; Първева, Ст., цит. съч., 2011, 
200–202, и цит. там лит. 
59 Ergene, B., Op. cit., 45. 
60 Исканията за промяна в размера на данъчно облагане можели да бъдат 
инициирани и от местния военно-административен управител - санджакбея, 
от самите събирачи на данъци и др. в случаите, в които те били затруднени 
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Можем да предположим, че още тогава висшите военни на 
града и провинцията са предложили и новите ангажименти на 
въпросните немюсюлмани по екипирането и издръжката на 
два военни кораба и техните гребци. 
Наред с това изворите свидетелстват за случаи, в които 
данъкоплатците изпращали и свои представители в столицата. 
Те лично предавали молбите и оплакванията на султана и 
членовете на Дивана. В този случай пътуването на 
представителите на раята до Истанбул изисквало сериозна 
организация и финансова подкрепа от страна на цялата 
заинтересована от решаването на проблема общност. 61 
Можем само да гадаем кой модел на поведение са следвали 
силистренци, за да запознаят властта със своите проблеми. За 
нас е важно да отбележим, че очертаните пътища за 
реализиране на техните цели са исторически възможни и 
многократно засвидетелствани в изворите от епохата.62 
Веднъж предадени лично от данъкоплатците или чрез 
нарочен куриер, изпратен от провинциалните власти, 
документите били насочвани за разглеждане към 
отговорните служби. Както се посочва в изследванията по 
въпроса, поне от средата на ХVI в. насетне с оплакванията 
и молбите, свързани с данъчното облагане, се занимавал 
башдефтердарят и неговите подчинени служители. Стъпките, 
които били предприемани, имали следната последова- 
телност. Първо била правена проверка в регистрите на 
                                                                                                          
да съберат данъците или конкретната ситуация изисквала бързи мерки от 
страна на централната власт. Darling, L., Op. cit., 97–98, 260–262. 
61 Faroqhi, S. Political Initiatives “From the Bottom Up” in the 16th- and 
17th-Century Ottoman Empire: Some Evidence for Their Existence. – In: 
Osmastische Studien zur Wirschafts und Sozialgeschichte in Memoriam 
Vanco Boskov. Wiesbaden, 1986, 24–33.  
62 Калицин, М., Кр. Мутафова. Подбрани османски документи за Търново 
и Търновска каза. В. Търново, 2003, 275–276, 278–283; Димитров, Стр., 
1976, цит. съч., 100–111. Faroqhi, S., 1986, Op. cit., 24–33; Demirci, S., Op. cit., 
437–474; Darling, L., Op. cit., 246–280; Singer, E., Op. cit., 24–131. 
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Мевкуфата,63 като били консултирани направените в тях 
допълнителни вписвания, ако съществували такива. Следва- 
щият етап от процедурата включвал вземане на решение 
по случая и записването му върху маргиналните полета на 
молбата. Съставян бил и документ – тезкере, на основата 
на който е трябвало да бъде издадена заповед. Тя представяла 
казуса, предприетите стъпки от страна на молителите и на 
властите, и най-сетне взетите по този повод решения. 
Заповедта била адресирана до провинциалните служебни 
лица, които били отговорни за прилагане и контролиране на 
всичко онова, което било предписано в нея. Тези лица 
най-често били кадиите, но също и санджакбеят, бейлербеят, 
командирите на военните подразделения, местните първенци 
(аяни) и др. Наред с това чиновниците във финансовото 
ведомство трябвало да актуализират дефтера, така че той да 
отразява последните промени, в случай че взетото от 
властите решение не представлявало отказ на молбата на 
данъкоплатците, а удовлетворявало изцяло или частично 
техните искания.64 
След време в Силистра трябва да е пристигнала 
султанската заповед – ферман в отговор на кореспон- 
денцията от провинцията. Ферманът бивал прочитан на 
глас в кадийския съд в присъствието на всички заинте- 
ресовани лица, а в случая и в присъствието на предста- 
вителите на силистренските немюсюлмани. След това се 
налагало високият стил на документа, както и сложната 
бюрократична терминология да бъдат разяснявани на данъко- 
платците.65 Обсъждани били навярно и обстоятелствата 
                                                        
63 Отдел във финансовото ведомство (дефтерхането), отговорен за събиране 
на държавните приходи и за регистрациите на населението, свързани с тях. 
64 Подробно по въпроса за процедурите виж.: Darling, L., Op. cit., 246–276; 
Велков, А. Допълнителни вписвания върху османските финансови 
документи от ХVІ–ХVІІІ в. (Дипломатико-палеографско проучване). – В: 
Народна библиотека “Кирил и Методий”, (20), 1976, №14, 83–140.  
65 Иванова, Св., цит. съч., 457–491. 
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около тяхното освобождаване от споменатите данъци, а 
също така и новите им задължения. 
Тук възниква въпросът за езика на комуникация между 
представителите на немюсюлманската общност и тези на 
местните власти по време на заседанието. Някои изследвания 
показват, че в големите административни центрове на 
империята в контактите между властта и местното население 
се случвало да бъдат използвани преводачи (tercüman). Те 
били в услуга на дейността на Дивана на санджакбея или 
на кадийския съд.66 Освен това като преводачи в местните 
институции можело да бъдат използвани и мюсюлмани 
конвертити или членовете на семейства от смесени 
бракове, които не били единици в османското общество.67 
И най-сетне, на много от европейските пътешественици 
правел впечатление билингвизма на балканските християни 
или поне на техните представители пред институциите. 
Владе- енето на османски/турски език трябва да е било на 
едно простонародно ниво – познание, натрупано в хода на 
ежедневните професионални и съседски контакти между 
членовете на двете етноконфесионални общности.68 
                                                        
66 Пак там, 488; Gradeva, R. On the Judicial Functions of Kadı Courts: 
Glimpses from Sofia in the 17th Century. – In: Gradeva, R. War and Peace in 
Rumeli – 15th to Beginning of 19th Century. Istanbul, 2008, 145; Veinstein, G. 
L’administration ottomane et le problème des interprètes. – In: Etudes sur les 
villes du Proche-Orient, XVIe-XIXe siècles. Hommage à André Raymond, 
coord. Par B. Marino, Damas, 2001, 65–79; Çiçek, K. Interpreters of the 
Court in the Ottoman Empire as Seen from the Sharia Court Records of 
Cyprus. – Islamic Law and Society, 2002, № 9/1, 1–15. 
67 Георгиева, Цв. Трансформациите на един сблъсък на цивилизации – 
християнството и исляма на Балканите. – В: Балкански идентичности. 
Ч. ІІІ. С., 2003, 69. 
68 Пътешественикът Карстен Нибур написал през 1767 г., че: „От 
Кючюк Дервент до Дунава се минава през много села, населени само с 
християни. В селата никой не разбира турски освен ония, които имат 
работа в града или които трябва да се грижат за даване на подслон и 
храна на пътуващите турци. Останалите селяни говорят само 
български.” Цит. по Румелийски делници и празници от ХVІІІ в. С., 
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След направените пояснения и разисквания пред заинте- 
ресованите данъкоплатци в съда, документът обикновено 
бил записван в кадийския регистър.69 По този начин се 
създавал един официален провинциален архив, който 
осигурявал постоянен достъп до информация, когато се 
налагали справки или били търсени сигурни аргументи за 
решаване на съдебни спорове. Към този архив можем да 
прибавим и копията на данъчните регистрации, чиито 
оригинали се съхранявали в централните данъчни служби. 
Някои от тях също били записвани на страниците на 
кадийските сиджили.70 В продължение на десетилетия, дори 
на столетия в тези данъчни регистри била акумулирана 
синтезирана информация за причините и обстоятелствата, 
при които данъкоплатците били натоварени с определени 
ангажименти и съответно освободени от някои данъчни 
задължения.71 Такъв бил случаят и с двата авариз дефтера 
от 1696-1697 г., които сто години след събитията все още 
съхранявали и препредавали информацията за участието на 
силистренските немюсюлмани във войната.72 
                                                                                                          
1978, 44; Георгиева, Цв., цит. съч., 69–71; Китромилидис, П. „Балкански 
манталитет” история, мит, представа. – В: пак той, От кръста към флага. 
Аспекти на християнството и национализма на Балканите. С., 1999, 
94-95; Китромилидис, П., цит. съч., 95; Иванова, Св., цит. съч., 488–489; 
Шушарова, М. Софроний Врачански (поп Стойко) като представител на 
раята в Османската държава. – В: Софроний Врачански книжовник и 
политик от Новото време. Сб. с материали от Международна научна 
конференция София, 24 ноември 2011 г. С., 2013, 104;   
69 Gradeva, R., 1978, Op. cit., 53–66; Ergene, B., Op. cit., 33–39. 
70 Вж. напр.: Национална библиотека „Св. Св. Кирил и Методий”, 
Ориенталски отдел, Софийски сиджили S85, р. 142, 150–152, 162–163, 
182–183; S309, р. 47, 62–65; S312(1), р. 20а, 23а-25а, 26б-28а; Русенски 
сиджили, R1, р. 15б, 24а-б; R7, р. 47б-48а, 63а-б и др. 
71 Vatin, N. Remarques sur l’oral et écrit dans l’administration ottomane au 
XVIe siècle. – In: Oral et écrit dans le monde turco-ottoman. Etudes sous la 
responsabilité de N. Vatin. – Revue du mond musulman et de Méditerranée, 
1995, № 75–76, 144; Иванова, Св., цит. съч., 428–494. 
72 Историята за войната не е записана в други подробни или кратки 
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Но паралелно с този официален архив се създавал и друг 
неформален архив. Както беше посочено в цитирания 
османски текст от двата авариз дефтера, данъкоплатците 
получили заповеди, регламентиращи техните професионални 
задължения към флота, както и данъчните отстъпки на властта. 
Тези заповеди са съхранявани навярно в църквата или в 
домовете на първенците на общността, хората, които 
представлявали своите съграждани пред органите на властта. 
Този своеобразен архив бил попълван с нов ферман, който 
потвърждавал или променял установеното статукво и който 
бил издаван при възшествието на всеки нов султан.73 Тази 
неформална архивна сбирка била източник за аргументи и 
доказателства срещу злоупотреби при данъчно облагане, при 
съдебни спорове в кадийския съд, при молби и оплаквания, 
изпращани до столичните власти и до султана. 
Посоченото дотук показва част от пътищата и меха- 
низмите за запазване на паметта за важни за битието на 
християнската общност събития. В процеса на съхра- 
няване и прерпедаване на информацията участвали инсти- 
туции и функционери от всички нива на османската 
йерархия, прилагани били бюрократични практики, свързани 
с регистрацията на населението и неговото данъчно облагане, 
със създаването на формални и неформални архивни сбирки. 
Съхраняването и предаването на спомена се осъщесвявало 
както чрез писмена комуникация между институциите чрез 
потока от документи в посока към центъра и към провинцията, 
                                                                                                          
авариз дефтери, които са ми известни и които са съставяни преди или 
след датите на изследваните авариз дефтери. Вж. BOA, Istanbul, TD 771, 
р. 320; K. Kepeci, Kevkufat kalemi 2849, р. 47; K. Kepeci, 12912, р. 18. 
73 За султанските документи муаф-наме, с които данъкоплатците били 
освобождавани от определени групи данъци и специално за муаф-намето 
на никополските граждани–мюсюлмани вж. Inalcık, Op. cit., 321; 
Първева, Ст. Българи на служба в османската армия: военни и 
военнопомощни задължения на градското население в Никопол и 
Силистра през ХVІІ век. – В: Контрасти и конфликти „зад кадър” в 
българското общество през ХV-ХVІІІ в. С., 2003, 230–231. 
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така и чрез устна комуникация в рамките на обсъжданията 
между представителите на властта и данъкоплатците в 
кадийския съд, а също така и между членовете на общността 
и техните първенци, присъствали на съдебното заседание.  
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ITALIANS IN THE VIENNESE COURT 
 
The present study is part of a future monograph on the Italian 
soldiers, generals in the Court of Vienna, since the Italian 
commandants played an important role in the Ottoman- 
Habsburg conflict in the late 16
th
 and during the whole 17
th
 
century as military generals (‟condottieri‟) and strategists. I 
shall mainly concentrate on the age of Leopold I. King of 
Hungary, Bohemia, Croatia, Archduke of Austria, and finally 
King of Germany and Holy Roman Emperor from 1658 up to 
his death in 1705.
1
  
In the capital of the Habsburg Empire, Vienna, Italian was 
almost an official language. Emperor Leopold I spoke perfect 
Italian, and he was said to be happy when he could use Italian 
language, since this reminded him to be the head of the Holy 
Roman Empire.
2
 In the Habsburg ideology the multiethnic empire 
was a reputed successor of the Holy Roman Empire and the notion 
                                                        
1
 Bérenger, J. Léopold I (1640-1705) fondateur de la puissance autrichienne. 
Paris, 2004; idem, La Cour impériale de Léopold Ier: partis, clans et clienteles. 
Marburg, 2001; Hamann, B. (Hrsg.). Die Habsburger. Ein biographisches Lexikon, 
Wien, 1988; Lorenzi, E. Kaiser Leopold I. Wien, 1986; Evans, R. J. W. Das 
Werden der Habsburgermonarchie 1550–1700. Gesellschaft, Kultur, Institutionen. 
Wien-Köln, 1989; Winkelbauer, Th. Ständefreiheit und Fürstenmacht. Länder 
und Untertanen des Hauses Habsburg im konfessionellen Zeitalter Teil 1. – 
In: Herwig, W. (Hrsg.). Österreichische Geschichte 1522–1699. Wien, 2003. 
2 De Bin, U. Leopoldo I. Imperatore e la sua Corte nella letteratura italiana. 
– Bollettino del Circolo Accademico Italiano a Vienna, Trieste, 1910. 
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of “imperial nobility”, among the Austrian and German aristocrats 
could be extended also to the Italians. We find several Italians 
among Leopold‟s counselors: as the historiographer of Habsburg 
Empire, Galeozzo Gualdo Priorato
3
 or Giovanni Battista 
Comazzi
4
 who continued his work. Furthermore many Italian 
priest, monks and clerks worked in the Habsburg Empire, 
there were numerous Italian musicians in Vienna, some of 
them were noted also as historians, like Angelini-Bontempi.
5
 
The Italian generals also formed a determining component 
of the Viennese court of Leopold I. Already in the 16
th
 century 
Italian military leaders had arrived to the Hungarian front-line, 
and with them also military engineers came from Italy, since in 
this field they were the most innovative experts, able to find 
always the cheapest, easiest and most efficient solution to any 
technical problem. In the Hungarian inventories in the 16
th
 
century we find the names of roughly 60 Italian constructors 
of castles who spent shorter or longer periods in the territory 
of the Hungarian Kingdom (for example Pietro Ferabosco, 
Giulio and Ottavio Baldigara, Felice da Pisa, Giovanni Maria 
da Speziacasa, Carlo Teti and so on).
6
 Furthermore we have to 
                                                        
3 Historia di Leopoldo cesare continente le cose più memorabili successe in 
Europa dal 1656 fino al 1670 descritta dal co.[nte] Galeazzo Gualdo Priorato; 
postovi li rittrati de Principi, de generali e de ministri principali, gli assedii 
di piazze e battaglie. appresso Gio. Battista Hacque, 1674; Bene S. „Ő 
császári felségének kedve telik benne…” Egy birodalmi história és 
társszerzői. – Filológiai Közlöny, 1993, 49–50. 
4 Istoria Di Leopoldo Primo Imperadore De Romani CXXII. Descritta dal 
cavaliere Gio. Battista Comazzi. Vienna-Milano, 1691. 
5 Historia della ribellione d'Ungheria di Gio. Andrea Angelini Bontempi 
perugino. Dresda, 1772. 
6  Maggiorotti, L. A. Gli architetti militari. L'opera del genio italiano 
all'estero. Published by Libreria dello Stato, 1932-1939, Roma, Vol. I–III. 
Vol. II. Gli Italiani nell'Architettura Militare dell'Epoca Moderna e Contem- 
poranea; Jászay M. Párhuzamok és kereszteződések. A magyar-olasz kapcsolatok 
történetéből. Bp., 2000, 267–269; Domokos Gy. Ottavio Baldigara. Egy 
itáliai várfundáló mester Magyarországon. Bp., 2000. 
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mention that Italians were the best experts also in the field of 
the artillery.  
Even if there was a considerable number of Italians in the 
court of Vienna, in this early period they did not form a 
considerable element of any group of the courtly life, they 
rather joined individually to one or another minister. The 
Italian presence became important only before the Thirty 
Years‟ War (1618–1648) thanks to the activity of well-known 
generals such as Giorgio Basta, Aldobrandini, Bentivoglio, 
Strozzi, Gonzaga, Spinola and others.
7
 Furthermore there 
were many Italian agents sent to the East, also in the Ottoman 
Empire, since in that time competent diplomatic corps in the 
Habsburg Empire did not exist. In the Viennese court the 
number and influence of the Italians increased clearly during 
the above mentioned Thirty Years War.
8
 
Around some of the most important Italian personalities and 
families – such Galasso, Piccolomini and others – real centers of 
clients were formed composed of friends and members of the 
wider family. These commandants supported the arrival of many 
other Italian to the court of Vienna. The almost continuous war 
(since 1618) meant a good opportunity for the Italian military 
experts, supported by the increasing number of fellow countrymen 
and by the familiar network between them. For example, before 
the activity of the most famous strategist, Raimondo Montecuccoli 
(1609, Modena – 1680, Linz), at least 18 members of his family 
held a position in the imperial court, accomplishing mostly 
                                                        
7 Brnardic, Vl. Imperial Armies of the Thirty Years‟ War. Vol. 2. Cavalry. Osprey 
Publ., 2010, 16; Hanlon, G. The twilight of a military tradition: Italian aristocrats 
and European conflicts, 1560–1800. New York, 1998, 2014. 
8 Thiriet, J. M. Les italiens au service de Léopold Ier. – In: Stolwitzer, 
Gertrude (Ed.). Le baroque autrichien au XVIIIe siècle. I. Rouen, 1989; 
Martelli, F. Generali italiani a Vienna tra scienza nuova, empirismo e ideali 
assolutistici. - In: La politica, la scienza, le armi. Luigi Ferdinando Marsili e 
la costruzione della frontiera dell‟Impero e dell‟Europa. A cura di Raffaella 
Gherardi. Bologna, CLUEB, 2010, 45–100. 
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shorter or longer military services.
9
 His father, Galeotto Monte- 
cuccoli fought also in Hungary in 1593 and the family wanted 
that Raimondo became a priest, but he choosed “il mestiere 
delle armi.”10  
 
THE POLITICS OF LEOPOLD I 
 
If we would like to investigate the considerable role that the Italian 
generals played in the Viennese court, we need first to illustrate 
briefly the problems Leopold I had to face during his reign, and to 
what extent the Italians could support him in these efforts. 
Leopold had to face basically five different serious problems 
during his reign: in the field of foreign politics there was a 
constant conflict on the one hand with the great European 
power, that is the „Sun King‟ Louis XIV of France, for the 
European supremacy, and on the other with the eastern enemy, 
the Ottomans. A further foreign political problem was the 
weakening of the Kingdom of Spain. In the inner politics, he 
had to fight against the separatism of the Hungarians and the 
attempts of the German princes for autonomy. In spite of these 
inner and foreign difficulties by the end of his rule Leopold‟s 
realm became from a middle power to a strong great power 
and he devised some type of pax asburgica. However, the fact 
that there was no venality, meant a serious control of the 
government and a spoil system existed instead. Leopold did 
not have a Prime minister, but a Privy Council had served as 
the Monarchy‟s highest deliberative body, a selected group of 
only 12 state ministers. In 1669 he had formed a new, smaller 
policy-making body, the Geheim Konferenz.
11
 With these 
                                                        
9 Sandonnini, T. Il generale Raimondo Montecùccoli e la sua famiglia. Modena, 
1913; Gimorri, Adriano. Raimondo Montecuccoli e le sue opere. Modena, 
1924; Rossi, B. Raimondo Montecuccoli: un cittadino d‟Europa del Seicento. 
Bologna, 2002. 
10 Brunelli, G. Montecuccoli, Raimondo. – In: Dizionario Biografico degli 
Italiani, Vol. LXXVI, Roma, 2012, 22–30.  
11 Gherardi, R., F. Martelli. La pace degli eserciti e dell‟economia. Montecuccoli 
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institutions the authority of the Kaiser in the Viennese Court 
was in many sense more firm that the Court of his cousin, 
Louis XIV‟s court.12  
The second Turkish siege of Vienna in 1683 and the 
formation of the Holy League in 1684 – promoted in a 
considerable manner by the activity of cardinal Francesco 
Bonvisi, the papal nuncio of Vienna – meant the Habsburgs‟ 
turn to take the offensive. This last stage of the conflict against 
the Ottoman Empire (called ‟Great Turkish War /German: Der 
Große Türkenkrieg/ or the War of the Holy League‟) ended 
with the Treaty of Karlowitz in 1699.
13
 Since the Habsburg 
army rapidly conquered the Turkish-controlled parts of Hungary, 
the Ottoman plans for expansion had been stopped. In addition 
Leopold was able to secure dominion over Slavonia and Transyl- 
vania, and the Habsburg Monarchy had significantly extended its 
territory towards the South-East that was undisputedly accepted 
by the Ottomans in the treaty of Karlowitz.  
Since in the meanwhile the Habsburgs stipulated a peace 
treate with France in 1697 in Rijswick, these foreign political 
succeses brought the victory of Leopold‟s political strategy. A 
significant factor of these successes was the military power 
created by the Emperor that meant a permanent army of 100 
thousand of soldiers in the given period.
14
 The leaders of this 
army were important generals such as, Charles V, Duke of 
Lorraine or the Italian Raimondo Montecuccoli or Prince 
                                                                                                          
e Marsili alla Corte di Vienna. Bologna, 2009, 13–15. 
12 Duindam, J. Vienna and Versailles. The Courts of Europe's Dynastic Rivals, 
1550–1780. Cambridge, 2003. 
13 F. Molnár M. Der Friede von Karlowitz und das Osmanische Reich. – In: 
Strohmeyer, A., N. Spannenberger (Hrsg.). Frieden und Konfliktmanagement in 
interkulturellen Räumen. Das Osmanische Reich und die Habsburgmonarchie 
in der Frühen Neuzeit. Stuttgart, 2013, 197–220. 
14 They were able to mobilize troops numbering between 64.000–86.000 in 
the 1680-90s and 110.000 in 1705. Ágoston, G. The Ottoman Wars and the 
Changing Balance of Power. – In: Ingrao, Ch., N. Samardžić, J. Pešalj (Eds.). 
The Peace of Passarowitz, 1718. Purdue University, 2011, 95. 
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Eugene of Savoy, their leadership was very important in 
reforming and modernizing the Habsburg armed forces.  
The Habsburg monarchy was similar to the Ottoman 
Empire in the sense of being a heavily multinational, multi- 
cultural and multiconfessional empire, and as such, despite the 
centralization attempts, its ruler still depended very much on 
the local aristocracies. In this society the army meant a separate 
universe, since it obeyed directly to the ruler, and consequently 
the army became the ruler‟s most faithful ally not only in the 
foreign policy, but also in the centralization attempts of the 
emperor. Moreover in the Habsburg army there were many 
foreigners at high positions who considered only the Emperor 
as their exclusive lord and patron (Herr und Meister).
15
 This 
was the period when the number and influence of the Italians 
reached the limit to be able to support one of the fractions 
(parties) of the court, and consequently to be involved in the 
political decisions. The Italians joined a multiethnic alliance of 
interests that was forming in that period, the so called ‟Military 
Party‟. This meant also to support and interpret the interests of 
this party also in cultural and literary sense, and the Italians 
were the most efficient in this field. This literary and cultural 
propaganda was an extremely important activity, since the 
military results alone were not enough to convince the society, 
and obviously the Emperor himself about their point. The 
supranational military party and the national military elites 
often collaborated against the Ottomans, but sometimes there 
were open conflicts among them. An interesting manifestation 
of these conflicts was the so called Zrínyi-Montecuccoli debate. 
This debate – which is widely studied by Hungarian historio- 
graphy – between the Italian general, Raimondo Montecuccoli 
and his Hungarian fellow, Miklós Zrínyi (famous general and 
poet) in the 1660s was discussed in the form of letters, 
pamphlets and projects between the two military leaders of the 
Habsburg army on political and military issues, including both 
                                                        
15 Gherardi, R., F. Martelli, Op. cit., 16. 
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ITALIAN GENERALS IN THE OTTOMAN-HABSBURG 
THEATRE OF WAR 
 
The military party was also called the “Spanish party” since their 
main political goal was to protect the Spanish territories of the 
Habsburgs from the attacks of Louis XIV and to maintain the 
European geopolitical balance. The main strategist of the Habsburg 
Empire, Montecuccoli underlined that both the Ottoman and the 
Spanish army were retarded. For example speaking about the 
Turkish army Montecuccoli stressed the increasing corruption in 
the Ottoman bureaucracy, the bad quality of the troops, the 
inadequacy of the military training, and, most of all, the more and 
more irreversible technologic backwardness. According to the view 
of Montecuccoli and the military party a modern, developed 
European army with the help of military science could defeat easily 
the Ottomans, even if they were more numerous. They worried 
much more about France, because of its well-trained, disciplined 
army, based on strong economic background under the leadership 
of the best commandants and military engineers.  
The modification of the war-tactics, the birth of the more 
numerous armies contributed to the success at the end of the 
17
th
 century against the Ottoman Empire that was left out from 
the “military revolution.” 17  The Italian soldiers were the 
promoters of a certain military revolution in the Viennese 
court, they aimed to introduce a modern, scientifically based 
                                                        
16 For a synthesis in Italian see: Hausner, G. Il dibattito tra Raimondo Monte- 
cuccoli e Miklòs Zrinyi. – In: Annuario. Accademia d‟Ungheria a Roma. Roma, 
2010, 450-458. 
17 Ágoston, G. Empires and Warware in East-Central Europe, 1550–1750s: 
The Ottoman-Habsburg Rivalry and Military Trasformation. – In: Tallet, F., 
D. Trim (Eds.). European Warware, 1350–1750. Cambridge, 2010, 110–134; 
Kelenik, J. The Military Revolution in Hungary. – In: Dávid, G., P. Fodor 
(Eds.). Ottomans, Hungarians, and Habsburgs in Central Europe: The Military 
Confines in the Era of Ottoman Conquest. Leiden, 2000, 117–159. 
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military art, using the so-called „geometria militare.” They 
worked on the practical elaboration of this, following the 
theoretical basis laid down by Galileo Galilei (1564–1642). 
The most important representatives of this group were from 
Bologna, such as Cesare Marsili (1592–1633),18 the Bentivoglios, 
the Marescottis, and first of all, the above mentioned Raimondo 
Montecuccoli and his family. They were aware of the utility of 
both the Galilei-method and the cartography and they diffused 
this knowledge of Galilei into a little élite, furthermore they 
were influenced by the writings of Justus Lipsius (1547–1606) 
about discipline and training necessary to the formation of a 
modern army. They argued for the centralization of the Kaiser‟s 
power against the local nobilities, in order to reinforce the 
Habsburg Empire. For the same reason, all the important Italian 




The Italians earned their practical experience in the service 
of the Habsburgs, mostly in the Hungarian theater of war: 
according to Fabio Martelli‟s opinion the Hungarian wars were 
“oggettivamente una vera e propria immensa ‘macelleria’ di 
turchi e di imperiali.”20 They had to face many difficulties in 
logistics (the Ottomans had permanent logistic department!) 
and economy (the imperials could not pay the stipend of the 
soldiers in the castles and in the field-armies), the absence of 
experienced military leaders, and that of a well-trained 
professional army. They had to adapt the theory (technics and 
geometrical skills) in the everyday military practice in Hungary. 
One of the most eloquent examples for this phenomenon was the 
case of the above mentioned Raimondo Montecuccoli, military 
                                                        
18 Cavazza, M. Marsili, Cesare. – In: Dizionario biografico degli italiani. Trecciani, 
Roma, 2008. 755–758; Baffetti, G. Cesare Marsili: un cauto galileiano nell‟ 
aristotelismo barocco bolognese. – In: Il Carrobbio, 17. 1992, 5–16. 
19 Martelli, F., Op. cit., 78–90. 
20 Martelli, F., Op. cit., 80. 
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writer,
21
 commandant and president of the Court War Council 
(1668–1681). Montecuccoli arrived to the Hungarian theater 
of war against his will. In the Hungarian front, the Italian 
strategist had to face serious alimentation and financial 
problems. Because of his dilatory strategy he had a conflict 
with the Hungarians.
22
 Even if Montecuccoli won the battle of 
Szentgotthárd, the disadvantageous treaty of Vasvár (10 August 
1664)
23
 increased the Hungarian‟s resentment against him, and 
these tensions exploited in the revolt by Imre Thököly.
24
 At 
the end, thanks to the ambitions of the gran vezir, Kara Mustafa, 
the siege of Vienna (1683) gave an impulse to the elimination 
of the Ottoman domination of Hungary. During and after the 
War of the Holy League, the central government gradually 
assumed stronger control over recruitment, financing, and supply 
and Habsburg commanders were better able to control their 
armies, which were organized into smaller and more agile units 
than their Ottoman counterparts.
25
 
As we have seen above, the Italian military experts and 
commandants from every part of the the Peninsula (Bologna, 
Modena, Roma, Napoli and various regions as Tuscany, 
Lombardy etc.
26
) were welcome, due to their qualification and 
                                                        
21 For the more complete and most recent pubblication of the works of 
Montecuccoli see: Le opere di Raimondo Montecuccoli. A cura di Raimondo 
Luraghi. Vol. 1–2. Roma, 1988. and Le opere di Raimondo Montecuccoli. A 
cura di Andrea Testa. 3. vol. Roma, 2000. 
22  Nagy L., Hausner G. Raimondo Montecuccoli és a magyarok. – 
Hadtörténelmi Közlemények, 124/3, 2011, 679–740. 
23 Tóth, F. Saint-Gotthard 1664. Une bataille européenne. Paris, 2007; Tóth, 
F., Zágorhidi Czigány , B. Szentgotthárd–Vasvár 1664: háború és béke a 
XVII. század második felében. Szentgotthárd, 2004. 
24 Varga J. Válaszúton. Thököly Imre és Magyarország 1682–84-ben. Bp., 2007. 
25 Ágoston, G., Op. cit., 95–96. 
26Mugnai, Br., L. Cristini (Eds.). L‟esercito imperiale al tempo del Principe 
Eugenio di Savoia 1690–1720. La Fanteria (1): The Imperial Army in the Age 
of Prince Eugene of Savoy 1690–1720 the Infantry (1). Soldiershop Publishing, 
2014, 46–47. 
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military talent, and also because of the fact that they did not 
aimed to form an “Italian party”, but they tended to get involved 
in the groups of the German aristocracy and bureaucracy, and 
made efforts to be accepted by the court. They had to 
legitimize themselves according to the norms of the given 
period, and consequently those Italians who started a carrier in 
Vienna – such as the above mentioned Raimondo Montecuccoli 
or we can mention the names of Collalto, Colloredo, Caprara, 
Torquato de‟ Conti, Galasso, Gambacorta, Isolani, Odeschalchi, 
Piccolomini and Veterani – tried to “find” (or rather invent) some 
historical connection (alliance or kinship) with the Habsburg 
dynasty in the late-antique period for themselves, or some of 
them choose a more direct way, and declared himself a 
descendent of a German tribe.
27
  
Since many of these persons coming from Italy showed 
special talent in both military and individual-cultural field, 
they could often earn special commissions from the Viennese 
court: as an example we can mention the activity of Giorgio 
Basta (1550–1607)28 from an earlier period, or later that of 
Antonio Caraffa (1646, Naples – 1693, Vienna) 29  or the 
carrier of Luigi Ferdinando Marsigli (1658-1730).
30
 For the 
Italians the military carrier meant an opportunity to reach the 
highest dignified ranks in the Viennese Court. The main reason 
of this was the fact that the Austrian rulers intended to avoid 
the highest state functions‟ becoming inheritable, and they 
wanted to keep these positions under control. The meritocratic 
approach of emperors in tended to put Italians to the main 
positions of the military leadership, since they were easily 
controlled and influenced, because of the lack of roots and 
                                                        
27 Martelli, F., Op. cit., 64–68. 
28 Veress, E. (Ed.). Basta György hadvezér levelezése és iratai (1597–1606). 
Vol. 1–2. Bp., 1909–1913. 
29 Vico, G. La gesta di Antonio Carafa. A cura di Manuela Sanua. Napoli, 1997. 
30 Stoye, J. Marsigli‟s Europe: 1680–1730. The life and times of Luigi 
Ferdinando Marsigli, Soldier and Virtuoso. New Haven–London, 1994. 
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political relations with the local nobility. The fact that they 
were linked uniquely to the Emperor was even more important 
than their objective merits, and it seems that this unconditional 
loyalty was the basic criteria in the formation of the new élite. 
It is true that Montecuccoli based his decisions on the Ragion 
di Stato (raison d’etat), but for him this concept was not an abstract 
philosophical notion, but it meant the Emperor‟s will, in the 
very pragmatic and effective sense. And for example Marsigli 
states that for him the amor principis was clearly identical with 
the amor Dei.
31
 So it was an absolutely logical choice to give 
the leadership of the imperial army to the Italian mercenaries in 
such a difficult period as the Thirty Years War, since they were 
independent economically and socially from the nobility of the 
Austrian-German regions. In other words we can say that there 
was a strong and reciprocal community of interests. 
In conclusion we can point out that in Habsburg military 
service a large number of Italian commandants of voluntaries 
fought for the liberation of the Hungarian Kingdom and Transyl- 
vania from the Ottoman occupation. These Italians contributed 
with their practical activity and with their theoretical writings to 
the success of Emperor Leopold resulting in the consolidation of 
his power over the whole region, and in the creation of an impor- 
tant European Empire. The expansion of the Monarchy following 
the military successes against the Ottomans is regarded as the key 
event of his reign, which was solemnly stylized in the patriotic 
historiography of the 19
th
 century as Austria‟s „heroic age‟. 
                                                        
31 Nagy, L. La frontiera, il buon governo e l‟armonia mondiale. L. F. Marsili 
sulla frontiera della Transilvania. – In: La politica, la scienza, le armi. Luigi 
Ferdinando Marsili e la costruzione della frontiera dell‟Impero e dell‟Europa. 
A cura di Raffaella Gherardi. Bologna, CLUEB, 2010, 192; Martelli, F. Le 
Leggi, le Armi e il Principe. Studio sul pensiero politico di Raimondo 
Montecuccoli. Bologna, 1990; Gherardi, R., F. Martelli. La pace degli 
eserciti e dell‟economia. Montecuccoli e Marsili alla Corte di Vienna. 
Bologna, 2009, 13–15.  
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Russia’s growing great power status and strengthening influence 
in the Balkans at the end of the 1820s were partially the 
consequence of the role Russia had played during the Greek 
Cause, as well as of its foreign policy towards the Ottoman 
Empire. As regards the latter, the issue of an upcoming war 
launched against the Porte had the greatest significance, the 
probability of which could increasingly be perceived since the 
autumn of 1827. Despite the fact that the alternative of a 
Russo–Turkish war had been an integral part of the rhetoric of 
Russia’s foreign policy, it had not been realized in practice. 
Since the main diplomatic tool in Russia’s foreign policy was 
to sustain the theoretical possibility of an upcoming war, which 
was not only regarded as a means for crisis management and a 
temporary solution in solving the Eastern Crisis, but also as a 
means in shaping international relations, in particular the Anglo– 
Russian diplomatic relations. 
Year 1828 brought sharp changes in this respect. In 
consequence of an actual armed conflict developing between 
Russia and the Ottoman Empire, Russia had managed to 
achieve substantial war successes, while the results ratified by 
the Treaty of Adrianople resulted in an unequivocal growth of 
the great power prestige of the Russian Cabinet. It was in this 
context that the allied cooperation between Russia and Great 
Britain, based on the treaties of April 4, 1826 and July 6, 
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1827 was broken, the precursors of which had started to reveal 
themselves since 1828, but it was not until the beginning of 1830s 
that its actual consequences became apparent for both the 
London and the St Petersburg Governments.  
The main objective of my paper is to give an overview of 
the most important stages of this process, and to demonstrate 
Great Britain’s foreign policy toward Russia following the 
Treaty of Adrianople, and also to present the major factors 
influencing this policy. For the interpretation of the British 
position I used foreign affairs sources from the British National 
Archives/Public Record Office, from the collections of which I 
used in particular volumes recording Britain’s direct communi- 
cation with Russia (General Correspondence – Russia). I also 
used several publications mostly issued in the 19
th
 century, 
comprising both private correspondence and collections of official 
government material, such as correspondence, dispatches of 
Arthur Wellesley the Duke of Wellington.  
The major policy guideline defining the British foreign policy 
of the era is marked with names of Duke of Wellington and Lord 
Aberdeen, and its basic principle was the reconsideration of the 
relationship with Russia, namely keeping under control St 
Petersburg’s position and ambitions represented in the Eastern 
Question. Endeavors to create a counterbalance had appeared 
as a main objective of the Foreign Office as early as during the 
months prior to the outbreak of the Russo–Turkish war. The 
turning point however, was undoubtedly the outbreak of the 
Russo–Turkish war, which for the Cabinet of St James resulted in 
understanding that London is not able to substantially influence the 
course of the Russian policy. The real or perceived possibility of 
launching an armed conflict turned out to be even more dominant, 
since during the Goderich Government, as a result of the Anglo– 
Russian negotiations, Britain still had a slight chance that St 
Petersburg would give up his plan of a war against the Ottoman 
Empire. Consequently, this failure of the British policy resulted in 
the gradual break-up of the Anglo–Russian alliance, concluded in 
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the spring of 1826, and issued in the continuous weakening of the 
Anglo–Russian diplomatic relations. London’s concerns or 
hypotheses, according to which Russia was a potential threat 
to the English geostrategic, political and economic interests, as 
well as to the sovereignty and integrity of the Ottoman Empire, 
had a top influence in this process. As a result, the need to 
protect the Balkan and Middle Eastern status quo gained more 
significance than ever.  
One of the most prominent moments of the British–Russian 
disintegration process was the Russo–Turkish peace treaty, signed 
on September 14, 1829, in Adrianople. The foreign policy 
determined and applied relating to the Ottoman Empire offered an 
alternative for the two leading Great Powers of Europe for a long 
term preservation of their cooperation, based on coordination of 
interests and exercising mutual control, which thus became the 
guarantee for either the stability or the instability of the formed 
coalition. In this context, the moment any difference in the attitude 
of the two Cabinets occurred, the conditions of the partnership 
based on mutual temperance would change at their core. And the 
Russo–Turkish war and the Treaty of Adrianople created a situation 
exactly of this nature, in which due to the changing international 
circumstances Great Britain was forced to redefine its relationship 
with Russia. Consequently, in the first part of this paper I 
attempt to find the motives of the Government of London in 
changing their foreign policy toward St Petersburg, while the 
second part will be a presentation of the actual political steps 
induced by the changes in the tone of the Foreign Office. 
The successful peace talks in Adrianople resulted in the 
implementation of several beneficial decrees for the Russian 
Empire, perhaps one of the most important of which was the 
reinforcement of the rights of the Danubian Principalities, which 
was a constant and dominant element of the foreign policy of the 
Russian Court “(…) the Danubian Principalities of Moldavia and 
Wallachia pursuant to their specific capitulation had subordinated 
themselves to the power of the Sublime Porte, and since Russia had 
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accepted to guarantee their well-being, at present they are granted 
all rights, advantages and privileges, which were assured for 
them by their capitulations, also by the agreements concluded 
between the Courts of the two Empires, and finally as a result 
of the Hatti Sherifs issued in different periods.”1 
The status of Moldavia and Wallachia and the reformation 
of their internal political structure also determined the degree 
of the Russian influence in the given region. The points of 
origin for the privileges of the Principalities went back to the 
Peace Treaty of Kuchuk Kainarji of 1774,
2
 to the Treaty of 
Jassy of 1792
3
 and to the Treaty of Bucharest in 1812,
4
 as 
well as to the Sultan’s Hatti–Sherif of 18025 and the Convention 
of Akkerman concluded in 1826.
6
 Based on these treaties, 
Russia gained more and more influence in the internal policy 
of the Danubian Principalities,
7
 a prominent example of which 
was the issue of representation of Moldavia and Wallachia, 
                                                        
1
 Внешняя политика России 19 и начало 20 века. [Henceforward: ВПР] 
Документы Российского Министерства Иностранных дел. Сер. ІІ. т. 8 
(16). М., 1995. Док. 103. Мирный договор между Россией и Османской 
Империей, Адрианополь, 2 (14) сентября 1829 г., 267. 
2 Кючук-Кайнарджийский мирный договор между Россией и Турцией, 
10 июля 1774 г. Под стягом России: Сазонов, А. А., Г. Н. Герасимова, О. 
А. Глушкова, С. Н. Кистерев. (Сост.). Сборник архивных документов. М., 
1992, 78–92.  
3 Extracted text In: The National Archives / Public Record Office / FO 
[Henceforward: TNA] 352/61/5. Abstract of Articles of Treaties between Russian 
and Turkey, – 1774–1849 –, subsisting April 4, 1854.   
4 Ibid.  
5 The Hatti–Serif ratified the election of Hospodars every seven years, as 
well as the manner and possibility of their removal, which in case of a 
justified failure should be carried out with the consensus between the Porte 
and the Russian Court, with their full agreement. – In: Ibid., 15.   
6 Extracted text In: Ibid. 
7 Taki, V. Russian Protectorate in the Danubian Principlaities: Legacies of 
the Eastern Question in Contemporary Russo–Romanian Relations. – In: 
Frary, L. J., M. Kozelsky. (Eds.). The Russian–Ottoman Borderlands. The 
Eastern Question Reconsidered. Madison, 2014, 42.   
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which could legitimately be fulfilled by the current Russian 
ambassador to Constantinople. Although the Russo–Turkish 
Treaty of 1774 assured for both provinces the orthodox 
representation through a chargé d’affaires at the Porte, the 
same Treaty granted the Tsar’s ambassador delegated to the 
Turkish capital a similar power.
8
  
Thus the gradual expansion of rights of the Danubian 
Principalities by means of the above mentioned Treaties, proved 
to be part of a well-constructed guideline of the Russian foreign 
policy. Since the results achieved in this region – besides being 
the means of a possible reinforcement of the Empire’s position 
in the Balkans as well as of the control over the internal affairs 
of Moldavia and Wallachia – would also offer international 
legislative points of reference for St Petersburg in his policy 
toward the Ottoman Empire. Later, St Petersburg’s freedom to 
act in this area was further enhanced by the Organic Statutes 
issued in 1831–1832.9  
The issue of Russia’s influence exercised in the region of 
East-Balkans became even more pronounced as the economic 
aspect was brought into the fore. In the strengthening of the 
economic and strategic role of the Danubian Principalities a 
substantial role was played by their unlimited freedom of 
shipping and commerce along the Danube,
10
 which resulted in 
                                                        
8 TNA/FO/352/61/5.14.  
9 Florescu, R. R. Stratford Canning, Palmerston and the Wallachian Revolution of 
1848. – In: The Journal of Modern History, 35, 1963, N 3, 229; Арш, Г. Л., В. Н. 
Виноградов, Э. А. Джападзе, И. С. Достян. (Ред.). Mеждународные 
отношения на Балканах 1815–1830. М., 1983, 270; Régnault, E. Histoire 
politique et sociale des principautés danubiennes . Paris, 1855, 166–186. 
Concerning the autonomy and aspirations for independence of the peoples of 
Balkans also see: Достян, И. С., А. В. Карасев, И. В. Чуркина. 
Национально-освoбoдительная борьба бaлканский народов как проявление 
кризиса Oсманской империи в 19 в. Революции и реформы на Балканах. 
Бальканские исследования, 12. М., 1994, 5–20.   
10 For Moldavia and Wallachia this right was guaranteed by article V of the 
Russo-Turkish peace treaty of 1829. – In: ВПР. Сер. ІІ. т. 8 (16). М., 1995. 
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Moldavia and Wallachia soon becoming significant stations of 
an important southeastern European grain transport route, 
especially in the period after the flourishing of the two port 
towns and commercial depots, Brăila and Galați.11 Even though 
the region gained relevance in European commercial life only 
starting from the 1840s, the supervision of the Danube Delta 
and the privilege of control over its most important sections 
had been one of the most fundamental great power policy issues 
since the 1830s.
12
 It was particularly true related to Great- 
Britain and Austria, who had kept the issue on the political 
agenda since 1829, and with Russia’s acquisition of the Sulina 
Channel the topic attracted further attention during this period.   
Russia’s leading position and control over the Danube 
Delta was closely linked to the policy of territorial acquisitions. 
The problem related to that and emerging on the part of the 
allies, in particular on the part of Great Britain, was connected 
with the evaluation of the Russian Empire’s true intentions. 
London’s concerns due to the Russian borders expanding to 
the south and southwest, based on the tendencies of the former 
Russo–Turkish war, could be regarded as a natural reaction. In 
this case, however, the Russian Ministry of Foreign Affairs 
distanced itself from the view of regarding the territorial 
expansion as warfare moves, or later, after the armed struggles 
ended, as war achievements. This view was justified by the 
provisions of the peace treaty, as according to article III “The 
border between the two Empires will be river Prut, starting 
                                                                                                          
Док. 103…, 267. 
11 Ardeleanu, C. Russian–British Rivalry Regarding Danube Navigation and 
the Origins of the Crimean War (1846–1853). – Journal of Mediterranean 
Studies, 29, 2010, N 2, 165; Ardeleanu, C. The Navigation of the Lower 
Danube (1829–1853). – Transylvanian Review, 22, 2013, Supplement. No. 2. 
230–241; Demeter G. A Balkán és az Oszmán Birodalom. Társadalmi és 
gazdasági átalakulások a 18. század végétől a 20. század közepéig. I. Kötet. 
Általános rész és Bulgária. Bp., 2014, 150.  
12 Hajnal, H. The Danube. Its Historical, Political and Economic Importance. 
The Hague, Martinus Nijhoff, 1920, 53–63.  
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from the point it enters Moldavia, as far as the confluence with 
Danube. From that point the borderline shall follow the flow 
of the Danube, as far as the arm of St. George meets the sea, 
in a way that all island, formed by various branches of this 
river, will belong to Russia, while its right bank will remain 
the property of the Sublime Porte.”13  
The Russian diplomacy both theoretically and in practice 
stuck to the principles pursued during the Eastern (Greek) 
crisis of the Ottoman Empire, namely, despite of taking part in 
its settlement, they refused to take advantage of the international 
situation by territorial acquisitions.
14
 Parties signing the Protocol 
of St Petersburg “(…) will not seek in this arrangement any 
increase of territory, nor any exclusive influence, nor advantage 
in commerce, for their subjects which shall not be equally 
attainable by all other nations.”15A very similar formulation 
can be seen in the agreement concluded between the great powers 
and signed in July 1827, where the content is supplemented with 
the fact that the liabilities of the Treaty shall be undertaken by 




Despite of Russia’s manifested statements and restrained 
policy bearing in mind the support of the Ottoman Empire’s 
integrity, St Petersburg’s political attitude was still not in 
accordance with its former promises. As even though the 
completed war was not an expansive one and did not result in 
large scale territorial acquisitions, Russia’s economic and 
political influence relocated to new territories of interest, one 
of which was the above mentioned Danube Delta, while the 
                                                        
13 ВПР. Сер. ІІ. т. 8 (16). М., 1995. Док. 103…, 267.  
14 Jelavich, B. Russia and the Formation of the Romanian National State, 
1821–1878. Cambridge, 2004, 29–30.  
15 Protocol of St. Petersburg, 23rd March (4th April), 1826. – In: The Duke of 
Wellington (Ed.). Dispatches, Correspondence and Memoranda of Field 
Marshal Arthur Duke of Wellington. Vol. 4. London, 1871, 60–61. 
16 Treaty of the Settlement of Greece, 6th July, 1827. – In: Ibid., 60.  
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other was the northeastern and eastern region of the Black Sea, 
the Coast of Western Caucasus.
17
 From this aspect, the 
Russian party did not fully comply with the intentions agreed 
in the provisions of the Protocol.  
The same conclusions can be made related to Russia’s 
countenance in gaining economic advantage. During the peace 
talks it was an important endeavour to preserve a favourable 
balance between the Ottoman and Russian commercial conditions 
along the Danube, which was a crucial issue for both Empires. 
This was one of the reasons why the Government of St Peters- 
burg stuck to the goal of acquiring control over the Danube 
Delta, and through that, over the Sulina Channel for his fleet 
“Merchant ships of both empires were granted free navigation 
along the full length of the Danube, considering that these 
ships under Ottoman flags may enter the Chilia and Sulina 
arms unhindered, while navigation in the St. George arm will 
remain free both for military and merchant fleet of both 
empires.”18 However, based on the above section, an expansion 
of larger latitude for the Russian fleet could be predicted, while 
from safety aspects Russia’s opportunities were restricted by 
the fact that: “At the same time, Russian military vessels shall 
not navigate the Danube upstream further the point it meets 
river Prut.”19  
In order to present the English position formulated concer- 
ning territorial issues and navigation on the Danube, it is 
important to take a look at the characteristics and political 
aspects of the Foreign Office’s reflections on the Treaty of 
Adrianople. One of the most insightful sources concerning the 
topic was Wellington’s, the Prime Minister’s (1828–1830) 
detailed assay addressed to Lord Aberdeen, the Minister of 
Foreign Affairs (1828–1830), in which besides describing the 
                                                        
17 The section between the river St. Nicholas and Kuban. See: ВПР. Сер. ІІ. 
т. 8 (16). М., 1995. Док. 103…, 267.  
18 Ibid. 
19 Ibid.  
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articles of the Russo–Turkish peace agreement, he also put 
forth the short-term and long-term consequences of the newly 
formed situation in the Balkan and Middle Eastern area, in a 
close context with the valid international legislative treaties of 
the period.
20
 One of the most meaningful topics described by 
the British Prime Minister was the range of changes concerning 
the Danubian Principalities, and parallel to that, the question 
of navigation, as well as the changes concerning the Russian 
commercial activities within the Ottoman Empire. 
The content of article VII of the Treaty provoked particularly 
vehement responses, according to which besides the unlimited 
freedom of movement and trade, ships with the Russian flag as 
well as merchandise transported by Russian merchants on 
Turkish territories, were granted exemption from the liability of 
inspection.
21
 As another neuralgic point, in his assay the Duke 
of Wellington also pointed out the provisions of the same 
article relating to the Black Sea, stating that “(…) the Sublime 
Porte commits itself to assure (…)”22 the free access to the 
Black Sea, as well as free passage through the straits of 
Bosporus and Dardanelles, and also to establish Russia’s free 
connection to the Mediterranean Sea.
23
  
The official criticism of the given section from the British 
side was formulated in the Memorandum of October 29, 
1829,
24
 in which the British Prime Minister did not primarily 
see the root of the problem in the advantages obtained by the 
Cabinet of St Petersburg, but in the content of the given 
statement relating to the merchant fleets of the other states, 
                                                        
20 Memorandum. – Observation on the Treaty of Adrianople. London, 10th 
October, 1829. – In: Dispatches…, Op. cit., Vol. 6. [July, 1829, to April, 
1830], 1877, 212–219.  
21 ВПР, Сер. ІІ. т. 8 (16). М., 1995. Док. 103. Мирный договор между Россией 
и Османской Империей, Адрианополь, 2 (14) сентября 1829 г., 268.  
22 Ibid.  
23 Exclusively for merchant vessels.  
24 Memorandum Upon the 7th Article of the Treaty of Adrianople, 29th October, 
1829. – In: Dispatches…, Op. cit., Vol. 6. 1877, 268–271.  
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namely: “(…) Based on the same principles and in compliance 
with conditions identical with those for vessels under Russian 
flag, the passage through the straits of Bosporus and 
Dardanelles is announced to be free for merchant ships of all 
states friendly to the Sublime Porte, regardless they are 
travelling to Russian ports, towards ports of the Black sea or 
returning back with cargo or ballast. (…).”25 The complexity 
of the problem and the cause for the concerns of the Cabinet of 
London could be basically explained by the fact that the treaty 
did not lay down clear and transparent rules concerning 
vessels flying flags of other states. That is to say, the treaty did 
not discuss and did not even mention, whether other states 
could expect the Russian Empire’s action in case their above 
described rights are violated, since on the event of the 
infringement of the scope of authorities included in article VII 
of the Treaty of Adrianople, the Tsar’s Court had the right to 
respond with retaliations, declaring those events as hostile 
acts.
26
 It is not clear however, whether St Petersburg could 
also use these measures in case of violations suffered by ships 
of other foreign powers,
27
 so Duke Wellington saw in this 
context the real danger of the Russo–Turkish Treaty, which 
could restrict the Ottoman Empire in his freedom to act.  
Lord Aberdeen goes even further with his arguments, and 
according to the Head of the Foreign Office Russia 
has ”Prominently advanced into the centre of Armenia, in the 
midst of a Christian population, Russia holds the keys both of 
the Persian and Turkish provinces; and whether she may be 
disposed to extend her conquest to the East or to the West, to 
Teheran or to Constantinople, no serious obstacle arrest her 
progress”,28 while its forging ahead „(…) is not hindered by 
                                                        
25 ВПР. Сер. ІІ. т. 8 (16). М., 1995. Док. 103…, 268.  
26 Ibid.  
27 Memorandum Upon the Seventh…, 270.  
28 Lord Aberdeen to Haystesburry, 31 October, 1829. Quotation. In: Ingram, 
Edward, In Defence of British India. Great Britain in the Middle East, 
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any restrictions.”29 With reference to the same point the British 
Ambassador to Constantinople, Lord Ponsonby, in one of his 
subsequent letters wrote the following: “Lord Aberdeen 
observes that the Treaty of Adrianople is not in conformity 
with Russian promises but appears to affect vitally the 
interests (and) the strength the dignity, the present safety and 
the future independence of the Ottoman Empire.”30 
In fact, the most conspicuous and alarming sign for the British 
diplomacy was the message right at the core of the Treaty of 
Adrianople: Russia had become independent from their allies in the 
formation of the Eastern Question,
31
 by which the British 
foreign policy had to face a new challenge. From that moment on, 
subsequent to, or rather parallel to the great power reconciliations 
closing the Greek Cause, Great Britain had to focus on taking a 
more active role, a more dominant and unequivocal one both in 
their rhetoric and acts. This was all the more important for Britain, 
since none of the other participants of the European Concert of 
Great Powers gave him any support in counterbalancing 
Russia’s policy. The British Prime Minister wrote: “France 
will not move with England and Austria without Prussia, and 
Prussia will not move without being certain that the movement 
will be agreeable to the Emperor of Russia.”32  
Based on those ideas and on the knowledge of the interna- 
tional relations, it soon became clear that London did not have 
a strong basis of allies during that period. However, this 
change of course did not bring an immediate success, moreover, 
the primary task of the Cabinet of St James was now to face all 
                                                                                                          
1775–1842. New York, 2013 (first published in 1984), 173.  
29 Ibid.  
30 Quotation. – In: Wiebe, M. G., M. S. Millar, A. P. Robson (Eds.). 
Benjamin Disraeli. Letters, 1852–1856. Vol. 6. Toronto, 1997, 247.  
31 Temperley, H. The Foreign Policy of Canning, 1820–1827. – In: Ward, A. 
W., G. P. Gooch (Eds.). The Cambridge History of British Foreign Policy. 
Vol. 2. Cambridge, 1923, 101.  
32 Memorandum. – Observation on the Treaty of Adrianople. London, 10th 
October, 1829. – In: Dispatches…, Op. cit., Vol. 6. 1877, 218.  
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the negative consequences of the last two years, as well as the 
apparent lowering of their political prestige. The most repre- 
senttative standpoint for the failure of the British foreign 
policy was formulated in the following: “Go to the North, and 
hear the terms of bitterness and contempt in which England is 
assailed by the Russian Government for our vacillation, by the 
Russian people for our illiberality… Turkey complains of being 
betrayed. Greece considers us her enemy.”33 
By studying the two diplomatic acts of the period following 
the Treaty of Adrianople, we may get a representative picture of the 
main features of the British Government’s attitude toward Russia, 
characteristic of the whole 1830s. The first example to that was the 
signing of the act of navigation and commerce with Austria. As to 
its essential point, Great Britain and Austria agreed in a joint Treaty 
about the commercial benefits used toward each other, defining 
first of all trade concessions in the field of export and import. A 
special gesture from the side of the British Government concerned 
the oversees colonies, with an exceptional attitude toward the 
province of India: the Cabinet of London held out prospects of 
future advantages – similar to those of Britain’s – for the 
Government of Vienna during their local trade activities in the 
oversees provinces.
34
 From one hand, the agreement tightened the 
Anglo–Austrian connections, and from the other hand, it was also a 
clear response to the dynamic changes of the Russian foreign 
policy tangible in 1828–1829. The agreement – concluded in two 
months after the Russo–Turkish Peace Treaty – was ratified on 
December 31, 1829,
35
 while the Russian diplomacy’s reaction 
followed only a year later, in September of 1830.  
St Petersburg standpoint was mediated to Aberdeen by 
Andrzej Josef Matuszewicz. The Polish-born diplomat had 
                                                        
33 Quotes Lady Canning’s opinion, Temperley, Op. cit., 104.  
34  TNA/PRO/FO/94/35 – FO and Foreign and Commonwealth Office. 
Ratifi- cation of Treaties. Austria Convention on Navigation and Commerce. 
Place and Date of Signature – 31.12.1829. 
35 Ibid.  
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represented the Russian interests as authorized ambassador 
extraordinary on the Conference of London discussing the 
question of the Greek State since 1830.
36
 The cause of the 
Anglo–Austrian agreement was not a negligible factor for the 
Cabinet of St Petersburg. Evidence to that was Matuszewicz’s 
ultimatum of September 26, 1830, in which he requested 
information from the Foreign Office’s regarding the provisions 
of the contract between London and Vienna, valid since February 1 
of the same year. Lord Aberdeen answered in an official letter, with 
full details of the treaty and with its regulations concerning the 
Ionian Islands. Since as it was revealed by the British Prime 
Minister’s response to Matuszewic, the Russian ambassador 
primarily wanted to obtain intelligence concerning the Greek 
territories in question, which was not surprising at all during the 
period of consultations on the circumstances and conditions of 
establishing an independent Greek State.
37
Based on the state- 
ment of the Foreign Office and the provisions of the official 
agreement the contracting parties confirmed for the Austrian 
Government all the formerly offered benefits as regards the 
commercial activities with the Ionian Islands,
38
 which were 
included in the contract about placing the given territories under a 
British protectorate, signed in the Four Power Agreement of 
November 5, 1815.
39
 Beyond those, Austria did not have any 
further benefits.  
                                                        
36 Satow, E. A Guide to Diplomatic Practice. Vol. II. Cambridge, 2011, 101; 
The Cabinet Annual Register and Historical, Political, Biographical and 
Miscellaneous Chronicle for the Year 1831. Vol. 1. London, 1832, 426. 
37 Draft, Count Matuszewic, FO, September 29, 1830. – In: TNA/PRO/FO/65/189 
– Foreign Office and Predecessors. Political and other Departments. General 
Correspondence before 1906, Russian Empire. Domestic, Prince Lieven, 
Matuszewic, Prince Troubetskoy, and various.   
38 TNA/PRO/FO/94/35. 
39 No. 426. Трактат, заключенный в Париже между Россией и Англией 
относительно Ионических островов Собрание Трактатов и Конвенций, 
заключенных Россией с иностранными державами. По поручению 
Министерство Иностранных Дел cоставил Мартенс, Ф. Ф. СПб, 1895, 250–255.  
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The curiosity of the situation was that according to the 
ultimatum received from the Russian ambassador, the Russian 
Government must have wished to expand the given regulations 
to Russian merchant ships, too. But the head of the Foreign 
Office in his answer to Matuszewic brought forth detailed 
arguments claiming that the benefit granted to Austria was not 
a new improvement in the British–Russian relations, as it was 
a confirmation of the related section of the former Treaty, signed 
one and half decade ago. And since in 1815 Russia fully 
supported the contents of article VII of the Treaty of Paris 
without insisting on its expansion, in view of all that, the 
British Government saw no reason for the Russian demands.
40
 
Another intriguing diplomatic affair of the time was the case of 
the British ambassador to St Petersburg designated to replace Lord 
Heytesbury (1828–1832). The Government led by Charles Grey, in 
agreement with the new Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, for 
the position of the outgoing diplomat appointed Stratford 
Canning.
41
 The candidate in theory could be a perfect choice 
for the position, as Stratford Canning had previously completed 
two periods of diplomatic missions in the capital of the Ottoman 
Empire, from 1809 to 1812 and from 1825 to 1827. Despite his 
profound experience and background knowledge related to the 
Eastern Question, to the Russo–Turkish, as well as the British– 
Turkish relations, his person caused a huge dilemma for the 
Russian Ministry of Foreign Affairs.
42
 Stratford Canning’s 
great disadvantage derived from his very advantages, mentioned 
before. Karl Nesselrode, the Russian Minister of Foreign 
Affairs and the official diplomatic body, as well as the Tsar, 
were very well aware of the British ambassador’s capabilities, 
                                                        
40 Draft, Count Matuszewic, FO, September 29, 1830 (TNA/PRO/FO/65/189).  
41 Jones, R. The British Diplomatic Service, 1815–1914. Waterloo, 1983, 39.  
42 Потемкин, В. П. (Oтв. ред.). История дипломатии. Т. 1. Библиотека 
внешней политики. М., Государственное социально-экономическое 
издательство, 1941, 418; Lane-Poole, St. The Life of The Right Honourable 
Stratford Canning Viscount Startford de Redcliffe. Vol. 2. London, 1888, 20.  
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owing to his anti-Russian performance during the mid-1820s. 
So when the Russian Court had to respond to the Foreign 
Office’s request, because of the raised concerns in connection 
with the candidate, Nicholas I. refused to receive him.
43
 
The categorical attitude from the side of the English 
diplomacy manifested in Palmerston’s refusal to change his 
decision, by rejecting all the compromise proposals from the 
other party.
44
 The delays in the agreement led to a situation in 
which Great Britain was left without a representative of 
ambassadorial rank in St Petersburg, which did not change 
until 1835. Thus, the Russian connection, which was of great 
importance for the British political and economic interests, 
seemed to loosen. The more so, since by 1834 based on the 
Russian Government’s decision, Prince K. A. Lieven – after 
more than two decades of ambassadorship to London – was 
recalled to Russia.
45
 The inefficiency of the consultations that 
lasted over two years, in the end forced the Court of St 
Petersburg – remaining temporarily without a representative in 
London – to make a decision. Several months later it was the 
Russian Government who solved the stalemate situation by 
appointing Pozzo di Borgo ambassador to London.
46
 
In the transformation of the Anglo–Russian relations in the 
beginning of the 1830s, the Eastern Question and the range of 
problems connected to the Balkans played a crucial role, all of 
which by 1828–1829 generated a favourable situation for Russia. 
The peculiar ambition of the St Petersburg diplomacy, the aim of 
which was to achieve independence in the forming of the Eastern 
Question, and parallel to that all endeavours to maintain the 
Anglo–Russian alliance, seemed to fail. To keep balance between 
                                                        
43 Потемкин, В. П., Op. cit., 418–419.    
44 Hyde, H. Montgomery, Princess Lieven, London, George G. Harp and Co. 
Ltd., 1938, 208–210; Потемкин, В. П., Op. cit., 418. 
45 Hyde, H., Op. cit., 210. 
46 The Annual Register or a View of the History and Politics of the Year 
1842. London, 1843, 252. 
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the two sides turned out to be an impossible task. At the same time, 
it became evident for London that the Anglo–Russian partnership 
could be maintained as long as the British Government was able to 
sustain the parity between the two leading Great Powers, along 
with the balance and integrity of their primary economic and 
political interests. A sharp change in that process was brought by 
the period following the Treaty of Adrianople, during which Great 
Britain lost its leading position within the Anglo–Russian coalition, 
thus becoming an external observer in the course of the Balkan 
events. The long-term consequence of the temporary failure of the 
British policy on the Great Power level was Britain’s distancing 
itself from Russia, and parallel to that, the increasing Russophobia, 
which by the 1830s will become one of the main features in 
the Anglo–Russian relations. 
Regional and Ethnic Differences in the 
Welfare of Urban Societies during the 
Tanzimat Period (1844–1870).  
A Comparative Analysis of Priština, Vučitrn and 









Ottoman sources provide facilities to measure and compare the 
welfare of the local societies through temettuat defters (which 
contain the yearly income for each person in the urban 
communities), or through the analysis of probates (in sicils and 
terekes),
2
 or based on documents containing the amount of taxes 
to be paid. Of course, researchers have to face with the methodo- 
logical challenge, that these are not comparable to each other – 
the first source-type refers to yearly income and tells nothing 
about the profits or the wealth itself, thus narrowing the 
possibilities of a comparative analysis. Tax-registers cannot refer 
to welfare or income accurately, because only tithe-types taxes 
(ondalik) are levied proportionally on income, vergi-type taxes 
or head taxes were not always handled in the same manner. 
Furthermore, types of taxes and methods of taxation were 
changing, rendering temporal comparisons more difficult. The 
existence of tax-farming further aggravated the quantification 
of income, as the profit of tax-farmers often remains unknown 
beyond the collected 10–12%. Although cizye (as head-tax) was 
                                                        
1 The study has been supported by the Bolyai János Research Scholarship of 
the Hungarian Academy of Sciences. 
2 Атанасов, Хр. В османската периферия: общество и икономика във 
Видин и околността през XVIII в. С., 2008. 
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collected based on wealth the proportion of the different 
categories of welfare were changing quickly even within 10–20 
years,
 3
 such as the amount of cizye per capita, not to mention its 
real value in silver, or value given in PPP. Furthermore, 
Draganova proved on the example of Pleven, that the extent of 
land is not in strong correlation with these cizye categories, 
which means that many villagers and urban dwellers had other 
sources of revenue beyond agriculture.
4
 And as Bilgi proved 
in the case of Salihli settlement, the proportion (%) of tax 
measured to revenues can vary between broad values within a 
community, depending on the origins of income (agriculture, 
industry, tertiary).
5
 These all create limits to comparison. In 
order to avoid the traps discussed above we decided to focus 
on the first type of documents, which rely on yearly income. 
Another problem is the selection of an appropriate welfare 
index. Regional studies now tend to focus on measuring 
inequalities instead of direct wealth in their calculations, as the 
formers may destabilize a society.
6
 Growing inequalities are 
                                                        
3 For example, in 1841 the number of persons grouped into the ala (richest) 
category was 234 in Berkovitsa, 5978 were evsat and 1124 edna. In 1831 it 
was 227, 6247 and 2978 respectively. Demeter G. A Balkán és az Oszmán 
Birodalom. Vol I. Bp., 2014, 354–355. (PPP = purchase power parity) 
4 Draganova, Sl. Documents of the 1840’s on the Economic Position of the 
Villages in Central North Bulgaria. – BHR, 1988, N 2, 87–100. 
5 Bilgi, N. A Developing Village in the Middle of the 19th Century: Salihli. – 
In: Imber, C., K. Kiyotaki, (Eds.). Frontiers of the Ottoman Studies: State, 
Province, and the West. Vol. 1. London – New York, 2005, 149–167. The average 
tax was about 16–17% of the income in Salihli, but in the case of richest it varied 
between 25–50% depending on the main occupation or sources of income. 
6 See: Coşgel, M., B. Ergene. Inequality of Wealth in the Ottoman Empire: 
War, Weather, and Long-term Trends in Eighteenth Century. Kastamonu 
Working Paper, http://web2.uconn.edu/economics/working/2011-29.pdf; also 
Canbakal, H., A. Filiztekin. Wealth and Inequality in Ottoman Lands in the 
Early Modern Period. AALIMS – Rice University Conference on the 
Political Economy of the Muslim World, 4–5 April 2013 (working paper) 
http://aalims.org/uploads/Rice_v1.pdf; further: Coşgel, M. Estimating Rural 
Incomes and Inequality in the Ottoman Empire. – International Journal of 
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more dangeorus – even within a society getting richer and richer 
averagely – from the aspect of social stability, than increasing 
poverty with decreasing inequalities between different layers of 
society. Contrary to this approach we chose the income as welfare 
index, partly because these above mentioned investigations are 
usually based on wealth (not on income). While probates can 
supply the researcher with continuous sampling for temporal 
comparisons, temettuat defters cannot provide us the same 
possibility, as these are static data and make possible rather 
spatial comparisons than temporal ones. Second, income data 
are also apt for investigating inequalities, thus Gini-coefficient 
can be calculated from them. Third, we were also curious about 
the internal stratification, the differences between occupations, 
mahalle-quarters, etc. and it is easier to count group average, 
standard deviation or mode, than the Gini-coefficient, which is 
based on the previously mentioned variables representing the 
dataset. 
The following comparative investigation is based on the 
yearly income differences of taxable urban population and aims 
to trace:  
1, the income differences between occupation-groups;  
2, income differences depending on size and functional 
types of towns (did smaller towns have poorer society, is there 
any difference between their social stratification compared to 
larger town at different hierarchical level?)  
3, differences in welfare of different religious communities 
(were Muslims richer in Ottoman Empire, what temporal and 
spatial patterns can be traced?);  
4, local spatial differences (segregation) of urban dwellers 
based on their religion or wealth (differences between quarters, 
mahalles);  
5, regional spatial differences regarding the welfare of 
                                                                                                          
Middle East Studies, 40, 2008, N 3, 374–375; and Milanovic, B. P. H. 
Lindert, J. G. Williamson. Measuring Ancient Inequality. NBER Working 
Paper 13550, revised (2007), http://www.nber.org/papers/w13550.  
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urban population (is there any difference between the welfare 
and social stratification of towns in Serbia, Kosovo, Bulgaria 
under Ottoman rule?);  
6, the changes over time (how did the process of Tanzimat 
influence the livelyhood of urban dwellers, did they become 
wealthy, more stratified or not?);  
7, the role of migrant society: their wealth compared to 
autochtonous populations and identification of main source areas. 
In the following pages I aim to analyze the validity of the 
statement whether the wheat producer Anatolian society was 
poorer compared to the Rumelian as for the 17th century 
Inalcik and Parveva pointed out, and to examine whether 
Tanzimat contributed to the enrichment of Christians or to the 
differentiation of Christian society, and whether these processes 
eliminated or enhanced material differences between Muslims 
and Christians in Rumelia. The investigations of Draganova 
and Berov put this debated question into another context, 
claiming that broad layers of Christian society were lucky enough 
to become rich compared to their prevoius status or compared 
with other regions. Whether it is the result of the activity of 
Midhat Pasha or not, or it is rather the consequence of favourable 
external circumstances (West Europe became the main consumer 
of Balkan wheat owing to the European division of labour, which 
implied manufactures for wheat, prior to the dumping of Russian 




The investigation includes the following localities in Anatolia: 
 
Salihli urbanized village, 278 conscripted in 1845 Anatolia 
Silifke kaza (Konya), 567 conscripted in 1844  Anatolia 
Kastamonu, Diyarbakir, Manisa, 1800–1820 Anatolia 
and the following in Rumelia: 
                                                        
7 For this see Demeter G. A Balkán és az Oszmán Birodalom. Vol. II. Bp., 2015. 
Sources used for this investigation: Osmanli Arsiv Belgelerinde. Kosova 
vilayeti. Istanbul, 2007, 363–413.  
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Priština: 1140 persons under taxation, 24% Christians, 
1844  
Kosova  
Vučitrn: 282 persons under taxation, 40% Christians, 1844  Kosova  
Provadija: 309 persons under taxation, Christians under 
50%, 1870  
Bulgaria  
Anhialo-Pomorie: 200 persons fell under taxation in 
1870, Christian predominance 
Bulgaria 
Majdanpek: 382 persons under taxation, 1862  Serbia  
Veliko Gradište: 721 persons under taxation in 1862  Serbia  




INCOME DIFFENCES BETWEEN SOCIAL STRATA AND 
DIFFERENCES ORIGINATING FROM DIFFERENT 
HIERARCHICAL LEVEL OF SETTLEMENTS 
 
Based on the summary of data illustrated in Table 1–2, and 
Figure 1–2, the following statements can be pointed out. Taxpay- 
ers at all categories of occupation were richer in Priština, than 
in Vučitrn with the exception of craftsmen, who were charact- 
erized by nearly the same per capita revenues (400–440 kurush) 
in the 2 towns. The income of administrative elite, soldiers and 
tradesmen was double in Priština compared to Vučitrn.  
Craftsmen were underrepresented in Vučitrn with their 
15% compared to the more urbanized Priština (40%). It is not 
surprising therefore, that land revenues were the major source 
of income in Vučitrn constituting 46+12% (while in Priština it 
was 14+8%), and peasants and landowners paid more tax 
compared to their proportion. Land revenues were of secondary 
importance in Priština: here only 10% of the taxpayers were 
free peasants or landowners, while in Vučitrn it exceeded 30%. 
Agricultural wage-labourers were also overrepresented in Vučitrn 
with their proportion of 26% compared to the 16% in Priština, but 
they were cheaper as well. The difference between the average 
income of the two settlements was more than 40%, people working 
in transportation earned 35% less in Vučitrn, teachers 50% less. 
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Tabs. 1–2. Distribution of income under taxation based on 













































































226 669 28.06 102 8.9 2222 3.2 
craftsmen 200 596 24.83 455 39.7 441 0.6 
peasants, 
landowners 
113 076 14.00 118 10.3 958 1.4 
merchants 81 846 10.13 71 6.2 1153 1.6 
agricultural 
wage-labourers 
64 517 8.00 184 16.06 351 0.5 
transportation 37 736 4.67 92 8.03 410 0.6 
teachers, priests 18 091 2.24 26 2.27 696 1.0 
other 65 262 8.08 98 8.55 666 0.9 
altogether 807 793 100 1146 100 705 1.0 




19 091 14 21 7 909 2,0 
craftsmen 17 065 13 42 15 406 0,9 
peasants, 
landowners 
60 063 46 97 33 619 1,4 
merchants 11 055 8 16 6 691 1,3 
agricultural 
wage-labourers 
15 426 12 74 26 208 0,5 
transportation 2 658 2 11 4 242 0,5 
teachers, priests 1 846 1 7 2 264 0,5 
other 4 713 4 20 7 236 0,6 
altogether 131 934 100 288 100 458 1,0 
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The role of administrative personnel was greater in Priština than 
in Vučitrn regarding both the percentage values (9 vs. 7%) and 
their proportion from the income as well (28% vs. 14%). The 
welfare index, which was calculated by using the proportion of 
income measured to the total, divided by the proportion of 
population group was extremely high in the case of 
administrative personnel in Priština, even higher than in 
Vučitrn, which means that inequalities based on social strata/ 
occupation were greater in the vilaet center. This is not surprising. 
Canbakal and Filiztekin proved the same: after the turn of the 
18
th–19th centuries, the inequality grew between civil society and 
the administrative elite. The latter was three times richer than 
the group average, as in Priština (Fig. 3).8 
 
Fig. 1. Differences in wealth of strata (average revenues in 
Priština and Vučitrn). 
 
 
                                                        
8 Canbakal, H., A. Filiztekin, Op. cit. 
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Fig. 2. Differences in social stratification and welfare of strata in 
the two Kossowar towns. 
 
 
Fig. 3. The changes in wealth of different social layers in 
Manisa, Bursa and Diyarbakir measured to the average (=1). 
 
Source: Canbakal, H., A. Filiztekin. Wealth and Inequality in Ottoman Lands…  
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INCOME DISTRIBUTION BETWEEN OCCUPATION GROUPS 
 
The prestige of different occupations can be estimated based on 
the yearly revenues, which enables us to group them: the 
coloured background in Table 3 represents the different social 
strata and occupations assigned to these categories. Barbers, 
carpenters, tailors and abadzhis were characterised of low income, 
while shopkeepers, peasants, bakers, bakals were among the 
richer. The difference between the two towns was significant: 
certain occupations (like Muslim priests) belonged to different 
social classes based on their yearly income. However it is true 
that we do not know anything about the costs of living and the 
differences in costs of living for the 2 towns, therefore we cannot 
analyze differences of purchasing power and the index of 
livelihood. 
According to the internal stratification (based on the distribu- 




The internal stratification of the population can be examined 
further by defining religious sub-groups. It is evident that the 
Moslem population was the wealthiest religious community in 
Kosovo according to the temetuat defters in 1844. In Vučitrn 
among the 20 wealthiest tax payers (7%), one can find only 2 
Christians (10%, compared to their 40% in the whole sample). 
The wealthiest Moslems were landowners, timar rentiers or 
tenants (14), the mukhtar himself and only 2 merchants 
(compared to Bulgarian lands their proportion was very low). 
10 of the richest were living in Gazi Ali bey mahalla, but the 
generally poorer Hürrem mahalla also gave 7 persons. Richest 
Christian merchants were living in the Kasaba ranked 21-25th 
place. Among the poorest 25 (10%) only 8 Christians were 
enumerated, a little bit underrepresented (33%) compared to 
their proportion from the whole society.  
In Priština among the wealthiest 50 persons (4,5%) with 
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income above 2000 grosh were 20 timarli rentiers, 2 çiflik 
owners, 5 ‘peasants’ and only 7 merchants besides the naib 
and the leaders of zaptie. Only 3 Christians and 1 Jew was 
enumerated in this group (2 of them are merchants). They 
were not concentrated in one district but rather dispersed: 13 
were living around the Great Cami and 9 in Alüaddin mahalla, 
4 in Hasan Emin. Among the poorest 100 (under 160 grosh) 
one can find 33 Christians, a bit overrepresented compared to 
their 25% in the whole society. 36 were living in the outskirts, 
13 in Ramazanije mahalle, 16 in Jusuf Celebi quarter.  
 
Fig. 4. Internal stratification of Priština and Vučitrn based on 
taxable income in 1844 (% and grosh-kurush). Data are given 
in current prices. 
 
 
A two sample t-test proves statistically, that inhabitants of 
Priština were significantly richer than their compatriots in 
Vučitrn. The statement is true for religious groups as well: 
Christians and Moslems in Priština were richer, than in Vučitrn 
considering the average income (Tab. 4). Regarding the median 
value, differences between religious groups were also diminishing 
compared to average values. Canbakal and Filiztekin also pointed 
out that among the richest differences in wealth originating from 
Gábor Demeter 
 
 - 82 - 
religious differences were eliminated between 1720–1820 people, 
meaning that the elite became religiously heterogeneous.
9
 
Differences within the identical religious group in different 
localities were also smaller if median is used as index. 
Standard deviation was great, meaning that both Christian and 
Muslim society was very differentiated in 1844. Differences 
within religious groups were even greater then differences 
between different denominations. 
When investigating the differences between the social 
stratificiation of local Muslims and Christians in Kosovo it 
became evident, that Christians with their 33% proportion 
among the poorest were overrepresented in Priština (their 
proportion from the total population was about 25%), while 
they constituted only 8–15% of the richer (Tab. 5). In the case 
of middle classes the proportion of Christians was similar to 
their proportion from the total population. While 33% of the 
Muslim community earned more than 666 groshes at corrected 
prices, it was only 15% in the Christian society. 60% of the 
Christians were classified into the poorest categories, while 
among the Muslims this was only 38%. 
In Vučitrn the 2 millets showed relatively balanced structure, 
although the proportion of Muslims among the poorest was 
13% greater than in Priština (the proportion of Christians was 
even higher in the category under 333 grosh). Among richer 
(1000–1333 piastres yearly income) the Christians were 
overrepresented. So, while the Bulgarian and Muslim society 
was very similar at the end of the Tanzimat regarding their 
social differentiation (Tab. 4, Kjotesh), in the beginning of the 
reform process significant differences were observable in the 
western part of the peninsula between the two millets. 
 
Tab. 3. Social position (based on yearly income) of different 
occupations in Priština and Vučitrn, 1844. 
                                                        
9 Religion explained only 10% of the differences in 1820 and dropped back 
from 22%. Canbakal, H., A. Filiztekin, Op. cit. 
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4 1225 305  pasha 1 78 000 78000 
arabadji 6 1897 316  
tailor of 
textiles 
4 1640 410 
shopkeeper 2 1300 650  arabadji 63 24 092 382 
barber 3 945 315  shopkeeper 44 31 469 715 
barber 
assistant 
3 987 329  barber 21 9010 429 
chapaldji 2 305 153  bojadji 6 2990 498 
peasant 93 51 636 555  choban 4 1170 293 
landowner 4 8426 2107  peasant 54 65 312 1209 
carpenter 2 400 200  landowner 15 29 019 1935 
baker 3 1440 480  carpenter 8 2246 281 
moslem 
priest 
4 1113 278  baker 16 7701 481 
tailor of 
clothes 
4 1551 388  moslem priest 16 11 954 747 
tailor 
assistant 
5 2050 410  
tailor of 
clothes 
76 34 004 447 
spahi 1 500 500  dervish 3 300 100 
timarli 
rentier 
7 7962 1137  
hamam 
keeper 
2 555 278 
gendarmerie 6 1763 294  coffee maker 11 4235 385 
trader 15 10 855 724  timarli rentier 76 130 000 1711 
 
 gendarmerie 12 6582 549 
 trader 61 65 497 1074 
 muezzin 3 1116 372 
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Tab. 4. Income inequalities of religious groups in Priština and 
Vučitrn towns (1844) and in Kjotesh village (Bulgaria) (1866) in 


























































































































Christian  427 414 300 367 259 291 
Bulgarian 
(27)  
402 184 300 
Moslem   707 828 420 518 641 315 
Ottoman 
(8)  
456 280 300 
Jewish  811 1021 395       Tatar (46)  348 186 300 
Total  630 748 375 459 530 300 Total  392 216 300 
Source: Osmanli Arsiv Belgelerinde. Kosova vilayeti. Istanbul, 2007, 363–413, 
and Драганова, Сл. Материали за Дунавския вилает. С., 1980, 242–245. 
(Tab. 163.) The pasha is omitted from the investigation.  
 
LOCAL PATTERN OF DIFFERENCES (SEGREGATION) 
 
Local income differences within settlements can also be traced. 
Richest quarters (based on mean income), mahalles were all 
Muslims in Priština (Cami, Jararçeri) and also characterised by 
mediocre homogeneity, referring to a differentiated local society 
(Tab. 7). The Muslim and Christian suburbs and the Muslim 
Yusuf Celebi district were poor and relatively homogenous. 
Districts of middle classes were not homogenous, while the 
districts of lower classes showed no real stratification. It seems 
that the greater the income, the smaller the homogeneity was. 
The average income in the wealthiest mahalle in Vučitrn did 
not exceed the welfare of mahalles of mediocre wealth in 
Priština, Christian mahalles were even poorer (Tab. 6).  
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Tab. 5. Social stratification of Christian and Muslim societies 
based on differences of income in Kosovo. 








105 9 92,11 7,89 13,3 3,0 
1000–1333 51 9 85,00 15,00 6,5 3,0 
666–1000 83 25 76,85 23,15 10,5 8,3 
333–666 247 79 75,77 24,23 31,4 26,4 
under 333 299 177 62,82 37,18 38,1 59,2 
        








14 0 100,00 0,00 8,1 0,0 
1000–1333 5 7 41,67 58,33 2,8 6,1 
666–1000 13 9 59,09 40,91 7,5 7,8 
333–666 48 24 66,67 33,33 27,6 20,9 
under 333 90 75 54,55 45,45 51,7 65,2 
Source: Osmanli Arşiv Belgelerinde. Kosova vilayeti, 363–413. 
 
Tab. 6. Income differences of mahalles in Vučitrn according to 










mahalle (St. dev. / 
Average) 
Gazi Ali bej (M) 665 822 373 ++++ *, 1.23 
Hürrem (M) 486 404 337 +++ ***, 0.82 





138 69 125 + ****, 0.49 
Mahalle (Ch) 427 293 303 ++ ****, 0.68 
Average 459 530 300 +++ *, 1.15 
                                                        
10 Christian gypsies. 
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(St. dev. / 
Average) 
Alaüddin (M) 786 711 525 +++ **, 0.9 
Cami kebir (M) 1195 1164 770 ++++ **, 0.97 
Hasanbey (Ch) 535 464 355 ++ ***, 0.86 
Hasan emin (M) 827 1383 405 +++ *, 1.67 
Hatuniye (M) 581 498 400 ++ ***, 0.85 
Yarar (Ch) 413 280 280 ++ ***, 0.67 
Yararçeri (M) 1109 991 821 ++++ **, 0.89 
Yunus (M) 755 714 500 +++ **, 0.94 
Yusuf Celebi (M) 337 275 250 + ***, 0.81 
Kasaba (Ch) 459 477 325 ++ **, 1.03 
Kücükcami (M) 1151 942 900 ++++ ***, 0.81 
Suburb (Ch) 207 58 200 + ****, 0.28 
Suburb (M) 240 88 225 + ****, 0.36 
Mehmed bey (M) 470 355 360 ++ ***, 0.75 
Pirnazir (M) 698 1085 504 +++ *, 1.5 
Ramazanije (M) 544 567 400 ++ **, 1.04 
Average 630 748 375 +++ *, 1.18 
Source: Osmanli Arsiv Belgelerrinde. Kosova vilayeti. Istanbul, 2007, 363–413. 
Richest mahalles are indicated by gray background, Christian mahalles are 
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REGIONAL SPATIAL DIFFERENCES 
 
The regional differences regarding the welfare of towns can 
also be measured by applying the same income classification, 
however it raises (1) the question of rescaling the data 
published by Nikolay Todorov, who used a different grouping, 
(2) the problems concerning the real prices of Thalers given 
for Serbia (B. Katić), and (3) the changes in silver content and 
in the prices of goods within the investigated 25 years. Thus a 
regrouping and correction of original data was required (Tab. 8). 
Since both the prices and the silver content of kurush 
changed during the investigated time interval, this required the 
introduction of purchasing power substituting the different 
currencies. Within 20 years the prices grew by 50%, while the 
piaster’s silver content was slowly increasing. This means, that 
2000 grosh in 1866 equalled with 1333 grosh in 1844. In this 
way the data on Vučitrn and Priština were rescaled in order to 
make them comparable with Bulgarian and Serbian towns 
from the later periods. 
Among the compared towns the small Pomorie was the richest 
followed by Priština – regarding the proportion of wealthy layers. 
The latter was very similar to the stratification of the small 
Provadija. These were followed by Vučitrn which had a more 
differentiated society with larger proportion of rich and poor and 
with a thinner middle-class compared to the 2 Serbian towns. 
The proportion of persons earning more than 1000 grosh a 
year was 20% in Provadija, 50% in Pomorje, only 26% in 
Priština and 17% in Vučitrn using the corrected values (but 
only 16% and 10% without the usage of PPP). The Anatolian 
Silifke kaza around Konya in 1845 was as rich as Pomorie in 
the 1870s. Urban Bulgaria was wealthier during the last decade of 
the Ottoman rule, than urban Kosovo in 1844 or Serbia in the 
1860s. The fact that in Vučitrn only 1 merchant, but 3 farmers- 
landowners had more than 2000 grosh yearly revenue, while in 
Pomorje–Anhialo 25 persons or 95% of this stratum was 
Gábor Demeter 
 
 - 88 - 
composed of merchants, clearly enlightens the changes over time 
and the differences in the way of living and in these two regions 
of Ottoman Empire. During these 25 years a new, wealthy 
stratum emerged in Bulgaria. In Priština this latter category of 
wealthiest people comprised 50 men including 23 farmers, 
çiflik owners and timariots (46%) and only 6 merchants (12%). 
Especially middle class was weak in Kosovo (32 and 25% 
between 333–666 grosh), while in Bulgaria this layer was 
strenghtening its position (42%, 500–1000 grosh).  
 
Tab. 8. Social stratification of Bulgarian, Serbian, Kossovar and 
























































































































































































































































































































1 3 4.6 2 2 
above 
1333 
10.5 5 11.5 
1500– 
2000 
10 1 5 4.2 2 9 
1000– 
1333 
6 4 33 
1000– 
1500 
28 6 16 7.6 5.2 33 
666– 
1000 








32 25 25 
under 
500 
38 19 36 61 74.2 
under 
333 
42 57 13 
Taxpayers and year in brackets. Serbian Thaler is counted at 6 kurush. Katić, B. 
Štruktura stanovništva Velikog Gradišta i Majdanpeka. – Istorijski Časopis, 35, 1988, 
119–131; Тодоров, Н. Из демографията на гр. Анхиало (Поморие). – ИБИД, 
1967, 159–181; the same, Социално-икономически облик на Провадия. – ИПр, 
1963, № 2, 68–85. 
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Tab. 9. Income of different settlements in Silifke kaza (case 















































































































Average income in 
kuruş in 1845  
(per tax-payers) 
808 434 1110 1009 610 900 
Based on Yalçin, A. Temettuat defterlerine… 
 
Was the Rumelian town/village richer, than the Anatolian 
town or village? Establet and Pascual in Damascus pointed out, 
that 75% of the population accumulated less than 500 grosh 
wealth (in 1720 it equals with 8000 gramms of silver, in 
1780–1800 with 4000 gramms), which is similar to the values 
in Vidin calculated after Atanasov.
11
 
In Kastamonu town, the average heritage was 1800 kurush 
in 1820 and has doubled since 1720. Unfortunately our data 
refer to yearly income, therefore not comparable. But in 
western Anatolia in the urbanized Salihli village the average 
income per household was 830 grosh (although agricultural 
income constituted only 55% of the total income, and 
agricultural taxes constituted 15% of the total taxes levied); in 
Marmara it was 1935 piastres (here 77% of revenues came 
from agriculture), and in Saruhan it was 1780 piastres in 1844. 
The latter two settlements were definitely richer than Priština 
and Vučitrn in the same era, while Salihli was similar to the 
Kosovar towns. Average income was around 1200 piastres
12
 
                                                        
11 Establet, C., J. P. Pascual. Damascene Probate Inventories of the 17th and 
18th Centuries. Some Preliminary Approaches and Results. International 
Journal of Middle Eastern Studies, 24, 1992, 375–376. 
12 Counted after the yields and animal population given by Draganova 
before the increase of wheat prices. 
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in Bulgaria in the vicinity of Pleven (for estates between 2–5 
hectares, for larger estates it was even higher) in the 1840s 
(higher than in Priština), but it was around 2000 groshes in 
Kjustendil and above 3000 in rural Berkovica in the 1870s.
13
 
Neither the silver content of the piaster, nor costs of living did 
change significantly over that time,
14
 which means that rural 
Bulgaria became richer by the end of the Tanzimat (Tab. 10). 
The Anatolian kaza of Silifke (Konya), where agriculture 
produced 75% of the income (in Priština it was 26 %, in 
Vučitrn it was 60%) was also poorer in 1845, than Pleven, 
where 20% of tax-payers had more than 2000 groshes yearly 
income, while in Silifke kaza it was only 2% (see also Tab. 
11).
15
 (Pleven lived from animal-husbandry prior to the great 
upswing of wheat export). Of course, Silifke was poorer than 
the Bulgarian towns in the 1870s, but not poorer than Priština 
or Vučitrn in 1844, or Kjotesh in the 1860s (see Tab. 9). The 
average income in the kaza was around 900 piastres, and 
Christians were the poorer (450 piastres). Even local leaders 
(mukhtars) had the same income (900–1400 kurush) as the 
administrative elite in Priština. 
Rural Anatolia was not significantly poorer than Bulgarian 
towns with the exception of the proportion of the richest layers. 
The middle class showed similar frequency values (in percentage) 
both in Bulgarian towns in the 1870s and in rural Anatolia in 
the 1840s. So, from economic aspects the Tanzimat strengthened 
                                                        
13 See the works of Sl. Draganova: Драганова, Сл. Берковското село в навече- 
рието на Освобождението: статистическо изследване според османските 
данъчни регистри. С., 1985; the same, Кюстендилски регион, 1864–1919: 
Етнографско и социално-икономическо изследване. С., 1996. 
14 The costs of living were decreasing while earnings were increasing between 
1840–1870 in Constantinople. See: Özmucur, S., S. Pamuk. Real Wages and 
Standards of Living in the Ottoman Empire, 1489–1914. – The Journal of 
Economic History, 62, 2002, N 2, 301. 
15 Yalçin, A. Temettuat defterlerine göre 19. Yüzil Ortalarinda Silifke kazasinin 
sosyal ve ekonomik yapisi. – OTAM. 15. 2004, 13–87. 
http://dergiler.ankara.edu.tr/dergiler/19/1272/14643.pdf  
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mainly the class over 2000 piasters yearly income in the towns of 
the Danubian provinces. It is also evident that incomes in rural 
Bulgaria were increasing, exceeding the values characteristic 
for Priština and often Anatolia. 
 
Tab. 10. Average income of different settlements in Rumelia 








































































































in kuruş (per 
households) 
3000–3500 2000 1200 850 1900 1700 750 
 
Tab. 11. The differences in stratification of social layers in 
urban Bulgaria (1870s, in %) and rural Anatolia (1840s). 
Yearly income in 
piastres 
Pomorie (200: 1870s) Silifke kaza, 1845 
above 2000 13 2.1 
1500–2000 10 9 
1000–1500 28 33 
under 1000 48,5 55 





Based on their names more than 80 Muslim and 10 Christian 
newcomers were identified in Priština, which is only 9% of the 
population. Of course the proportion of not indigenous population 
might be greater, but could not be identified as many of the 
names did not refer to the place of origin, but to occupation. 
Based on these available data, Christian society tended to be less 
mobile towards the vilaet seat, as the number of Muslim 
immigrants exceeded that of the Christians by 8 times, while 
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among the total population the ratio between the two millets was 
3:1. This might be explained by the fact, that among Christians 
peasants settled on land were overrepresented and for them 
migration was forbidden. Furthermore, the ethnic proportions 
also show that the town was not among the most favoured 
destinations of Christians as ethnic replacement has already taken 
place by that time not only in Priština, but in Kosovo as well (this 
process accelerated in 1878, when 25% of the inhabitants were 
conscripted as Muslim muhadjir refugees from Bosnia). Those 
who were conscripted with the name Yanovali (8 persons) were 
all Muslims, although formerly Yanova was the centre of Catholic 
Slavs in Kosovo with strong trading relationship with Ragusa in 
the earlier centuries. More interestingly, among the source areas 
of Muslims immigrating to Priština one can find Novobrdo (15 
persons), the last capital city of medieval Serbia. This place is 
followed by Vučitrn (5), Prizren (4), Ipek (3), Lipjan (3), Zaskok 
(2), so most of the immigrants arrived from the nearest 
neighborhood. Djakova and Gilan gave 1-2 immigrants. Outside 
the borders of Kosovo the main source areas were Dupnica (2), 
Shkodra (2), the Serbian Retkošer (3) and Trstenik (2). Beyond 
these Mitrovica (2) Skopje, Niš, Belgrade (1-1-1) can be 
mentioned. The main source of Christian immigrants was Vučitrn 
(3) followed by Prizren, Štip, Mitrovica, Ipek (1). It is surprising 
that the yearly income of immigrating Christians did not lag 
behind that of the immigrant Muslims (540 piastres), who were 
poorer than local Muslims (700 piastres). The latter fact is 
even more surprising if we analyse the occupational structure of 
Muslim newcomers: among the one can enumerate 8 timar and 
2 çiflik owners or rentiers/tenants/leaseholders and several 
richer peasants (only 3 of them had lower income than 1000 
piastres). But the reason of the relative poverty of Muslim 
immigrants is that most of them were agricultural wage- 
labourers, chapaldjis, bostandjis (8), or sekbans (5), wagoners 
(6), whose yearly taxable income was between 300–400 
piastres (the 2 merchants had 750 piastres each, which is lower 
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than the local average). The reason for the relative wealth of 
immigrant Christians is the high income of merchants that 
modified the average, which would have been around 400 
kurush anyway. 
The USA and the Peace with Bulgaria after 









Although geographically far from Europe, the US were (and 
still are) bound up with the European continent through the 
Atlantic Ocean and are inseparable part of the North-Atlantic 
community. It was exactly because of the Atlantic that the US 
got involved in the Napoleon wars and once again one century 
later they unwillingly joint the Great, by that time, European 
war. Their economic power and after 1917 their real and at 
moments decisive participation in battles gave them good 
reasons to pretend for a key role in establishing the post-war 
order in Europe. The Paris Peace Conference (January 18, 1919 
– January 21, 1920) was the forum at which the US presented 
their intentions to take part in the recovery of the old continent. 
According to the American experts House and Seymour, one of 
the most dramatic questions to be settled by the conference was 
the Balkan one.
1
 On its side, Bulgaria, situated in the heart of 
the peninsula, laying territorial claims to all its belligerent 
neighbors, and historically taken, even to its Balkan ally in the 
war – Turkey – was most directly interested in how the future 
state and territorial map of the Balkans would look like. All this 
justifies the interest to the position of Washington for settling 
the Balkan territorial issue after WWI. 
The American delegation entered the negotiation process 
                                                        
1 House, E., Ch. Seymour. What really happened at Paris. The story of the 
Peace Conference, 1918–1919. New York, 1921, 158; Пантев, А., П. Петков. 
САЩ и България по време на Първата световна война. С., 1983, 104. 
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following the principles expressed by President Woodrow Wilson 
in his famous “Fourteen Points” statement on January 8, 1919. It 
was provoked by the Soviets proposal for just and democratic 
peace with no territorial annexations. The first five points of 
Wilson‟s statement which had been consulted neither with Great 
Britain nor with France concerned the basic principles of the new 
world order: open agreements gained through negotiations “in the 
public view” instead of secret diplomacy; freedom of navigation 
upon the seas, outside territorial waters, alike in peace and in war; 
removal of economic barriers and the establishment of an 
equality of trade conditions among all the nations; reduce of 
national armaments consistent with domestic safety; a free and 
impartial adjustment of all colonial claims. The next eight 
points referred to the territorial arrangements. For the Balkans 
they provided for (in point 11): 
Evacuation of Rumania, Serbia, and Montenegro and 
restoration of all occupied territories restored; free and secure 
access to the sea for Serbia; relations of the several Balkan states to 
one another should be determined by friendly counsel along 
historically established lines of allegiance and nationality; and 
international guarantees of the political and economic indepen- 
dence and territorial integrity of the several Balkan states. Point 12 
asserted that the Turkish portion of the then Ottoman Empire 
should be assured a secure sovereignty, but the other nationa- 
lities which were under Turkish rule should be assured a security 
of life and an opportunity of autonomous development; the Darda- 
nelles should be permanently opened as a free passage to the 
ships and commerce of all nations under international guarantees.  
The last, 14
th
 point, stated that a general association of 
nations had to be established for the purpose of affording 
mutual guarantees of political independence and territorial 
integrity to great and small states alike.
2
 
Wilson was not a foreign policy expert and shortly before 
                                                        
2 Papers Related to the Foreign Relations of the United States (FRUS), 
1918, Supplement I, Part I, p. 15. 
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his first inauguration in 1913 he confessed that it would be 
ironically if his administration should have to deal mainly with 
diplomacy. When events forced him to enter the war, in 
September 1917 he established a special study group named 
the „Inquiry to investigate the contested issues and the terms of 
peace‟. It was composed of about 150 academics, headed by 
the presidential advisor Colonel Edward House and supervised 
by Dr Sidney Mezes.
3
 
By the end of 1917 the Inquiry submitted its first report to the 
Department of State. The official Memorandum of December 22, 
1917 treated in eight points the borders of the European states 
from historical, ethnographic and economic point of view. For 
the Balkans, the suggested statement of peace terms said that: 
“…No just or lasting settlement of the tangled problems 
confronting the deeply wronged peoples of the Balkans can be 
based upon the arbitrary treaty of Bucharest. That treaty was a 
product of the evil diplomacy which the peoples of the world are 
now determined to end. That treaty wronged every nation in the 
Balkans, even those which it appeared to favor, by imposing upon 
them all the permanent menace of war. It unquestionably tore men 
and women of Bulgarian loyalty from their natural allegiance. It 
denied to Serbia that access to the sea which she must have in 
order to complete her independence. Any just settlement must of 
course begin with the evacuation of Rumania, Serbia, and 
Montenegro by the armies of the Central Powers, and the 
restoration of Serbia and Montenegro. The ultimate relationship of 
the different Balkan nations must be based upon a fair balance of 
nationalistic and economic considerations, applied in a generous 
and inves[ti]tive spirit after impartial and scientific inquiry. The 
meddling and intriguing of great powers must be stopped, and the 
efforts to attain national unity by massacre must he abandoned. 
It would obviously be unwise to attempt at this time to draw 
frontiers for the Balkan states. Certain broad considerations, 
however, may tentatively be kept in mind. They are in brief these: 
                                                        
3 Джонсън, П. История на американския народ. С., 2010, 714.  
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1) that the area annexed by Rumania in the Dobrudja
4
 is 
almost surely Bulgarian in character and should lie returned; 2) 
that the boundary between Bulgaria and Turkey should be 
restored to the Enos-Midia line, as agreed upon at the 
conference of London.
5
 3) that the south boundary of Bulgaria 
should be the Aegean Sea coast from Enos to the gulf of Orfano, 
and should leave the mouth of the Struma river in Bulgarian 
territory; 4) that the best access to the sea for Serbia is through 
Saloniki; 5) that the final disposition of Macedonia cannot be 
determined without further inquiry; G) that an independent 
Albania is almost certainly an undesirable political entity. 
We are strongly of the opinion that in the last analysis 
economic considerations will outweigh nationalistic affiliations 
in the Balkans, and that a settlement which insures economic 
prosperity is most likely to be a lasting one”.6 
The recommendations of the Inquiry combined two appro- 
aches – the ethnic and the economic one, the latter prevailing 
over nation concerns when conflict problems occurred as in 
the case of Dobrudja and Thrace in favor of Bulgaria. As for 
Macedonia, the experts were obviously aware of the complex 




During the next 1918 year teams of experts were sent all over 
Europe to study the local peculiarities and gather information 
from different sources and researches. In October 1918 a Balkan 
Section was formed presided by Clive Day, doctor of economic 
history at Yale University which had to examine the grounds for 
the Balkan states territorial aspirations (with the exception of 
Turkey) and recommend what position the US should take. One 
of the main tasks of the Balkan section was to draw up drafts for 
a Balkan national, state and political map which had to be 
                                                        
4 In the Treaty of Bucharest [Footnote in the original]. 
5 And in the treaty of San Stefano [Footnote in the original]. 
6 FRUS, 1919, Vol. I, 50–51. 
7 Пантев, А., П. Петков, Op. cit., 75. 
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accepted by the Paris Peace Conference. Its experts had to find 
ethnographic, language, historical, cultural, economic and 
strategic arguments in connection with the boundaries of the 
Balkan states. In this respect, the records of the proceedings did 
not mention any division between victors and vanquished but 
recommended that the majority of population in each state should 
consist of representatives of one and the same nationality.
8
 
As a result, the Inquiry furnished the US delegation for the 
pending peace negotiations with an impressing set of documents, 
full of reliable text information and maps. According to the 
British specialist on diplomatic history Harold Nicolson, who 
attended the conference, if the Versailles Treaty were drawn up by 
American experts only, this would have been one of the wisest 
and scientifically grounded peace treaties ever written.
9
  
The benevolent attitude to Bulgaria demonstrated in the 
Memorandum cited above rested not only on the good expert 
knowledge of the origin of the Balkan conflicts and Bulgarian 
problems, but also on the information and the influence of the 
American missionaries who had entered the European provinces 
of the Ottoman Empire as early as in the beginning of the 19
th
 
century. Here they got in touch with the Bulgarians in the sphere 
of religious and lay education. The process of getting knowledge 
of each other continued in the turmoil after the April Uprising 
of 1876 through the American defense and sympathy to the 
participants in the rebellion against the Ottoman rule rendered by 
the American Consul General in Constantinople Eugene Schuyler 
as well as the support of the Act of Unification (1885) by both 
diplomats and missionaries who appreciated the Bulgarians as a 
nation who loved freedom and totally deserved it. Due to the long 
contacts with the Bulgarian population and impartial observations 
the American missionaries got to know quite well their ethnic 
                                                        
8 Ibid., 106–107. 
9 Джонсън, П., Op. cit., 714. 
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boundaries in the Balkan Peninsula. The “Miss Stone Affair”10 
increased the interest to the Bulgarian liberation cause in 
Macedonia, which the Americam missionary herself supported 
when she returned to the USA. The heroism of the rebels in the 
Ilinden-Preobrazhenie Uprising (1903) and the atrocities during 
its suppression provoked reaction of sympathy among the 
American public (well informed about the events by the 
missionaries in Macedonia and the Adrianople region) and gained 
the support of distinguished public figures and high officials.
11
 
The end of the Balkan wars presented one more opportunity 
for the US diplomacy to demonstrate will and equity despite its 
interests in the region: the US Minister Plenipotentiary to 
Bucharest Charles Vopicka (covering also Bulgaria for the State 
Department) refused to sign the Treaty of Bucharest (1913) as a 
protest against its unjust clauses to Bulgaria. The situation in the 
Balkans and Bulgaria‟s isolation precipitated the Bulgarian 
intentions at activating the dialog with the USA. In early 1914 
Bulgarian Consulate General was opened in New York. The US 
businessman Clayton Rockhill was appointed Consul General. 
Besides, the Radoslavov Cabinet decided to open a Bulgarian 
legation in the US capital. Stefan Panaretov, a graduate of and a 
lecturer at the famous Robert College in Constantinople was 
chosen for the position of Bulgarian Minister Plenipotentiary to 
Washington. He presented his credentials to President W. 
Wilson on December 10, 1914.
12
  
The war put to the test Bulgarian-American relations. Consul 
General in New York C. Rockhill left office while in October 1915 
                                                        
10 The kidnapping for ransom of the American Protestant missionary Ellen Maria 
Stone and her pregnant fellow missionary friend Katerina Stefanova–Tsilka by an 
Internal Macedonian-Adrianople Revolutionary Organization detachment led by 
the voivoda Yane Sandanski and the sub-voivodas Hr. Chernopeev and Kr. 
Asenov on 21 August 1901 and their subsequent release. 
11 Тошкова, В. САЩ и България 1919-1989. Политически отношения. 
С., 2007, 9–10. 
12 Ibid., 14. 
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the State Department released from service the consular agent in 
Sofia Dr. A. Kermekchiev who had been appointed two years 
before. The office was transformed into Consulate General and 
Dominic Murphy became the Consul-General in Sofia, the first 
American diplomat resident in Bulgaria. In October 1915 the State 
Department sent Lewis Einstein, a diplomat from the American 
Embassy in Istanbul, to Sofia. The observations of the American 
diplomats confirmed the conclusions already made by Vopicka that 
Bulgaria‟s ambitions in the war were deprived of megalomania and 
were limited to the revision of the Treaty of Bucharest.
13
 
Although participating in opposite belligerent coalitions in 
the First World War, the US and Bulgaria did not sever diplomatic 
relations. On February 6, 1917 the Secretary of State Lansing 
informed the Bulgarian Government through the Consul 
General Murphy that the US Government assumed the friendly 
relations between Bulgaria and the United States would continue 
in spite of the necessity which had arisen for the United States to 
sever relations with Germany. He asked Murphy, in case of 
uncertainty, to convince Bulgarian authorities that it was for the 
mutual interest of Bulgaria and the United States to avoid the 
suspension of the friendly relations which had always existed 
between the two countries.
14
 Radoslavov‟s answer, delivered 
again through Murphy, was not delayed: “I request you to declare 
to the Honorable Government of the United States on behalf of 
the Royal Government that Bulgaria intends also on her part to 
preserve the relations of perfect friendship that she has always 
been happy to maintain with the United States”.15 
Official contacts were preserved despite the German pressure 
over Bulgaria or the ambivalent assessments of Bulgaria‟s siding 
with the Central Powers among US politicians and public. This 
was mainly due to the strong pro-Bulgarian campaign carried out 
by American missionaries, scholars, journalists, diplomats, joined 
                                                        
13 Пантев, А., П. Петков, Op. cit., 60–61. 
14 FRUS, 1917, (Supplement 2) Vol. I, p. 116. 
15 Ibid., 138.  
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by Bulgarian public figures, who stood in defense of the 
Bulgarians and their motives for entering the war.
16
 
Especially empathetic and helpful was the activity of the 
US Consul General to Sofia Murphy whose reports to the State 
Department bore not only the information of a professional 
diplomat but also the deep conviction that the Bulgarian people 
and government definitely did not want to fight with the US. 
In his telegram of May 10, 1917 he announced:  
“Audience with Minister for Foreign Affairs Wednesday. 
Received assurances that there would be no break in relations 
happily existing between the two countries. German-Austrian 
pressure is still very great but up to date has failed. Official 
circles in Bulgaria strongly in favor of friendly relations, public 
sentiment likewise. Newspaper reports of disturbances in 
Bulgaria entirely unfounded.”17 
The lost battle of Dobro Pole forced Malinov's government 
to seek termination of the Bulgarian participation in the 
bloodshed, according to the principles declared by W. Wilson 
and with the mediation of the United States. D. Murphy, 
together with the military attaché Archibald Walker accompanied 
the Bulgarian delegation for the signing of the armistice. After 
twice editing the answer, the Bulgarian proposal was accepted 
but the speed with which the armistice was signed (September 
29, 1918) made the initiative pointless. This incurred criticism 
to Murphy that his hasty action could isolate the US from the 
settlement of peace in the Balkans.
18
  
The armistice with Bulgaria accelerated the opening of a 
US diplomatic mission in Sofia. Charles Wilson was appointed 
Chargé d`afer ad interim to Bulgaria. He arrived in Sofia on 
December 8, 1918 from Madrid to directly monitor the events 
in the country after the armistice. On October 24 he was 
                                                        
16 Петков П. (Ed.). С. Панаретов. Дневник 1917-1920. – ИДА, Т. 48 (1984), 
259, 265–266, 273, et al.  
17 FRUS, 1919, The Paris Peace Conference, Vol. 1, 67. 
18 Пантев, А., П. Петков, Op. cit., 95. 
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specifically instructed not only to explain to the Bulgarians the 
US position in the war, but also to supply the State Department 
with more information about Bulgaria. Secretary of State 
Lansing explicitly indicated that he should completely avoid 
engaging the US government or himself with the ambitions for 
territorial expansion of Bulgaria, thus determining Wilson‟s 
position of a distant observer and mediator.
19
  
Getting to know the country and the people, the US 
diplomat noted that all the American missionaries here were 
“strongly pro-Bulgarian and strong partisans of Bulgarian 
territorial ambitions”.20 He found out that during the war they 
had carried on a considerable propaganda work in the United 
States, especially with a view to preventing a declaration of 
war against Bulgaria, and that they were continuing this 
propaganda in a more intensely in the hope that Bulgarian 
aspirations for increasing their territory would be considered 
favorably at the Peace Conference, and especially receive the 
support of the American delegation.
21
 
Although instructed to keep distance, Wilson transmitted 
thorough diplomatic channels the communications of the 
missionnaries of the American Board, residing in Bulgaria who 
advocated for Bulgaria‟s right to present its stand before the 
Peace Conference. He also informed of the request of the 
Bulgarian Prime Minister, and the Ministers of War and Finance 
to secure permission from the US Government “for some of the 
American missionaries in Bulgaria to go to Paris, officially or 
un-officially, to place before American and other allied public 
men Bulgaria's position and aspirations for increased 
territory.”22 
Wilson also reported about the friendly feelings the Bulgarians 
cherished for the United States and their expectations to obtain 
                                                        
19 Тошкова, В., Op, cit., 20; NA USA 123 W 69/106. 
20 FRUS, 1919, The Paris Peace Conference, Vol. II, 248. 
21 Ibid., 249. 
22 Ibid. 
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from them protection of their national interests in Paris. This hope 
was equally shared by both politicians and people. On December 
16, 1918 in a telegram to the Ambassador in France Sharp Wilson 
informed him about the Prime Minister‟ s request to convey to the 
President of the United States, in the name of the Government of 
Bulgaria, and its people, congratulations upon his arrival in Europe. 
For the Bulgarians, the Prime minister continued, this was an event 
of great importance “as Bulgaria looked to the President of the 
United States to save Bulgaria from annihilation”.23 Ten days after 
his arrival in Sofia, having had numerous meetings and talks, 
Wilson concluded: “Every Bulgarian with whom I have spoken 
looks to the United States to espouse the Bulgarian cause at the 
Peace Conference, and states that they have the most absolute 
confidence in President Wilson and his theory of nationalities, 
which they expect will fulfill all their aspirations for territorial 
expansion. I have not spoken to a single Bulgarian who has not 
told me that no pressure could have induced Bulgaria to side with 
Germany if she had believed that the United States would enter the 
war. It is also a fact that Germany used every argument and threat 
to induce Bulgaria to declare war on the United States and that the 
latter refused even at the risk of a break with her allies.”24 
The Paris Conference was the tribune where the US presented 
their ambitions to play a major role in the recovery of the Old 
continent. However a difference existed between the Entente and 
the American concerning the arrangement of the European matters. 
As early as on October 2, 1918 the US mission in London 
informed the representatives of the Entente that the US regarded 
the treaties about the Balkans as a part of the general issue of the 
future world order. The declaration also warned that they would not 
approve agreements which would allow the Balkan allies of Great 
Britain to solely and without control arrange the territorial 
problems in this region. In addition, Wilson pointed out that 
one of the main elements of the European “new order” should 
                                                        
23 FRUS, 1919, The Paris Peace Conference, Vol. II, 250. 
24 Ibid., 255. 
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be the withdrawal of the Great Powers from the Balkans.
25
  
Just after the Peace Conference was open, on January 21, 
1919 the Inquiry presented “Outline of Tentative Report and 
Recommendation, prepared by the Intelligence Section with 
instructions for the President and the Plenipotentiaries”. The 
document, which became famous at the conference as “The 
Black Book”, would serve as the principle policy document for 
the American delegation during the negotiations. The greater 
part of it (79 out of 98 pages in total) was devoted to territorial 
issues which, together with the large collection of maps, was 
intended to give background and starting position for the 
negotiators and influence the final policy decisions in Paris.
26
 
The document proposed considerable changes of the borders 
in the Balkans. According to it, the Bulgarian-Romanian border 
had to be restored as it had been before the Second Balkan War of 
1913 i.e. before the Treaty of Bucharest; Macedonia should gain 
autonomy or retain its pre-war status quo; Bulgaria should take 
the territory in Eastern Thrace to the Midia-Enos line (as 
recognized by the London Peace Treaty of May 1913). At the 
same time the report maintained the territorial claims of Romania 
and the still unrecognized Yugoslav state towards Austria-Hungary; 
of the Yugoslavs – towards Italy and of Greece – towards Turkey. 
However, the implementation in practice of the scientific and 
historical conclusions of the experts in the Balkan problems 
proved to be quite different.
27
  
In Paris, in the name of the right of nations to 
self-determination, proclaimed by W. Wilson, for “their” national 
territories fought both victors and vanquished (assuming the latter 
were given an opportunity to present their stand in one way or 
another). In fact, the defense of the peacemakers as well as the 
                                                        
25 Тошкова, В., Op. cit., 21; Saunders, R. In Search of Woodrow Wilson. 
Beliefs and Behavior. Praeger, 1998, 181–182. 
26 Reisser, W. J. The Black Book: Woodrow Wilson‟s Secret Plan for 
Peace. Lexington Books, 2012, 33.   
27 Пантев, А., П. Петков, Op. cit., 110. 
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national propaganda of the countries contending for the same area 
covered the entire range of arguments by which a nation state 
claimed their rights over certain – from the romantic view of 
language and religion, uniting people in a “national territory”, 
through the Enlightenment idea referring the integrity of the 
national territory rather to its security and economic viability; 
from the geographic determinism and the search of “natural 
boundaries to geopolitical concerns and the emerging fear of the 
spread of Bolshevism. Above them all, however, applied 
selectively, stood the principle of punishing the “guilty”, i.e. the 
vanquished, and encouraging friends – former allies and future 
partners. Bulgaria was among the punished.
28
 
The conclusions and recommendations of the US experts 
concerning Bulgaria were not taken into consideration by the 52 
sub-commissions of the Peace Conference and subsequently 
were abandoned by the American delegation. Headed by 
President Wilson himself, in the course of negotiations the US 
diplomacy changed its stands and priorities. The pragmatic 
political approach, the shrewd diplomatic combinations and the 
pressure from the position of power prevailed over the declared 
intentions for just, backed up by scientific arguments.  
The US activity towards the Balkans was motivated by their 
apparent disagreement (before and after they entered the war) 
with the economic and territorial aims of the Entente and by 
Wilson‟s ambitions to displace the old Great Powers from their 
positions in Europe. Partially, this idea was accomplished with 
the establishment of a big state of the southern Slavs as a barrier 
to a possible German expansion. The project for a multinational 
state created from the territories of Serbia, Croatia, Bosnia and 
                                                        
28 For the principles of drawing nation-state borders in Paris, see White, G. 
Nation, State and Territory. Origin, Evolutions, and Relationships. Vol. 1. Inc., 
2004, 204–228; Генов, Г. П. Ньойският договор и България. С., 1935, 5–58. 
For the Bulgarian propaganda in defense of Bulgarian territorial aspirations, 
see Христов, Х. България, Балканите и мирът. С., 1984, 53–75; Илчев, И. 
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Herzegovina, Slovenia and Macedonia was approved by the US 
as early as in the beginning of February 1919. Washington was 
the first to recognize the new Kingdom of Serbs, Croats and 
Slovenes. With their position on the Italian-Yugoslav controversy 
the US intended to outplay Great Britain and France in shaping 
post-war Europe and replace the old protection over the small 
European states and nations. Wilson‟s pro-Yugoslav attitude to 
the Adriatic issue had also the aim to neutralize the pro-Bulgarian 
conclusions of the Balkan section of the Inquiry which faced 
Belgrade‟s discontent. Meanwhile, the Yugoslav delegation was 
inclined to show certain consideration with the US on the issue of 
the western Bulgarian border in return for support of the 
Yugoslav interests in Dalmatia and especially if the US dropped 
the idea of autonomy for Macedonia under the mandate of a 
neutral state as well as the demand for a plebiscite there carried 
out under the control of the Great Powers.
29
  
Discussions on the borders with Bulgaria began on 21 July 
                                                        
29 The Memorandum of the Balkan section of the Inquiry of March 1919 
concerning the borders in the Balkans stated that Macedonia which had been a 
bloody battlefield for 25 years had to be given special attention if in the Balkans 
should be established healthy relationship. It recommended that the territory from 
the Shar Moutains to the present Serbian-Greek border together with Eastern 
Macedonia with the valley of Struma, Serres and Kavalla should be given to 
Bulgaria. Serbia might keep the territory north of the Shar Mounatains; Greece – 
Thessaloniki and neighboring areas, which were Slavic before 1913, but due to 
an exchange of population gained Greek appearance. This. According to US 
experts, would be the most durable and just division. Another solution, 
recommended by the Memorandum, was the establishment of “autonomous” 
part of Macedonia under the control of a no-interested elected government 
uninterested mandate power. The document also stated that Bulgaria should keep 
or recover all its territories given to it in 1878. It specifically noted that the 
changes of the western and northern borders were of strategic character but the 
change affected seriously the principle of self-determination, and re-enforced 
permanent enmity. As for the Thrace, analyzing different options the experts 
stated that in any case it would be better if Western Thrace remained in Bulgaria 
while there were good reasons for Eastern Thrace with the Midia-Enos line to be 
given to Bulgaria. – See Пантев, А., П. Петков, Op. cit., 115–117. 
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1919 and the difference in the positions of the negotiators 
became clear already in the Report presented to the Supreme 
Council by the Central Territorial Committee. On the boundary 
of Dobrudja, the American delegation proposed that Roumania 
should return to Bulgaria the territories which she had annexed 
by force in 1913 since she received now much more extensive 
territories from Austria; the Committee except for the US 
delegation insisted on the maintenance of the 1914 boundary. 
Unanimity could not be obtained about the Southern 
boundary as well. Contrary to the British, French and Japanese 
delegations, the American and Italian delegations proposed the 
frontier of 1913, amended to the profit of Bulgaria by 
Turko-Bulgarian Treaty of 1915. The American delegation whose 
observations were supported by the Italian delegation, noted that 
Bulgaria had not acquired Western Thrace by conquest but with 
the voluntary consent of Greece and her allies who had the wisdom 
to recognize her this natural outlet to the sea. The American 
delegation disputed the Report of the Commission on Greek 
Affairs stating that the non-Mohammedan population of 
Bulgarian Thrace was more Greek than Bulgarian and questioned 
the alleged preference of the Mohammedan population the 
majority of which spoke Bulgaria, to be under Greek rather than 
under Bulgarian authority. The US delegation pointed out that the 
lack of direct access by land to the Mediterranean would 
seriously compromise the economic development of Bulgaria. 
Even if these economic inconveniences could be overcome 
bitterness and resentment for the injustice committed would still 
remain among the Bulgarian people which would be an inevitable 
menace to the future peace of the world. 
“Ethnographical, economic, and political arguments, as well 
as possession certainly supported by valid claims, all favor the 
maintenance of the Bulgarian boundaries as they are at the 
present time. 
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“The Southern boundary of Bulgaria will be that which 
existed after the cession by Turkey in 1915 of territory adjoining 
Adrianople, under the reservation of the right of the principal 
Allied Associated Powers to attach to the International State 
such part of the said territory as seems desirable.” 
The Italian delegation associated itself with the conclusions 
of the American delegation.
30
  
Although W. Wilson refrained from denouncing directly 
the Bucharest Treaty, the initial statements and acts of the 
American delegation ignored it. Consequently, the US gradually 
changed their position. 
For regions like Banat, Croatia, Istria, Bukovina and Dalmatia 
which are associated rather with Eastern and Central Europe than 
with the Balkans, the US diplomats managed to impose their views 
which only partially coincided with those of the Entente. As far as 
“the true” Balkans were concerned, the victory states neglected 
Wilson‟s principle for self-determination which remained a priority 
only to scholars – ethnologists, geographers, historians, and 
linguists. The fate of Eastern and Western Thrace, Dobrudja, 
Macedonia and some sectors of the Serbian-Bulgarian border was 
decided in this manner. The unwillingness of the US diplomats to 
listen to the recommendations of the Inquiry coincided with the 
decreasing chances for the establishment of a Constantinople State 
with an American mandate over it. 
In the final decisions of the Conference the American support 
for Bulgaria was of importance only in rejecting the Serbian 




The other decisions on the Balkan problems were taken in 
the same pattern of strong pressure from the Balkan victory 
states and their European patrons followed by partial concessions. 
In the end, the Paris Conference confirmed the decisions of the 
Bucharest Treaty of 1913. 
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The Thracian question from February to September 1919 
was among the most controversial topics in the commissions 
and committees of the Conference dealing with the future 
Bulgarian-Greek border. According to the American experts, who 
obviously assumed the economic factor as dominant in settling 
territorial problems, the principal focus of territorial difficulty in 
the Balkans was Thrace, whose Eastern and Western sections 
affected the commercial outlets of Bulgaria in a critical way.
32
 
Greek claims to Thrace received solid support from her former 
and future allies France and Britain, assisted by Japan; reserved to 
them was Italy as far as she has plans of her own in the Eastern 
Mediterranean.
33
 The US position evaluated: – from accepting of 
the Bulgarian rights over Western Thrace based on ethnic and 
economic arguments and expansion of its eastern border in the 
Adrianople region, depending on the range of the projected by 
them Constantinople state (in January – March 1919), through the 
defense of a Bulgarian outlet to the Aegean Sea through Western 
Thrace
34
 to accepting the compromise solution that Bulgaria 
should renounces in favor of the Principal Allied and Associated 
Powers all rights and title over the territories in Thrace which 
belonged to her (in September 1919) and the recognition by 
declaration of the American Congress of January 20, 1920 of all 
Greek claims over Eastern and Western Thrace.
35
 
The issue of Southern Dobrudja was solved in a similar way. 
Despite the US initiative for Roumania to return to Bulgaria the 
territory which she had taken in 1913, eventually Under- 
Secretary of State Frank Polk withdrew the US proposal with the 




                                                        
32 House, E., Ch. Seymour, Op. cit., 173. 
33 Helmreich, P. C. From Paris to Sevres. Columbus, 1974, 153–154.    
34 Трифонов, С. Българското национално-освободително движение в 
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While not at war with Bulgaria, representatives of the US at 
the Paris Conference Frank Polk, Under-Secretary of State, Henry 
White, formerly Ambassador Extraordinary and Plenipotentiary of 
the United States at Rome and Paris and General Tasker Bliss, 
Military Representative of the United States on the Supreme War 
Council, by a decision of the Council of Five of November 3, 
1919 signed the Treaty of Neuilly as a demonstration of 
consensus with the Allies.
37
 
On October 27, 1919 Panaretov sent a note to Secretary of 
State Lansing on the occasion of the Peace Treaty with 
Bulgaria, indicating the severity of its conditions and their 
incompatibility with the principles of Wilson. The Bulgarian 
Minister Plenipotentiary had no illusions that it could change 
anything in the treaty, but he could not help expressing at least 
one “moderate protest” against the false assurances that 
Bulgaria would receive justice. In his diary he could not hide 
his disappointment at Wilson‟s fiasco and his promises about 
the settlement of the world problems.
38
 
The convincing scientific arguments, presented by scholars, 
remained helpless against the game of the career diplomats. Due 
to that reason Wilson quickly gave up the pro-Bulgarian recom- 
mendations of the Inquiry and Lansing and House changed their 
views about to which country certain Balkan territory should 
belong. 
The Bulgarian case, in particular, showed that the US 
diplomacy yielded to the old European school. This was due not 
only to the fact that to compared to it, the team of Wilson was 
less experienced and skillful or because after the idea of an 
American mandate in Constantinople failed the US had no 
direct territorial interests in the region. It was mainly because 
the majority of the participants in the Paris Peace Conference 
imposed the principle of punishing “the guilty”, i.e. the 
vanquished and compensating the victors. With the U.S. Senate 
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opposition to the Covenant of the League of Nations and the 
with the Congress refusal to ratify the Versailles Treaty, the US 
reverted to isolationism but not for long. In the big politics the 
end of Eurocentrism had come although in the Balkans the Old 
Europe had still the final word. Future would show whether the 
“twofold” position of the US about the Versailles Treaty (on 
theoretical and practical level) would foster pro-American 
revisionist hopes among the disappointed with the new order 
small states and nations or would sober down their illusions in 
favor of a more pragmatic and rational assessment of the 
reliability and prospects of one or another political alliance, and 
whether the US could be that possible and perspective ally. 
Principles and Realities of World War One 










RELEVANCE OF THE TOPIC  
 
The case study of the Slovak–Hungarian border-distinction 
after the First World War is an interesting object for study 
because of several reasons. First of all – this border had no 
precedence, i.e. it could serve as a pure illustration of the 
peace-making process. As known, since the dissolution of the 
early medieval Great Moravian State, the Slovak lands were 
incorporated in the medieval Hungarian state and became a 
possession of the crown of St. Stephen under the name of 
Upper Hungary. According to the new principle of the right of 
self-determination, legitimized at the end of WWI, the new 
border distinction between Hungary and Slovakia a priori had 
to be defined as a border between two nations, i.e. it had to 
follow the ethnic distribution and localization of the population. 
The newly drawn border arrangement had to demonstrate in a 
pure form the national distinction which brings birth to two 
national states, successors of the old Habsburg monarchy. A 
pure theoretical assumption. 
Secondly, both newborn national states were accepting as 
general criteria for the territorial arrangement the right of a 
nation to self-determination. The Czechoslovaks used this 
right to call their independent state in October 1918. The 
Hungarians first called their rights over the integrity of St 
Stephen’s crown and accepted these criteria a bit later. Anyway, 
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it was the Entente to decide about the new border arrangement. 
The fact that the decision laid in the third power, presumably 
neutral and not malevolent, and the fact that both sides accepted 
the right of self-determination as a common ground for the 
new border distinction supposed an easy, mutually accepted and 
just decision in this issue. Again a pure intellectual speculation. 
 
PRES. W. WILSON’S GENERAL DESIGN: THEORY AND 
APPLICATION IN CENTRAL EUROPE 
 
In the first version of pres. Woodrow Wilson’s program a call for 
more autonomy for the people of Central Europe was expressed. 
As vague as it was stated, it left room for future arrangements, 
eventually for a constitutional reform, but at that time no 
responsible policy-maker thought about the dissolution of 
Austro-Hungary, the main goal was rather to separate the 
Danubian Monarchy from its German ally and thus to win the 
war. For this purpose – winning the war – the Czechoslovak 
legion was formed fighting on the side of Entente and against 
the Central Powers. Situation changed as the emigrant 
Czechoslovak National Council (CSNC) was recognized as a 
legitimate political speaker for the new nation – first by France, 
then by Great Britain, USA, Italy and Japan. 
The new US note of October 18, 1918, send to Habsburg’s 
government was reflecting this new political reality. It spoke 
again of an enlarged autonomy for the peoples of Central 
Europe and built up of responsible governments. The crucial 
point however was: Washington did not treat Habsburg’s 
government any more as a legitimate. The future partner to 
deal with was CSNC (together with the Polish, Serbian and 
Rumanian emigrant committees). All they were invited to take 
part at the peace conference in Paris.  
Immediately after receiving this US answer in Vienna, on the 
next day – October 28, 1918 – the Czech National Committee 
(CNC) at home peacefully took the power from the Habsburg 
authorities in Prague. Thus, the political coordination between 
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CSNC and the politicians at home gave birth to the new 
Czechoslovak state. At that time the names of two Slovaks were 
connected with this act: Milan Rastislav Štefanik, a general of the 
French Army with sound connections at Quai d’Orsay, who was 
active in organizing the Czechoslovak troops abroad fighting on 
the Entente’s side – he became a minister of War in the first 
Czechoslovak’s provisional government; and the Slovak 
politician Vavro Šrobar. Šrobar was a keen promoter of the ideas 
of pres. T. G. Masaryk for building up a common Czechoslovak 
state. On a working class demonstration in May 1918 in 
Liptovsky Mikulas he spoke openly about this political project.
1
It 
happened only by chance that Šrobar from the Slovak National 
Party was in Prague on October 28, 1918, when the CNC took 
the power and became the sole Slovak, signing up the 
proclamation of the new state.
2
 But as a matter of fact, by that 
time he had no authorisation from the Slovak National Council.
3
 
Two days later – on October 30, 1918 the so called Martin 
Declaration was proclaimed by the Slovak National Committee. It 
stated close ethnic, linguistic and cultural affiliations between 
Slovaks and Czechs, accepted fully Wilson’s points as a base for 
future arrangements and showed political will to build up a 
common state with the Czechs.
4
 The initial text under point 4 
stated that “we expect that the solution of the Slovak question 
would be done on the peace conference, where the destiny of our 
nation would be settled down. That is why we insist that also the 
Hungarian branch of the Czecho-Slovak nation should be 
represented on the coming peace congress”.5 This, of course, 
                                                        
1 Peknik, M. Tomáš Garrigue Masaryk a nektoré aspekty slovensko-českých 
vztahov za prvej svetovej vojny. – In: První svĕtová válka, moderní 
demokracie a TGM. Sborník konference, Praha, 1995, 234. 
2 Kvaček, R. První světová válka a česká otázka. Praha, 2013, 167. 
3 Holec, R. The Slovaks in the Whirwind of War. – In: A Concise History of 
Slovakia. Mantova, E. (Ed.). Bratislava, 2000, 237. 
4  Naše dejiny v pramenoch, Sbornik dokumentov. Ratkoš, R. (Ed.) 
Bratislava, 1971, 290. 
5 Ibid., 290. 
Principles and Realities of World War One Peace Settlement 
(A Case Study of the Slovak–Hungarian Border) 
 
 - 115 - 
 
meant that the Slovak political leaders wanted to have their own, 
separate political representation at the peace conference in Paris – a 
claim, which was dropped down in the final version of the 
document.
6
 This claim did not find place in the last version of the 
Declaration, which was sent to Prague. The reason was that during 
the debate of the declaration Milan Hodţa (editor and deputy at 
Hungarian parliament and member of the Slovak National Party, 
who was based during the war in Vienna) convinced the gathered 
politicians that the claim for a separate Slovak presentation on the 
peace conference would complicate the issue, as the Slovaks had 
already an internationally accepted speaker, the CSNC.
7
 
It is also worth pointing out that on the Martin Declaration 
there was also the signature of pater Andrej Hlinka, the founder 
of the Slovak National Party, who stood for years for more 
Slovak autonomy and was persecuted for his views.
8
 As early as 
in May 1918 on a meeting of his party, he decidedly proclaimed 
that the “1000 year marriage of the Slovaks with the Hungarian 
State was a disaster” and thus a logical separation from this state 
could be expected and pro Czech orientation promoted.
9
 Even 
when signing up the Martin declaration, however, he was not 
thinking of abandoning his claim for Slovak autonomy – it was just 
politically unwise not to use the advantage of having already an 
internationally accepted presentation on the peace conference. 
The Martin Declaration further proclaimed the Slovak 
National Committee (a counterpart of the Czech one) as the 
new legitimate ruler of the country. However, as a matter of 
fact, unlike the Czech National Committee, the Slovak National 
Committee never got a strong hold over the country. It was in 
power only on the paper, it had no force to implement decisions. 
The local institutions: police, army, post, railway, clearks, i.e., 
                                                        
6 Pastor, P. Hungary between Wilson and Lenin: The Hungarian Revolution 
of 1918–1919 and The Big Three. Boulder, USA, 1976, 49. 
7 Kvaček, R., Op.cit., 170. 
8 Hlinka had spent two years in prison. 
9 Slovenské dejiny. Martinka, P. (Ed.). Bratislava, 1993, 202. 
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all authorities remained loyal to the Budapest government. This 
was not surprising, given the fact that out of 6185 clerks, 
governing Upper Hungary by the outbreak of the World war, 
there were only 154 Slovaks.
10
 
Furthermore, unlike its Czech counterpart, which was built 
on the parliamentary representation of the Czech parties in the 
parliament in Vienna, i.e. legitimized in elections, the Slovak 
National Committee could not accept this key.
11
 It came into 
existence by a general agreement among the political parties, 
resp. their most prominent leaders (Andrej Hlinka, Vavro Šrobar, 
Milan Hodţa etc.) 
The Martin Declaration and the expression of the self- 
determination will of the Slovaks to join the Czechs, raised for 
the first time the question of shaping a border between the 
Upper land and the post-war Hungary. The war, however, was 
still to be won on the battlefields, and the question of the 
future territorial arrangements after its end – still open. An 
armistice was signed on November 3 in Padua between the 
representatives of the Entente and of Austro-Hungary. 
Accordingly, the Entente was given access to strategically 
important points on monarchy’s territory, the demarcation line 
however did not deviate from the pre-war border line.
12
 Thus, 
the integrity of the pre-war Hungary was still kept untouched – 
the question of the future territorial arrangements left to be 
solved at the peace conference.
13
 By that time, the Budapest 
Government accepted the idea of an independent Czech state, 
but not yet the inclusion of the Slovaks in this state. The 
                                                        
10 For the rest of the country there were 2911 Slovaks out of 230 000 clearks. See 
Rusinow, D. Ethnic Politics in the Habsburg Monarchy and the Successor States: 
Three Answers to the National Question. – In: Nationalism and Empire. Rudolph, 
R., D. Good (Eds.), New York, 1992, 253; Kann, R., Zd. David. The Peoples of the 
Eastern Habsburgs Lands, 1526-1918. Washington, 1984, 384. 
11 After the elections of 1910 there were only three Slovak deputies in the 
Hungarian parliament – see Slovenske dejiny, 1993, 192. 
12 Унгер, М., О. Соболч, История на Унгария. С., 1968, 273. 
13 Pastor, P., Op. cit., 65. 
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Declaration of Károlyi’s government expressed a general 
acceptance of pres. Wilson’s principles, but at the same time 
claimed the integrity of the historical lands of St. Stephen’s 
crown, which meant with Slovaks within.
14
 A special ministry 
for minorities issues was set up to illustrate that the future of 
Slovaks laid further in connection with Hungarians. 
The armistice agreement with Hungary stroke alarm by 
CSNC in Paris. Edvard Beneš took an audience by George 
Clemenceau and gen. Foch and convinced them to intervene in 
order to change the armistice terms. A message from Paris 
soon reached the French representatives in Central Europe – 
the armistice had to be considered only of pure military and 
temporary nature, the agreement with the Károlyi’s government 
on the integrity of the country had to be considered only as a 
temporary, the issue to be settled on the peace forum.
15
 
So far then, by the beginning of the peace conference there 
were two important things to be noted: on one hand there was 
CSNC, accepted as a legitimate speaker for the Czechoslovakian 
nation, but with no borders yet fully defined, i.e. first the 
independence, based on Wilson’s principle, then shaping the 
territory of the state; and on the other hand there was the 
French–Hungarian armistice, where among the terms the integrity 
of the lands of St. Stephen’s crown assumed, which agreement 
however, on the pressure from Paris had to be considered as a pure 
military one, without any connection with the future Czecho- 
slovak–Hungarian border distinction. Both actions were of poli- 
tical and strategical nature, designed to fit to the needs of the war. 
Let us mention that by the end of 1918 there was also an 
attempt for a border arrangement, based on national principle. 
Direct Hungarian–Slovak bilateral negotiations began. The 
Hungarian side was represented by the minister of defense Albert 
Bartha and the Slovak by Milan Hodţa, as representative of the 
Slovak National Party. Hodţa had some kind of legitimation. For 
                                                        
14 Galantai, J. Hungary in the First World War. Bp., 1989, 321. 
15 Pastor, P., Op.cit., 66.  
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the years 1905–1910 he was the only Slovak deputy in the 
Budapest parliament, he was also among the signatories of the 
Martin Declaration.
16
 Further, he got in advance approval and 
mandate from the first Czechoslovak prime-minister Karel Kramař 
to start negotiations with the Hungarian government on military 
issues, but also over border arrangements. Let us also mention that 
by that time Budapest had already accepted the future separation of 
the Slovak lands.
17
 All this give a presumption that a fair ethnic 
distinction between the two nations could be possible. As a base for 
it, both sides agreed, the last census, held in 1910, had to be used. 
As a result a new demarcation line was agreed on, leaving 
Bratislava and Košice within Hungary.18 
The Hodza–Bartha Agreement, signed up on December 6, 
1918, in fact was following the national distinction between 
Slovaks and Hungarians and thus was to a great extend fulfilling 
the national criteria. The last decision again was left to the peace 
conference. However, even this temporary arrangement provoked 
a strong protest and reaction: the French representative in Prague 
sent a letter to Hodţa on December 23, 1918, in which he ordered 
immediate interruption of the bilateral negotiations with the 
Hungarians. The argument was not to leave the issue for the peace 
conference, as could be expected. He informed the Slovak 
representative that the Slovak–Hungarian border had been already 
settled down in November 1918 by an agreement between French 
military leadership and Edvard Beneš on the demarcation line (the 
so called Pichon’s line). 19  Beneš succeeded in getting the 
French support for the “historical limits” of Slovakia. On 
December 19, 1919 Clemenceau sent instructions to gen. Franchet 
                                                        
16 Готовска-Хенце, Т. Назад към изгубения трон: последният хабсбургски 
император и държавите-наследнички. С., 1993, 80. 
17  Romsics, I. Edvard Beneš a československo-maďarska hranice. – In: 
Edvard Beneš a střední Evropa. Sborník přednasek a statí. Praha, 1993, 
30–31. 
18 Krejčí, O. Český národní zájem, Praha, 1993, 114.  
19 Krejčí, O., Op. cit., 115. 
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d’Esperey, in which the southern border was following the Danube 
up to the river of Ipel, then along this river up to Rimavska Sobota 
and then straight to the East up to river of Uh. This line was a part 
of the definitive demarcation line, approved by the Entente, which 
further gave the right to the Czechoslovak army to occupy 
Slovakia.
20
 Nevertheless this way the entente violated the 
principle of self-determination.  
Under the benevolence of the French government, Beneš 
encouraged the Military leadership in Prague to commit a “fait 
accompli” and take Slovakia – as silently as possible.21 Occu- 
pation started in the beginning of November and followed this 
demarcation line, which paid little attention to the ethnic 
Slovak–Hungarian distinction. In Paris the Czechoslovakian 
representatives, most active of which was Beneš, were giving 
new and new economical, infrastructural, transport etc. argu- 
ments for moving the border further to the South. Even future 
demographical prognoses were among the arguments, for 
example that Slovaks had a bigger birth rate than Hungarians 
and because of this reason they would need a fertile soil for 
agriculture, which could be found only in the South.
22
 Gen. 
Miklós Horthy remembered that in December 1918 the Entente 
Representatives in Budapest announced that the Czech aspira- 
tions over Bratislava (Presburg, Pozsony) and its surroundings 
were met with approval.
23
 Therefore, before the peace confe- 
rence the new state had preliminary borders, negotiated in Paris. 
London however agreed only on Czechoslovak borders in the 
North, without mentioning Slovakia, i.e. the Slovak–Hungarian 
border.
24
 On December 31 the Czechoslovak troops took Brati- 
slava. Vavro Šrobar, the Czechoslovak minister with full power to 
                                                        
20 Slovensko v 20. storoči,, 3 sväzok: V medzivojnovom Československu 
1918-1939. Ferenčuhová, B., M. Zemko (Eds). Bratislava, 2012, 34.  
21 Krejčí, O., Op. cit., 115. 
22 Slovensko v 20 storoči..., Op. cit., 57. 
23 M. Horthy. Memoires. West Point, USA, 1978, 96. 
24 Slovensko v 20 storoči..., Op. cit., 54. 
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administer Slovakia moved from Ţilina to Bratislava. By 
January 20, 1919 the Czechoslovak army strengthened by the 
French and Italian legionaries moved further to the South, beyond 





PEACE-MAKING: PRINCIPLES AND ARGUMENTS  
 
When on January 18, 1919 the peace conference in Paris started, 
the hopes of the Hungarians for a fair treatment were diminishing, 
since their attempts to negotiate a fair peace arrangement on the 
pres. Wilsons 14 points were in vain. Defeated countries were not 
allowed to participate in the peace negotiations. On the other hand, 
Czechoslovaks, together with Rumanians and Yugoslavs as allies 
were permitted to take part in the commission with “limited issues”. 
The most active and successful of Czechoslovak delegation in 
Paris was the young minister of Foreign Affairs Edvard Beneš 
supported in his work by the Slovak Stefan Osusky.  
Osusky was en emmigrant, US lawyer and represented the 
Slovak league in the USA. He was also a secretary of the 
delegation. After Beneš left Paris it was exactly Osusky, who had 
to take the responsibility for the peace treaty with Hungary.
26
 
The US representatives in Paris were still fairly insisting 
on application of self-determination principle as main criteria 
for border distinction, but this was a general concept – they did 
not know the region in detail. As early as in January 1919 pres. 
T. G. Masaryk warned Beneš, who was actually leading the 
negotiations in Paris, to choose carefully his arguments, since 
the US representatives had an “abstract” approach concerning 
the national and the territorial questions in Europe.
27
 
Indirectly, this was implying a closer cooperation with the more 
                                                        
25 Holec, R., Op. cit., 243. 
26 Slovensko v 20. storoči..., Op. cit., 55. 
27  Šolle, Zd. Masaryk a Beneš ve svých dopisech z doby pařyţských 
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“concrete” working French delegation. Further, the US promise 
of no annexations, no reparation was forgotten, the losers had 
to accept and sign a “Diktat“. Before the end of the conference, 
the US president departed to his home land.  
Without Germany and Russia and with the dissolution of 
Austria-Hungary a big power gap in Central Europe was opened, 
the political design of the region needed to be generally redrawn. 
This had to be done with fine consideration and future vision. 
Unfortunately, this was not the case. France was obsessed with 
the idea of revenge for Germany and was strongly engaged in 
building up a strong antibolshevik alliance of the successors 
states in order to circle Russia and stop revolutionary spill-over. 
(Cordon sanitaire). Great Britain was showing small interest (and 
knowledge) in Central Europe’s affairs.28 This was for sure not 
the best precondition for drawing new borders in a region with 
very complex population structure. On February 5, 1919 Beneš 
presented his government’s view on the borders to the highest 
representatives of the Entente. After a 3-hour discussion with the 
presence of George Clemenceau, Woodrow Wilson, David Lloyd 
George and Vittorio Orland the inclusion of Slovakia within 
the Czechoslovak state was generally approved.
29
 
When on March 19, 1919 the severe peace conditions 
were officially presented in Budapest, Karolyi’s government 
gave demission. In the new government some members of the 
new formed Hungarian Communist Party were included. As 
some 500.000 war prisoners returned from Russia (many of 
them already convinced Bolsheviks) the communist ideas were 
rapidly spreading throughout the country.
30
 A Hungarian 
Soviet Republic was proclaimed in Budapest, a dictatorship of 
proletariat established with Béla Kun ahead. His goal was to 
spread the world revolution in Europe and that was why he 
addressed the solidarity of the workers abroad.  
                                                        
28 Готовска-Хенце, Т., Op. cit., 89. 
29 Slovensko v 20 storoči..., Op. cit., 57–58.  
30 Hönsch, J. Geschichte Ungarns, 1867–1973. Köln, 1984, 89. 
Teodoritchka Gotovska-Henze 
 
 - 122 - 
The revolution was in Central Europe and this fact provoked 
a big alarm in Paris. Of course, like in case of Russians, there 
would be no negotiations with Béla Kun. Kun himself also had 
no intention to deal with the Entente, as, “the imperialistic 
Entente clearly showed what the right of the nations to 
self-determination means – it occupied also territories, which 
even from its own point of view were unquestionable”31. 
At the same time, Beneš was skillfully convincing the 
peace-makers, that in contrast to the dangerous “Bolshevik” 
Hungarians, threatening to destroy the status quo in Europe, 
the Czechoslovaks were a state-building nation, going to 
create an “isle of peace” in Central Europe.32 Pres. Masaryk 
was interpreting the new situation also as a favorable for his 
country, however with other arguments. In a letter to Beneš, 
written on April 5, 1919 he stated that Bolshevism in Hungary 
“has helped us in Slovakia” since many Hungarians and 
magyarophiles (residing in Slovakia) put their hopes on the 
Czechs.
33
The Czechoslovak president (who supported the 
Czechoslovak presence in Slovakia) was however against 
further Entente intervention on Hungarian soil.
34
 
Under the silent benevolence of the Entente the situation 
deteriorated further as the neighbours of Hungary tried to 
incorporate further Hungarian territories. With the approval of 
the French gen. Henri Berthelot, Rumanian troops crossed the 
demarcation line at Békéscsaba and in April advanced deeper 
in the country. On April 26 the Czechoslovak corps attacked 
from north. By May 1 the Rumanians were at Szolnok, the 
Czechoslovaks at Salgotarjan. Serbs took the chance and 
occupied Bácska and Baranya.
35
   
The situation for the Hungarians was hard but not 
                                                        
31 Б. Кун. Избранное. Будапешт, 1980, 109.  
32 Готовска-Хенце, Т., Op. cit., 91. 
33 Šolle, Zd., Op. cit., 205. 
34 Готовска-Хенце, Т., Op. cit., 95.   
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desperate. It had to be won on the battlefield. Despite of the 
fact, that the Hungarian army was in a unfavorable situation 
(the ratio to the Czechoslovaks in April was 1:3, to the 
Rumanians 1:2, the Hungarian army was dissolved and had to 
be reorganized)
36
 a successful counterattack forced the Czecho- 
slovak army to withdraw. The British representative in Prague 
stated that “The Czech troops, sent to fight Hungarians, acted 
bad and irresponsible”.37 He was right. The Hungarian army 
proceeded further to the north and on June 6 it took Košice, 4 
days later Bardejov (thus cutting communication lines between 
Czecho- slovakian and Romanian troops). On June 16, 1919 a 
Slovak Soviet Republic was proclaimed in Prešov, under the 
“protection” of the Hungarian troops. Their communist leaders 
addressed immediately their Czechs “brothers” asking for 
proletariat solidarity. A further revolution’s spill over was to 
reach Czech lands, Poland and Austria.
38
 
The peace-makers in Paris were frightened, alarmed and 
disorientated. As Beneš informed Masaryk from Paris, “Above 
all they fear a worker’s revolution at home”39 and in such an 
atmosphere it was hard to take a reasonable decision. General 
Foch proposed an immediate military intervention in Hungary, 




The atmosphere in Paris described by Beneš in a letter of 
June 11, 1919 to T. G. Masaryk was “bad, dim and unpleasant”. 
The Czechs were blamed of “crossing the demarcation line, 
being beaten and now making too much noise”.41 It was the 
military failure that brought change in the mood of the peace 
makers. In another letter Beneš wrote frankly: “Would we have 
                                                        
36 Hajdu, T. The Hungarian Soviet Republic. Bp., 1979, 93–94. 
37 DBFP, I Series, Vol. VI, 1956, 71. 
38 Ibid., 19. 
39 Šolle, Zd., Op. cit., 275. 
40 Ibid., 277. 
41 Ibid., 275. 
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entered Muškovce (Miskolc) as winners and without asking 
them (Entente states) for a help, they would have had nothing 
(against it).” 42  In other words, Czechs were given “free 
hands” to take as much territory as they could. As a matter of 
fact, it was again the French military leadership which 
supported the take over of Petrţalka on the right bank of the 
Danube by the Czechoslovak troops in August 1919.
43
 
On behalf of the peace conference a special note, written by 
Clemenceau, proposed a withdrawal of the Rumanian troops 
from Hungary, under condition that Béla Kun’s army leaves 
Slovakia. The Rumanians however were reluctant to withdraw 
and the domestic political situation was far from being peaceful 
and clear. In the view of a Foreign Office’s representative in 
Prague, the city inhabitants in Slovakia were in their majority 
magyarophiles, and the peasants in many cases showed desire for 
independence, but still in no way sympathy for the Czechs. 
Slovakia’s future “seems very uncertain”– was the main 
conclusion.
44
 As a matter of fact, there was a big confusion 
among the Slovaks with people’s attitude varying from apathy 
through fear of the unclear future up to enthusiastic welcoming 
of the newly born Czechoslovak state.
45
 
Meanwhile, the political situation in Hungary showed sign of 
consolidation in August 1919, when after being 133 days in 
existence, Béla Kun’s government fell and was replaced by a new 
one. The Romanian troops entered into Budapest. At the same 
time, Miklós Horthy, an admiral of already nonexisting Austro- 
Hungarian fleet, was gathering anticommunist volunteers at 
Szeged. Horthy remembered that it would take time for him to win 
the support of the French government, because Clemenceau was 
supporting the actions of Rumanians.
46
 But the Foreign Office 
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saw in him a “strong man, one could rely on”.47  Horthy’s 
negotiations with the Entente leaders were successful – the 
Rumanian troops finally left Budapest. Leading his army the 
admiral entered the capital of the country and helped the 
composition of a new coalition government. 
 
BORDER BUILDING TECHNIQUES 
 
As long as Hungary was in communist turmoil, there were no 
negotiations on the terms of the Peace Treaty with Hungary 
because Béla Kun’s government was not accepted as a legitimate 
one. On June 12, 1919 Beneš informed Masaryk about this 
decision, pointing out, that the final settlement on the southern 
border would be taken by the Entente experts’ commission 
without Hungarian and Czechoslovak representatives. Prague 
and Budapest would be only informed and they would have to 
obey and accept this decision.
48
 
Taken into consideration, that the region had a highly 
complex ethnic composition and the border had no precedence, 
the decision to eliminate the Hungarian and Czechoslovak 
counterparts in the border settlement and to leave the final 
solution in the hands of Entente’s could not be expected as a 
happy one.
49
 Most of the western representatives (not only the 
US) knew few about the ethnic composition of the region. 
Masaryk was very disgusted from the way in which the Entente 
was building up the peace settlement in Central and Eastern 
Europe, because it showed so little knowledge of this region.
50
 
Was only the ignorance the main mistake?  
Let us look further at the mechanism of the decision-making 
process. The experts’ commissions had to prepare technical 
reports and submit them for discussion and approval in the 
                                                        
47 DBFP, Op. cit., 401. 
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commissions on the Czechoslovak, Rumanian and South-Slav 
territorial issues. Among the 65 experts, advisers and journalists 
dealing in this commission on Czechoslovak issues there were 
only 6 Slovaks included.
51
 At the end, as already mentioned, 
the definitive decision over the borders had to be taken by the 
Entente without participation of concerned states.  
Some already published sources
52
, give a good idea about the 
preparation of the experts reports. The British representatives felt 
uncertain about the issue and addressed it further specialists, 
more familiar with the topic. Such a specialist was prof. R. W. 
Seton-Watson, a person with good knowledge about the region. 
One of the British experts, member of the the commission on 
drawing the new Czechoslovak–Hungarian border, named 
Leeper exchanged letters with Seton-Watson. Seton-Watson 
knew also Nicolson and Headlam-Morley, other members of 
the experts’ commission. Of interest is the letter written by 
Headlam-Morley on May 27, 1919. After expressing gratitude 
for Seton-Watson’s previous letters, he pointed out that Leeper 
and Nicolson found the professor´s writhing extremely 
“interesting and useful”. Discussing the minority rights in the 
new states, the expert was of opinion that the professor´s view 
“corresponds” to a great extend with the point of view Beneš 
was presenting on the peace conference. Not surprisingly. 
Seton-Watson was a keen supporter of the Czechoslovak cause 
during the war and a close friend of T. G. Masaryk.
53
 
From the same letter we also understand that the expert 
commission, which Headlam-Morley was part of, maintained 
as he pointed out “direct contacts” with Beneš.54 And for sure, 
the young Czechoslovak foreign minister could not be blamed 
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I, 1906–1951. Prague, 1995. 
53 Goldstein, E. Winning the Peace: British diplomatic Strategy, Peace 
Planning and the Paris Peace Conference 1916–1919, Oxford, 1991, 257. 
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of ignorance of Central Europe. Given the fact that there were 
no negotiations with Budapest and as proved there were very 
close contacts with the Czechoslovak delegation in Paris, it is not 
suprising which point of view the commission was supporting. 
The final border distinction between Slovaks and Hungarians 
was settled down in June 1919 with the Treaty of Trianon. No 
Czechs, no Slovaks, no Hungarians took part in it. As expected in 
Prague, it fulfilled all their territorial claimes. On June 16
th
 1919 
Beneš informed Masaryk that on the “Hungarian question” he 
was given everything he wanted: “a general satisfaction and… 
the borders!”55 He was right: the new border included also 
Bratislava and the Grain isle. As a ground for this border 
distinction, a mixture of ethnic, economic, military-strategic and 
demographic arguments were used.
56
 The new borders included 
49.006 km² with population of 2.998.244, which represented 
22% of the total population in Czechoslovakia and formed 
35% of the territory of the new state.
57
 
An isolated Slovak political action is also to be mentioned, 
which was unsuccessful, but not insignificant – the trip of the 
tutor of the Slovak National Party Andrej Hlinka to Paris in 
August 1919. Equipped with a false Polish passport and 
accompanied by some supporters, he intented to submit a 
special memorandum, wherein more autonomy for the Slovaks 
was claimed. Without putting under question the future of the 
Czechoslovak state, the documents main idea was “Slovakia to 
the Slovaks”, Slovaks were neither Czechs, nor Czechoslovaks, 
but Slovaks. He was waiting in Paris up to October, but no 
hear was given to his memorandum.
58
 The peacemakers had 
enough problems to deal with. Centralistic or federal, the 
constitutional design of the new Czechoslovakian state was no 
topic to be discussed in Paris – the peacemaker had anyway 
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enough problems to deal with. And there was an already 
accepted as legitimate speaker for the Slovaks. M. Štefanik 
meanwhile, in the function of the foreign minister in the first 
Czechoslovakian government. Hlinka travelled back home, 
where on order from Prague he was immediately arrested.
59
 
This was not a well calculated action – the arrest provoked 
demonstrations in Slovakia. But not everybody was on his side. 
In December 1919 Milan Hodţa wrote to Seton-Watson that 
Hlinka had “sick ambitions”, was a “megaloman”, whose 
claims were damaging the image of the newly created state
60
, 
i.e. his actions have to be ignored.  
The preliminary peace conditions for Hungary were 
announced on January 15, 1920. To admiral Miklos Horthy – and 
to the majority of Hungarians – they seemed “fantastic”, not real, 
impossible.
61
 That is why the Hungarian government tried in 
the months to come any possible diplomatic channel to present 
its point of view and to pretend for border rectifications. From 
Budapest the British representatives were sending warning 
signals to Foreign Office that the border arrangement de facto 
violated pres. Wilson’s principles, which were accepted for just 
by majority of Hungarians. Lord Curson was warned that such an 
arrangement could be a “threat” for the peace in Europe.62 
In January and June 1920 the Hungarian government 
undertook different diplomatic actions in the European capitals 
in order to draw the attention that significant amount of 
Hungarians remained beyond the new borders of the country. 
By that time Hungarian claims met already a joint 
Czechoslovak–Yugoslav–Rumanian diplomatic opposition. 
The formation of the Little Entente was underway.
63
 When 
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opposed to the question of the considerable Hungarian 
minority, included in his state, Beneš argued that their number 
approximately corresponded to the number of Slovaks, 
remaining in Hungary and further – that Hungarians in his state 
were spread among the domestic population, i.e. that they did not 
inhabit compact regions.
64
 The main reason for shifting the 
border was of economic character – Prague wanted access to 
the Danube for this continental state. Having no access to the 
sea, the Danube could be used as an substitution and as an 
important transportation channel for the Czech industry. 
“Czechoslovakia has to be a Danubian state” – proclaimed 
openly Beneš.65 And of course, this could not be possible, if 
the national principle was consequently applied. 
Hungarian borders were debated in the beginning of March 
1920 on the Ambassadors’ conference in London. The issue 
provoked vivid and sometimes controversial discussion on the 
general post-war peace arrangement in Central Europe. On 
behalf of British Leeper underlined that any questioning of the 
already settled Hungarian borders could provoke loose of trust in 
the Entente authority and serious government’s crisis in Central 
Europe.
66
 His stand was supported by the French. To the 
question on the right of self-determination – main point in the 
memorandums submitted by the Hungarian representatives – 
Leeper reminded that this right was accepted as legitimate for 
the fighting Czechoslovaks as early as in August 1918, i.e. before 
the start of the Peace conference on the ground that 50.000 
Czechoslovaks were fighting on the side of Entente and against 
Austro-Hungary.
67
 Of course, this was a crucial political 
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argument for proclaiming an independent state, but not a 
convincing one for a fair border distinction based on the pres. 
Wilson’s principles, accepted as a common guiding line for the 
general peace settlement in Europe. It was also not hard to 
notice that many of Leeper’s arguments were “borrowed” from 
Masaryk’s memorandum. The French position, expressed by 
Berthelot
68
 was firm – no border rectifications in Central 
Europe, any change in this direction would provoke disorder and 
political chaos in the region. On behalf of the British government 
Lloyd George stated that it was exactly the incorrect border 
settlement in the region could provoke disorder or even war as 
the desperate Hungarians could join Russians or Germans.
69
 He 
proposed an open debate on borders in Central Europe and more 
moderation toward the Hungarians. Too late. At the end 
however Ambassadors’s conference rejected any rectification in 




The general conditions on which the armistice was signed up, 
were based on the pres. Wilson’s peace program. They introduced 
for the first time in the international relations the right to 
self-determination and as a result, the CSNC as a nucleus of a 
legitimate Czechoslovak national government was acknowledged. 
Internationally accepted as a general principle for the shaping of 
the new status quo in Europe, the right to national self- 
determination in fact was applied selectively, only for 
co-fighters of the Entente, i.e. for the winners. And the CSNC 
was able to gain far-reaching promises of the French military 
leadership even before the peace conference started. 
In a power gap, when the traditional powers in the region 
Germany, Russia and Austro-Hungary, were set apart and 
given the small interest in the region’s affairs of Great Britain, 
                                                        
68 Also a good personal friend of Benes. 
69 DBFP, Op. cit., Vol. VII, 387. 
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the main designer of post-war Central Europe was France. 
However the main decisions in Paris at that time were taken by 
the military leadership and some hard-line politicians and 
these were calling for nothing else but for a harsh revenge 
against the Germans and fighting the Bolsheviks. In such an 
outlook, the new grounded states in Central Europe were given 
considerable support in order to make them a strong ring 
isolating the Bolsheviks from the rest of Europe. This included 
also having “free hand” to take as much territory as they 
wished from the defeated Hungary. The last fact of course, 
radicalized the atmosphere in Budapest and brought into power 
the government of Béla Kun, which succeeded in pushing back 
the Czechoslovak army and exporting revolution to Slovakia.  
The peacemakers in Paris were alarmed – the revolution 
stood at their front door. Under these changed circumstances the 
Czechoslovak representatives suddenly lost their favorable 
position at Paris peace conference, but in no way at the 
experts’ commissions and they still enjoyed good contacts at 
Quai d’Orsay. Not surprisingly, the post-war Hungarian– 
Slovak border suited all their claims. Having no precedence in 
the history, this new border thus apriori had a fair chance to be 
drawn on the newly formulated principle of national 
self-determination and to become an illustration of the basic 
principles the new born political status quo was based on. In 
reality however, it became what all the peace treaties were – a 
tool for a punishment, “ein diktat”. When in January 1920 the 
preliminary peace conditions with Hungary were announced, 
admiral Miklos Horthy was already firmly convinced that the 
new neighbors of Hungary would soon be very sorry for their 
excessive “appetite” for Hungarian territory.70 
As a conclusion of this case study however, I found it 
more convincing to quote the peace-makers, i.e. the words 
coming from the side of the very doers. In one discussion held 
at the Ambassador’s conference in London, Lloyd George 
                                                        
70 Horthy, M., Op. cit., 109.  
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stated – as soon as in 1920! – that the new drawn Czechoslovak- 
Hungarian border could become a threat to the general peace 
in Central Europe. In a merely “medical” way of expression, 
he pointed out to the fact that the Czechoslovak state had to 
“swallow” such amount of Hungarian territories which could 
provoke an “acute appendix”. In his view then, an operation 




Another British point of view was expressed by Prof. 
Seton-Watson, as already mentioned also a supporter of the 
newly created status quo in Central Europe. When confronted 
with the question on the controversy on which the new 
Czechoslovak state was build up (the border to Germany claimed 
on historical right, which on other side it denied to Hungary) he 
stated a bit cynically that “there was not a single claim of 




Even Masaryk, who could hardly be blamed for being 
neglected or ignored by the Entente, shared with Beneš that 
the peace-making in Central and Eastern Europe was “fearful” 
and this was “clear to every child” in his country and abroad this 
was “even more obvious”. Because of this, he concluded, the 
Entente was “loosing prestige”…73 He was speeking not on 
the concrete border settlement but about the general way the 
peace was made at Paris. But what was valid for the general 
peace making process was even more evident in the case of the 
new Czechoslovak border – it was grounded with many 
arguments, but based on no single principle. 
                                                        
71 DBFP, Op. cit., Vol. VII, 387. 
72 Готовска-Хенце, Т., Op. cit., 74.  
73 Šolle, Zd., Op. cit., 203.  
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Before the presentation of the circumstances of the 
proclamation of the ‘Slovakian Kingdom’, a brief introduction of 
the antecedents seems necessary in order to follow the 
ideological development of Slovak politicians in 1918–1941; 
how and why they arrived at the idea of founding a monarchy. 
Czechoslovakia was founded on 28 October 1918, and the 
country showed a great diversity of ethnic groups. According to 
the statistics of 1910, Czechs and Slovaks together gave a mere 
59.09% of the population in the territory in question. In other 
words, 40.91% had become citizens in a new ‘foreign’ country. 
Those who had German as their first language formed 27.58% of 
the population, Hungarians formed 7.88% while 5.45% spoke 
Ruthenian, Polish, Romanian, Croatian or something else as their 
mother tongue.
1
 The Slovaks joined the new state as ‘the 
Hungarian branch of the Czechoslovak nation’. However, this 
proved to be an ‘association of two unequal sides’, which had an 
impact on the two-decade history of the nation.
2
 In Slovakia, not 
                                                        
1 Popély Gy. Népfogyatkozás. A csehszlovákiai magyarság a népszámlálások 
tükrében 1918–1945 (Population decrease. Hungarians in Czechoslovakia in 
census statistics). – Regio (Bp.), 1991, 104–105. 
2 Szarka L. A szlovákok története. Bp., 1993, 170.  
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only political parties but also most politicians were discontented 
with the constitutional system of Czechoslovakia. There were 
many ideas to modify the situation from decentralisation through 
the strengthening of local government to the construction of a 
federal state. It is widely known that Eduard Beneš, later foreign 
minister of Czechoslovakia, did not support the separation of 
Slovakia; on the contrary, he did all he could to prevent it. 
Interestingly, Beneš only acknowledged the Slovak language as a 
dialect of Czech rather than a different language. In the view 
of Beneš the two nations were one.3 The Czechoslovak state 
was founded on the doctrine of Czechoslovakism,
4
 which 
attacked Slovak national identity, and therefore it had to be 
rejected by the Slovak side. After 1918, the majority of the 
Slovaks were convinced that the new Czechoslovak state was a 
temporary stage.
5
 They were glad to have been seceded from 
                                                        
3 The Czechoslovak state was founded on the doctrine of Czechoslovakism, 
which stated that Czechs and Slovaks formed one nation, or, in the more 
extreme version, the Slovaks were in fact Czechs. Czechoslovakism did not 
recognise Slovak national identity, and therefore the Slovaks rejected it. The 
founders of the state (Masaryk and Beneš) used the fiction of Czechoslovakism 
to explain the contradiction that the new country had been born as a nation 
state, while it was multi-national. The constitution made Czechoslovakian 
official language; its Czech dialect was used in Bohemia and Slovak in 
Slovakia. The Czech leaders were hoping that the two nations would mix in 
time and develop a common identity. It is obvious that this idea only wanted 
to ensure the Slavonic majority of the newly born state.  
4 The Czechoslovak state was founded on the doctrine of Czechoslovakism, 
which stated that Czechs and Slovaks formed one nation, or, in the more 
extreme version, the Slovaks were in fact Czechs. Czechoslovakism did not 
recognise Slovak national identity, and therefore the Slovaks rejected it. The 
founders of the state (Masaryk and Beneš) used the fiction of Czechoslovakism 
to explain the contradiction that the new country had been born as a nation state, 
while it was multi-national.  
5 Kníchal, O. Slovenská národná identita. – Ľudové Noviny, 28 March 2002, 
4–5. The leaders of the Slovak National Party asked President T. G. Masaryk 
not to allow a referendum about territorial changes because the Slovaks might 
vote for the union with Hungary. 
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Hungary but they were also distrustful of their new home. They 
had expected to enjoy autonomy in the Czechoslovak state, 
which would protect them against centralising and nationalist 
attempts of the Czechs.  
However, it proved certain, by the mid 1920s, that 
Czechoslovakia would not give the political, administrative 
and economic autonomy that had been promised to the Slovaks. 
The original plans for Slovakia with wide self-government did not 
come true. Slovakia, in effect, had become an occupied territory. 
The Czechoslovak constitution declared that the official language 
was ‘Czechoslovak’, whose Czech and Slovak dialects were 
used in the Czech and Slovak territories respectively.
6
 The Czech 
leaders were hoping that the two nations would merge in time and 
form a common identity. It goes without saying that this idea 
served the purpose of ensuring the Slavonic majority of the new 
state. Czechoslovakia could not look back at a thousand-year past 
but the mediaeval Kingdom of Bohemia could, so the Czech 
political leadership regarded the new state as the renewal and 
extension of historical Bohemia rather than a new construction. 
This idea generated continual conflict between the politicians of the 
two nations, for it stood in opposition with the Slovak conception 
of the alliance of two equal sides. The creation of Czechoslovakia 
was regarded as a Czech ‘project’ even though Slovak politicians 
had participated in it. For the Czechs it meant an outbreak from the 
surrounding German ring, a direct link with the Slavonic peoples 
and the possibility to become a medium-sized power in the region. 
For the Slovaks, the creation of Czechoslovakia meant shaking off 
Hungarian rule, which denied the independent Slovak national 
existence and it provided a road towards a free national home.
7
 
The Slovaks had never been satisfied with the political 
possibilities provided by the Czechs. No wonder, therefore, that 
                                                        
6 Rychlík, J. Češi a Slováci ve 20. století. Spolupráce a konflikty 1914–1992. 
Praha, Vysehrad, 92. 
7 Simon A. Az elfeledett aktivisták. Kormánypárti magyar politika az első 
Csehszlovák Köztársaságban. Somorja, Fórum 2013, 19. 
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certain resentment had developed in the course of time towards the 
central administration in Prague. They condemned the Czecho- 
slovak government for making important decisions that affected 
them above their heads without consulting them. According to the 
Slovak nationalists the problems of Czech and Slovak coexistence 
stemmed from the fact that effective Slovak representation had 
ceased for a while after the death of Milan Rastislav Štefánik.8 
In fact, Czechs and Slovaks interpreted the common state in 
two different ways. The former interpreted it as the realisation of 
Czech statehood in a developed and modern form extended with 
Slovakia. The latter regarded Czechoslovakia as a unit created 
from two different parts. The Slovaks thought that the existence 
of Czechoslovakia was an inevitable stage of development, which 
was necessary for the Slovaks to get free from the past that had 
linked them to the Kingdom of Hungary. However, this stage was 
interpreted to be a temporary one. The strongest Slovak political 
party in Czechoslovakia was the ‘Hlinkova slovenská ľudová 
strana’ led by Andrej Hlinka.9 It was later described as “Hlinka‟s 
                                                        
8 Milan Rastislav Štefánik (1880–1919) – Slovak politician, diplomat, astronomer 
and pilot. After the outbreak of the First World War, he joined the French army, 
where he reached the rank of general. He formed the Czechoslovak National 
Council with other politicians in Paris in February 1916. The president of the 
council was T. G. Masaryk, the vice president was Štefánik and the secretary was 
Eduard Beneš. Thanks to his scientific activity Štefánik had access to higher French 
circles, and therefore he was able to gain the political support of the main figures of 
the entente for the Czechoslovak independence attempts. Masaryk and Beneš 
wanted to push the Slovaks back from the very beginning, which led to conflicts 
between the latter and Štefánik. Štefánik wanted to return home from Udine, Italy, 
due to the weaning of his position in the Czechoslovak government but suffered a 
deadly accident during the landing of his aeroplane near Pozsony / Bratislava in 
spring 1919. The Slovaks thought that the Czechs put Slovakia under ‘colonial 
rule’ after the death of Štefánik on 4 May 1919. It made matters worse that the 
lay Czechs started attacks against Slovak Catholicism; crosses were taken off 
walls and other atrocities happened. Masaryk renewed Hussite religion, 
which condemned Catholics. Hussitism started to spread, but the campaign 
was not successful in Slovakia even in Lutheran territories. 
9  Bartlová, Al. Návrhy slovenských politických strán na zmenu 
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Slovakian people‟s party is the sole heir of the history of the 
Slovaks, the centre of Slovak patriotism.”10  Between the two 
world wars, the Slovaks were distrustful of the Czechoslovakian 
leadership. Nevertheless, no significant change took place in the 
form of government or the domestic policy of the country.
11
  
The Hungarian government did not consider the establishment 
of Czechoslovakia as the unification of the Slavonic peoples of 
historical Hungary with their mother country; they even denied 
consistently that the Slovaks and Czechs belonged to one nation. 
By doing so, they denied, in effect, the Czechoslovak state 
theory, which regarded Czechs and Slovaks as two branches of 
the same nation. The Hungarian government endeavoured, 
through two decades, to hinder the approach of the Slovak and 
Czech nations. For them the Slovaks were people under Czech 
occupation, who, together with other national minorities, were 
struggling to liberate themselves. In their view, the Slovaks 
formed a nation ethnographically, linguistically and historically 
separate from the Czechs. The Hungarian leaders agreed that 
Slovakia, or at least its territory with Hungarian majority had to 
return to Hungary in some way.
12
 They believed that if a 
referendum had been held, the Slovaks and the Ruthenians 
would vote for reunification with Hungary. After the First 
World War, they expected the Slovak political elite to turn 
towards Hungary, which would lead to Slovakia’s unification 
with Hungary, but this proved vain hope in the second half of 
the 1930s (although there were some attempts for the realisation 
                                                                                                          
štátoprávného usporiadania ČŠR v rokoch 1918–1935 a zapojenie HSĽS do 
vládnej koalície v rokoch 1927–1929. – In: Zemko, M., V. Bystrický (Eds.). 
Slovensko v Československu (1918–1939). Bratislava, 2004, 138–139. 
10 Tiso, J. Snemovanie slovenského národav Piešťanoch. – Slovák, 18–22 
September, Vol. 217, 3. 
11 Letz, R. Hlinkova Slovenská ľudová strana. – In: Letz, R., P. Mulík, Al. Bartlová 
(Eds.). Slovenská ľudová strana v dejinách 1905-1945. Martin, 2006, 30. 
12 Zeidler M. A revíziós gondolat. Pozsony, 2009, 8; Bárdi N. Tény és való. 
A budapesti kormányzatok és a határon túli magyarság kapcsolattörténete. 
Pozsony, 2004, 49.  
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of this option). Hungarian diplomacy did all it could to gain 
Andrej Hlinka
13
 and his party in the 1920s and 1930s. These 
attempts failed due to the Vojtech Tuka
14
 trial, through which 
they lost the person who could have an influence on Hlinka as 
well as Jozef Tiso.
15
 While in prison, Vojtech Tuka changed 
his views that Slovakia had to join Hungary, which he openly 






                                                        
13 Andrej Hlinka (1864–1938) - Slovak politician and Catholic priest. He 
started his political career in the Catholic People’s Party, later became the 
clerical wing of the party of the Slovak People’s Party. Founding president 
of the Slovak People’s Party. Member of Parliament. In 1919, he asked the 
Paris Peace Conference to guarantee self government for Slovakia within the 
Czechoslovak state in a memorandum. Therefore the Czech authorities 
deprived him of his MP status and put him into prison for eight months. 
Later he became the leading figure of the Slovakian autonomy movement 
against Czech centralising attempts. His successor was Jozef Tiso.  
14 Vojtech Tuka (1880–1946), lawyer, university professor, politician. He thought 
at the law academy in Pécs and the University of Pozsony. He participated in the 
secret Hungarian military movements and the organisation of Hungarian political 
parties in Czechoslovakia from the beginning. He joined Hlinka’s Slovak People’s 
Party; he was its vice-president and representative in parliament from 1925. He 
made the first autonomy programme of the party. The Czechoslovak authorities 
arrested him as Hungarian spy and sentenced him to 15 years imprisonment. He 
was released with amnesty in 1937. Deputy minister in Tiso’s Slovak republic, 
foreign minister and prime minister. Executed for war guilt in 1946. 
15 Slovak-Hungarian cooperation was hindered by the Tuka trial. It turned 
out, although not proven, that Tuka received money and spying commission 
from the Hungarian government. See: Veres T. A Tuka-per közvetlen előzményei 
a cseh és szlovák sajtóban. – Fórum-Társadalomtudományi Szemle 6, 2004, N 
1, 149–153. Also: Lukeš, M. Cesta k amnestii Vojtecha Tuky. – Historický 
Časopis, 46, 1998, N 4, 663–672. 
16 In the first half of 1939 Tuka declared that he could do nothing for the 
unification of Slovakia and Hungary. The Hungarian diplomacy did not 
count on him as an agent after this. Fabian, J. Svätoštefanské tiene Telekiho 
zahraničná politika a Slovensko 1939–41. Bratislava, 1966, 31, 91. 
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THE STAGES OF THE IDEOLOGICAL DEVELOPMENT OF 
SLOVAK POLITICIANS FROM THE AUTONOMY OF 1938 TO 
MONARCHY 
 
The deepening of the Czechoslovakian crisis shifted Germany 
and Czechoslovakia closer and closer to a military conflict by 
the middle of 1938. The great powers wanted to avoid a world 
war with the Munich talks.  
After the signature of the Munich Pact in 1938, the establish- 
ment of an independent Slovak state seemed to be at hand. 
Germany was one of the strongest supporters of this idea. The 
destabilisation of the Czechoslovak domestic policy served as 
another pretext for Hitler, whose real objective was the complete 
dissolution of the country.
17
 In the Slovak political elite’s view 
the Czechoslovak Republic, proclaimed on 14 November 1918, 
saved the Slovaks from Magyarisation and defended them from 
Hungarian irredentism but the Slovaks immediately faced a new 
threat: the Czech centralisation, and therefore they moved towards 
independence. The Munich decision and the territorial changes in 
its wake brought forth new ideas in Slovak politicians as well. It 
was not political parties but individuals from the lines of Hlinka’s 
Slovak People’s Party that started to deal with constitutional 
questions. These conceptions were responses to the momentary 
situation of Central Europe especially the Nazi expansion in the 
region. The names of Jozef Tiso, Vojtech Tuka, Alexander Mach 
and others could be mentioned here. The Munich Pact sealed the 
fate of Czechoslovakia. Beneš resigned from presidency on 5 
October 1938 and flew to emigration in London. As a result of the 
activity of Slovak politicians the so-called ‘Zsolna / Ţilina 
Agreement’ was signed, which meant, in effect, the conclusion of 





 Czechoslovakia was transformed 
                                                        
17 Germany had already planned its plans to get Czechoslovakia as a vassal 
state or as protectorate. They needed the ‘Slovak card’ in 1938–1939. Lukeš, 
F. Podivný mír. Praha, 1968, 145. 
18 T. G. Masaryk and the American Slovak leaders made an agreement in 
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to be a dualist state on the pattern of the Austro-Hungarian 
Monarchy: only foreign affairs, defence and financial affairs 
remained common affairs with Prague. Jozef Tiso became the 
head of the autonomous government of Slovakia. The 
five-member Slovak regional government was a part of the 
central government. The name of the state was hyphenated to 
Czecho-Slovak Republic. Another document was also accepted 
in Zsolna / Ţilina, in which the participants declared that “the 
constitutional situation of Slovakia will be finally solved”, but 
this close remained in effect for only five months.  
Slovak politicians worked out new plans with new elements 
regarding the form of government in Slovakia in the second half 
of 1938. They were seeking some alternative solution for the 
case if Czechoslovakia should fall apart or be occupied. These 
political speculations were based on the notion that the year 1938 
would be just as significant from the point of view of European 
international affairs as 1918. They even considered the possibility 
of joining a neighbouring country, in the form of autonomy, 
federation or union, in order to avoid the dissolution of the 
Slovak nation. There held negotiations with the Hungarians and 
the Poles on this question. The possibility of establishing 
monarch did not yet occur in 1938. The neighbouring states and 
the European great powers did not think of Slovakia as a possible 
sovereign state but as the part of a greater one.  
Hungary had to choose between two options after the 
Anschluss: either to come to an agreement of some sort with the 
states of the Little Entente giving up her revisionist ambitions, or 
                                                                                                          
Pittsburgh on 30 May 1918. The town had the largest Slovak community. They 
declared that free Bohemia and free Slovakia had made a common state. Political 
leadership, schools, law courts and other institutions would have Slovakian 
control and would use Slovakian language in Slovakia and Czech in Bohemia. 
Slovakia was even promised a parliament but it did not come true.   
19 On the question of autonomy see: Gebhart, J., j. Kuklík. Česká politika a 
zákon o autonómii Slovenka. České zemĕ a Československo v Evrope XIX. 
a XX století. – In: Dejmek, J., J. Hanzal. Sborník prácí k 65. narodeninám 
prof. Roberta Kvača. Praha, 1997, 357–379. 
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to participate in the unfolding German action against Czecho- 
slovakia during 1938. No matter how much Hungary was afraid 
from the strengthening of Germany, the Hungarian reluctance 
shown during the dissolution of Czechoslovakia was unfat- 
homable from both international and domestic point of view. 
The Hungarians realised that they had to negotiate with the leader- 
ship of the Slovak People’s Party: Andrej Hlinka and Jozef Tiso 
in order to make some achievement in terms of territorial 
growth.
20
   
Hungarian diplomacy was encouraged by the information that 
Andrej Hlinka had left for his supporters, on his death-bed in 
August 1938, that “As soon as time comes and possibility for 
secession from the Czechs is provided, I leave it for Karol Sidor, 
as the most competent representative of the nation and my will, to 
have talks with the Hungarian government on the Slovaks' joining 
Hungary bearing in mind the conditions for autonomy according 
to the programme of our party.”21 No documents have remained 
about the talks between Hlinka and the Hungarian government, 
so the reality of the political testament cannot be proven with 
evidence.  
Hungarian diplomacy realised, as early as the beginning of 
1938 that the strongest man and possible successor of Hlinka 
was Jozef Tiso, so they tried to come to some agreement with 
him in the question of Slovakia. The secret talks took place at 
the 34
th
 Eucharistic World Congress in Budapest in late May 
1938.
22
 Jozef Tiso, the new president of the Slovakian 
People's Party, participated as a priest, which gave him an 
opportunity to meet Hungarian foreign minister Kálmán 
Kánya without being noticed. Tiso told Kánya that the Slovaks 
would be willing to form a union with Hungary after having 
seceded from the Czechs. The talks continued until the end of 
                                                        
20 Ádám M. Diplomáciai Iratok Magyarország Külpolitikájához 1936–1945. 
Vol. II. (Henceforward: DIMK). Bp., 1965, 2. Doc. 187, 369–370. 
21 Naša Zastava, 4 February. 1940, N 2. 
22 MNL, K-63-1938-7/1. 
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September 1938.
23
 Tiso summarised his conditions in three 
points: “1. A central office with executive power in Slovakia 
and the use of Slovakian as official language. 2. A separate 
parliament and legislative power in domestic, religious and 
economic affairs. 3. A budget quota.” 24  The Poles were 
inquiring about the Slovak–Hungarian talks as well and 
received this information from Hungary on 14 September: 
“...there is no final agreement yet but the negotiations are going 
in a favourable atmosphere.”25 Tiso travelled to Eduard Beneš 
in Prague on 23 September 1938 and he let the Hungarian 
government know about his trip. He wanted to prevent the 
split of the Slovak leadership into factions, and he also wanted 
to disprove the accusation that he failed to do all he could to 
come to an agreement. Therefore he asked the Hungarians not 
to regard his trip to Prague as delaying tactic, “but they have 
to show a friendly face towards Prague, otherwise they are 
exposed to the danger of being massacred.”26 He also asked the 
Hungarian leaders that in case of a union, Hungarian officials 
should not invade Slovakia as they were unfamiliar with the 
situation there, and therefore they could easily elicit resentment in 
the Slovak population. Although the Hungarian government 
accepted Tiso’s conditions the Slovak–Hungarian talks ended 
without success. In the view of ambassador András Hory they 
were unable to come to an agreement because Kánya did not 
trust Tiso.
27
 Kálmán Kánya described the attitude of the 
Slovak politicians with these words: “The Slovaks seem to 
continue their double-sided game. While Sidor apparently makes 
Czech-friendly remarks, Tiso has summarised his wishes, in the 
                                                        
23The Munich Pact and Hungarian foreign policy (1936–1938). DIMK, Doc. 
403, 665–666. 
24 Ibid. Also: Archív Minsterstva Zahraničných Vecí, Praha, ZU Budapesť, 
20. karton, No. 352. 
25 DIMK, 337, Doc. 596. 
26 DIMK, 388, Doc. 645–646. 
27 Pritz P. (Ed.). Hory A. Bukaresttől Varsóig. Bp., 1987, 252. 
István Janek 
 
 - 143 - 
 
past days, in case they join Hungary.
”28
 Later Slovak foreign 
minister Ferdinánd Ďurčanský29 put the Slovak attitude towards 
the Hungarians in this way: “… the Slovaks were afraid that 
autonomy attempts for the Hungarians would eventually mean 
reunification with Hungary. What has been written down and 
said about the cooperation with the Hungarians can only be 
regarded as a means to put pressure on Czechoslovakian 
policy.”30 In other words: it was a mere tactical step, which was, 
in reality, rejected. The Hungarian–Slovak talks ended without 
success.  
When the Munich Pact was signed, the Slovak political 
leadership started thinking about the establishment of an 
independent Slovak State. This idea also received formidable 
support from abroad especially Germany, whose objective was 
the destabilisation of the domestic situation in the Czecho- 
slovak Republic, and finally to create some pretext for the 
dissolution of the state. On 9 March 1939, protests broke out 
in Slovakia against the Prague administration. President Emil 
Hácha displaced the autonomous Slovak government led by 
Jozef Tiso. Czech army and gendarme units occupied key 
positions in Slovakia and arrested several politicians. On 12 
March 1939, the Czecho-Slovak government had to stop 
making order on German pressure. On 13 March, Hitler 
invited Tiso to Berlin and let him know that if he failed to 
appear, the Hungarians would occupy not only Subcarpathia 
but also Slovakia. Under the impression of his Berlin talks, 
Tiso and the Slovak parliament proclaimed the independence 
                                                        
28 DIMK, Vol. 2, 403, Doc. 665. 
29  Ferdinand Ďurčanský (1906–1974) – Slovak politician and lawyer. 
Representative of the Slovak People’s Party in the National Assembly from 
1935. Editor of the periodical Nástup. Minister in the autonomous 
government in the Tiso era from 7 October 1938 to 9 March 1939. Foreign 
minister after the establishment of Slovakia until 1940. After this, he did not 
hold any significant offices. In 1945, he escaped to the west; sentenced to 
death in absence. He was a leader of Slovak emigration until his death.   
30 Ďurčanský, F. Pohlaď na slovenskú politickú minulosť. Bratislava, 1943, 205. 
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of Slovakia, which formally put an end to the Czecho-Slovak 
State Federation. Meanwhile, Hitler got the consent of President 
Emil Hácha to the German military occupation of Bohemia and 
to the establishment of the Protectorate of Bohemia and Moravia.  
Slovak independence, created by international circumstances 
and German pressure, did not last long as they signed the 
so-called ‘Schutzvertrag’, a defensive alliance with Germany 
on 23 March 1939. The German Reich guaranteed the 
sovereignty of Slovakia for 25 years and Slovakia obliged herself 
to cooperate with Germany in international and military affairs. 
What is more, they agreed to the creation of the Schutzzone.
31
 
Jozef Tiso became head of state and a single-party system of 
Hlinka’s Slovak People’s Party developed.  
At the time of her birth, Slovakia was bordered by Germany, 
Poland and Hungary; by 1939 only with Germany and Hungary. 
Diplomatic relations between Slovakia and Hungary were 
organised around three main questions: 1. the territories given 
to Hungary in the First Vienna Award, 2. the situation of 
minorities in those territories, and 3. to gain German support 
against each other. The Hungarian government did not reject 
the possibility of annexing the whole Slovakia in some form or 
other. The Slovak state gradually became the puppet figure of 
German political ambitions and her sovereignty depended on the 
German momentary interests. The Slovak leaders, understanding 
the complicated situation in international and domestic questions, 






                                                        
31 The territory of the Schutzzone formed a 30-40-km wide region along the 
Protectorate of Bohemia and Moravia from the Polish to the former Austrian 
border. Only German troops were allowed to station and only German 
barracks could be built here. 
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THE IDEA OF THE „KNGDOM OF SLOVAKIA‟ WITH A 
BULGARIAN MONARCH AND THE HUNGARIAN 
DIPLOMACY 
 
On 23 June 1941 the embassy of Slovakia in Berlin leaked 
information that Slovakia would become a kingdom. They 
would invite Cyril from the House of Saxon-Coburg-Gotha, 
the Prince of Preslav, younger brother of the King of Bulgaria 
to the throne. The Slovakian embassy conveyed the message 
as if it had come from the German foreign ministry. The 
background of the story was that President Jozef Tiso and PM 
and Foreign Minister Vojtech Tuka met Ferdinand I, the 
former King of Bulgaria as well as his son, Boris III, then 
King of Bulgaria in Muraň and Bratislava on the formation of 
the kingdom of Slovakia on 30 May and 19 June.
32
 Ferdinand 
I, who had abdicated from the throne on the pressure of the 
Entente in 1918, often spent shorter or longer periods on his 
estates in Slovakia. Boris III talked with Mussolini and Hitler 
on this issue in early June 1941.
33
 On 19 June 1941, King 
Boris stopped in Bratislava on his way back from Berlin and 




Hungarian ambassador in Slovakia, Lajos Kuhl, heard of 
these talks and turned to the Foreign Ministry of Slovakia for 
more information. The ministry formally denied that the 
question of monarchy had come up at the talks with the 
Bulgarian king. Slovakian propaganda minister, Alexander 
Mach gave his word to journalists that there had been no talks 
about changing the form of government in Slovakia and the 
election of Prince Cyril as king at the Bulgarian–Slovakian 
negotiations. His words were contradicted by the Hungarian 
ambassador, however, who confirmed the talks on the issue 
                                                        
32 See his articles in Slovák on 31 May and 21 June 1941. 
33 MNL, K-63, Fasc. 461, No. 78/pol. 1941. (23.06.1941.) 
34 Ibid. 
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referring to his information from Tiso’s personal secretary. The 
secretary also explained that the Italian diplomacy supported the 
idea while the Germans were against it. Kuhl also asked the 
German ambassador in Bratislava, Hanns Elard Ludin for 
information. Ludin admitted hearing about the plan and said that 
he had even visited Tuka, who denied the news. Ludin said to 
Kuhl: Germany was interested in the consolidation of the 
political situation in Slovakia without troubles and significant 
changes. Kuhl also talked with the Italian ambassador on this 
question, and the latter confirmed the information. Kuhl thought 
that the Slovak government wanted to confirm the sovereignty 
of the state by electing a strong-handed king from a foreign 
dynasty, which would also make control over the parties and 
administration easier. The king could have higher reputation 
and authority than President Jozef Tiso. The final conclusion of 
the Hungarian ambassador was, as his report to the Hungarian 
Foreign Ministry testifies, that the Slovak politicians did bring up 
the possibility of the rule of Prince Cyril to King Boris.
35
  
King Boris III brought up the issue in Berlin and Rome, its 
practicability and method of implementation. After all this, he 
could return to Bratislava knowing the opinion of the Axis 
leaders. Since the Slovak Foreign Ministry denied the talks, 
Kuhl concluded that Germany had rejected the idea of 
monarchy, which, therefore, was taken off the agenda. In his 
view, the purpose of the rumour was to prevent the Hungarians 
from making use of the pro-Hungarian atmosphere in Slovakia 
and confirm their position and political influence in Slovakia.  
The visit of the Bulgarian king had another purpose: to 
settle the problem of the wealth of his family in Slovakia. The 
Saxon-Coburg-Gotha dynasty had extensive land and real 
estate property in the country, which had caused inheritance 
debates in the family. A great amount of land had earlier been 
confiscated by the Czechoslovak Land Office without compen- 
sating the family. Kuhl thought that the increased activity of 
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the family to regain the estates could be put down to the fact 
that the wealth of the Coburg family in England had been 
distrained by the authorities. He even thought it was possible 
that the Bulgarian king promised political support to Slovakia 
against Hungary, and this gave the idea to the Slovak leaders 
to form a monarchy.  
Hungarian Foreign Minister László Bárdossy instructed 
Hungarian ambassador in Sofia Mihály Arnóthy-Jungerth to find 
out about the reality of the news in the Bulgarian court.
36
 The 
ambassador received mixed information. People close to the court 
simply rejected the idea and labelled it ‘false information’. A 
secretary in the Bulgarian foreign ministry said that the 
government did not know about such plans. The German 
ambassador in Sofia, who had talked to the king, declared that the 
visit of Boris III to Tiso in Bratislava was an act of mutual 
courtesy. Formerly both Tiso and Tuka had paid a visit to the king 
when he was at his father Ferdinand’s residence in Muraň. The 
Hungarian ambassador in Sofia did not exclude the possibility 
that the idea of creating a Slovak kingdom and the enthronement 
of Prince Cyril had been discussed in Muraň. He also found it 
possible that Ferdinand, who had been living in Slovakia, gave 
the idea to the Slovak politicians because he was expecting 
that both he and his family would benefit considerably from 
the monarchy. They could regain the Coburg-Koháry estates, 
which were in litigation. In Arnóthy-Jungerth’s opinion, 
however, Boris III and Cyril were familiar with the German 
plans regarding Slovakia and they finally rejected participation 
in the creation of a ‘puppet kingdom’ in Slovakia.37  
Slovakia had got under overwhelming German influence 
(dependence) by 1939–1940, which resulted in political 
                                                        
36 MNL, K-63, 85/pol. 1941. sz. (Reports of the Hungarian embassy in 
Sofia.) (17 July 1941.) 
37  Holec, R. Bulharský excár Ferdinand a Slovensko (1939–1944). - 
Historický Časopis, 56, 2008, N 4, 674. Also: Holec, R. Coburgovci a 
Slovensko. Bratislava, 2010. 
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obligation. It is possible that the Slovak administration 
intended the enthronement of the royal house of Bulgaria to be 
the first step of opening within the Axis, and there might be 
attempts for gaining total independence. In retrospect, it may 
also be assumed that the Slovak administration regarded the 
kingdom of Slovakia a better-founded sovereign state between 
Germany and Hungary, which could have argued more effec- 
tively in a general territorial reorganisation in order to regain the 
lost areas. What is more, even the Saint Stephen state theory could 
not have been used as an argument against Slovakia, which would, 
then be a sovereign kingdom. The establishment of the kingdom 
could be a response to the Hungarian revisionary propaganda.  
Germany wanted to make Slovakia a model state, which 
could have been used for propaganda purposes in Central and 
Southwestern Europe. Model state, for the Nazis, meant total 
subjugation to German demands; it would demonstrate that a 
state could only survive and complete its plans with the help of 
Germany. The establishment of a kingdom, therefore, did not fit 
in the Nazi framework and it would not serve Nazi interests. Even 
if founded, a sovereign kingdom could not have lasted long; it 
would probably have been transformed into a ‘puppet kingdom’ 
of Germany. It does not seem very likely that Slovak society, 
which had been living in a republic since 1918 and had 
predominantly democratic sentiments, would have accepted 
monarchy as a form of government. The Slovak kingdom did 
not come into existence mostly because it did not meet with 
German approval. Germany preferred those contemporary 
politicians who had been enjoying their support to remain at 
power. The Germans did not want to confront other allies 
including Hungary because of this issue. 
Macedonia between the Two World Wars: 









After World War I, the great Eastern European empires collapsed, 
and new states were established, such as Czechoslovakia or 
Yugoslavia. The new countries were comprised of parts that had 
previously belonged to different empires. On 1 December 1918 
the Kingdom of Serbs, Croats and Slovenes was proclaimed. The 
new state included seven different regions, which had been either 
sovereign states (Serbia and Montenegro) or parts of the 
Austro-Hungarian Monarchy. 57.5% of the country’s territory 
had previously belonged to the Austro-Hungarian Monarchy: 
Croatia, Dalmatia, Slovenia, Vojvodina, and Bosnia and 
Herzegovina (the last one had belonged there since 1878). Serbia’s 
pre-1914 territory, expanded as a result of the Balkan Wars, 
accounted for 38.5% of the new state.
2
  
Earlier there had been very few connections between the 
different parts of the new state, in fact, in many cases there was 
no connection at all. The regions of the new state had different 
levels of social, economic and cultural development. They had 
                                                        
1
 The study has been supported by project K 101 629 of the Hungarian 
Scientific Research Fund (OTKA). 
2 The state of Serbs, Croats and Slovenes had a territory of 248.987 sq km. 
The territory of the different areas was as follows: Serbia 95.667 sq km 
(pre-1912 Serbia 49.950 sq km and Southern Serbia 45.717 sq km), 
Montenegro 9.668 sq km, Bosnia and Herzegovina 51,199 sq km, Dalmatia 
12.732 sq km, Slovenia and Prekmurje 16.197 sq km, Croatia 43.822 sq km, 
and Vojvodina 19,702 sq km. Đuričić, V. M., M. B. Tošić, A. Vegner, et al. 
Naša narodna privreda i nacionalni prihod. Sarajevo, 1929, 30.  
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different experience and traditions in political life, along with 
different institutions and institutional systems (for example, 
differing economic, political, judicial and educational systems). 
The new state had to face a huge challenge: integrating the 
different parts, regions and systems and organising them into an 
unified country. This work took place on several levels. 
In this study we shall mention some measures through which 
the government intended to integrate the different regions and 
unify the differing political, economic and educational systems, 
after that, we wish to point out what impact such measures had 
on Macedonia as part of Yugoslavia. In the Middle Ages, the 
region was part of the Bulgarian Empire, and it came under 
Ottoman rule in the 14th century. In the period of the formation 
of nations, the Bulgarians, Serbs and Greeks also laid their 
claims to the area, wanting to define the national consciousness 
of the population as well. In 1913, after the Balkan Wars, the 
geographical territory of Macedonia was divided, and the 
so-called Vardar Macedonia came to form part of Serbia. It 
was one of the least-developed regions of Yugoslavia. In times 
of the Kingdom of Yugoslavia, the government intended to 
integrate the locals into the Serbian population, while after 1945 
the new socialist state supported the local population’s ambitions 
of becoming a nation. The history of this region and nation 
presents an interesting case within the Yugoslav integration.  
 
ONE COUNTRY, SEVERAL REGIONS, SEVERAL NATIONS 
 
After World War I, several new states were established in 
Europe, but the Kingdom of Serbs, Croats and Slovenes had 
the largest differences of all in terms of development (or, even 
if there were similarly large differences, none of the states was 
comprised of so many different regions).
3
 Various comparative 
historians highlighted the fact that the regions that ended up 
                                                        
3  For detailed information on regional differences and the Yugoslav 
integration, see: Bíró, L. A jugoszláv állam, 1918–1939. Bp., 2010.  
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constituting the southern Slavic state had previously belonged 
to different historical regions or to different subregions of the 
same region (Eastern Europe). Boundaries were basically drawn 
between the Slovenian, Croatian and Vojvodinan areas, on the 
one hand, and Serbia and Bosnia and Herzegovina, on the other 
hand. Among the different areas of the new state, compared to 
each other, some were very poor while others somewhat more 
prosperous. The economic performance and economic structure 
of these regions and, therefore, the living conditions of their 
population showed significant disparities (see Tab. 1).
4
 As you 
can judge from the data: The territories that had previously 
belonged to the Austro–Hungarian Monarchy produced more 
income than the rest of the regions. 
 
Table 1. Ratio (%) of per capita national income by regions 
compared to the Yugoslav average, 1923.  
Region Agriculture  Industry  Other  Total 
Slovenia 90.8 317.3 177.1 160.5 
Vojvodina 175.5 107.7 125.7 146.0 
Croatia 120.2 123.0 141.5 128.3 
Dalmatia 74.7 180.9 94.0 99.8 
Serbia 88.1 45.6 70.4 74.5 
Bosnia and Herzegovina 72.0 71.3 62.4 68.4 
Southern Serbia 71.0 6.1 49.3 52.2 
Montenegro 46.7 3.2 32.2 34.1 
Kingdom of SCS 100 100 100 100 
 
The population of Yugoslavia increased by 29.3% from 
11.984.911 to 1.490.000 (an increase of 3.5 million persons) 
from 1921 to 1939 (the data for 1939 are based on official 
estimates). However, the population of the different regions 
increased in different degrees. In proportion, the Yugoslavian 
population increase was one of the largest in Europe, with only 
                                                        
4 Jakir, A. Dalmatien zwischen den Weltkriegen. Agrarische und urbane 
Lebenswelt und das Scheitern der jugoslawischen Integration. München, 
1999, 141–142.  
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Albania and Greece registering a bigger growth.
5
 As a 
consequence of several factors, during the twenty years of the 
Kingdom of Yugoslavia the population of the different regions 
grew to different extent. The smallest increase was recorded in 
the north and northwest while in the south there was a 
population explosion of 150–200% of the Yugoslav average. A 
larger increase exceeding the national average took place in 
the southern areas that were less developed economically and 
culturally, while the largest population increase was recorded 
in Bosnia and Herzegovina, Macedonia and Kosovo. The 
population increase was still, first of all, a consequence of high 
birth rates in the southern parts of the country. In the regions 
with more developed industry and agriculture, as a result of 
demographic changes that had taken place earlier, the population 
increased to a significantly smaller extent (in Croatia by 
17.1%, in Vojvodina by 19%, in Slovenia by 19.9%, in Serbia 
by 26.2%, in Montenegro by 39.6, in Macedonia by 42.9, in 
Bosnia and Herzegovina by 46.1%, and in Kosovo by 69.7%).
6
 
The natural population increase was mainly a consequence of 
high birth rates. The number of births per 1000 women of 
childbearing age (15 to 49 years) was 170 in Bosnia and 
Herzegovina, 167 in Macedonia, and 162 in Kosovo. This ratio 
approximately equalled the national average (132) in Serbia 
(136) and Montenegro (131), while it was lower in Croatia 
(118), Slovenia (104) and Vojvodina (101).
7
  
75% of the Yugoslav population lived of agriculture. 
During the life of the Yugoslav state, there was no significant 
change in the employment structure. The agriculture preserved 
its predominant role within the employment structure of the 
                                                        
5 Tomasevich, J. Peasant, politics and economic change in Yugoslavia. 
Standford–London, 1955, 288–289. 
6  Statistički Godišnjak, 5, 1935, 40–41; Simeunović, V. Stanovništvo 
Jugoslavije i socijalističkih republika 1921–1961. Beograd, 1964, 30–32, 40.  
7 Simeunović, V., Op. cit., 44. 
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country, although with some regional differences (see Tab. 2).
8
 
The proportion of agricultural workers decreased very slowly 
(from 1921 to 1931 it fell from 80.4% to 76.3%), and little 
increase was recorded in the proportion of workers in the 
industrial (8.6% to 10.7%), trade (2% to 2.3%) and transportation 
sectors (1.2% to 1.5%). A relatively faster increase took place 
only in the economically more developed regions, such as 
Slovenia. In the southern regions and Serbia (except for Belgrade 
and some industrial areas developed partly in the 1930s), 
agricultural production was the only source of income for the 
population even if large parts of the land were not suitable for 
agricultural production. In these parts of the country, the 
proportion of industrial workers, craftsmen and employees of 
the transportation sector was less than half of such proportion in 
Croatia and Vojvodina.  
 
Table 2. The active population by employment areas, 1931 (%). 
Region Agriculture Industry Trade Public 
services 
Other 
Slovenia 60.6 21.1 5.7 4.9 7.7 
Croatia 76.3 10.7 4.3 4.2 4.5 
Vojvodina 69.2 15.2 5.7 5.2 4.7 
Serbia 79.3 8.9 3.4 4.5 3.9 
Montenegro 78.1 5.8 3.0 8.3 4.8 
Bosnia and 
Herzegovina 
84.1 6.7 3.1 3.6 2.5 
Macedonia 75.1 9.4 4.1 7.0 4.4 
Kosovo 85.8 4.9 2.2 3.9 3.2 
Sandžak 89.3 3.9 1.9 2.5 2.4 
 
The types and distribution of the country’s settlements were 
determined by the fact that Yugoslavia was a predominantly 
agricultural country: agriculture was the principal source of 
                                                        
8 Mirković, M. Ekonomska historija Jugoslavije. Zagreb, 1968, 308; Isić, M. 
Socijalna i agrarna struktura Srbije u Kraljevini Jugoslaviji (Prema popisu 
stanovnišva od 31. marta 1931. godine). Beograd, 1999, 11.  
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income of more than 75% of the population and, according to 
different calculations, 80–90% of the inhabitants lived in villages. 
Towns, constituting a more modern settlement type, deserve 
special attention. In the Kingdom of Yugoslavia, the number 
and proportion of people living in towns were constantly on 
the rise. From 1921 to 1941 the number of town dwellers 
increased from 1.84 million to 3.64 million. In that period, the 
proportion of the urban population to the entire population also 
increased: from 12.4% to 22.8%.
9
 The degree of urbanisation 
varied from region to region: the proportion of the urban 
population was highest in Vojvodina and above average in 
Southern Serbia as well. In the preceding centuries large 
agricultural towns had been established in the market centres 
of Vojvodina, while in Southern Serbia people had moved to 
larger settlements in search of more protection during the 
century-long Ottoman domination, and thus craftsmen were also 
concentrated in those towns. Nevertheless, in these regions 
several towns remained closely related to agriculture, and, as a 
result of the sector's previous development, the proportion of 
the agricultural population continued to be significant. Taking 
some of the larger towns as an example, the proportion of 
inhabitants making their living of agriculture was 51.6% in 
Subotica, 40.6% in Sombor, 23.0% in Novi Sad, 22.2% in 
Split (fishing), 13.6% in Skopje, and 12.9% in Bitola. In other 
larger towns the proportion of the agricultural population was 
insignificant (Belgrade 1.3%, Zagreb 2.8%, Ljubljana 2.3%, 
Sarajevo 1.4%, and Niš 1.5%).10 Skopje between the wars became 
a transport hub and later, after 1929, administrative seat of the 
Southern regions and a university town due to the newly built 
railway line. In 1941 its population reached 100.000.
11
 
Loyalty to the state would have become significantly stronger 
if Yugoslavia had been a real nation state, as the official ideology 
                                                        
9 Statistički godišnjak, 1, 1929, 60.; Tomasevich, J., Op. cit., 301.  
10 Statistički godišnjak, 9, 1938–39, 20–35. 
11 Rogić, V. Regionalna geografija Jugoslavije. Zagreb, 1990, 187–191. 
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proclaimed. As a result of historical events, however, the different 
peoples living in the territory of the country got mixed up with 
each other during the centuries. It might be useful to mention the 
principal stages of such mixing of peoples because migration 
processes are at the origin of one of Yugoslavia’s features and its 
problems: the fact that it was comprised of both regions with a 
homogeneous population and others with a mixed population, 
different nations and peoples living together and mixing with 
each other, often amidst conflicts.  
The country’s population was made up of various nations, 
whose national consciousness, however, was not equally strong. 
Some of them had had developed a strong national consciousness 
long before (for example Serbs, Croats, Slovenes), while there 
were others whose national consciousness was still at a very early 
stage and would only became stronger after World War II (for 
example Macedonians). The Bosnians’ sense of nationhood was 
also unquestionable, and they continued to maintain their 
distance from both the Serbs and the Croats, even if a small group 
of intellectuals did draw closer to the Croats. Their religion-based 
system of advocacy, which had been created in the preceding 
century principally as a means of self-defence, made its entry also 
in the Kingdom of Yugoslavia and soon assumed an independent 
political form. The majority of the ethnic groups, by then regarded 
as national minorities, had developed a strong national 
consciousness, and they were often supported by a neighbouring 
motherland (for example Hungarians and Romanians).  
According to the official position, the country’s population 
was one nation with three names and tribes, the Serbo-Croatian- 
Slovenian nation. Censuses never included questions about the 
citizens’ national identity, and the published statistics contained 
no such data. During the 1921 census, when asked about their 
mother tongue, the citizens of Slavic origin could choose between 
Serbo-Croatian, Slovenian or “another Slavic language” (the 
latter was subsequently explained in the statistical publications). 
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Table 3. Distribution of nationalities in the Kingdom of Serbs, 
Croats and Slovenes in 1921. 





Serbian 4,704,876 39.0 4,665,851 38.8 
Croatian 2,889,102 24.0 2,856,551 23.8 
Slovenian 1,023,588 8.5 1,024,761 8.5 
Bosnian 759,656 6.3. 727,650 6.0 
Macedonian 
(Bulgarian) 
630,000 5.2 585,558 4.9 
German 512,207 4.2 513,472 4.3 
Hungarian 472,079 3.9 472,409 3.9 
Albanian 483,871 4.0 441,740 3.7 
Romanian 183,563 1.6 229,398 1.9 
Turkish 143,453 1.2 168,404 1.4 
Other Slav 198,857 1.6 174,466 1.5 
Jewish   64,159 0.5 
Italian 11,630 0.1 12,825 0.1 
Other 42,756 0.3 80,079 0.7 
Total 12,055,715 100 12,017,323 100 
 
Apart from the Serbs, Croats and Slovenes, the Macedonian 
population, which spoke a Southern Slavic language and was 
attached to Serbia in 1912–13, was also regarded as part of the 
nation of Serbs, Croats and Slovenes. 83% of the population 
belonged to the state-nation, and more than ten other national 
minorities made up the remaining 17%.
12
 Thus the Kingdom 
of Serbs, Croats and Slovenes could be regarded as a nation 
state, nevertheless, the homogeneous state–nation was mere 
fiction. Several researchers made efforts to reconstruct the 
national composition of the Southern Slavic state based on the 
citizens’ mother tongue, religion and other factors. The most 
important question was to calculate the number of Serbs, Croats, 
                                                        
12 Definitivni rezultati popisa stanovništva od 31 januara 1921 god. Sarajevo, 
1932, 2–3. (Further DRPS 1921.), Statistički godišnjak, 1. (1929) 69. 
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Bosnians and Macedonians within the state–nation (we will 




In the so-called Southern Serbia, which comprised Kosovo, 
Macedonia and some smaller regions and had been previously 
considered an administrative unit (46.000 sq km, 1.474.560 
inhabitants in 1921, out of which 854.000 in Macedonia and 
439.000 in Kosovo, calculated on the basis of districts), there 
were three ethnic groups constituting more than 10% of the 
population on their own: Serbo-Croats (59.7%), Albanians 
(28.2%) and Turks (10%). Approximately 60% of the 
population of Macedonia was made up of Macedonians, 
regarded as Serbs between the two world wars, 13% by 
Albanians, 13% by Turks (according to the language-related 
data of the 1921 census, there were 105.000 Albanians and 
107.000 Turks), and there was also a larger group of Serbs. 
The Albanians lived mainly in the West of Macedonia, 
neighbouring Kosovo and Albania, where their proportion was 
significantly higher (46% in the province of Tetovo, 74% in 
the province of Gostivar).
14
 A significant part of the 
approximately 107.000–strong Turkish population lived in 
towns: in Skopje (14.000), Tetovo (6.500), Bitola (6.000) and 
Prilep (3.300).
15
 In the 1930s, a large part of the Turkish 
                                                        
13  Gligorijević, Br. Jugoslovenstvo između dva rata. – Jugoslovenski 
istorijski časopis, 1986, № 1–4, 76; Banac, I. The National Question in 
Yugoslavia. Origins, History, Politics. Ithaca–London, 1984, 58.  
14 Stawowy-Kawka, Ir. Die Albaner in Makedonien – Vergangenheit und 
Gegenwart. – Österreichische Osthefte, 40, 1998, № 1–2, 115–122. The 
Macedonian researcher L. Sokolov described the ethnic make-up of the 
region as follows: he regarded almost the entire Southern Slavic population 
living there (67.65%) as Macedonian, while the rest of the population was 
made up of Turks (14.88%), Albanians (13.86%), Roma (1.61%), Vlachs 
(1.14%) and Serbs (0.78%). Sokolov, L. Promene u strukturi stanovništva na 
teritoriji NR Makedonije 1921–1953. godine kao odraz ekonomskog razvoja. 
Skopje, 1962, 81–83. 
15 Sokolov, L., Op. cit., 83. 
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population moved somewhere else as a consequence of an 
interstate agreement.  
Yugoslavia was a diverse country not only from the point of 
view of nations and nationalities but also from that of religion. 
There were three main religious communities: the Orthodox 
(44.67%), the Roman Catholics (39.29%) and the Muslims 
(11.22%), in different proportions depending on geographical 
areas and ethnic groups. Considering the different nations and 
national minorities, the Croats, Slovenes, Germans, Hungarians, 
Slovaks and Czechs were Roman Catholic, the Serbs, 
Macedonians, Bulgarians and the emigrated Russians were 
Orthodox, while the Bosnians, Turks and nearly two thirds of 
the Albanians were Muslim. Almost 60% of the Muslims 
declared Serbo-Croat to be their mother tongue (908,000 
people out of 1.561.000 in 1931). Nearly 40% of the Muslims 
belonged to some ethnic minority (Albanians, Turks). In the 
so-called Southern Serbia the Orthodox accounted for 50.4% 
of the population (Macedonians, Serbs, Vlachs) and the Muslims 
for 47.9% (Albanians, Turks, Bosnians). In Macedonia the 
proportion of the Orthodox was higher: the ratio of the 
Orthodox to Muslims was 2:1, while in Kosovo Muslims 




INTEGRATION MEASURES IN YUGOSLAVIA 
 
There were not only social differences between the different parts 
of the state of Serbs, Croats and Slovenes but their political 
institutions and traditions were also different. The political system 
of the Yugoslav state was established within a couple of years of 
the creation of the new state. A common parliamentary body and 
a unified government and public administration were established, 
and the common army was also formed based on the Serbian 
army. Some time later the judicial systems were also unified. 
Harmonisation failed only in the field of civil law. 
                                                        
16 PRPS 1921, Op. cit., XIX–XX. 
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The issue of domestic political order was determined by 
the 1921 constitution (Vidovdanski ustav). It was the achievement 
of Serbian parties that the constitution was adopted not by 
qualified but only simple majority. During the debate they 
achieved that, apart from Serbian parties, the Bosnian and 
Muslim parties of Southern Serbia also voted for the 
constitution. The first constitution of the new kingdom did not 
recognize any autonomy, either territorial or ethnic.
17
 
The restructuring of public administration was also decided 
by the constitution. The winning position was the one proposing 
the establishment of smaller administrative areas instead of 
larger territorial units with more extensive autonomy, based on 
some historical right (or ethnic borders). After the reorga- 
nisation of state administration in 1922, the central power 
completely limited the districts” self-governance. Thus, a 
centralized and unitary political system was established. By 
1924, even the remaining regional governments stopped working 
(in Slovenia, Bosnia and Herzegovina, and Vojvodina).
18
 
After the establishment of the state, the primary task was 
the unification of the economic institutions. Organising the 
economic life and starting the integrating processes encouraged 
by the government required substantial efforts. One of the 
most important tasks was the establishment of the country's 
own currency system and the stabilisation of the national 
currency. Before World War I, the Southern Slavic regions 
basically belonged to one of two currency zones: the regions 
forming part of the Austro-Hungarian Monarchy used the 
                                                        
17  Gligorijević, Br. Parlament i političke stranke u Jugoslaviji 1919–1929. 
Beograd, 1979, 89–114; Sagadin, St. Ustrojstvo naše države: Kralj, Narodna 
skupština, Državna uprava, Državno činovništvo. – In: Jubilarni zbornik života i 
rada Srba Hrvata i Slovenaca 1918–1928. Knj. I. Beograd, 1928, 72–113; 
Hohnjec, J. O ustavi naše države. – In: Mal, J. (ur.), Slovenci v desetletju 
1918–1928, Zbornik razprav iz kulturne, gospodarske in politične zgodovine. 
Ljubljana, 1928, 295–338; Mrđenović, D. (ur.), Ustavi i vlade Kneževine Srbije, 
Kraljevine SHS i Kraljevine Jugoslavije (1835–1941). Beograd, 1988, 209–229. 
18 Mrđenović, D., (ur.), Op. cit., 221–222. 
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crown as legal tender, while Serbia used dinar and Montenegro 
used Montenegrin perper. The introduction of the common 
currency was completed in 1921, not without political debates. 
The National Bank was created, the use of the dinar was extended 
to the entire country, its gold cover and convertibility were 
guaranteed, and the use of other currencies was prohibited.
19
 
In 1919, the ministry of financial affairs was created, and in 
the following two years numerous laws and decrees regulating 
duties, state monopolies, use taxes and customs were adopted. 
The laws were based on former Serbian decrees, and most often 
the process began by simply extending the laws in force in the 
Kingdom of Serbia to the entire country. The system of state 
revenues and expenditures was organised by the mid-1920s, and 
the unification of direct taxes completed the establishment of the 
fiscal system. Unified customs tariffs were introduced in 1925. 
The slowest and politically most debated part of the 
organisation of state revenues was the unification of direct 
taxes. 1918 saw five different direct tax systems in force in the 
territory of the Southern Slavic state, which implied differing tax 
burdens in the different parts of the country. This heterogeneous 
fiscal system was in force for nearly ten years. The fiscal 
system was unified by the law on taxes adopted on 8 February 
1928. The law determined the types of taxes (land tax, property 
rental tax, corporate profit tax, interest tax, income tax, bachelor 
tax) and the way to calculate the tax base.
20
  
In the multi-ethnic Yugoslavia the question of which part 
of the country, which nation had the highest tax burden was an 
ever topical political issue and cause for debate. There is no 
way to do justice but the available data show that during the 
                                                        
19 Slokar, Iv. Valutne razmere, devizna politika in bankarstvo. – In: Mal (ur.), 
Op. cit., p. 553.; Ugričić, M. Novačni sistem Jugoslavije. Beograd, 1967, 95.  
20  Murko, Vl. Državne in samoupravne finance v dravski banovini v l. 
1918–1938. – In: Lavrič, J., J. Mal, Fr. Stele, (ur.), Spominski zbornik Slovenije, 
Ob dvajsetletnici Kraljevine Jugoslavije. Ljubljana, 1939, 474–476; Murko, Vl. 
Systém jihoslovanských přímých daní. Bratislava, 1938. 
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whole period of Yugoslavia the parts of the former 
Austro-Hungarian Monarchy paid the largest amount of tax. 
From 1919 to 1929 the direct tax per capita in Vojvodina and 
Slovenia could easily amount to 3 to 5 times the direct tax paid 
in the southern parts of the country, while Croats paid more 
than 1.5 times as much as Serbs. The unified fiscal system did 
not bring about substantial changes, as shown by the data 




Table 4. Direct taxes and duties per banovinas, 1939. 







 Total  Per capita 
Drava 323.546.287 411.603.267 270 336 
Sava 539.619.616 779.116.811 185 267 
Danube 521.878.477 1.056.868.038 206 417 
Littoral 58.936.467 73.601.132 61 76 
Morava 116.215.387 195.660.335 71 119 
Drina 142.235.535 178.504.685 78 98 
Vrbas 43.689.735 108.545.321 36 91 
Zeta 56.858.001 66.690.442 54 64 
Vardar 89.930.027 103.282.144 51 57 
Belgrade 449.911.913 717.405.233 110 765 
Yugoslavia 2.351.821.445 3.691.277.408 152 238 
 
There is no real reason for assuming political motivation 
behind the tax imposition, although the government must have 
had some reason for delaying the tax unification until 1929 
and letting the regions of the former Monarchy pay higher 
taxes. The degree of tax payment also reveals the differences 
in development between the different regions. 
After the establishment of the Yugoslav state, there were 
huge disparities also in the fields of education and culture. In 
1918, there were five different laws in force on primary 
                                                        
21 Statistički Godišnjak, 10, 1940, 467. 
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education. A unified educational system would have been 
necessary for various reasons: an efficient educational policy 
could have reduced the educational differences between the 
various parts of the country, and the curriculum drawn up in 
the spirit of Yugoslavism could have brought the Southern 
Slavic nations closer to each other, which could have 
strengthened their loyalty towards the newly founded state.
22
 
Before 1918, the cultural life of some Southern Slavic 
nations was directed from various centres (Belgrade, Zagreb, 
Ljubljana, Sarajevo, Novi Sad and Split). The state centralisation 
started in the 1920s also reached the fields of education and 
culture. The centralisation of educational and cultural affairs 
under the supervision of a common ministry was finished after 
the withdrawal of local government rights and duties, the 
introduction of the new public administration and the cancellation 
of regional governments (1923–1924), that is, five years after 
the creation of the Kingdom of Serbs, Croats and Slovenes. 
The first educational programme, which never came into force, 
was only drawn up by December 1927.
 23 
The restructuring and 
development of the school system did not appear to be an easy 
task. There were two basically opposing concepts regarding 
the organisation of the education. The Unitarian concept 
aiming for the establishment of a unified school system was 
based on the idea that a unified school system was the most 
efficient means to educate the young generation in the spirit of 
the new state ideology. The political unity of one nation with 
three names and tribes was already expressed by the establishment 
of the common state, thus, according to the advocates of the 
Unitarian approach, the remaining economic and cultural 
                                                        
22  Dimić, L. Kulturna politika i modernizacija jugoslovenskog društva 
1918–1941. Mogućnosti i ograničenja. – In: Perović, L., M. Obradović, D. 
Stojanović (ur.) Srbija u modernizacijskim procesima XX. veka. Beograd, 
1994, 193–194. 
23 Dimić, L. Kulturna politika u Kraljevini Jugoslaviji 1918–1941. Knj. I. 
Društvo i država. Beograd, 1996, 184–189. 
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differences could be eliminated, among others, by breaking down 
cultural barriers and more specifically by means of a unified school 
education. The opposing approach would stick to the traditions and 
claims of the different areas, and would claim more flexibility in 
the solution of practical issues.
24
 The conflict of the two opposing 
concepts, just like the issue of the country’s new structure, was 
decided by the Vidovdan Constitution. It provided for education 
“under identical circumstances” in the entire country.25 
Although during the years several draft laws were prepared, 
the laws enacting the unified school system were only adopted 
ten years later. The first law to be adopted was the one on 
secondary education, on 31 August 1929. The act on public 
elementary schools, which affected the largest number of 
people and thus can be considered the most important act, was 
adopted on 5 December 1929. It declared that the objective of 
education was to educate children in the spirit of national and 
state unity and religious tolerance. Education was universal, 
free and compulsory for all in the entire country. The state had 
the right to oblige parents to send their children to school. 
(This was especially important as 30% of children of school 
age did not attend school.) The law prescribed eight years of 
compulsory education. Article 17 also aimed at smoothing out 
disparities within the country by ordaining the establishment 
of schools in all areas with at least 30 children of school age 
within a 4 km range. The law also determined the 14 subjects 
to be taught in a uniform way all over the country. Furthermore, 
the law stipulated that the language of public elementary school 
education was the language of the state, i.e. Serbo-Croat- 
Slovenian. Schools were only allowed to employ teachers who 
graduated from state-run teacher training colleges and worked 
as state employees.
26  
According to a recent researcher of 
                                                        
24 Tešić, Vl., M. Mirković, S. Ćunković, R. Vuković. Sto godina Prosvetnog 
saveta Srbije 1880–1980. Beograd, 1980, 89.  
25 Mrđenović D. (ur.), Op. cit., 211. 
26 Službene novine, 9 December 1929.  
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Yugoslav cultural policy, this act combined the ideology of 
integral Yugoslavism with the modern educational policy 
objectives (or often simply desires and hopes) of smoothing out 
disparities of cultural levels within a short period of time. 
However, the ideas did not turn into practice; for example, 
compulsory education was not introduced in the entire country.
27
  
The educational system had two main sources of financing: 
state and local government budgets. Local governments (villages, 
towns, and voivodeships) allotted 4 to 16% of their budget to 
education. The ministry of education, which also controlled 
the cultural and scientific institutions, allotted 75 to 90% of its 
budget to education, the 50 to 67% of which was dedicated to 
elementary schooling.
28
 Taking into account the average costs 
of that period, these funds were insufficient for bringing about 
significant cultural development and enabling disadvantaged 
regions to start catching up. Due to the previously different 
development levels and the insufficient funds for smoothing 
out differences, significant regional disparities continued to 
exist regarding the school system and cultural development 
levels in Yugoslavia. In the north and northwest there were 
almost thrice as many schools per capita and almost four times 
as many schools per sq km as in the less developed south, i.e. 
in Kosovo and Bosnia and Herzegovina. This situation could 
be attributed both to the previous educational policy and to 
geographical factors. In the mountain areas villages were 
smaller and could not afford maintaining their own schools. 
Between the two world wars, regional differences hardly 





                                                        
27 Dimić, L. Kulturna politika u Kraljevini Jugoslaviji 1918–1941. Knj. II. 
Škola i crkva. Beograd, 1996, 134. 
28 Mayer, M. Elementarbildung in Jugoslawien (1918–1941). Ein Beitrag 
zur gesellschaftlichen Modernisierung? München, 1995, 95. 
29 Mayer, M., Op. cit., 100. 
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Table 5. Density of the elementary school network (1922–23 
and 1938–39) 
Region 1922–23 1938–39 
Inhabitants 
per school 




Sq km per 
school 
Slovenia 1,288 25 1,404 24 
Croatia 1,587 25 1,587 21 
Dalmatia 1,193 24 1,256 22 
Vojvodina 1,284 18 2,443 34 
Bosnia and 
Herzegovina 
3,425 93 2,550 49 
Serbia 1,685 32 1,823 23 
South 
Serbia 
1,941 60 1,714 38 
Montenegro 694 34 918 37 
Yugoslavia 1,679 34 1,718 28 
 
Nevertheless, the proportion of children attending school 
increased in all parts of the country: the number of pupils in 
the academic year 1921–22 was 989.000 while in 1938–39 
1.426.000. There were more schools but the overall number of 
places did not increase more than the number of children as a 
result of natural population increase. Illiteracy rates also fell 
but to a smaller extent than desired, and regional differences 
remained (see Tab. 6).
30
 According to official statistics, illiteracy 
rates decreased by 5.9% from 1921 to 1931: from 51.5% to 
44.6%, and later on, by 1944 to 38%.
31
 In the age group of 
11–24, i.e. pupils who began their studies in the Yugoslav state, 
illiteracy rates fell from 42% to 37%. Literacy rates within this 
age group equalled the number of children attending school.
32
  
                                                        
30 Statistički godišnjak, 1 (1929) 70–71, 6 (1934–35). 
31 Mayer, M., Op. cit., 205. 
32 Literacy rates per banovinas: Drava 97.5% (men 97.5%, women 98.4%), Sava 
83.0% (88.2%, 77.8%), Danube 80.5% (87.9%, 73.0%), Littoral 52.6% (64.9%, 
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Table 6. Illiteracy rates per banovinas (1921, 1931). 
Banovina 1921 1931 
Men Women Total Men Women Total 
Drava 8.9 8.9 8.9 5.26 5.79 5.54 
Sava 25.7 40.1 31.1 19.57 35.15 27.67 
Danube 24.5 43.0 34.1 17.52 39.56 28.87 
Littoral 53.3 77.2 67.2 44.11 69.76 57.46 
Vrbas 76.1 91.4 83.5 59.89 85.81 72.60 
Drina 52.6 78.0 65.4 43.24 81.02 62.11 
Morava 53.5 86.6 70.8 38.83 83.72 61.96 
Zeta 59.5 86.8 73.5 48.80 82.90 66.04 
Vardar 71.8 90.3 81.3 55.70 85.50 70.86 
Belgrade 11.5 18.8 14.1 7.10 15.32 10.87 
Yugoslavia 42.2 60.3 51.5 32.27 56.40 44.61 
 
THE RESULTS OF THE INTEGRATION AND MACEDONIA 
 
Macedonia’s situation was determined mainly by the fact that 
the region was annexed to Serbia after the Balkan Wars. Vardar 
Macedonia found itself in a new situation, as previously its main 
economic and political relations were with the South, with 
Thessaloniki being the economic centre of the region. Its links 
with Serbia were weaker. Local people did not consider themselves 
Serbs, thus they did not regard their coming to form part of the 
new state. Serbia, however, considered the territories acquired in 
                                                                                                          
40.5%), Drina 48.5% (66.1%, 29.8%), Morava 47.9% (69.9%, 25.3%), Zeta 45.3% 
(62.2%, 26.6%), Vardar 34.5% (52.4%, 25.0%), Vrbas 34.5% (48.2%, 20.4%), 
Belgrade 93.1% (93.4%, 92.7%). Yugoslavia 63.2% (74.1%, 52.0%). DRPS 1931. 
Knj. III. Prisutno stanovništvo po pismenosti i starosti. Beograd, 1939, 7. 
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1913 as Serbian territories, and extended the Serbian laws to the 
Macedonian areas as well.
33
 
The Balkan Wars were followed by another war, World War I, 
after which an extremely complex state was established.
34
 In terms 
of state organisation, in principle, the new state had different 
alternatives. 1. Full integration, which implied the necessity of 
creating unified institutions. This excluded any kind of autonomy. 
Supporters of this approach were of the opinion that after World 
War I a Yugoslav nation state was created, thus everyone in the 
country belonged to the same nation. 2. By contrast, the other 
option was a kind of decentralized state preserving certain forms 
of autonomous government. This implied that some policies, 
mostly cultural and social issues, would be handled at the local 
level. Only some policies would be the competence of the central 
government: foreign policy, trade, and defence.  
As it is widely known, Yugoslavia’s state structure was 
determined by the Constitution of 1920 as a centralized political 
system. Macedonian MPs voted for the Constitution, however, 
the MPs of the democratic and radical parties that obtained 
seats in the parliament were not local politicians but people 
appointed by the party headquarters in Serbia. MPs of the 
Muslim Džemijet were promised, in exchange for their votes, 
to be able to keep their estates in the course of the agrarian 
reforms. The antipathy towards the Yugoslav state was manifest 
in the fact that hardly more than half of the eligible voters 
                                                        
33  See Boeckh, K. Von den Balkankriegen zum Ersten Weltkrieg. 
Kleinstaatenpolitik und ethnische Selbstbestimmung auf dem Balkan. 
München, 1996; Svirčević, M. The New Territories of Serbia after the 
Balkan Wars of 1912–1913: The Establishment of the First Local Authorities. 
– In: Balkanica, 44, 2014, 285–306. 
34 The most comprehensive studies about Macedonia within Yugoslavia are 
the following: Boškovska, N. Das jugoslawische Makedonien, 1918–1941. 
Eine Randregion zwischen Repression und Integration. Wien–Köln–Weimar, 
2009; Jovanović, Vl. Jugoslovenska država i Južna Srbija 1918–1929. 
Makedonija, Sandžak, Kosovo i Metohija u Kraljevini SHS. Beograd, 2002; 
Jovanović, Vl. Vardarska banovina, 1929–1941. Beograd, 2011. 
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went to the polls (the Internal Macedonian Revolutionary 
Organisation, VMRO called for a boycott) and the Communist 
Party received the largest number of votes (Communist Party 
15, Democratic Party 11, Radical Party 6 seats).
35
 
During the entire period in question, this region was not 
represented by local politicians in the parliament, and locals 
were hardly appointed for higher positions in the public 
administration.
36
 It was not until the end of this period that 
local elite, furthering the interest of the region, was formed. In 
other parts of the country, however, there were groups that 
managed to achieve certain results. The Slovenian People’s 
Party (at times in opposition, other times in the government) 
managed to obtain the right to decide on various issues, especially 
cultural and social issues, affecting the Slovenian areas, and 
also succeeded in establishing a voivodeship for the Slovenian 
territories in 1929. Almost the entire Croatian population 
supported the Croatian Peasant Party, and, as a consequence of 
the state of foreign affairs and constant opposition, Croatia was 
given autonomy in 1939 (sporazum, Serb–Croat agreement, 
establishment of Banovina Hrvatska). The Serbian elite 
considered Macedonia to be Serbian land, therefore it would 
not give autonomy to Macedonia as it did to Croatia in 1939. 
In addition, since the population of this region was considered 
Serbian and these territories were annexed to Serbia before 1914, 
adjudicating minority rights, laid down in the peace treaties, to 
the Macedonian population was completely out of question.
37
 
Nevertheless, Yugoslav authorities had to make enormous 
efforts to maintain peace in the region. A large part of the army 
                                                        
35 Gligorijević, Parlament i političke stranke, op. cit., 83.  
36 See Cvetkovska, N. Makedonskoto prašanje vo jugoslovenskiot parlament 
meģu dvete svetski vojni. Skopje, 2000; the same, Političkite partii vo 
parlamentarnite izborni borbi vo vardarskiot del na Makedonija (1919–1929). 
Skopje, 2004; Katardžiev, I. Istorija na makedonskiot narod. T. 4. Makedonija 
meģu Balkanskite i Vtorata svetska vojna (1912–1941). Skopje, 2000. 
37 Boškovska, N., Op. cit., 361–364. 
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and almost two thirds of the gendarmerie were stationed in 
Macedonia. The region constituted a real borderland, surrounded 
by countries with territorial claims and active propaganda. The 
population in the south of the country was not loyal to the 
Yugoslav state; in Kosovo it took years to put down the 
Albanian revolt, and the VMRO was ever active in organising 
anti-Yugoslav actions. The peaceful population did not like the 
officials coming from Belgrade and regarded the state power 
as an oppressive regime.
38
 
The Kingdom of Yugoslavia failed to acquire a unified 
national identity; neither the one nation with three names and 
tribes nor the “integral” Yugoslavism after 1929 managed to 
imbue the masses of people with such an identity. The national 
identity remained unattained, as loyalty towards Yugoslavia did 
not strengthen, and indeed, it was the different national identities 
that became stronger. Macedonia was in a special situation. The 
Serbs wanted the inhabitants of Macedonia to assimilate the 
Serbian national consciousness. But they did not have the 
facilities to develop culture in the region and attract the local 
population. At the same time, Serbian soldiers and officials were 
very much disliked by Macedonian people. Local Macedonians 
simply did not want to acquire the Serbian national consciousness. 
Apart from the political system, it was necessary to form a 
common economic, monetary and customs system and a unified 
system of national education. To put it simply, we can say that 
the unification was carried out in all areas, mostly by extending 
the Serbian institutional systems. In the 1920s, the common 
currency was introduced and the tax revenue system was 
organised. The unification finished by the beginning of the 1930s. 
The northern territories complained that they were paying much 
higher taxes than the southern ones. For Macedonia, the biggest 
disadvantage was that tobacco became state monopoly.  
In 1918 various different regions, which often had very 
                                                        
38 Jovanović, Vl. Vardarska banovina: Drušveno-politička skica. – Istorija 
20 veka, 28, 2010, № 1, 70. 
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poor economic relations with each other, came to form part of 
the same country. While they belonged to the common state, 
significant changes took place in all the regions and also in the 
economic relations between them. It should be noted, first of 
all, that amongst the free market economy conditions investments 
focused on the previously developed areas. Therefore, industry 
went on developing in Slovenia and Croatia, and Belgrade 
became the centre of the banking system after the Great 
Depression. In the 1930s, Belgrade with its surroundings and 
certain Bosnian areas profited from the industrial projects. The 
food industry in Vojvodina and Croatia was in decline after 
having lost its markets in the Monarchy. In Macedonia, a larger 
number of firms were established compared to previous times, 
and the tobacco industry received the heaviest investments. The 
state played a significant role – 40% of the investments were 
made by the state. Investments in Macedonia were not considered 
profitable, therefore the amount of investments there was well 
below the amount in the more developed regions. Yet, in spite 
of the development, Macedonia remained one of the most 
underdeveloped areas of Yugoslavia.
39
 
As we have seen, at the beginning of the 1930s new laws 
on education were adopted, which introduced compulsory 
schooling, and the education system was unified in the spirit of 
integral Yugoslavianism. New schools were built in every part 
of the country, but, in spite of the obligation, 40% of 
Macedonian children did not attend school in order to be able 
to work at home or in the fields instead. Pursuant to the law, 
the language in schools was “Serbo-Croatian” but children in 
Macedonia did not understand the state language properly. 
                                                        
39  Zografski, D. Glavne faze, obeležja i dimenzije razvitka industrije u 
Makedoniji do kraja drugog svetskog rata. - Acta historico-oeconomica 
Iugoslaviae, 1, 1974, 123–139; Lazarov, L. Opšestveno-ekonomskiot razvoj na 
NR Makedonija vo periodot na obnovata i industrijalizacijata (1944–1957). 
Skopje, 1988, 21–86; Djurkovska, L. Faktori za razvoj na stopanstvoto vo 
Skopje meģu dvete svetski vojni. – Glasnik, 56, 2012, № 1–2, 111–116. 
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Many teachers were sent from other parts of Yugoslavia to 
Macedonia as a punishment (for them Macedonia was the 
Yugoslav Siberia). Thus, education was not effective. There 
were no schools with teaching in Albanian language, so 
Albanian children did not attend school at all. A large part of 
Macedonian people remained illiterate. 
When dealing with such a complex country as Yugoslavia, 
governments have to be able to make appropriate and effective 
efforts to help disadvantaged regions catch up with the rest. 
During the first (royal) Yugoslavia little was done to align the 
economic level of the different regions. Here we should 
mention some important measures. 
1) Only in 1938 was a special fund established from which 
the less developed regions could receive additional money 
(Bosnia and Herzegovina, Montenegro, Kosovo, and 
Macedonia).
40
 Only in the second half of the 1930s did prime 
minister Milan Stojadinović promise a development plan for the 
southern regions. In the 1930s, plans were drawn up for the 
development of Macedonia, improvement works (partly in 
order to stop the spread of malaria) and railway construction. 
However, rural development was very slow. In Macedonia the 
largest city, Skopje was developing the most rapidly. In the 
1920s, major private investments began and in the 1930s 
communal and infrastructural constructions were going on 
with funding from the government and state banks.
41
 
2) At this point we can mention some measures taken 
during the agrarian reform and colonisation, which contributed 
to the development of poorer regions. Approximately 20–22 
thousand families (80–90 thousand people) moved to the south 
of the country, out of which approximately 4–6 thousand 
families moved to Macedonia (20 thousand people) and 
received land there. The government established new villages 
                                                        
40  Stanarević, N., St. Milačić, M. Milošević, et al. (ur.). Ministarstvo 
Financija Kraljevine Jugoslavije, 1918–1938. Beograd, 1939, 182. 
41 Boškovska, N., Op. cit., 195–205. 
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and settlements (more than 100 in Macedonia), built houses, 
wells, and schools. 3–4 times more funds were spent on a 
colonist in the south than in the north.
42
 However, newcomers 
did not manage to become integrated in the Macedonian 
society as the local population considered them as strangers 
sent there with the purpose of serbianisation.  
3) With the construction of railways the state sought to 
develop the less-developed areas and incorporate them into the 
transport system of the country. The main problem in the 1920s 
was that these railway lines mostly linked the regions with the 
former capitals, i.e. Vienna, Budapest, and Thessaloniki, and did 
not effectively help the communication between the different 
parts of Yugoslavia. So one of the most important tasks was the 
construction of the Belgrade–Zagreb line to facilitate transport 
links between the two largest cities in the country, as well as 
between Serbia and Croatia. During the first Yugoslavia, some 
lines were built in the mountainous regions of Macedonia, Bosnia 
and Kosovo. The railway lines constructed in Macedonia in this 
period are: till 1926 the line between Veles and Kočani (of 
military importance), in the 1930s the one between Veles and 
Bitola, and during World War I and after the World War a 
narrow gauge railroad between Skopje and Ohrid. However, 
the largest plan – the line between Belgrade and the Adriatic 
Sea – was never realized. Despite this, we can say that the new 
railway lines helped reduce regional disparities.
43
 
To sum it up, the unification of institutions and systems 
was successful. On the other hand, the socio-economic differences 
                                                        
42  Lekić, B. Agrarna reforma i kolonizacija u Jugoslaviji 1918–1941. 
Beograd, 2002, 463–474; Apostolov, Al. Kolonizacijata na Makedonija vo 
stara Jugoslavija. Skopje, 1989, 160–161. 
43 Ivanović, M. Građenje železnica od 1918 do 1941 godine i građevinska 
politika u tome periodu. – In: Blagovac, Bl. (ur.). Sto godina železnica 
Jugoslavije. Zbornik članaka povodom stogodišnjice železnica Jugoslavije. 
Beograd, 1951, 129–136; Lazić, M. Investiciona politika Kraljevine 
Jugoslavije u železničkom i drumskom saobraćaju 1919–1941. – In: Piljević, 
Đorđe O. (ur.), Jugoslovenska država 1918–1998. Beograd, 1999, 375–382. 
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were not successfully reduced. As a result of economic 
development, modernisation kept taking place in the regions 
that had come to form part of the state of Serbs, Croats and 
Slovenes with a more developed social structure (except for 
Belgrade and its surroundings that gained the greatest advantage 
of becoming the centre of a bigger country). From a social point 
of view, the Yugoslav integration cannot be considered successful, 
although we have to acknowledge that time was often insufficient 
for smoothing out disparities and the factors facilitating the 
change were also missing. The governing authorities never 
showed understanding towards the viewpoints of the different 
regions and nations, such as the ever faster Macedonian national 
development. This latter led to the joy of many over the 
disintegration of the Kingdom of Yugoslavia. 
Reducing the disparities between the different regions is a 
big challenge. The Yugoslav federation, which was established 
during World War II (1943) upon new foundations, was unable 
to achieve it. The socialist Yugoslavia pursued a more active 
policy in order to help the less developed regions catch up 
with the rest. In 1965 a special financial fund was created for 
supporting the less developed member republics and regions: 
Bosnia and Herzegovina, Crna Gora, Macedonia and 
Kosovo.
44
 The country’s economic structure underwent 
substantial changes after 1945, when a centralised economic 
management system was introduced. As a result of 
development measures, all the regions developed significantly 
compared to their previous situation. Nevertheless, the relative 
per-capita differences in terms of development between the 
regions remained unchanged, and so did the differences 
between their economies in terms of productivity and income 
generating capacity. It is not necessary to discuss the details of 
economic development to realize that the socialist attempt to 
                                                        
44 Mihajlović, K. Privreda Jugoslavije 1920–1990. – In: Piljević D. O. (ur.), 
Op. cit., 119–123; Miljković, D., M. Nikolić, Razvoj republika SFR 
Jugoslavije, 1947–1990. godine. Beograd, 1996, 9–10. 
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The political and cultural relations, however, developed 
differently. In 1943 Macedonia was declared a member of the 
Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, and thus it was given a significant 
economic and cultural autonomy. The literary language was 
developed. A school system with education in Macedonian 
language was established. New faculties were added to the 
university, and the Macedonian Academy of Sciences and Arts 
was created in 1968. As a consequence, the Macedonian 
national consciousness became stronger. When Yugoslavia was 
dissolved, on 8 September 1991 Macedonia’s independence 
was proclaimed; and thus the country's integration into the 
Yugoslav state became history. Nevertheless, there is an issue 
that is not history yet: how to integrate regions of different 
development levels to everyone’s satisfaction and how to 
prevent masses of people from migrating from poorer areas to 
the more developed regions. This is the challenge facing the 
European Union. Similarly, the question of how to integrate 
groups of different ethnicities and religions within one state is 
not history either. This is the challenge facing Macedonia.  
                                                        
45 For detailed data, see Miljković D., M. Nikolić, Op. cit., 21–38. 
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This paper, based mainly on Hungarian and to lesser extent on 
British Foreign Office documents (incoming and outgoing 
dispatches, reports and memoranda), aims at illuminating the 
role that Turkey had in the Balkan Entente. It shows the 
objectives that Ankara wanted to achieve with the help of this 
organization in its Balkan policy. The role of the Balkan 
Entente in Turkish foreign policy is observed from the angle of 
a central European state which was very lively interested in 
the Balkan affairs and in whose foreign policy Turkey had a 
highly outstanding place. Therefore Hungary eagerly watched 
and analyzed every step that Turkey made toward the Balkans as 
a member state of the Balkan Pact, and also Ankara’s intentions 
to become one of the leading powers within this group of the 
Balkan states – both in political and military sense. 
The road that led Ankara to the Balkan Pact was quite long 
and rugged both in fact and according to the Hungarian 
foreign officials. The first two decades of the 20
th
 century were 
very stormy for Turkey: it lost the First Balkan War and as a 
consequence of it lost almost all territories that it possessed in 
the Balkans for more than half a millennium. Its defeat in the 
World War I caused nearly similar sequels and only due to the 
                                                        
1
 The paper was written within the framework of the OTKA (the Hungarian 
Scientific Research Found) K 113004 project. 
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successful war of independence resulted in a shameless new 
peace signed in Lausanne in 1923. The memories were very 
fresh at the end of the third decade and Turkey understandably 
did not have so friendly feelings toward the Balkan national 
states, especially not towards Greece. Yet, despite that its 
foreign policy had to adapt to the new situation, the Turkish 
Republic, being engaged with the empowerment and 
reconstruction of the state and society, persuaded harmonic 
relations with all its neighbours including Greece.
2
 Nevertheless, 
according to the Hungarian observers, it did not mean that 
Ankara abandoned its aim to become the leading power in the 
Eastern part of the Mediterranean in the future.
3
 
The idea of Balkan nations’ independency, emancipation and 
collaboration with each other arouse at the end of the 1920s. 
Briand’s plan of Pan European Union played quite a big role in it, 
since it was regarded by the Balkan nations as opposite to their 
interests and enforced the idea of a collaboration leaving out 
all the Great Powers. However, the main impulse on this mutual 
collaboration was given by the economic crisis, whose graduation 
was directly proportional to strengthening the idea of the 
necessity of concentration the Balkan nations’ forces.4 
Since there were many unsolved and pending political 
questions among the Balkan states that made their cultural, 
economic and political rapprochement difficult, the initiative 
was taken by the “civilians”. Since 1930 annual Balkan 
conferences were kept where the participating countries were 
represented by businessmen, scholars and people from the 
public life etc. Politicians were present just as observers at the 
meetings that aimed to help the collaboration of the states of 
the Peninsula. The initiative came from the Greeks, more 
precisely from the Greek prime minister Eleftherios Venizelos 
                                                        
2 MOL, K63-1929-32/1, 66 pol. (1745) Report of Kálmán Kánya, the Hungarian 
minister in Berlin on the visit of Tewfik Rüstü Arras bey to Germany on May 8, 1929. 
3 Ibid. 
4 Avramovski, Ž. Balkanska antanta, (1934–1940). Beograd, 1986. 35.  
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who managed to convince Ismet Inönü, the Turkish prime 
minister, and Tevfik Rüştü Bey, the minister of foreign affairs 
who also became an ardent supporter of the idea.
5
 But not only 
him, the Hungarian minister in Ankara could also report – already 
in 1931, that “the idea of the Balkan movement had deep roots in 
the Turkish public opinion too”, and the leaders of the Movement 
in Turkey were the most prominent members of parliament, 
journalists and people, coming from the economic sphere.
6
 
In his report László Tahy (at that time Hungarian minister 
in Ankara, who was possibly the most significant Hungarian 
minister to Turkey in the 20
th
 century) briefly summed up the 
Turkish aims regarding the Balkans. According to him Turkey 
would prefer a horizontal disbandment of the Peninsula. The 
Southern part would be consisted of the Greeks, Bulgarians, 
Turks, and eventually the Albanians, and the Northern part – 
of the Serbs (Yugoslavia) and the Rumanians. In such a case 
Turkey – with its political and military power – would 
definitely convince the majority of the group to which it would 
                                                        
5 The report of the British Minister in Ankara described very well the 
transformation of the Turkish opinion concerning the Balkan Entente. „At 
first the attitude of the Turkish Government as expounded by Tevfik Rüştü 
Bey was sceptical though friendly. Turkey considered such a federation 
premature and chimerical, and held that if it took the form of an extension of 
the Little Entente it would be definitively harmful. At the same time Turkey 
felt she could not disinterest herself in Balkan politics although she was not 
purely Balkan State. Her position, Tevfik Rüştü Bey suggested, resembled 
that of the British Empire in relation to schemes of European federation. 
During the latter half of the year, however, this attitude developed somewhat 
as a result of M. Veniselos’s visit and Tevfik Rüştü Bey’s journey to Geneva, 
and it seems likely that Turkey will in the future be willing to play a more 
active part in Balkan affairs. She will undoubtedly throw all her influence 
into the scale against any scheme for the absorption by Yugoslavia of Bulgaria 
whose independence is a matter of utmost concern to Turkey.” Turkish 
National Archives, Foreign Office [further abbr.: TNA FO] 371/15376 E 
913/913/44, Sir Georg Clerk’s 1930 annual report on Turkey. 
6 MOL, K63-1931-32/1, 3726 pol. 1931. Tahy’s strictly confident despatch about 
the endeavours of establishment a Balkan Union (25.08.1931). 
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join.
7
 What was the aim of the Turks with this movement? – 
asked Tahy and gave his answer as follows: “to create a group of 
states that are under the hegemony of Ankara and by whose help, 
per analogiam - the Little Entente, Turkey and the members of 
this group could play bigger role in the European politics and 
could improve its position in the League of Nations.”8 
Finally, four years after the Balkan conferences the 
four-power pact of the Balkan states was signed on 9
th
 
February 1934. According to the Hungarian officials Turkey’s 
foreign policy during the six months preceding this agreement 
could be characterised as pact mania and it was because of 
Ankara’s efforts to preserve the already started process of 
country’s modernization from any kind of disturbances caused 
by wars.
9
 This aim made Turkey break up with its policy of 
sympathy towards revisionism and help the encirclement and 
isolation of Bulgaria that led to the establishment of the 
Balkan Entente – thought the Hungarian minister.10 
 Certainly the Hungarian officials were not happy about 
the creation of the Balkan Entente. From the very beginning 
Budapest wanted to dissuade Ankara from the Balkan Entente. 
In these efforts Hungary drew Turkey’s attention on the 
dangers that such an organisation might mean to Turkey. In a 
conversation the Hungarian minister, Tahy asked Tefvik Rüştü 
Bey: “Do you not think that such a Balkan Union could turn 
against Turkey and endanger it?” But Tevfik Rüştü answered 
with the greatest optimism: such an Union can never be 
established without Turkey and even if it happens how can 
someone assume that the Turks are so naive that will not 
assure themselves with adequate political warranties?!”11 
                                                        
7 Ibid. 
8 ibid. 
9 MOL, K63-1934-1932/1-I. Annual report of the Hungarian minister in 
Ankara on Turkey for 1934. 
10 Ibid. 
11 Ibid. 
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Why was such a Balkan Entente unfavourable for Hungary? 
For Hungary it meant that beside the Little Entente, which was 
created for safeguarding the status quo in Central Europe, there 
will be another organisation too, that could be considered even as 
an extension of the Little Entente. Also we should have in mind 
that for Hungary the ideal Southern neighbourhood was a divided 
Balkan.
12
 It is not surprising therefore that Hungarians eagerly 
observed every movement of the Balkan Entente and were so 
happy seeing that the newly established organisation did not 
function as its creators planned. In September 1934 the acting 
minister in Ankara reported – with a certain dozen of malice – 
that despite the enthusiasm demonstrated by Turkey and by the 
Balkan politicians concerning the Balkan Entente there appeared 
signs of its slow extinction. “It did not have many effective results; 
the so called Balkan weeks, that should have be kept in every 
country, were cancelled everywhere; the football matches kept 
were good business only for the sport managers; and the 
establishment of a Balkan Commercial Chamber also was not 
fruitful.
”13
 The facts differed from the expectations. According to 
the new Hungarian minister to Turkey, Jungerth-Arnóthy Mihály 
it was undeniable that the Turkish public and political opinion 
celebrated with great enthusiasm the Balkan Entente believing 
that it had strengthened the international positions of the Turkish 
Republic and thought that in case of war Turkey – due to its 
membership in the Balkan Entente – would be on the stronger 
side, therefore everybody not simply supported the new 
organisation but was in favour of strengthening and developing it.
14
 
Being aware of the Hungarian concerns the Turkish 
government wanted to calm down the Hungarian anxiety stating 
that the Balkan Entente aimed at safeguarding the status quo in 
the Balkans, but Turkey was going to have a neutral position 
                                                        
12 Emre Saral. Törökország és a Balkán Paktum szerepe a magyar követi 
jelentések tükrében (1931–1935). - Keletkutatás, 2013, ősz, 87. 
13 MOL, K63–1934–1932/1–I. 3082/Pol. 1934.  
14 MOL, K63–1934–1932/1–I, 3870/Pol. 1934, 10.11.1934. 
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in case of possible territorial changes in the Danubian basin.
15
 
But these words could not calm Hungarians’ anxiety. 
Most of the Hungarian officials believed that the Balkan 
Entente served as a tool for Turkey to get closer to Yugoslavia 
and Romania. This way Ankara realised better relations with 
France and indirectly counterbalanced the Italian threat through 
the French-Italian alliance from 1935.
16
 
Beside the desire for safety and peace the Turkish foreign 
political activity was indisputably motivated during the last 
years – more and more with the prestige – reported the Hungarian 
minister in Ankara. “The new regime considers Turkey as an 
European Great Power and its efforts aim at participating in 
all European matters, at being listened to, and even more, at 
not allowing to happen anything without it. The ambitions of 
the minister of foreign affairs, Tevfik Rüştü – who has its own 
ambitions to place his country among the important European 
powers and himself could be counted as one of the leading 
European politicians and statesmen – also contribute to this.” 
In the course of 1935 the Turkish foreign policy suffered from 
many disappointments; therefore Ankara based its policy on 
the following pillars: demonstrating friendly relationships with 
Russia; strengthening the Balkan Entente and making it an 
important political factor; closer cooperation between the Little 
Entente and the Balkan Entente. Ankara aimed at being heard 
in all European questions and tried to enter into the solution 
processes through the Balkan Entente. According to the annual 
report of the Hungarian minister in Turkey its further goal was to 
get closer to Romania and Yugoslavia and by the help of these 
two countries to participate in the creation of a bloc or at least in a 
close cooperation scheme stretching from Ankara to Prague. 
Since the military value of the Balkan Entente decreased due to 
                                                        
15 MOL, K63–1934–32/7, 6470/Pol. 1934. Strictly confidential despatch of 
the political director of Hungarian Foreign Ministry from 22.11.1934. 
16 MOL, K63–1934–32/7, 9/Pol. 1935. Report of the Hungarian Minister in 
Ankara for 1935 (31.01.1935). 
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the events in Greece, Turkey consolidated its military 
alliance with Romania and Yugoslavia. The latter was the 
basis of Turkey’s Balkan policy. “The Turks think, stated the 
Hungarian minister in his report, that Yugoslavia is the biggest 
and strongest state in the Balkans which will be the most 
useful for the Turkish interests in case of combined attack from 
Bulgaria and Italy. Nevertheless in Ankara there are 
permanent concerns about a Serbo-Bulgarian alliance that 
could be warded best by the help of strong and reliable 
relations with Yugoslavia, strengthening the Balkan Entente 
and involving Bulgaria into it.”17 
The role of Turkey in the Balkan Entente increased greatly in 
1936 (the second anniversary of its formation) when the Turkish 
Foreign Minister became president of the Balkan Entente Council 
(9.02.1936). In a press interview which Tevfik Rüştü gave shortly 
afterwards he summarised the policy of the Entente as follows: 
“Peace and friendship between the Balkan states: peace and 
order in Europe: finally world peace. Fidelity to the system of 
collective security and textual execution of engagements 
undertaken towards the League of Nations”. Certainly these 
words were not simply slightly overestimating the role and 
importance of the Balkan Entente in the European politics. 
Possibly we can agree with the evaluation of the British minister 
in Ankara that “on the whole in 1936 the Balkan Entente served 
the purposes of its authors and withstood reasonably well, though 
not without some creaking, the strains put on it as a result of flux 
in European affairs.”18  This evaluation can be true for the 
forthcoming 1937 and 1938 years, too. It partly fulfilled the 
expectations of its initiators. It was safeguarding Turkey for years 
                                                        
17 Tevfik Rüstü Bey said to Hungarian minister that Turkey was absolutely 
calm since believed that any kind of Yugoslav-Bulgarian rapprochement, 
even the closest one could be paralysed by Turkish-Greek alliance. MOL, 
K63-1934-32/7, 1592/Pol. 1934. Tahy’s report from May 19, 1934. 
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and it was possibly the most important benefit that Ankara 
expected from its establishment, namely to give chance to Turkey 
to increase its importance in this part of world and to get involved 
to a bigger extent into the European affairs; all this fulfilled. But 
in 1939 due to the dramatically changed political situation and 
altered balance of power the Balkan Entente could not serve these 
purposes and help the fulfilment of the above mentioned aims 
any more, even more it became an obstacle to them and its 
existence could endanger its participants. Turkey, just like the 
other Balkan Entente states, normally wanted to ensure its interest 
by the help of another scheme through leaning on the Western 
powers (at least accepting their friendship) and this meant that in 
1939 the days of the Balkan Entente were numbered. 
Политиката на България в областта на 
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Първата световна война завършва с тежки последици за 
България, като голям удар е нанесен и на българското военно 
въздухоплаване. По силата на Ньойския договор въздушните 
войски са унищожени. Клаузите на договора разпореждат:  
o Военните сили на България да не включват никакви 
въздушни военни части; 
o В срок от два месеца след влизането на мирния 
договор в сила личният състав на Въздухоплавателната 
дружина трябва да бъде демобилизиран; 
o До шест месеца след влизането на договора в сила да 
се прекрати в цяла България производството и вносът на 
въздушни уреди.1 
o Освен това България трябва на свои разноски да пре- 
даде на съюзните сили всичкия наличен въздухоплавателен 
материал, а хангарите – в Божурище и Ямбол, трябва да 
бъдат разрушени. През месец декември 1919 г. съглашенс- 
ките окупационни власти описват цялото българско въздухо- 
плавателно имущество, а през 1920 г. на летище Божурище 
са унищожени с чукове и триони пред очите на пилотите 
наличните въздушни уреди, части и материали от летище 
Варна, Ямбол и Божурище. 
o Унищожени са 51 самолета, 113 въздушни мотори и др.2 
                                                        
1 ДВИА, ф.1049, оп.1, а.е. 111, л. 320б.     
2 Пак там. 
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По силата на част 10–та от Ньойския договор България 
може да има единствено гражданско въздухоплаване при 
редица ограничения, които са проблем за създаването и 
изграждането на едно модерно за времето си въздухоплаване.3 
През 1921 г. се формира гражданско въздухоплавателно 
отделение при Главната дирекция на пощите, телеграфите, 
телефоните и въздухоплаването. На отделението се възлагат 
следните служби: пощенско–пътнически съобщения, плано- 
снимачнокадастрална служба, пощенска охрана на горите и 
изпълнение на специалния договор от 1 февруари 1921 г. 
относно поддържането на летищните центрове – Божурище, 
Ямбол и Варна. 
Оказали се в края на Първата световна война в лагера 
на победените, България и Унгария са наказани сурово от 
победителите чрез наложените им мирни договори. Пробле- 
мите, които стоят пред тях за разрешаване, са сходни.4 
Общата злополучна съдба на двата народа, военното им 
сътрудничество по време на Първата световна война като 
бивши съюзници, както и аналогичните им цели за пре- 
махване на нанесените им от мирните договори неспра- 
ведливости, са предпоставки, които създават подходящ 
политико–психологически климат за сътрудничество и 
сближаване между двете държави през изследвания период. 
Непосредствено след войната контактите между прави- 
телствата на двете държави са съвсем плахи. Българската 
страна се страхува да отговори на унгарската инициатива за 
по-активни отношения, за да не си спечели гнева на съседите. 
По-късно връзките между двете страни се засилват, за да 
стигнат в навечерието на Втората световна война до про- 
веждане на чести взаимни консултации и сондажи.5 
Ньойският договор затваря вратите на България за разви- 
тието на военна авиация в периода след 1919 г., но отваря 
                                                        
3 Пак там. 
4 Гърдев, К., цит. съч., 5. 
5 Пак там. 
Политиката на България в областта на авиацията в 
периода 1920–1940 г. и нейните европейски аспекти 
 - 185 - 
 
широко вратите за развитие на гражданското въздухо- 
плаване, което по-късно прави страната ни част от евро- 
пейската международната въздушна мрежа за гражданската 
авиация (макар и летище „Божурище” да е използвано 
предимно като транзитно летище). Осъществяването на 
граждански полетите от–за и през България на едни от 
добре развитите европейски авиокомпании дава възможност 
на страната ни да насочи усилията си към съвместни 
дейности в развитието на икономическите, културни и 
туристически отношения с Германия, Италия, Франция, 
Полша а по-късно и Унгария. 
Тази авиационна политика на страната задълбочава 
културните и икономическите отношения между България 
и европейските държави и „вписва” страната ни в общата 
европейска въздушна мрежа за осъществяване на граж- 
дански полети през 1930–1937 г. Експлоатирането на 
въздушни трасета за мирни цели от Германия, Франция, 
Италия, Полша и др. над България задълбочава сътрудни- 
чеството между тези държави, като интегрира успешно 
България към Европа. За това съдейства и откриването 
през 1923–1924 г. на авиационното училище на летище 
„Божурище” с нова мирновременна програма. Обучението 
на пилотите и механиците продължава в граждански 
условия. Началото е трудно, но обещаващо. 
В края на 1926 г. в навечерието на сключването на 
първия договор за даване право на френското дружество 
„Сидна” да експлоатира редовни въздушни линии над 
българска земя, българското правителство прави постъпки за 
премахване на чуждия контрол над родното въздухоплаване, 
защото като редовен член на OH e редно България да бъде 
третирана като суверенна държава.6 
След кратки преговори от 21.XI. до 14.XII.1926 г. 
между българската делегация и конференцията на посла- 
ниците е приготвен протокол с четири приложения, чиито 
                                                        
6 ДВИА, ф. 1049, оп.1, а.е.111, л. 321б. 
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постановления се изразяват на първо място в това, че за 
цивилното българско въздухоплаване се дава пълна свобода, 
без каквито и да е ограничения.7 Така българското въздухо- 
плаване продължава да съществува като гражданско. 
Първата въздушна линия над България е открита на 15 
март 1927 г. от френската авиокомпания „Сидна” по маршрут 
Париж–Белград–София–Цариград съгласно спогодба, склю- 
чена между българското правителство и Франция.8 С допъл- 
нителен протокол от 1931 г. е разрешено самолети на 
френската фирма „Ер Франс” (приемник на „Сидна”) да 
прелитат над българска територия по линията Букурещ– 
Бургас–Цариград с евентуално кацане в Бургас.9 През 1931 г. 
е дадено право на германското въздухоплавателно дружество 
„Дойче Луфтханза” да открие въздушна линия Берлин– 
Белград–София–Цариград и София–Солун.10  На 16 март 
1931 г. с концесионен договор България предоставя на 
германския превозвач постоянно право на прелитане над 
страната. Това дава повод на германското министерство на 
транспорта да предприеме стъпки за сключване на между- 
държавна въздушна спогодба. Година по-късно София дава 
съгласие, но едва през април 1933 г. проучвателната комисия 
одобрява проекта, в основата на който лежи германско– 
норвежки договор.11 
В същия период от 1930 до 1940 година по силата на 
сключени спогодби полското предприятие „Лот” открива 
въздушната линия Варшава–Букурещ–Солун; югославс- 
кото „Аеропут”–София–Белград, италианското „Ала литория” 
– Рим–Бриндизи–Тирана–Солун–София, румънското „Ларес” 
– Букурещ–София–Солун–Атина; унгарското дружество 
                                                        
7 Пак там, л. 321б. 
8 Енциклопедия България. Т. I. С., 1978, 772. 
9 Пак там. 
10 Пак там. 
11  Златарски, Вл. Райхът и царството. Германското присъствие в 
България, 1933-1040 г. С., 2014, 98. 
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поддържа линията Будапеща–Белград–София–Солун–Атина. 
На 11 ноември 1939 г. предприятието „Аерофлот” открива 
въздушната линия Москва–Херсон–Бургас–София.12 
В периода между двете световни войни България не 
разполага със собствена авиокомпания, нито е съоръжена 
с необходимите въздухоплавателни средства, чрез които да 
има възможността да осъществява превози в национален и 
международен план за нуждите на гражданската авиация. 
Авиационната политика на страната осигурява използ- 
ването на въздушното пространство за мирни цели, в 
смисъл на осъществяване на полети на самолетите на 
гражданската авиация над страната ни по определени 
трасета за страни като Германия, Италия, Франция, Румъния, 
Югославия, Полша, Унгария и пр., което от своя страна 
способства да се развие двустранното (икономическо, кул- 
турно и туристическо) сътрудничество между тези държави. 
За периода от 1930 до 1938 г. (след като през 1938 г. по 
силата на Солунската спогодба от 31 юли с.г. летище 
„Божурище” отново става военно летище и българските 
въздушни войски се възраждат) България е записана и в 
международната европейска мрежа за осъществяване на 
полети на самолети на гражданската авиация над страната ни 
за държави като Германия, Полша, Франция, Италия и др., 
както и в световната карта за въздушни линии (последната 
е съставена през лятото на 1935 г. от английското списание 
„The Aeroplane” и съдържа всички по-важни въздушни 
линии в света). В световната карта са и две важни въздушни 
линии, които пресичат България: едната е Балтийско море – 
Средиземно море, от Гдиня и Рига през Варшава–Букурещ– 
София–Солун, която е използвана от полското въздухо- 
плавателно дружество; а другата е Средна Европа – Среди- 
земно море, от Берлин, който е свързан с всички центрове 
в Централна и Западна Европа, през Виена–Будапеща– 
                                                        
12 Енциклопедия България. Т. I. С., 1978, 772. 
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Белград–София към Солун (свързан посредством Атина с 
всички линии от Средиземно море от запад към изток). 
Тази въздушна линия се експлоатира от германското дру- 
жество „Дойче Луфтханза”. Над България за същия период 
преминава и линията Париж–Страсбург през Виена– 
Будапеща–Белград–София–Цариград, използвана от Френско 
то дружество „Air France”. 
В края на декември 1939 г. в София завършват прего- 
ворите между унгарска и българска делегация за устано- 
вяване на въздушна линия Будапеща–София. Те протичат в 
изключително приятелски дух. На 30 януари 1940 г. договорът 
е изготвен и Българо–унгарската въздухоплавателна компания 
е парафирана. По този повод и в резултат на военното 
сближаване между Унгария и България 25 български офицери 
получават унгарски отличия. Българското Външно минис- 
терство награждава осем унгарски граждани, между които и 
главния авиационен съветник И. Сегьо.13 
На 4 декември 1940 г. Народното събрание одобрява 
подписаната на 10 ноември 1940 г. в София от И. Попов и 
от унгарския пълномощен министър в София М. Юнгерт– 
Арноти Конвенция за въздухоплаване между България и 
Унгария, както и Спогодба за установяване и експлоатация на 
редовни въздушни линии между двете държави. Тя е в сила за 
срок от две години, може да се продължава с мълчаливо 
споразумение и да се денонсира със съобщение, направено 
една година по-рано; съставена в два екземпляра на френски 
език и е подписана от ген. В. Бойдев и от М. Юнгерт– 
Арноти.14 
В разискванията народните представители изтъкват, че 
конвенцията за въздухоплаване между България и Унгария е 
първият държавен акт, сключен между двете приятелски 
държави. Народните представители подчертават, че при- 
ятелството между България и Унгария е изградено върху 
                                                        
13 Гърдев, К., цит. съч., 127. 
14 Пак там, 144. 
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две здрави основи – икономическа и политическа. Смята се, 
че подписаната конвенция ще допринесе твърде много, за да 
се задълбочат стопанските връзки между двете страни. Като 
политическа основа на приятелството се посочва „еднаквата 
политика на мирен ревизионизъм, която двете държави 
следват след Ньой и Трианон”. Приятелството на унгарците с 
България се определя като „кристално чисто” и „без сметки”. 
Те сърдечно желаят България да осъществи своите нацио- 
нални идеали и затова приемат нашата кауза като своя.15 
                                                        
15 Пак там, 145. 
Kis iskola – nagy alku. A brailai magyar 
oktatás ügye a két világháború között 
 
 
Attila Seres   
 






A hazai történetírás már felfigyelt a Magyarországról, és 
különösen a – magyar állam keleti-délkeleti perifériájának 
számító, gazdasági integrációját és fejlettségét tekintve 
elmaradott, ugyanakkor Romániával közvetlenül határos, a 
román fővároshoz és a nagyobb román ipari centrumokhoz 
földrajzilag közelebb fekvő – Székelyföldről a regáti területekre 
irányuló kivándorlás jelenségére a román egységállam 19. sz. 2. 
felében megvalósuló megalakulásától az első világháború 
kitöréséig.
1
 A történeti kutatások nemcsak ennek a folyamatnak 
a méreteit és szociális mozgatórugóit igyekeztek feltérképezni, 
hanem a királyi Romániában letelepedő magyarság jogi 
státuszával, anyaországi kapcsolatrendszerével, továbbá a 
nemzeti, társadalmi, kulturális és felekezeti önszerveződésével 
összefüggő problémákra is reflektáltak.2   
                                                        
1 Itt és a későbbiekben a „Regát” toponíma alatt az 1919 előtti román állam 
történelmi Moldva nélküli földrajzi régióit értjük, azaz Olténia, Munténia, 
Dobrudzsa és a Duna-mellék egészét, azt az iparosodó vagy kereskedelmi 
szempontból frekventált településterületet, amely a legnagyobb vonzerőt 
gyakorolta az Erdélyből kivándorlókra.  
2 A legújabb hazai történeti irodalomban mindenekelőtt Makkai Béla szakmunkáit 
kell megemlítenünk. A teljesség igénye nélkül csak a regáti magyar katolikusságot 
is érintő főbb tanulmányaira utalnánk. Ld. Makkai B. Magyarsággondozás Galaţin 
(1901–1920). – In: Hagyomány, közösség, művelődés. Tanulmányok a hatvanéves 
Kósa László tiszteletére. Bp., 2002, 492–504; Uő., A kivándorolt magyarság 
anyaországi támogatása a 20. sz. elején – Ploieşti példáján. – Századok, 2002, N 1, 
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Hasonló migrációs folyamatok zajlottak le az első világháború 
után román fennhatóság alá kerülő magyar kisebbségi tömegek 
körében, amelyek intenzitása, megítélésünk szerint, a korábbiakhoz 
képest nemhogy gyengült, hanem inkább erősödött, részben annak 
köszönhetően, hogy a felduzzasztott területű Nagy-Romániában 
eltűntek az államhatárok Erdély és a hagyományos migrációs 
célterületnek számító regáti régiók között. A két világháború 
között a munténiai és Duna–melléki nagyvárosokba kirajzó 
magyar népi elemet akár a romániai magyarság erdélyi etnikai 
törzsterületének nyúlványaként vagy a magyar etnikai határok 
kitolódásaként is lehetett értelmezni, valójában azonban ezt a 
diaszpórát a látványos felmorzsolódása és az idegen környezetben 
őt érő számos akkulturációs hatás miatt inkább a teljes magyar 
entitás súlyos etnikai-demográfiai veszteségeként kellett 
elkönyvelni.
3
 Nem lehetett ezért véletlen, hogy a magyarság 
elvándorlásának problémája folyamatosan jelen volt az 
asszimilációs trendekre rendkívül érzékenyen reflektáló erdélyi 
magyar közvélemény korabeli diskurzusában, hiszen az a 
kisebbségi jövőkép szempontjából akár egyfajta 
sorsszimbólumként is felfogható és interpretálható volt. A 
nagyvárosi magyar kolóniák belső közösségi fejlődéstörténetére 
vonatkozó ismereteink mégis aránylag szerénynek mondhatók, 
még úgy is, ha azokat a regáti magyarság dualizmuskori 
históriájának tudományos feldolgozottságával vetjük össze. 
Tanulmányunkban a dualizmus korában alapított, de az 
első világháború után a magyar anyanyelvű oktatási hálózatból 
kikerült brailai magyar katolikus iskola, illetve az annak helyet 
adó épület sorsát vizsgáljuk meg. Azért esett a választásunk erre a 
konkrét kérdéskörre, mert a bemutatása révén rá tudunk világítani 
arra a regáti magyarság általános helyzetén és kisebbségtörténeti 
                                                                                                          
3–29. Ld. még: Magyar élet a régi Bukarestben. Levelestár a 19. sz. 2. feléből. 
Bevezető tanulmánnyal ellátta és jegyzetekkel közzéteszi: Kovách G. 
Encyclopaedia Transylvanica. Források és tanulmányok. Bp., 1996, 7–35.    
3 Rónai A. Erdély népességi viszonyai. – Magyar Kisebbség, 2002, N 4, 125–126. 
Vita S. Tallózás az 1930. évi román népszámlálás köteteiben. Ibid. 145–146.  
Attila Seres  
 - 192 - 
problémáin túlmutató, nem ritkán döntő érvényű politikatörténeti 
mozzanatra is, hogy milyen alkufolyamatok zajlottak le a 
magyar–román bilaterális kapcsolatokban egy-egy sokszereplős 
(különféle felekezetek egyházi szervezetei, nemzetközi tényezők, 
magyar kormány, román kormány stb.) problémacsomó 
rendezésének hátterében. Az eset rekonstruálásához magyar 
diplomáciai forrásokat vettünk alapul. Hosszas bukaresti 
kutatásaink során sajnos sem a Román Nemzeti Levéltárban, sem 
a Román Külügyminisztérium Levéltárában nem találtuk meg 
ennek a szerteágazó kérdéskörnek a parallel román forrásanyagát. 
A rendelkezésünkre álló magyar forráskör kiegészítése és ezzel 
együtt a román kormányzati és egyházi aktorok szempontjainak 
még mélyrehatóbb elemzése a közeljövőben minden bizonnyal a 
Bukaresti Katolikus Érsekség Levéltárában lévő iratbázis 
feldolgozásával válik majd lehetővé.  
 
A SZENT LÁSZLÓ TÁRSULAT ÉS A BRALILAI KATOLIKUS 
MAGYARSÁG A DUALIZMUS KORÁBAN 
 
A bukaresti katolikus érsekség egyik első egyháztörténésze, 
Julius Hering által a brailai hitélet kezdeteit feltáró leírás alapján 
világosan arra tudunk következtetni, hogy a 19. században a 
felekezeti ellátás megszervezésében vezető szerepet játszottak az 
olykor az erdélyi egyházmegyéből érkező magyar származású 
lelkészek. A katolikus közösség az általa tárgyalt időszakon belül 
a századfordulón érte el a legnagyobb lélekszámot, a plébániai 
nyilvántartás szerint 1898-ban 3200 főre emelkedett. Ennek a 
létszámnak a felét az ő adatai szerint magyar nemzetiségűek 
tették ki. A szerző – a bukaresti katolikus érsekség archívumában 
őrzött kéziratos munkájában – részletesen kitért a felekezeti 
oktatás megteremtésére is. Eszerint a négyosztályos plébániai 
vegyes fiú- és lányiskola megnyitása is egy magyar lelkipásztor, 
Kis Lajos nevéhez kötődik az 1860-as évek legvégén. Kiderül 
továbbá, hogy már az 1870-es évektől Nagy Ádám tanító magyar 
nyelvet, 1888-tól pedig, Knossala János plébános szolgálatának 
kezdetétől az önálló magyar iskolaépület létrehozásáig a magyar 
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ajkú plébánoshelyettesek magyar katekizmust is oktattak a 
gyerekeknek. Hering azt is tudatta, hogy a magyar nyelven oktató 
pedagógust a szerény plébániai bevételek miatt alapvetően a 
budapesti Szt. László Társulat javadalmazta.
4
 
Noha a fentebbiekben idézett szakmunka szerzője sejtetni 
engedte, hogy Brailában egy idő után önálló épülettel bíró magyar 
iskolát is létrehoztak, nem említette meg, hogy ez pontosan melyik 
évben történt. Deszke Mihálynak, a helyi Római Katolikus 
Temetkezési Egylet vezetőjének egy jóval későbbi leveléből 
azonban megtudjuk, hogy az iskolaépületet 1912-ben adták át, s 
ekkor kezdte meg működését az önálló magyar tanintézmény. Ő 
ebben a levelében azt állította, hogy az iskola létrehozásának teljes 
költségét, az épület helyéül szolgáló telek megvételét és az 
építkezési költségeket teljes egészében a Szt. László Társulat 
fedezte, az építési tervek elkészítésével pedig egy budapesti 
mérnököt bíztak meg.
5
 Később úgy emlékezett vissza, hogy az 
építkezési költségek biztosításához építési anyagok, tégla és mész 
megvásárlásával, illetve pénzadományok révén a helyi magyar 
hívek is hozzájárultak.
6
 Az épület fontos szerepet játszott a helyi 
magyar közösség művelődési igényeinek kielégítésében, oktatási 
funkciója mellett egyúttal a magyar dalárda, az olvasókör és a 
temetkezési egylet székhelyéül is szolgált, sőt, alkalmanként 
imaházként is funkcionált, a magyar ajkú lelkipásztorok esténként 
ott tartották a különféle összejöveteleket és magyar nyelvű 
prédikációkat.
7
 Mivel az idegen állampolgárokat tömörítő oktatási, 
kulturális és társadalmi szervezetek akkoriban nem rendelkezhettek 
nyilvánossági joggal Romániában, a Szt. László Társulat mind a 
                                                        
4 Hering, J. Analele parohiei romano-catolice Brăila cu hramul „Adormirea Maicii 
Domnului”. – Pro Memoria. Revistă de istorie ecleziastică, 2007, N 6, 104–109.  
5 Deszke Mihálynak, a brailai Római Katolikus Temetkezési Egylet elnökének 
levele Shvoy Lajos székesfehérvári püspöknek. Braila, 11.02.1934. MNL OL, P 
1431, 17. d., 1. t., 9/1934. sz.  
6  Deszke levele Krywald Ottónak, a Szt. László Társulat ügyvezető 
alelnökének. Braila, 5.1.1934. MNL OL, P 1431, 17. d., 1. t., 150/1934. sz.  
7 Deszke levele Krywaldnak. Braila, 2.03.1934. MNL OL, P 1431, 17. d., 1. 
t., 18/1934. sz.  
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telek, mind az iskola tulajdonosául August Kuczkát, a bukaresti 
érsekség teológiai szemináriumának lengyel származású rektorát és 
az egyházmegye főtanfelügyelőjét jegyeztette be.8  
Mielőtt az eseményeket a továbbiakban nyomon követnénk, 
érdemes néhány gondolat erejéig kitérni azok egyik 
főszereplőjének, a Szt. László Társulatnak a történetére. A Szt. 
László Társulat 1861-ben alakult meg Pesten katolikus egyházi 
jótékonysági szervezetként. Az élén mindig valamely katolikus 
egyházi főméltóság, érsek vagy püspök állt. A legfőbb célkitűzése a 
történelmi Magyarország határaival kelet és dél-kelet felől 
szomszédos területeken élő, a magyar etnikum Kárpát-medencei 
törzsterületéhez képest peremhelyzetben lévő magyar eredetű és 
tudatú katolikus népcsoportok anyanyelvű felekezeti gondozása, az 
etnikai különállásukat nagymértékben elősegítő nemzeti talajú 
egyházi és oktatási hálózat kiépítése és fejlesztése, illetve az ehhez 
szükséges segélyprogram koordinálása volt. A leginkább patronált 
közösségek sorába tartozott a 19. sz. 2. felétől, döntően gazdasági 
és szociális tényezők miatt, főként Erdélyből és a Székelyföldről a 
román egységállam déli, dél-keleti területeire (Regát) vándorló, s a 
nagyobb városokban koncentrálódó magyar lakosság is.
9
  
A dualizmus korában a Szt. László Társulat alapozta meg a 
regáti magyar gyermekek magyarországi iskoláztatásának 
intézményes kereteit, létrehozta az ehhez szükséges ösztöndíj- 
rendszert, amelyek segítségével az ott élő magyarok köréből egy, 
a közösségéhez kötődő saját plebejus értelmiségi réteget, papokat, 
tanítókat és iparosokat igyekezett kineveltetni. Hozzájárult a 
Románia nagyobb városaiba kiküldött, eredetileg magyar 
honosságú tanítók rendszeres javadalmazásához, az egyházi 
szertartáshoz szükséges kellékekkel, kegyszerekkel (miseruhák, 
áldozati kelyhek), magyar nyelvű egyházi kiadványokkal (ima- 
és énekeskönyvek, katekizmusok) látta el a magyar közösségeket 
és lelki vezetőiket, illetve – legalább részben – fedezte egyházi 
                                                        
8 Deszke levele Shvoynak. Braila, 11.02.1934. Loc. cit.    
9  Borovi J. A szórványban élő magyar katolikusok lelkigondozásának 
története. Bp., 2000, 15–18.  
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építményeik (templomok, kápolnák) építési és felújítási 
költségeit is.  
A Társulat igazán számottevő eredményeket a bukovinai 
székelység nemzeti gondozása mellett ekkoriban leginkább 
éppen a regáti városokba áramló, a magyar állampolgárságukat 
megtartó magyarok körében könyvelhetett el. Ennek 
viszonylagos sikerét az alapozhatta meg, hogy a román kormány 
engedélyezte a magyar nyelvű oktatást azon Romániában élő és 
dolgozó egyének gyermekei számára, akik nem mondtak le a 
magyar állampolgárságukról.
10
 Az első világháború kitörésének 
évében a Társulat Bukarestben két óvodát, három elemi iskolát, 
továbbá néhány szakiskolát is fenntartott összesen 20 tanítóval. A 
vidéki városok közül – különböző időszakokban – nemcsak 
Brailában, hanem Craiovában és Ploieştiben is működött egy-egy 
elemi iskola, de más városokban, így például Turnu Severinben, 
Piteşti-ben, Târgovişte-ben, és Galacon is állomásozott a Társulat 
által fizetett tanító. A vidéki városokban oktató magyar tanerők 
összlétszáma meghaladta a háromtucatnyit is. Bukarestben 
1915-ben adták át a részben a helyi hívek adományaiból, részben a 
Társulat ráfordításával felépített, a magyar közösség hitéletét 
szolgáló, s magyar papság vezetése alatt álló Szt. Ilona templomot.
11
 
Szükséges aláhúzni, hogy az egyesület a Regátban elért 
eredményeit, és ezen belül különösen az ottani magyar oktatási 
hálózat szubvenciójának rendszeresítését, nem kis mértékben a 
magyar állami szervek hozzájárulásának és közreműködésének 
köszönhette. A segélykerete ugyanis az 1890-es évek első 
felére fokozatosan kimerült, s az évtized második felében a 
korábbiakhoz képest nagyságrendekkel szűkebb, már csak 
eseti jellegű finanszírozási lehetőségeket biztosított.12 Az általa 
                                                        
10 Erre részletesen ld. Szemes József, A Szent László Társulat története 
1861–1941. Veszprém, 1942, 20–64.  
11 Oberding J. Gy. A bukaresti magyarság egyházi, társadalmi és kulturális 
szervezete a világháború előtt és ma. – Kisebbségvédelem, 1939, N 6, 2.  
12 Ebben nem kis szerepet játszott az, hogy ekkorra már megmutatkoztak a 
bukovinai székely néptöredékek 1880-as és 1890-es években véghezvitt al-dunai és 
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létrehozott regáti magyar katolikus egyházi oktatási hálózat 
zökkenőmentes működését ezért a századfordulótól egy nagyrészt 
kormányzati pénzekből dotált segélyprogram, az 1902-ben 
meginduló ún. „romániai magyar akció” katolikus ága tette 
lehetővé. A támogatás pénzügyi feltételeit jórészt kormányzati 
anyagi eszközökkel – mindenekelőtt a Vallás- és Közoktatásügyi 
Minisztérium ún. „vallásalapjából” és a Miniszterelnökség 
akcióinak titkos keretét képező ún. „külföldi alapból” – 
teremtették meg, de a korábban a Társulat által kezelt kisebb 
alapítványi vagyonokat is a kultusztárca vette át és osztotta szét. 
Az egyesület továbbította az érintettek számára a rendelkezésükre 
bocsátott összegeket, amelyek tekintetében elszámolási köte- 
lezettséggel tartozott a kormányzat felé. Ebben a mechaniz- 
musban a Társulat valójában a Magyarország határain kívül 
letelepedett magyarok javára kialakított kormányzati támogatási 
rendszer egyik társadalmi fedőszervévé vált.13 
Románia hadba lépése az első világháborúban súlyos hatást 
gyakorolt a nagyobb városokban rekedt regáti magyarok élet- 
viszonyaira és népi közösségi perspektíváira, még a puszta 
létük is veszélyben forgott, különféle retorziókkal, elüldözéssel, 
internálással, gazdasági javaik konfiskálásával sújtották őket.14 
Mindezek következtében a világégés komoly zavarokat, majd 
                                                                                                          
dél-erdélyi visszatelepítési kísérleteinek társadalompolitikai (földbirtok-politikai 
nehézségek, természetföldrajzi kihívások, etnikai konfliktushelyzetek 
kialakulásának veszélye) ellentmondásai, amit a magyar közvélemény részben 
kudarcként élt meg. Ennek hatására érezhetően csökkent a Társulat iránti társadalmi 
figyelem és érdeklődés, illetve ezzel együtt a javára irányuló adakozási kedv. Nem 
lehet ezért véletlen, hogy az egyesület vezetése az évtized második felében 
kénytelen volt a kormányzat anyagi segítségét kérni. A dotációs nehézségekre ld.: 
Seres A. A magyarországi segélyezés szerepe a moldvai csángók egyházi 
oktatásában a 19. sz. végén. – Székelyföld, 2004, N 6, 98–104.  
13 A támogatási szisztémára és elszámolási mechanizmusra részletesen ld. Makkai 
B. Magyarsággondozás Bukovinában. – Kisebbségkutatás, 2000, N 3, 475–476. 
14 August Kuczkának, a bukaresti érsekség főtanfelügyelőjének beszámolója 
a magyar Miniszterelnökségnek. Bukarest, 6.07.1918. MNL OL, K 26, 1185. 
cs., XVIII. t., 3517/1918. sz.  
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végső soron törést okozott az egyesület és a Kárpátokon kívüli 
magyar népcsoportok közötti összeköttetési rendszerben: 
Romániában szétesett a magyar nyelvű felekezeti oktatás 
Társulat által korábban kiépített és működtetett infrastruktúrája, 
az egyesület és patronáltjai közötti kapcsolatok az első 
világháború befejezését követően hosszú ideig szüneteltek. 
Románia háborús szerepvállalása az Antant oldalán Magyarország 
ellen a brailai magyarok életére is rendkívül kedvezőtlen 
következményekkel járt: a helyi magyarság jelentős része elhagyta 
az országot, a katolikus plébánost és helyettesét, a már említett 
Knossala Jánost és a magyar közösség körében szintén nagy 
tiszteletnek örvendő Sebastian Hübert internálták. A magyar 
katolikus iskolába beiratkozott gyermekek létszáma az első 
háborús tanévben, 1914-1915-ben regisztrált 178 főről az 
utolsó háborús tanévre, tehát 1917–1918-ra 84 főre zuhant. 
1918 őszén a román hatóságok bezáratták az iskolát, majd az 




A SZENT LÁSZLÓ TÁRSULAT INGATLANVAGYONA 
ROMÁNIÁBAN AZ ELSŐ VILÁGHÁBORÚ UTÁN 
 
A román hatóságok által 1918-ban lefoglalt regáti magyar 
tanintézmények nacionalizálását jogilag az 1923-ban meghozott ún. 
„kisajátítási törvény” szentesítette, amely a Romániával egykor 
ellenséges államok alattvalóinak tulajdonában román területen lévő 
ingó- és ingatlanvagyon likvidálásáról határozott.
16
 Ennek 
értelmében zár alá vették a Szt. László Társulat romániai 
ingatlanait is, és kivették a kezéből a tulajdonosi jogok gyakorlását. 
Noha a törvény értelmében meginduló likvidálási eljárás évekig 
elhúzódott, a román pénzügyminisztérium 1926. ápr. 9-én és 10-én 
végül kimondta az egykor magyar tulajdonú ingatlanegyüttes 
elvételét a román háborús kárpótlási alap javára. A Szt. László 
Társulat legnagyobb épületkomplexuma Bukarestben volt, itt a 
                                                        
15 Hering, J., Op. cit., 110–113.  
16 Ld.: Monitorul Official, 13.06.1923. 1–3.  
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jogszabály érvényesítése összesen mintegy 12 ezer m² területen 
elterülő, három nagyobb épülettömb, illetve a hozzájuk tartozó 
telkek konfiskálásával járt együtt, amelyek összértéke az 1920-as 
évek második felében elérte a 20 millió lejt.
17
 Természetesen az 
intézkedések érintették az egyesület fővároson kívüli ingatlanait is, 
giurgiu-i, târgovişte-i, ploieşti-i tanítói lakásokat, tantermeket, 
illetve Brailában a Bălcescu u. 7. sz. alatti, két épületszárnyból álló 
iskola épületét. Az objektumok többségét a román nemzeti oktatási 
célok érdekében hasznosították, internátusokat rendeztek be 
azokban ortodox fiatalok számára stb.
18
 
Azt, hogy az ingatlanok elvétele nemcsak anyagi tekintetben 
sértette a magyar egyházi érdekeket, hanem a regáti magyarság 
szellemi kapacitásaira (illetve utánpótlására) is súlyos csapást 
mért, jól illusztrálja Raymund Netzhammer bukaresti katolikus 
érsek egyik összeállítása a Szt. László-iskolákba járó tanulók 
létszámáról. Az érsek által az egyházi nyilvántartások alapján 
összeállított kimutatás az 1918. évi állapotokra hivatkozik. Nem 
lehet tudni pontosan, hogy a Románia központi hatalmaktól 
elszenvedett veresége, illetve a bukaresti békeegyezmény utáni 
viszonyokat tükrözi, amikor az elüldözött magyarok egy része, s 
velük együtt a magyar iskolák tanári kara visszatérhetett 
Romániába, s néhány hónap erejéig regenerálhatta a „régi 
Bukarest” magyar hétköznapjait, vagy a Románia újbóli hadba 
lépése utáni helyzetet, amikor a magyarok ismét nemkívánatos 
elemekké váltak a Regátban. Tanulságos mindenesetre, hogy a 
Társulat 7 különféle bukaresti oktatási egységében összesen 927, 
a brailai Szt. László-iskolában 84, Ploieşti-ben 46, Târgovişte-ben 
38, míg Giurgiuban 32 tanulót számoltak össze.
19
  
                                                        
17 A Bukaresti Ítélőtábla végzése. Bukarest, 1927. nov. 2. MNL OL, P 1431, 
29. d., 8. t., sz. nélk.   
18  Kimutatás a Romániában a háború után zár alá vett magyar egyházi 
ingatlanokról. Villani Frigyes bukaresti követ jelentésének 2. sz. melléklete. 
Bukarest, 1928. febr. 1. MNL OL, K 64, 95. cs., 1942/27. t., 115/1928. res. pol. 
sz.  
19 Raymund Netzhammer feljegyzése G. G. Derussi román külügyminiszternek. 
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A bukaresti magyar követség felállítását követő első években, 
1921-től, a magyar diplomácia inkább arra törekedett, hogy a 
bukaresti katolikus érsekségen keresztül érvényesítse az érdekeit. 
Az egyházmegye főpásztora 1924-ig az előbb említett Raymund 
Netzhammer volt, aki német nyelvterületen született, s sokáig ott 
szolgált, így minden bizonnyal az indíttatásából fakadóan is, nem 
táplált ellenszenvet a magyarokkal szemben. Emellett pragmatikus 
szempontok is azt diktálták számára, hogy elejét vegye az 
ilyenfajta ellenséges érzületnek. A viszonylag fiatal, csak 1884-ben 
megalakult egyházmegyéjét még a román tényezők is alapvetően 
„nemzetiségi egyházmegyének” tekintették. Joggal, ugyanis abban 
a román ajkúak aránya teljesen elhanyagolható volt, a döntő etnikai 
elemét, mind a papság, mind a hívek körében, a nem államalkotó 
nemzetiségek képviselői, németek, magyarok és lengyelek tették ki. 
Az akár mesterségesen generált etnikai konfliktusok nyilván 
akadályozták volna a még friss és kialakulatlan egyházi 
infrastruktúra fejlesztését, amelynek legnagyobb terhe 1905-től 
éppen Netzhammer vállára nehezedett.
20
 Mivel Várady Lipót 
Árpád, a Szt. László Társulat akkori elnöke, a magyar diplomácia 
jóváhagyását is maga mögött tudva, a magyar nyelvűséget előtérbe 
helyező preferenciák ellenében hajlott arra, hogy átruházza az 
épületek tulajdonjogát a bukaresti érsekségre,
21
 a német főpásztor 
regnálása idején az egyetemes katolikus egyház szempontjaira és 
az intézmények karitatív jellegére hivatkozva, a bukaresti érsekség 
reprezentánsai lépéseket tettek a kormányzatnál az elkobzás 
visszavonása érdekében. Az érsek az eseményeket napi 
                                                                                                          
Bukarest, 10.01.1922. Arhiva Ministerului Affacerilor de Externe (AMAE), fond 
„Problema 16” (Şcoli străine în România), Vol. 21, Nr. 2761/1922. 
20 Netzhammer, N., Kr. Zach (Eds.). Raymund Netzhammer, Episcop în 
România. Înt-o epocă a conflictelor naţionale şi religioase. Vol. 1. Bucureşti, 
2005, 20–23, 29–34. 
21 A Társulat részéről mindvégig hangsúlyozták, hogy ez az ajándékozás csak színlelt 
jogügylet lenne. Ennek keretében a kedvezményezettnek egy bizalmas nyilatkozatot 
kellene kiállítania, amellyel elismerné a Társulat birtokjogát, s annak fejében évi 
jelképes összeg megfizetésére kötelezné magát. A Szt. László Társulat igazgatósági 
ülésének jegyzőkönyve. Bp., 31.05.1922. MNL OL, P 1431, 24. d., 6. t. 
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pontossággal visszaidéző naplójában minden esetben utal arra, 
amikor az illetékes kormánytényezőkkel, olykor magával a 
kormányfővel folytatott személyes konzultációin felvetette ezt a 
kérdést, s többször is bővebb emlékeket őrzött meg arról, hogy a 
felek részéről milyen érvek hangzottak el ezeken a 
megbeszéléseken.
22
 Ő valóban energikusan szorgalmazta a kérdés 
megoldását, igaz, a zár alóli feloldásra, továbbá az iskolák magyar 
jellegének megőrzésére és az ott folyó oktatásban a magyar 
nemzeti szempontok tolerálására maga is csak abban az esetben 
látott garanciát, ha az ominózus ingatlanok az érsekség kezelésébe 
kerülnek és az oktatás az érsekségi iskolahálózat keretében valósul 
meg.
23
 A magyar diplomáciai iratokból tudjuk azt, hogy 1923-ban 
a már említett August Kuczka prelátus is egy memorandummal 
fordult a kormányhoz a kérdés megoldása érdekében. A bukaresti 
katolikus klérus erőfeszítései azonban eredménytelenek maradtak. 
Az események az 1926. áprilisi pénzügyminiszteri rende- 
letek meghozatalát követően felgyorsultak, ugyanis ezek a 
rendelkezések végérvényessé tették a szekvesztrummal bekö- 
vetkező állapotokat. A magyar kormány május 11-én diploma- 
ciai jegyzékben tiltakozott ez ellen, de Villani Frigyes buka- 
resti követ személyesen is interveniált a román külügyi 
tárcánál a végrehajtás felfüggesztése, illetve a szóban forgó 
vagyonelemek zár alóli felszabadítása érdekében.
24
 
A román kormányzat álláspontját belpolitikai szempontok 
is befolyásolták. Mint ismert, 1926. ápr. 1-jén lemondott 
posztjáról Ugron István, az Országos Magyar Párt elnöke. A 
helyére egyelőre ideiglenesen dezignált politikus, Bethlen 
György felújította az Alexandru Averescu nevével fémjelzett, s 
március 27-től kormányzati pozícióban levő Román Néppárttal 
                                                        
22  Raymund Netzhammer, Op. cit., Vol. II. 863, 928, 1002–1003, 
1036–1037, 1074, 1122–1123, 1148, 1191, 1124, 1128, 1241, 1243–1244, 
1251. 
23 Ibid. 1035. 
24 Összefoglaló jelentés a Szent László Társulat ingatlanai ügyében. Villani Frigyes 
bukaresti követ jelentésének 1. sz. melléklete. Bukarest, 1.02.1928. Loc. cit. 
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folytatott korábbi kooperációt, s ápr. 26-án választási kartellt kötött 
vele.
25
 A magyar követ személyes eljárása során óvatosan utalt is 
a kormány és a magyar etnikai párt közötti együttműködésre. 
Noha Bukarest a békeszerződés 232. cikkelyére hivatkozva 
elutasította a magyar követelést,
26
 minden bizonnyal belpolitikai 
megfontolásból, azaz az OMP támogatásának megőrzésére 
való tekintettel, egy kisebb engedményt téve, a bukaresti Szt. 
Ilona templomot kivonta a szekvesztrum alól. Román részről 
azzal is érveltek, hogy a pénzügyminiszteri rendeletekkel 
szemben Majláth Gusztáv Károly erdélyi püspök időközben jogi 
úton terjesztett be kifogást.
27
 
Noha a püspök és az államrezon közötti peres eljárás 
1926–1927 folyamán két joghatóságra (ilfovi törvényszék, 
bukaresti ítélőtábla) is eljutott, az nem vezetett eredményre,28 
alapjában véve annak köszönhetően, hogy azok egyike sem ismerte 
el a püspök illetékességét a kérdésben. Noha utóbbi érveit döntően 
az egyetemes katolicizmus érdekeire, a kánonjogra, és a Szt. 
László Társulattól kapott formális megbízatására alapozta, továbbá 
hivatkozott a közben román állampolgárságúvá lett erdélyi és a 
regáti magyar katolikus hívek közadakozásának elsődleges 
                                                        
25 Az Országos Magyar Pártnak szüksége volt román szövetségesre, hogy 
kiegészíthesse a választói névjegyzékeket, vagyis szavazóbázisa részt 
vehessen a választásokon. A választási kartell belpolitikai előzményeire 
részletesen ld. Mikó I. Huszonkét év. Az erdélyi magyarság története 1918. 
dec. 1-től 1940. aug. 30-ig. Bp., 1941, 54–60. 
26 A trianoni békeszerződés 232. cikkelye kimondta, hogy a szövetséges hatalmak 
jogában áll azokat a javakat, jogokat és érdekeket felszámolni, amelyek a saját 
területükön a Magyar Királyság állampolgárainak vagy az ellenőrzésük alatt álló 
szervezeteknek a tulajdonában állnak. A passzus rendelkezett arról is, hogy a 
felszámolás az illető szövetséges állam törvényeinek megfelelően történik. Az 
1921/XXIII. tc. vonatkozó cikkelyének szövegét ld.: Magyar törvénytár. 1921. évi 
törvénycikkek. Jegyzetekkel ellátta: Dr. Térfy Gy. Bp., 1922, 276–280. 
27 Összefoglaló jelentés a Szent László Társulat ingatlanai ügyében. Villani Frigyes 
bukaresti követ jelentésének 1. sz. melléklete. Bukarest, 1928. február 1. Loc. cit. 
28  A Szt. László Társulat igazgatósági ülésének jegyzőkönyve. Bp., 
23.02.1928. MOL, P 1431, 24. d., 6. t. 
Attila Seres  
 - 202 - 
szerepére is a bukaresti egyházi ingatlanok felépítésében, a román 
bíróság a jogcímét azok vonatkozásában nem látta igazoltnak.
29
 
Nem lehet ezért meglepő, hogy a Szt. László Társulat egyik 
budapesti közgyűlésén felvetődött egy olyan elképzelés is, hogy az 
egyesületet Romániában is jegyezzék be jogi személyként abból a 
célból, hogy a további működésének is zálogául tekintett 
vagyontörzs legtetemesebb részét képező romániai ingatlan- 
komplexumot legalább a romániai peres eljárás keretén belül, 
törvényes úton visszaszerezhesse.
30
 Egyes dokumentumok alapján 
bizonyos, hogy a per egészen az 1930-as évek első feléig 
elhúzódott, döntően amiatt, hogy szinte minden román jogalany élt 
az időhúzás taktikájával. A bukaresti ítélőtábla 1927. évi 
végzésével szemben az erdélyi püspökség által megbízott román 
ügyvéd fellebbezéssel kívánt élni a semmitőszéknél, de a 
fellebbezéshez szükséges hivatalos dokumentáció beszerzését 
mind a pénzügyi tárca, mind az ítélőtábla hátráltatta.31 
A magyar kormányzat ezzel párhuzamosan kísérletet tett arra 
is, hogy az OMP és a kormánypárt közötti együttműködést 
kiaknázva mozdítsa előre az ügyet, ezért bukaresti követe révén 
sürgette a magyar kisebbségi vezetők fellépését. Erre alapot adott 
az is, hogy a két politikai erő, az OMP és a Néppárt közötti 
választási paktum 3. fejezetének 1. pontja kifejezetten elő- 
irányozta a zár alá vett magyar katolikus és református iskolák 
visszaadására irányuló egyeztetések megkezdését. Bethlen 
György pártelnök és Gyárfás Elemér, a Katolikus Státus világi 
elnöke által tett puhatolózások a kérdés rendezésének lehetőségét 
illetőleg mégsem jártak sikerrel. A két vezető ezért végül azt 
                                                        
29 A Bukaresti Ítélőtábla végzése. Bukarest, 2.11.1927, Loc. cit. 
30  A Szt. László Társulat igazgatósági ülésének jegyzőkönyve. Bp., 
23.02.1928, Loc. cit. 
31 Török Ferenc levele Faluhelyi (Frey) Ottó ügyvédnek, Majláth Gusztáv 
Károly magyarországi jogi képviselőjének. Gyulafehérvár, 1933. január 28. 
MNL OL, P 1431, 29. d., 8. t., sz. nélk. Minden bizonnyal a semmitőszék is 
az elévülésre játszott, a fellebbezéssel kapcsolatban még 1934-ben sem 
hozott ítéletet. A Szt. László Társulat választmányi ülésének jegyzőkönyve. 
Bp., 8.06.1934. MNL OL, P 1431, 22. d., 1. t. 
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javasolta, hogy bizonyos feltételek teljesülése esetén a Szt. László 
Társulat javait ruházzák át a bukaresti katolikus érsekségre. Ezt, a 
korábbi magyar elképzelésekhez részben visszanyúló javaslatukat 
1927. nov. 21-én közölték a magyar követtel. Úgy vélték, hogy 
ha Alexander Theodor Cisar bukaresti érseket bevonják a 
megbeszélésekbe, akkor nagyobb reménnyel juthatnak 
megállapodásra a kormánnyal. Igaz, ebben a konstrukcióban a 
modus vivendi megteremtését nagymértékben nehezítette, hogy 
az érsek elődjéhez képest jóval kevésbé hajlott a magyar nemzeti 
szempontok akceptálására.
32
 Az erdélyi magyar politikusok 
elképzelése szerint ugyanis a javak átadásáért cserébe az oktatási 
intézmények működtetésére vegyes iskolaszéket kellett volna 
alakítani a bukaresti érsek, az erdélyi, a nagyváradi és a szatmári 
püspök jelöltjeiből. Ebben a román szellemű érsekség és a 
magyar dominanciájú egyházmegyék között paritás létezett volna. 
Ezzel szemben az érsek legfeljebb a helybeli magyarság 
részvételével megalakuló oktatási önkormányzati testületet 
engedélyezett volna. Nem járult hozzá továbbá ahhoz sem, hogy 
a visszaadott iskolák tannyelve a magyar legyen, legfeljebb a 
magyar nyelv elsődlegességét méltányolta volna.33 
A kormányközi megállapodás esélyét ráadásul a minimálisra 
csökkentette, hogy az Averescu-kormány alig egyéves regnálása 
után, 1927. jún. 4-én megbukott, s ezzel sokak szerint vele bukott 
az OMP addigi politikai vonalvezetése is, hiszen a magyar vezetők 
egyetlen kívánságuk teljesítését sem tudták elérni azoknál, akik 
győzelmüket részben a magyar szavazatoknak köszönhették. Ezt 
követően az OMP a kisebbségi politizálás felé próbált orientálódni, 
                                                        
32 Netzhammert a Vatikán a román kormány nyomására váltotta le az érsekség 
éléről. Eltávolítására az egyik legfőbb ürügyet éppen a nemzetiségek és a 
kisebbségi nyelvhasználat iránti empátiája, és ezzel a „román nemzeti érdekek 
sérelme” szolgáltatta. Cisar érseksége valóban egy új korszak nyitányát jelentette, ő 
elődjénél érezhetően merevebb álláspontot képviselt egyházmegyéjének 
magyarságával szemben. Raymund Netzhammer, Op. cit., Vol. I. 63–71. 
33  Összefoglaló jelentés a Szt. László Társulat ingatlanai ügyében. Villani 
Frigyes bukaresti követ jelentésének 1. sz. melléklete. Bukarest, 1.02.1928, 
Loc. cit. 
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ami leginkább a magyar–német választási blokk 1927. jún. 14-i 
megalakításában öltött testet,
34
 majd 1928-tól önállóan mérettette 
meg magát a parlamenti választásokon.
35
 Nyilvánvaló, hogy 
Bethlen és Gyárfás novemberi javaslata már a politikai 
erőviszonyok kedvezőtlen átalakulását, a pártközi kapcsolatokban 
az OMP által élvezett alkupozíció elvesztését is tükrözte. 
Mint láttuk, a magyar kormány a megegyezést – a háttérből 
mozgatva –, belpolitikai és egyházi vonalon, illetve jogi úton is 
igyekezett kikényszeríteni. Bukarest nagyobb engedékenységre 
bírása érdekében emellett a diplomáciai nyomásgyakorlás 
eszközével is élt, ugyanis a budapesti Gozsdu Alapítvány 
státuszának román részről már régóta szorgalmazott megoldását 
összekötötte a Szt. László Társulat ingatlanainak kérdésével is. 
Mint ismert, Gozsdu Manó (1802–1870) román származású író és 
politikus, továbbá társadalmi és kulturális mecénás,
36
 az 1869-ben 
meghozott végrendeletében a vagyonából egy magánalapítványt 
hozott létre, amely román nemzetiségű, ortodox hitű fiatalok 
tanulmányait támogatta. Az alapítvány vagyona, amelyre román 
részről igényt tartottak, az impériumváltás után Magyarországon 
maradt. A magyar kormány álláspontja az volt, hogy az alapítvány 
ügyét a Romániában 1919 után elkobzott magyar egyesületi 
vagyonok tulajdonjogi kérdésével együtt kell rendezni 
rekompenzációs alapon. Mivel a román vezetés vonakodott ettől, a 
magyar kormány 1926-ban zárolta a Gozsdu Alapítvány budapesti 
bankszámláját. Az általunk tanulmányozott iratokból arra lehet 
következtetni, hogy az elsődlegesen erdélyi egyházi karitatív és 
oktatási intézményeket tartalmazó magyar követeléslistára csak 
                                                        
34 György B. Magyar–német kisebbségi blokk Romániában (1927). – In: Nazare, 
D. et al. (Red.). In honorem Gernot Nussbächer. Braşov, 2004, 349–353.  
35 Utoljára 1938-ban került sor arra, hogy az OMP választási paktumot kötött 
román politikai erővel, mégpedig az Octavian Goga nevével fémjelzett 
Nemzeti Keresztény Párttal. Az OMP egész korszakon átívelő kisebbségpolitikai 
stratégiáira részletesen ld.: Bárdi Nándor, A romániai magyarság kisebbségpolitikai 
stratégiái a két világháború között. – Regio, 1997, N 2, 32–66.   
36 Románul Manuil Gojdu.  
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később kerültek fel a Szt. László Társulat regáti ingatlanai,37 s 
Villani Frigyes magyar követ minden bizonnyal csak 1927. ápr. 
26-án jelezte a román külügyminisztériumban, hogy a magyar 
kormány e két probléma között is junktimot fog teremteni,
38
 
amivel nyilván a Bukarestre gyakorolt nyomást kívánta 
kombinálni. 
A romániai ingatlanvagyon kérdése a két világháború közötti 
időszakban végig megterhelte a Szt. László Társulat tevékenységét, 
s az 1920-as években szinte kizárólagos jelleggel dominált a vezető 
testületeinek (választmány, igazgatóság) ülésén. Sőt, 1929-től az 
egyesület megújulási folyamatának kezdete is közvetve ezzel a 
kérdéskörrel hozható összefüggésbe. 1912–1923 között, így az első 
világháború idején a már említett Várady Lipót Árpád győri 
püspök majd kalocsai érsek volt a Társulat egyházi elnöke, akit 
Glattfelder Gyula szeged-csanádi püspök követett az egyesület élén. 
Az 1911-ben püspökké dezignált utóbbiról közismert, hogy az 
impériumváltás után is egyházmegyéje korabeli székhelyén, 
Temesváron maradt. Az 1920-as évek legelején többször 
hangot adott a magyar nemzetiségűeket diszkrimináló román 
földbirtok-politikával szembeni álláspontjának, továbbá a Románia 
és a Szentszék közötti konkordátumtárgyalásokon ő fogta össze a 
magyar nemzetiségű püspököket, és következetesen képviselte a 
magyar érdekeket. Mindez a román hatóságokkal való sorozatos 
összeütközésekhez vezetett, s ez a konfliktus idővel tarthatatlanná 




 válaszul a 
román hatóságok 1923-ban kiutasították az országból. 
A román kormányzattal való szembeszegülése azonban 
                                                        
37 Khuen-Héderváry K. feljegyzése a Gozsdu Alapról folytatott tárgyalásokról. Bp., 
5.03.1927. MOL, K 28, 201. cs., 380. t., 1526/1935. M. E. al. sz., 144/1927. biz. sz.   
38 Összefoglaló jelentés a Szt. László Társulat ingatlanai ügyében. Villani Frigyes 
bukaresti követ jelentésének 1. sz. melléklete. Bukarest, 1.02.1928. Loc. cit.   
39 Erre részletesen ld.: Varga A. Chronica Aulae Episcopalis Timisoaraensis. 
(Seria Documente Istorie Mărturii). Cluj–Napoca, 2008, 349–373. Ld. még: 
Juhász K. Temesvártól Szegedig. – Erdélyi Tudósító, 1941, N 6, 85. 
40 Ld. pl.: Glattfelder püspök nagyszabású pásztorlevele. – Temesvári Hírlap, 
1923. feb. 9., 2–3.  
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megalapozta Glattfelder tekintélyét a magyarországi politikai 
közvélemény és egyházi vezetés körében,
41
 később számos 
egyházi funkciója mellett a Szt. László Társulat elnökévé is 
meg- választották, amelynek végül hat évig állt az élén. A tisztéről 
1929-ben mondott le. Erre vonatkozó döntését az egyesület április 
22-i választmányi ülésén jelentette be, s azzal indokolta, hogy a 
román állam és a Vatikán közötti konkordátum megkötésével a 
Társulat és a román kormányzat között új jogi status quo alakult 
ki.
42
 (Az egyezmény 21. cikkelye ugyanis kimondta, hogy azon 
egyházi javak tulajdonjogának kérdése, amelyek Romániában 
fekszenek, de olyan egyházi és vallási jogi személyhez tartoznak, 
amelyeknek a székhelye a román állam határain kívülre esik, külön 
megegyezés tárgyát képezik.
43
) Glattfelder azon véleményének 
adott hangot, hogy a konkordátum rendelkezései engedékenyebb 
magatartásra késztetik majd a román kormányt a bukaresti 
ingatlanok kérdésében. Arra hivatkozott, hogy az ő személye 
„vörös posztó” a román hatóságok szemében, és ezt a személyi 
akadályt el kell távolítani a majdan meginduló tárgyalások elől. A 
választmányi ülést ezért még aznap közgyűléssé alakították, amely 
hivatott volt személyi kérdésekben, így az új elnök meg- 
                                                        
41 Gergely J. Glattfelder Gyula csanádi püspök a magyar Katolikus Püspöki Kar 
konferenciáin (1911–1943). – In: Zombori I. (Ed.). Igazságot – szeretettel. 
Glattfelder Gyula élete és munkássága. A Szegeden, 1993. szept. 3-án tartott 
konferencia kibővített anyaga. Bp.–Szeged, 1995, 42–44. 1927-ben, Prohászka 
Ottokár székesfehérvári püspök halála után Glattfelder lett a rangidős a 
megyéspüspökök sorában, ráadásul ő rendelkezett a legnagyobb közéleti 
tapasztalatokkal, nem lehetett tehát véletlen, hogy elhunyt püspöktársa számos 
magas egyházi funkcióját vette át. Még ugyanabban az évben, Csernoch János 
esztergomi érsek halála után az érseki szék várományosaként is felmerült a neve, 
a magyar kormányzat az ő személyének jelölése érdekében próbált meg 
közbenjárni a Szentszéknél. Zombori I. Glattfelder Gyula tevékenysége a 
parlamentben (1911–1943). Ibid. 111. 
42  A Szt. László Társulat választmányi ülésének és közgyűlésének 
jegyzőkönyve. Bp., 22.04.1929. MNL OL, P 1431, 1. t., 17. d., 3/1929. sz. 
43 Konkordátum és Római Egyezmény. Cluj–Kolozsvár, Szt. Bonaventura 
Könyvnyomda, 1933, 12.  
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választásáról is dönteni. Az új vezetőség köréből a későbbi- 
ekben két személy neve fémjelezte a Társulat tevékenységét: az 
új egyházi elnök Shvoy Lajos székesfehérvári püspök, az új 
egyházi alelnök, az egyesület „motorja” Krywald Ottó prépost, a 
budatétényi Názáret Missziósház vezetője lett.44 
Véleményünk szerint Glattfelder helyzetértékelése téves volt, 
amit természetesen csak az események későbbi menetének 
ismeretében állíthatunk. A konkordátum ugyanis kivonta a 
magyar–román egyezkedési folyamatból a katolikus érdekek 
egyetemes védelmezőjének tekintett, egyúttal nemzetközi 
tényezőnek minősülő pápai államot, s ezzel a vagyonjogi kérdések 
tisztázását kizárólag a két, egyébként egyenlőtlen fajsúlyú ország 
illetékességébe utalta. A Szentszék autoritásának hiánya ebben a 
vitás kérdésben a román kormány részéről könnyen időhúzáshoz, a 
probléma elodázásához vezethetett. Úgy tűnik ráadásul, hogy a 
magyar engedmények tárgya részben a bukaresti épületkomplexum 
lett, ugyanis a Gozsdu Alapítvány státuszát rendező jóval későbbi, 
1937. október 27-i magyar–román kétoldalú megállapodásba végül 
nem vették fel az óromániai javak kérdésének megoldását. Már itt 
megelőlegezzük azt is, hogy az általunk tárgyalt tágabb korszak 
végéig, azaz 1944-ig, a kérdés magyar nemzeti érdekeknek 
megfelelő regulációját egyáltalán nem sikerült elérni.45 
 
A BRAILAI KATOLIKUS ISKOLA STÁTUSÁNAK KÉRDÉSE 
 
A brailai katolikus iskolaépület ügye nem vált el teljesen a Szt. 
László Társulat bukaresti ingatlankomplexumának sorsától, 
1926-tól kezdődően mégis más jogi megítélés alá esett. Mint 
korábban utaltunk rá, a Társulat annak idején az iskola 
tulajdonjogát, az oktatás megkezdésének lehetővé tétele érdekében 
August Kuczka prelátus nevére íratta, aki akkoriban német 
                                                        
44 Ugyanekkor Glattfeldert tiszteletbeli elnökké választották. A Szt. László Társulat 
választmányi ülésének és közgyűlésének jegyzőkönyve. Bp., 22.04.1929. Loc. cit.   
45 Árvay Zs. A bukaresti magyarok lélekszámának alakulása. – In: Györfi 
Ibolya et. al. (Eds.). A Bukaresti Petőfi Művelődési Társaság Értesítője. 
1994–1997. Bukarest, 1998, 99–100. 
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állampolgárnak számított, mivel a német fennhatóság alá tartozó 
sziléziai Osinyben látta meg a napvilágot.
46
 Ez a terület azonban a 
világháború után Lengyelország birtokába került. A territoriális 
átrendeződés Kuczka számára kedvező jogi konstellációt teremtett, 
hiszen erre támaszkodva ki tudta járni, hogy lengyel honosságot 
szerezzen. Így a tulajdonában lévő ingatlanra nem terjedhetett ki a 
kisajátítási törvény hatálya, hiszen – a háború idején még nem is 
létező – Lengyelország nem állt katonai konfliktusban 
Romániával.
47
 Kuczka a román állammal szembeni jogigényét 
így is egy peres eljárás keretében tudta csak érvényesíteni, igaz, a 
per megnyerése érdekében a diplomáciai kapcsolatait is 
mozgósította, a processzus idején végig a lengyel követ 
támogatását élvezte. Nem volt tehát véletlen, hogy az iskolaépület 
zár alóli feloldását a saját érdemének tudta be. Ráadásul mindvégig 
azt hangoztatta, hogy mind a pereskedésre, mind az épületen 
később végzett állagmegóvási munkálatokra tetemes összegeket 
áldozott a saját megtakarításaiból.
48
 Deszke Mihály, a helyi 
Római Katolikus Temetkezési Egylet vezetője ugyanakkor 
felhívta a figyelmet arra, hogy Kuczka a per lefolyása – és 
megnyerése – után 1 millió 200 ezer lejes kártérítést is nyert a 
román államtól. Az ő leveleiből is tudhatjuk azt is, hogy a háború 
után az iskolaépületbe helyezett román állami leányiskola 




A katolikus iskolaépület tulajdonviszonyainak rehabilitálása a 
brailai magyarság anyanyelvű oktatási perspektíváit döntő módon 
befolyásoló pillanatban következett be, ugyanis a még magyar 
                                                        
46 Iosif, G. Istoria seminarului catolic din Bucureşti. – Pro Memoria. Revistă 
de istorie ecleziastică. 2007, N 6, 234. Osiny németül: Rothhaus. 
47 Magyary A. bukaresti követ jelentése Walko L. külügyminiszternek. Bukarest, 
21.01.1930. MNL OL, K 64, 39. cs., 1930/27. t., 41/1930. res. pol. sz. 
48 Nagy L. bukaresti ideiglenes ügyvivő jelentése Kánya K. külügyminiszternek. 
Bukarest, 21.04.1934. MNL OL, K 64, 95. cs., 1942/27. t., 168/1934. res. pol. sz. 
49 Deszke levele Shvoynak. Braila, 11.02.1934. Loc. cit. Az épületet a hadsereg 
foglalta le, s az utolsó háborús évben, illetve minden bizonnyal még 1919-ben is 
katonai raktárként használták azt. R. Netzhammer, Op. cit., Vol. II. 862. 
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tannyelvű református elemi iskola éppen a zár alóli feloldással 
egy időben szüntette meg a működését. 
Hegyi Mózesnek, az 1936–1940 között a helyi református 
egyházközség élén álló lelkésznek a könyvéből tudhatjuk, hogy a 
reformátusok által 1867-ben alapított, az 1873-1886 közötti majd 
másfél évtizedes szünet után újrainduló, s ezt követően 
folyamatosan fenntartott brailai iskolát a román hatóságok 
1918-ban, a világháború végén, ugyancsak bezárták. Igaz, az 
intézmény 1921-ben, Torró Miklós lelkészsége idején, második 
kényszerszünete után ismét megkezdte működését.50 A városban 
tehát a háború után is létezett intézményes kerete a magyar 
anyanyelvű oktatásnak, s mindennek témánk szempontjából is van 
jelentősége, hiszen Hegyi Mózes egyik mellékelt táblázatából 
egyértelműen kiderül, hogy felekezeti jellege ellenére az iskolába 
más vallású gyerekek is jártak, sőt, az 1921-1922-től 1926–1927-ig 
tartó hat tanévben, az elsőt leszámítva, a katolikus növendékek 
alkották a legnagyobb létszámú csoportot. Rajtuk kívül lutheránus 
és izraelita tanulók is színesítették a konfesszionális összképet. A 
legtöbb tanuló, 33 fő, az 1925–1926. tanévben iratkozott be az 
iskolába, közülük 17 volt a katolikus. A következő tanévben a 
beiratkozottak száma 23 főre csökkent, 51  majd 1927 őszére, 
döntően a szülők elköltözése miatt, csak 5 növendékük maradt, 
ezért a lelkész felfüggesztette az iskola működését.52 Hegyi 
véleménye szerint a református iskolának a kegyelemdöfést nem is 
az 1918–1921 közötti kényszerszünet, hanem az 1912–1913. tanév 
adta meg, amikor megnyitották a Szt. László Társulat 
katolikus iskoláját, amely a gyermekek megnyerése érdekében 
kedvezményesen, esetleg díjmentesen vállalta az oktatást. Az 
1890-es és 1900-as években, olykor még a 150 fős létszámot is 
elérő, de mindvégig stabilan több mint 100 gyermeket oktató és 
nevelő, ugyanakkor a szülőktől némi tandíjat szedő református 
                                                        
50 Hegyi M. Végvár. A 75 éves brailai református egyházközség történetéből. 
Kolozsvár, 1937, 72. 
51 Ibid. III. sz. tábl. 
52 Ibid. 74. 
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iskola létszáma ezt követően apadt le vészesen, sőt, később 
emiatt kellett azt vegyes jellegűvé alakítani.53 
A per megnyerése, illetve a zárlat feloldása után az 
időközben Brailából Turnu Severinbe áthelyezett Kuczka a 
felmerülő tulajdonjogi ellenmondások kontextusában eleinte 
maga is hangsúlyozta, hogy kompromisszumra törekszik a Szt. 
László Társulat vezetőségével.54 Magyary Antal bukaresti követ 
a vele folytatott beszélgetésről is ebben az értelemben jelentett a 
Dísz térre: „Kuczka prälátus [sic! – S. A.], akinek a romániai 
magyar katholikus iskolák úgyszólván életművét képezik, most 
arról óhajtana gondoskodni, hogy a brailai iskolaépület 
tulajdonjoga cessió, ajándék, névleges eladás, vagy bármely más 
úton ismét magyar kezekbe jusson, nehogy halála esetén a 
tulajdonjog körül bonyodalmak keletkezzenek.”55 Ennek azonban 
némiképp ellentmond, hogy – mint az általa írt terjedelmes 
memorandumból kitűnik – az iskolaépület átadását a Szt. László 
Társulatnak igazából ő maga sem tartotta megfelelő megoldásnak. 
Eleve célszerűtlennek, sőt lehetetlennek vélte ezt addig, amíg 
magyar szempontból nem rendeződik kedvezően a Társulat teljes 
ingatlanvagyonának státusza. Más romániai magyar szervezetekre 
sem kívánta átruházni az épület tulajdonjogát. Alapvetően azzal 
érvelt, hogy annak idején az iskolát a magyar útlevéllel rendelkező 
                                                        
53 Ibid. 72. Az 1930. évi román népszámlálás hivatalos statisztikái szerint az 
adatfelvétel időpontjában Brailában közel 1150 fő vallotta magát magyar 
nemzetiségűnek, ami százalékarányosan a város – kerekítve mintegy 68 ezer fős – 
összlakosságának csupán 1,7 %-át tette ki. Forrás: Recensământul general al 
populaţiei României din 29 decemvrie 1930. Vol. 2. Neam, limba maternă, religie. 
Publicat de Sabin Manuilă. Bucureşti, 1938. LXII. tábl. A helyi viszonyokat jól 
ismerő magyar egyháziak becslései az 1920-as, 1930-as évek fordulóján ennél 
jóval nagyobbra, 3-4 ezer fősre tették a helyi magyarság lélekszámát. Erre ld. pl.: 
Vécsey József Aurél beadványa a Szt. László Társulat elnökségének. Hely nélkül, 
dátum nélkül. [Bp., 23.02.1928 előtt]. MNL OL, P 1431, 17. d., 1. t., 1/1928. sz. 
Továbbá: Deszke levele Krywaldnak. Braila, 5.11.1934. Loc. cit. 
54 Kuczka német nyelvű memoranduma Shvoynak. Bukarest, 31.08.1934. 
MNL OL, P 1431, 17. d., 1. t., sz. nélk. 
55 Magyary jelentése Walkónak. Bukarest, 21.01.1930. Loc. cit. 
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katolikusok gyerekei részére hozták létre, s mivel Brailában a 
háború után alig maradt magyar állampolgár, a magyar szülőktől 
származó, de román honosságú gyermekek javára történő 
hasznosítása ellentmondana az alapító okiratban foglalt 
alapelveknek, ezért a román hivatalos szervek egészen biztosan 
áthidalhatatlan akadályokat gördítenének a működése elé.56 
A kompromisszum kialakítását jelentős mértékben 
megnehezítette a Kuczka és a helyi magyar katolikus közösség 
között az iskolaépület hasznosítása körül kialakult konfliktus.  
Deszke Mihály egyik későbbi levelében tömör, de érzékletes 
képet festett erről: „Mi kértük szépen [t. i. a per megnyerése 
után – S. A.], adná vissza iskolánkat, és azt felelte, az iskola 
saját tulajdona, azt tesz véle, amit akar.”57 Ennek hátterében 
minden bizonnyal az is meghúzódott, hogy a lengyel 
lelkipásztor közvetlenül a Szt. László Társulat vezetőségével 
kívánt egyezkedni, és nem az általa inkompetensnek tartott 
helyi temetkezési egyesület elöljáróival. Nyilván erre azért is 
érezhetett erkölcsi alapot, mert a személyét a világháború 
előtti tevékenysége okán általános közmegbecsülés övezte a 
Társulat tagsága körében. Erre egyértelműen utal az, hogy a 
Társulat igazgatóságának tagjai egyhangúlag méltánylandónak 
ítélték, hogy a romániai magyar iskolák érdekében teljesített 
szolgálata címén végellátásban részesüljön, ezért 1921. ápr. 
1-től számítva évi 40 ezer koronás kegydíj kiutalásáról 
                                                        
56  Kuczka német nyelvű memoranduma Shvoynak. Bukarest, 1934. 
augusztus 31. Loc. cit. A meglehetősen terjedelmes irat jelentős 
forrásértékkel rendelkezik, hiszen Kuczka, amellett, hogy ismerteti a XIX. 
századi bukaresti katolikus érsekek és az egyházmegye területén élő magyar 
ajkú hívek közötti viszonyrendszert, részletesen kitér az egyházmegye 
magyar honosságú híveinek 1918–1919. évi kálváriájára. Leírja például, 
hogy a magyar gyülekezettel együtt internálták őt is, s miután kitoloncolták 
őket Romániából, rövid ideig a budapesti Központi Szemináriumban tudott 
elhelyezkedni. A proletárdiktatúra hatalomra jutása után személyesen 
találkozott Kun Bélával, aki, némi készpénzt is biztosítva számára, elintézte, 
hogy magyar utazási igazolvánnyal a németországi rokonaihoz távozhasson. 
57 Deszke levele Shvoynak. Braila, 11.02.1934. Loc. cit. 
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határoztak a számára.
58
 (Az – ekkor egyébként a történetének 
talán legsúlyosabb financiális válságával küszködő – egyesület 
pénztárnaplójának tanúsága szerint 1923 harmadik negyedévéig, 
negyedéves bontásban rendszerint át is utalták neki a számára 
elkülönített összeget.
59
) Kuczka olyan információkat is közölt, 
melyek szerint a brailai Római Katolikus Temetkezési Egylet – 
noha a saját okmányai szerint a vezetősége (elnöke, titkára, 
számviteli ellenőre) magyar származásúakból állt –, az idők 
során fokozatosan elvesztette a magyar etnikai jellegét, 
elrománosodott, s az 1930-as évek második felére a tagságát 
már 80–90 %-ban ortodox románok alkották.60 
Kuczka elmondásából is egyértelműen arra lehet 
következtetni, hogy a brailai ingatlan ügyében megfordult 
Magyarországon, de állítása szerint ott „süket fülekre” talált.61 
Valóban konstatálható, hogy 1930. jan. 22-én Budapestre utazott, 
hogy a Szt. László Társulat újonnan megválasztott vezetőségével 
tárgyaljon,
62




A modus vivendi kialakítását nyilván az is hátráltatta, 
hogy a Szt. László Társulat a tisztújítás ellenére sokáig 
„tetszhalott-állapotban” volt. Az újjáalakulással kapcsolatos 
nehézségeket jelzi, hogy az ügyvitel átvétele, s azzal együtt a 
készpénz- és ingatlanvagyon felmérése, leltárazása, az irattár 
                                                        
58  Kuczka a munkaképtelenségére hivatkozva saját maga fordult ilyen 
irányú kérelemmel a Társulat vezetőségéhez. A Szent László Társulat 
igazgatósági ülésének jegyzőkönyve. Bp., 19.11.1921. MNL OL, P 1431, 24. 
d., 6. t.  
59 Az 1934-1944 közötti pénztárnaplót ld.: MNL OL, P 1431, 7. t., 29. d.  
60 Gyárfás Elemér romániai parlamenti szenátor levele Teleki Pálnak, a Szt. 
László Társulat világi elnökének. Bukarest, 17.05.1935. MNL OL, P 1431, 
18. d., 1. t., 21/1935. sz.  
61 Nagy jelentése Kányának. Bukarest, 21.04.1934. Loc. cit.   
62 Magyary jelentése Walkónak. Bukarest, 21.01.1930. Loc. cit. 
63  A Szt. László Társulat választmányi ülésének jegyzőkönyve. Bp., 
21.09.1930. MNL OL, P 1431, 24. d., 6. t. Kollányi Ferenc közlése szerint 
Kuczka „csak az idő rövidsége miatt nem kereshette fel Shvoyt.” 
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rendbetétele, az új tisztikar és a személyi állomány kialakítása, 
továbbá az egyházi és kormányzati szervekkel való kapcsolatok 
kiépítése még éveket vett igénybe. Az újrakezdést szimbolikusan is 
kifejezte, hogy 1933. marc. 23-án egy ünnepélyes (újjá)alakuló 
közgyűlést tartottak, amelyre az esemény rangjának emelése 
érdekében meghívták a katolikus klérus összes reprezentánsát. A 
közgyűlésen jelen volt Zichy Gyula kalocsai érsek, Radnai Farkas, 
a Csehszlovákiából kiutasított egykori besztercebányai püspök, 
címzetes érsek, Glattfelder Gyula, Rott Nándor veszprémi püspök, 
Mikes János szombathelyi püspök és Hanauer Árpád István váci 
püspök.
64
 Krywald Ottó ebből az alkalomból ismertette a Társulat 
új hitbuzgalmi és nemzetgondozási programjára vonatkozó, általa 
kidolgozott javaslatokat. Ennek egyik meghatározó eleme volt a 
Monarchia utódállamaiban élő magyar katolikus szórványok 
felekezeti ellátásának kérdése. A tervezet szükségesnek vélte, hogy 
a szomszédos államok kormányaitól eszközöljenek ki engedélyt 
arra nézve, hogy tisztán vallásos célból magyarországi papok is 
átmehessenek a területükre, és ott népmissziókat, tridiumokat, 
konferenciákat tarthassanak, mivel ezen államok hatóságai magyar 
papoknak csak azzal a záradékkal adtak vízumot, ha azok minden 
papi funkciótól és egyházi tevékenységtől tartózkodnak. A 
programtervezet előirányozta azt is, hogy az egyesület eredeti 
célkitűzéseihez híven először a Kárpát-medencén kívüli 
autochton magyar népcsoportok, a bukovinai székelyek és a 
moldvai csángók, illetve a regáti magyarok helyzetén 
igyekezzenek javítani, amihez diplomáciai segítséget, adott 
esetben a Szentszék közbenjárását is kérni fogják.
65
  
                                                        
64 A Társulat közgyűlésének jegyzőkönyve. Bp., 23.03.1933. MOL, P 1431, 
24. d., 6. t. Előzetesen Serédi Jusztinián esztergomi érsek is jelezte részvételi 
szándékát, de a Pázmány P. Tudományegyetem diákságának 24-én kezdődő 
lelkigyakorlata miatt 23-ára kellett előrehoznia az egyetemen eredetileg egy 
nappal későbbre tervezett előadását. Serédi levele Shvoynak. Esztergom, 
11.03.1933. MNL OL, P 1431, 17. d., 1. t., 10/1933. sz. 
65 Shvoy jelentése a püspöki karnak a Társulat működéséről. Hely nélkül, dátum 
nélkül. [Székesfehérvár], 13.11.1933 után. MNL OL, P 1431, 17. d., 1. t., 16/1933. sz. 
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A fentebbiekből kiindulva nem hinnénk, hogy a brailai 
iskola ügyében valamiféle, akárcsak átmeneti megoldás is 
körvonalazódott volna az érintett felek között. Alexander 
Theodor Cisar érsek tanúsága szerint Kuczka az épületet 
eleinte katolikus egyházi célokra hasznosította, az 
1932–1933-as tanév elejétől ugyanis egy fogyatékosok 
képzésével foglalkozó karitatív intézményt (ún. „fogyatékosok 
kertjét”) rendezett be abban. Az intézmény működtetéséhez az 
érsek is hozzájárult azzal, hogy az egyházmegyéje területén 
dolgozó iskolanővéreket küldött oda gondozókként, akik 
között állítása szerint magyar anyanyelvű is volt. A lengyel 
pap időközben kinyilvánította abbéli szándékát is, hogy az 
épületet majdan az érseki szemináriumnak adományozza 




Gyárfás Elemér, a Katolikus Státus világi elnöke, aki a Szt. 
László Társulat megbízásából 1934-től Bukarestben személyesen 
vette kézbe az ügy intézését, már arról tudósított, hogy Kuczka 
akkoriban már nem is a katolikus hittestvérei, hanem az 
újonnan felállított görögkatolikus plébánia részére bocsátotta 
rendelkezésre az épületet, amelynek vezetője elfogadta az évi 
60 ezer lejes bérleti díjra vonatkozó igényét, míg a katolikus 
egyházközség csak 20 ezer lejt tudott felajánlani erre a célra. A 
görög rítusú plébánia az épület egyik egykori tantermét 
használta a szertartások elvégzésére. Gyárfás úgy vélte, hogy 
Kuczka a bérleti szerződést már eleve a jövőbeni végleges 
elidegenítés tudatában kötötte meg az unitusokkal, tehát 
opciós jogot biztosított számukra. A reményei azonban nem 
                                                        
66 Alexander Theodor Cisar bukaresti katolikus érsek levele Shvoynak. Bukarest, 
7.04.1934. MNL OL, P 1431, 17. d., 1. t., 43/1934. sz. Cisar Shvoynak 
küldött levele azt sugallja, hogy az épület hasznosítása a Szt. László Társulat 
jóváhagyásával valósult meg valamilyen bérleti konstrukció keretében, és az 
épület kiadásából befolyó bérleti díjat Kuczka a háború előtt a Társulat számára 
teljesített szolgálataiért jutalmul honorárium gyanánt megtarthatta magának. Ezt 
a helyzetképet azonban semmilyen más forrás nem támasztja alá. 
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teljesültek maradéktalanul, mivel utóbbiak 1934-ben nem 
fizették ki a bérleti díjat. Kuczka minden bizonnyal ekkor 
döntött úgy, hogy az épületet átruházza a bukaresti katolikus 
érsekségre, s noha tényleg kiállított ilyen értelmű nyilatkozatot, 
az nem lett benyújtva a bíróságra a romániai ingatlanátírási 
szabályoknak megfelelően, így jogilag ő maradt az ingatlan 
tulajdonosa, s neki állt módjában felette rendelkezni. Az épület 
elidegenítésére vonatkozóan Kuczka tárgyalásokba kezdett a 
balázsfalvi görögkatolikus érsekséggel, amelyek a bukaresti 
katolikus érsek egyetértésével, de legalább is tudtával zajlottak.
67
 
Miután az ingatlan eladására vonatkozó egyezkedések híre 
Budapestre is eljutott, Shvoy egy éles hangú levelet írt Kuczkának, 
melyben követelte, hogy részletesen informálja az ügyről.68 
A Szt. László Társulat eközben a legfelsőbb vatikáni 
egyházigazgatási fórumok előtt is felvetette a romániai 
ingatlanvagyonának a kérdését. Shvoy székesfehérvári 
püspökként három ízben, 1928-ban, 1933-ban és 1938-ban járt 
Rómában ad limina látogatáson, a két utóbbi alkalommal a Szt. 
László Társulat egyházi elnökeként már a nagy múltú 
egyesületet is képviselhette a Szentszék előtt. Sajnos azonban 
a visszaemlékezéseiben csak szűkszavúan osztja meg az 
ezekkel az útjaival kapcsolatos emlékeit. Inkább az 1938. évire 
tér ki bővebben, de ezen a helyen is inkább egy élményszerű 
és meghatódott leírást ad arról, hogy milyen nagy hatást 
gyakorolt rá a pápával való találkozás. Eszerint nem egyedül, 
hanem az egyházmegye néhány esperesével, papjával és 
hívével ment, s a körülbelül 50-60 fős nyájat az akkor már 
nagyon beteg XI. Pius fogadta, akivel együtt énekelték el a 
pápai himnuszt Az érdemi megbeszéléseiről mindössze annyit 
ír, hogy 1933-ban és 1938-ban is beszámolt a pápának a 
fílialátogatásairól, s ezzel összefüggésben az egyházmegye 
                                                        
67 Gyárfás levele Shvoynak. Bukarest, 21.02.1935. MNL OL, P 1431, 18. d., 
1. t., 79/1935. sz. 
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hitéletéről, utóbbi alkalommal a papnevelés helyzetéről is.69 
A püspökkari konferencia számára a Szt. László Társulat 
működéséről készített első jelentéséből azonban utal arra, hogy az 
1933. októberi római útja alkalmával a zsinati kúrián ismertette a 
Romániában élő magyar katolikusok problémáival kapcsolatos 
álláspontját.
70
 Nyilvánvalóan csak félreértés következménye 
lehet az a hazai történeti irodalomban napvilágot látott 
információ, mely szerint Shvoy már ekkor bemutatott egy 
memorandumot, amely felhívta a figyelmet a Kárpátokon túli 
magyarság anyanyelvű lelki gondozásának problémáira, illetve 
a Társulat regáti ingatlankomplexumának rendezetlen 
helyzetére.
71
 A valóság azonban az, hogy Krywald csak Shvoy 
hazatérése után, a Társulat november 13-i igazgatósági ülésén 
mutatta be a püspök utasítása alapján elkészített, és a pápának 
küldendő emlékirat magyar nyelvű szövegtervezetét. Ezen a 
tanácskozáson határoztak a memorandum szövegének olaszra 
fordításáról,
72
 amely minden bizonnyal csak a következő év 
elejére készült el, hiszen a fordítónak járó 50 pengőt kitevő 
munkadíjat január 8-án utalták ki a Társulat pénztárából.
73
 
A memorandum kitért a bukaresti ingatlanvagyon rendezetlen 
státuszára is, hangsúlyozva, hogy hatékonyabban szolgálhatná a 
bukaresti magyar anyanyelvű katolikus hívek vallási életének 
megújhodását, ha újból rendelkezhetnének korábbi spirituális, 
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kulturális és szociális központjaikkal.
74
 A Szt. László Társulat 
nem sokkal később, még 1934 tavaszán egy különálló levélben 
tudatta Angelo Rotta budapesti pápai nunciussal, hogy sérelmesnek 
tartja az egykori brailai Szt. László-iskola görögkatolikusoknak 
történő esetleges eladásával kialakuló helyzetet is.75 
Egyáltalán nem zárható ki azonban, hogy az eleve a 
szentatyának címzett memorandum, akárcsak a budapesti 
nunciusnak címzett, a brailai iskola ügyét szóvá tevő levél, végül 
nem is jutott el közvetlenül a pápa kezeihez, hanem a szentszéki 
állam- és diplomáciai apparátus más szintjein vizsgálták meg a 
benne foglaltakat. A Szt. László Társulat vezetősége a 
memorandumot is csak közvetve, hivatalos csatornán, vagyis a 
budapesti apostoli nunciatúrán keresztül juttathatta el az 
egyházfőhöz. Rotta mindkét előterjesztést továbbította a Vatikánba, 
ahol azonban azokat a bukaresti nunciatúra hatáskörébe utalták.
76
 
A brailai iskola ügyében ezzel egy időben a magyar kormány is 
diplomáciai lépéseket tett és erőteljes nyomást gyakorolt a 
bukaresti érsekre. Barcza György vatikáni magyar követ 
közvetlenül a szentszéki államtitkárságnál interveniált az épület 
eladásának megakadályozása érdekében,
77
 illetve Shvoy, részben a 
Dísz tér ösztönzésére, telefonon beszélt Cisarral és kontaktusba 
lépett Valerio Valeri bukaresti szentszéki megbízottal is.
78
 A helyi 
belpolitikai és egyházpolitikai viszonyokra, illetve a román 
államhatalom és a romániai katolikus egyház között 
egyházszervezeti kérdésekben az 1929. évi konkordátum révén 
kialakult kényes egyensúlyra hivatkozva utóbbi megvalósít- 
                                                        
74 A Szt. László Társulat olasz nyelvű memoranduma a Szentszékhez a regáti 
magyarok és a moldvai csángók felekezeti ápolásának problémáiról. Hely nélkül, 
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76 Rotta levele Shvoynak. Bp., 25.05.1934. Ibid. 
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hatatlannak ítélte a Szt. László Társulat nagyszabású pasztorációs 
és restitúciós kezdeményezéseit és célkitűzéseit. Csak a zár alól 
kivont ingatlanok, vagyis éppen a brailai iskolaépület ügyében 
látott esélyt az előrelépésre, aláhúzva azonban, hogy ezt is csak 
egy majdani magyar–román bilaterális megegyezés keretében 
tartja kivitelezhetőnek. A bukaresti nuncius, álláspontja kiala- 
kításához Gyárfás Elemér véleményét is kikérte, és a válaszában 
kifejtett helyzetértékelés a vele folytatott eszmecserén elhang- 
zottakat is tükrözte, igaz, arra, hogy egy vatikáni vizsgálat 
befejezéséig felfüggeszteti a brailai iskolaépület adásvételi 
tranzakcióját, csak a bukaresti magyar követ intervenciójára 
reagálva tett ígéretet.
79
 A bukaresti érsekséget képviselő 
mindkét egyházi tényező, Kuczka és Cisar is, sérelmesnek vélte, 
hogy a Szt. László Társulat diplomáciai síkra terelte a kérdést. 
Az események menetének talán nem érdektelen mellékszála a 
Kuczka és a nála közel harminc évvel fiatalabb, 1933-tól Brailában 
plébánosként szolgáló Emanuel Kreis közötti konfliktus alakulása. 
Nem kizárt, hogy kettejük ellentéte egészen 1924-ig vezethető 
vissza, amikor a városba plébánosnak kinevezett Kuczka új 
helyettest hozott magával az 1922-től káplánként ott fungáló Kreis 
helyébe. Julius Hering már említett történeti feldolgozása alapján 
nehezen ítélhető meg, hogy Kuczka érkezése és Kreis távozása 
összefüggésben állt-e egymással. Az általa megrajzolt – de a 
közeljövőben minden bizonnyal több helyen árnyalható – történeti 
kép azt sugallja, hogy közvetlenül a háború után a helyi magyarság 
szempontjából Kuczka személye kedvezőbb volt, mint Kreis 
ténykedése, ugyanis míg előbbi elsajátította a magyar nyelvet, és a 
nevéből ítélve a vikáriusa is magyar származású lehetett, addig 
utóbbi nem beszélt magyarul, sőt azon első papok közé tartozott, 
akik románul prédikáltak Brailában.
80
 Ezzel szemben az általunk 
feltárt forrásokból arra is következtetni lehet, hogy az 1930-as évek 
első felében akár Kreis személye is garancia lehetett a magyar 
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érdekek védelmére. A Szt. László Társulat vezetősége is inkább 
„magyarbarátként” könyvelte el, amit plasztikusan szemléltet az, 
hogy az egyesület 1934. évi támogatási keretének szétosztására 
vonatkozó első tervezet az ő nevét is tartalmazta, és 200 pengő 
segélyt irányzott elő számára.81 Egyúttal az is igaz, hogy ha a 
brailai iskola ügyére vonatkozó teljes dokumentációt tüzetesen 
átnézzük, akkor arra kell gyanakodnunk, hogy a német származású 
Kreis alapvetően nem a helyi magyarság, hanem a helyi 
egyházközség érdekeit védelmezte Kuczkával szemben, s az 
épületet valójában a részben német tannyelvű plébániai iskola 
számára, az ott folyó oktatás kiterjesztése céljából szerette volna 
megszerezni. Minderre azért is ki kellett térnünk, mert ez alapján 
tapintható ki, hogy Kuczkának megvolt a maga belső ellenzéke az 
egyházmegyén belül, ami csökkentette a mozgásterét a 
Társulattal folytatott egyezkedések során. Minden bizonnyal 
erre vezethető vissza az is, hogy korábban Cisar nem merte 
maradéktalanul elfogadni az iskolaépület tulajdonjogának 
átruházásáért cserébe szabott feltételeit, például nem kívánta a 
teológiai szeminárium elöljárójává tenni.
82
 
A bukaresti nunciussal szoros összeköttetésben álló 
Gyárfás a nevére szóló, a Szt. László Társulattól nyert 1934. 
november 22-i felhatalmazására hivatkozva lépett kapcsolatba 
az érdekeltekkel. Noha utalt a Kuczka és Kreis között feszülő 
ellentétekre is, rámutatott, hogy előbbi, ha megakadályoznák 
abban, hogy realizálja a balázsfalvi görögkatolikus érsekséggel 
kötött opciós egyezségét, érvényesíteni fogja a Szt. László 
Társulattal szembeni magánjogi igényeit. Ebben a helyzetben 
Gyárfás csak egy megegyezésre látott lehetőséget az épület 
vételárának felhasználásával kapcsolatban. A modus vivendi 
szükségességét nyomatékosította, hogy a bukaresti nuncius is 
a kompromisszumos megoldás mellé állt, mivel el akarta 
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kerülni a konfrontációt az unitusokkal. 
A kompromisszum lényege lett volna, hogy a vételárat a 
bukaresti érsekség magyar nyelvű pasztorációs céljaira fordítják: 
Kuczka elképzelése szerint azt valamilyen jövedelmező alapban 
helyezték volna el, s az így rendszeresen befolyó pénzösszegből 
egy, a bukaresti érseki teológián a magyar nyelvet tanító, a 
református iskolába járó gyermekek hitoktatását ellátó, illetve a 
Szt. Ilona templom gyülekezetének lelki szolgálatára is 
megbízatást nyerő katolikus pap ellátmányát biztosították volna. 
Gyárfás ezzel szemben arra tett javaslatot, hogy az összeget a Szt. 
Ilona templom melletti, s az érsekség tulajdonát képező telken 
felépítendő plébánialak építési költségeire fordítsák, s az érsekség 
részéről biztosítsák az így megalakítandó önálló Szt. 
Ilona-plébánia magyar jellegét. Igaz, a majdani plébánia magyar 
jellegének szavatolására hosszú távon maga is csak úgy látott 
lehetőséget, hogy a Szt. László Társulat a templom tulajdonjogát 
átruházza az elvitathatatlanul magyar érzelmű erdélyi ferences 
rendtartományra. Úgy érvelt, hogy Cisar nehezen tagadhatná meg 
a szerzetesek letelepedését a fővárosban, ha arra hivatkoznának, 
hogy azért mennek oda, mert ott van saját templomuk. 
Véleményünk szerint Gyárfás jól érzékelte, hogy Kuczka 
propozíciói kérdésessé tették volna a magyar katolicizmus 
szempontjainak érvényesítését. Javaslatának értelmében ugyanis 
a vételárat akár ingatlanba is lehetett volna fektetni, amelynek 
bérjövedelme képezte volna a magyar lelkész ellátmányát. Ez a 
megoldás gyakorlatilag visszatérést jelentett volna a probléma 
kiindulópontjához. A bukaresti szemináriumban akkoriban 
egyébként is létezett magyar nyelvű tanszék, amelynek dotációja 
megoldott volt.
83
 Ráadásul a Szt. László Társulat feltételei 
messzebb mentek Gyárfás elképzeléseinél. Azok szerint, azon 
túlmenően, hogy az érsekségnek letelepedési engedélyt kellett 
volna adnia Bukarestben az erdélyi Szt. Ferenc-rend számára, az 
eladott brailai épületben valamely magyar katolikus egyesületnek 
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örök időre megfelelő helyiséget kellett volna biztosítani, a helyi 
magyar gyerekeket kedvezményes tandíjjal kellett volna felvenni, 
akiknek hitoktatását magyar nyelven kellett volna biztosítani. 
Kikötötték azt is, hogy a vételárból a bukaresti Szt. Ilona 
templom telkén plébánialakot kell építeni, s az esetleg 
fennmaradó összeget értékpapírba kell fektetni, amelynek 
hozamai a plébánia javát szolgálnák.
84
 
Mivel az 1923. évi kultusztörvény és a konkordátum 
értelmében a honosított szerzetesrendek is csak 
kormányhatósági engedéllyel nyithattak új rendházakat 
Romániában, semmi kilátás nem volt arra, hogy az erdélyi 
ferencesek bukaresti működési engedélyt szerezzenek, Gyárfás 
kezdettől fogva arra gondolt, hogy nem bevallottan rendház 
épülne, hanem az érsek egyszerűen megbízna 2-3 rendtagot a 
létesítendő plébánia vezetésével, amivel elkerülhető lett volna 
a kormányengedély megszerzése. Kérte a Társulat vezetését, 
hogy minden olyan feltételt vonjon vissza, amelynek teljesítése 
nem függ Kuczkától, ugyanakkor a Szt. Ilona-plébánia 
kialakításának és átvételének pénzügyi biztosítékait megteremtve, 
a brailai épület eladásából befolyó összeget a bukaresti 
nunciatúrán helyezzék letétbe, amit a nuncius a megfelelő időben 
a Társulat rendelkezésére bocsáthat azzal a megkötéssel, hogy 
azt az országból nem viheti ki és lehetőség szerint Bukarestben 
vagy az ókirályságban fogja felekezeti célokra fordítani. 
Amennyiben a nunciatúrán a szükséges keretösszeget letétbe 
helyeznék, a Társulat egy formális okmányban az erdélyi ferences 
rendtartománynak ajándékozná a templomot, amelynek birtokában 
már nem a Társulat, hanem a rend fordulna az érsekhez, s arra 
hivatkozva, hogy rendelkezésére állnak a plébánialak építéséhez 
szükséges financiális eszközök, kérnék, hogy engedje át nekik a 




A Társulat magáévá tette a Gyárfás által felvázolt menetrendet 
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a templom melletti telek megszerzésére s a plébánialak felépítésére, 
igaz, ezzel együtt a brailai épület helyiségeinek hasznosítására és a 
magyar gyermekek oktatására vonatkozó álláspontján nem kívánt 
módosítani.
86
 Kuczka azonban elutasította ennek a két feltételnek 
az elfogadását, mivel szerinte egy ilyen restrikció az adásvételt jogi 
és gyakorlati szempontból is ellehetetlenítette volna. Azt állította, 
hogy az egyébként is elrománosodott temetkezési egylet mellett 
nem létezik más magyar jellegű egyesület Brailában, illetve a 
magyar gyermekek tandíjkedvezménye megoldhatatlan, mert az 
ebből keletkező különbözetet a fenntartó egyházközségnek kellene 
pótolnia. Elfogadta ugyanakkor, hogy a vételárból a Szt. Ilona 
templom melletti telken építsenek egy plébánialakot, de azt 
ellenezte, hogy az összeget a nunciatúrán helyezzék letétbe. 
Azzal érvelt, hogy nem bízik a lej értékállóságában és 
öregségére való tekintettel még az életében szeretné biztosítani 
az összeg megfelelő felhasználását, s a mintegy 600 négyszögöl 
területű telken építendő plébánia tervei már el is készültek. 
Amennyiben a Szt. László Társulat hozzájárul, hogy a brailai 
épület eladásából befolyó pénzösszegből egy plébánialak 
építési költségeit fedezzék a Szt. Ilona templom melletti telken, 
a bukaresti érsek által kiadandó, s a nunciatúra által is 
láttamozandó bizalmas okmányban hajlandók írásban is 
garantálni, hogy a templomban vasárnap és ünnepnapokon a fő 
istentiszteleti nyelv a magyar legyen és plébánián mindenkor 
egy magyar nyelvet bíró lelkészt alkalmazzanak. 
Később azonban kiderült, hogy az érsek semmi szín alatt 
nem járulna hozzá a franciskánusok fővárosi működéséhez. 
Valeri, aki Rómából kapott utasításra szóvá tette az érsek előtt 
a ferencesek letelepedésének kérdését, olyan ellenállásba 
ütközött, hogy végül maga is kénytelen volt a terv elvetését 
javasolni. Kuczka egyébként egy világi pap jelölését tartotta 
volna célszerűnek a plébánia élére.87 Ezzel szemben Gyárfás, 
                                                        
86 Teleki és Krywlad levele Gyárfásnak. Bp., 11.04.1935. MOL, K 64, 95. 
cs., 1942/27. t., 248/1935. res. pol. sz.  
87 Gyárfás levele Telekinek. Bukarest, 17.05.1935. MOL, P 1431, 18. d., 1. 
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tudván, hogy 1934-1935 folyamán Cisar a fővárosban szolgáló 
magyar származású egyházmegyés papokat szétszórta, és 
Bukarest-környéki vagy vidéki plébániákon helyezte el őket,88 
ezzel nem látott garanciát a magyar nyelvűség biztosítására a 
plébánián és a gyülekezeti hitéletben. 
Egy lehetséges áthidaló megoldást vetett fel Zombory 
László, a bukaresti Szt. József székesegyház kanonokja, aki 
azt javasolta, hogy a Szt. Ilona-templomot a romániai jezsuita 
rendtartománynak engedjék át azzal a kikötéssel, hogy a fő 
istentiszteleti nyelv mindig a magyar legyen. A rendtartomány 
vezetése olasz kézben volt, ugyanakkor ebben az időben két 
magyar származású papot is állomásoztatott Bukarestben, s 
szervezeti kérdéseikben a rend római generálisa döntött, így 
nem voltak kitéve a bukaresti érsek főhatóságának. Szerinte a 




A ferencesek jezsuitákkal való kiváltására irányuló elképzelés 
támogatására mind Cisar, mind a Társulat vezetősége hajlott. 
Figyelembe véve azonban, hogy a Jézus Társaság Romániában 
a görög rítusú katolikusok pasztorációjára is berendezkedett, és 
már két ilyen plébániát is fenntartott, illetőleg Bukarestben 
ekkoriban nem volt görögkatolikus templom, félő volt, hogy a 
Szt. Ilona-plébániát a görög rítusú hívek lelki igényeinek 
ellátására is felhasználja majd. Ezt elkerülendő, a Társulat 
kikötötte, hogy csak akkor ajándékozza véglegesen a templomot 
a rendnek, ha kizárólag latin szertartású miséket tart ott, addig 
csak használatra engedi át azt.
90
  
                                                                                                          
t., 21/1935. sz. 
88 1934 tavaszán-nyarán Cisar négy, Bukarestben szolgáló magyar lelkészt 
helyezett vidékre, illetve kényszerített távozásra az egyházmegyéből. Köztük 
volt Gáll Antal és Tamás Pál, a Szent Ilona templom két egymást követő 
plébánosa is. Nagy jelentése Kányának. Bukarest, 1934. augusztus 21. MOL, 
K 105, 20. cs., 150/1934. biz. sz. 
89 Bárdossy László bukaresti követ jelentése Kányának. Bukarest, 1935. júl. 
3. MOL, K 64, 95. cs., 1942/27. t., 474/1935. res. pol. sz. 
90 Gömbös átirata Kányának. Bp., 1935. aug. 12. Ibid. 568/1935. res. pol. 
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Vasile Suciu balázsfalvi görögkatolikus érsek 1935. jan. 
25-i halála és az érseki szék megüresedése miatt azonban a 
brailai iskolaépület adásvételi tranzakciója hosszú időre 
megtorpant. Az általunk vizsgált források arra is következtetni 
engednek, hogy mivel Kuczkának az ügyletet nem sikerült 
nyélbe ütnie, az időhúzás taktikájához folyamodva, ezek után 
leginkább csak a látszat kedvéért tartotta fenn a tárgyalásokat 
újabb és újabb követelésekkel előállva.91 Ebben a helyzetben 
döntött úgy a Szt. László Társulat vezetése, hogy ismét 
diplomáciai beavatkozással igyekszik nyomást gyakorolni a 
bukaresti érsekségre. Ennek megfelelően 1936. aug. 29-én a 
vatikáni magyar ügyvivő egy diplomáciai jegyzékben kérte 
Eugenio Pacelli szentszéki államtitkártól, hogy kötelezzék 
Kuczkát a Szt. László Társulatnak járó 860 ezer lej lefizetésére 
a nunciushoz. A jegyzék átadásakor a magyar diplomata 
aláhúzta, hogy a lengyel pap öregségére és a bukaresti katolikus 
magyar hívek anyanyelvű lelki gondozásának hiányára való 
tekintettel a magyar kormány nagy súlyt fektet arra, hogy a 
bukaresti magyar plébánia ügye minél hamarabb rendeződjön.92 
A Kuczka öregsége miatti aggodalmak nem voltak 
megalapozatlanok. Az akkor már meglehetősen idős pap ugyanis 
hamarosan, 1936. dec. 24-én elhunyt.
93
 Sajnos az események 
további menetére vonatkozó dokumentáció rendkívül hiányos, de 
nyilván a főszereplő elhalálozása is egy időre függőben hagyta a 
kérdés rendezését. A további fejleményekről alapvetően csak 
Gyárfás egy jóval későbbi összefoglalójából tájékozódhatunk. 
Ebben a magyar ügyvéd és politikus megerősítette azt a korábbi 
feltételezést, mely szerint Kuczka 1935–1936 fordulójától 
valójában már arra törekedett, hogy elodázza a Társulattal kötendő 
                                                                                                          
sz. 
91 Ibid. 
92 Thierry Heribert ideiglenes vatikáni ügyvivő jelentése Kányának. Róma, 
29.08.1936. Ibid. 579/1936. res. pol. sz. 
93 Krywald beszéde a Társulat közgyűlésén. Bp., 08.06.1937. MNL OL, P 
1431, 18. d., 1. t., 29/1937. t. 
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megállapodást, sőt, utóbb, a Gyárfásnak írt 1936. jún. 27-i 
levelében megszakítottnak deklarálta a kapcsolatát a 
magyarországi egyesülettel. Ebből a dokumentumból derül ki az is, 
hogy a lengyel pap a végrendeletében a jogilag az ő tulajdonát 
képező brailai ingatlant a bukaresti katolikus érsekségre hagyta, 
amely így annak kizárólagos és korlátlan tulajdonosává vált. 
Gyárfás ezért úgy vélte, hogy ettől kezdve az egyeztetéseket a 
bukaresti egyházmegye híveinek kellene folytatni az egyházi 
elöljáróval, mivel az általuk kezdeményezett megbeszélésektől az 
érsek nem zárkózhatna el. A bukaresti katolikus magyarság köréből 
ekkor szervezték meg a Katolikus Férfiszövetséget, amelynek 
elnöke Blaskó Pál mérnök lett, s amelynek egy önálló bizottsága 
volt hivatott tárgyalásokat folytatni a Szt. Ilona templom 
státuszáról. A testület azzal kívánta megvetni a brailai épületre 
irányuló igényének jogalapját, hogy előkészítette a Szt. Ilona 
templom melletti önálló magyar egyházközség megalapítását. 
Ennek szervezeti szabályzatát elküldték Cisarnak azzal, hogy 
jóváhagyása után ennek az egyházközségnek bocsássa 
rendelkezésére a Kuczkától örökölt brailai objektum eladásából 
befolyó vételárat. 1937. okt. 23-án a magyar katolikus szövetség 
vezetőit fogadta Cisar, majd az új bukaresti nuncius, Andrea 
Cassulo is. Előbbi ígéretet tett a magyar egyházközség szervezeti 
szabályzatának jóindulatú megvizsgálására, illetőleg a brailai 
iskolaépület eladásából befolyó – becslések szerint akkori értékén 
már legalább 1,5 millió lejes – vételárból az egyházközség 
céljainak támogatására. Ennek nyomán Blaskó 1938. febr. 24-én 
vételi ajánlatot nyújtott be azzal, hogy amennyiben az érsek 
hajlandó a Szt. Ilona templomot és a mellette elterülő telket a 
magyar katolikus hívek felekezeti, kulturális és oktatási céljaira 
fordítani, egy 1,2 millió lejes hitelkeretből megveszik a brailai 
épületet. Ennek az elképzelésnek a megvalósítását nemcsak az 
érsek halogató magatartása hátráltatta, hanem a részben világi 
személyeket tömörítő magyar katolikus szövetség és a Szt. Ilona 
templomban akkor szolgáló jezsuita páter, Horváth Sándor 
közötti ellentétek is. A fennmaradt iratokból leszűrhető, hogy 
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utóbbi inkább a Jézus Társaságának kezében szerette volna 
látni a templomot és a telket, amelyen kifejezetten egy jezsuita 
rendházat kívánt volna felépíttetni, míg a helyi katolikus 
szövetség ezzel hosszú távon nem látta volna biztosítottnak a 
magyar nyelvű lelki gondozást, ezért inkább a megalakítandó 
egyházközség kompetenciáját próbálta érvényesíteni. A 
második bécsi döntés idejéig a kérdésben nem sikerült dűlőre 
jutni, a döntőbírósági egyezmény után pedig minimálisra 
csökkentette a megegyezés esélyét, hogy a bukaresti magyar 




Nem tudjuk, pontosan mikor, de minden bizonnyal valamikor 
1941–1942 fordulóján Cisar az akkori valós értékén aluli áron, 
800 ezer lejért eladta a brailai iskola épületét, igaz, az összeget a 
jezsuitákat képviselő Horváth rendelkezésére bocsátotta. A 
vételárból a páter 200 ezer lejt rögtön felhasznált a bukaresti 
rendház felépítésére felvett hitel törlesztésére, a maradékból pedig 
megvásárolta az épület melletti telket. Sem a Külügyminisztérium, 
sem a Szt. László Társulat levéltárában lévő iratok nem tisztázzák 
pontosan a kialakult helyzetet, de a külügyi dokumentumok arra 
engednek következtetni, hogy az összeg felhasználásának 
mikéntjét Horváth nem egyeztette előzetesen a Szt. László 
Társulat vezetőségével. 95  Ezt támasztja alá a kérdésről az 
utókorra maradt utolsó irat, a vatikáni magyar követség 1942. 
szept. 18-i jelentése is. Eszerint az államtitkárságon interveniáló 
Luttor Ferenc kánonjogi tanácsos kérte, hogy szólítsák fel 
Cassulót a Szt. László Társulatot megillető tulajdon- és 
rendelkezési jog védelmére. Guilio Barbetta prelátus, a Római 
Kúria püspöke a nuncius korábbi jelentéseire hivatkozva 
                                                        
94 Gyárfás összefoglaló feljegyzése. Hely nélkül, 04.09.1942. MNL OL, K 
64, 95. cs., 1942/27. t., 336/1942. res. pol. sz. 
95 A Miniszterelnökség átirata a KÜM-nak. Bp., 08.08.1942. Ibid. 319/1942. 
res. pol. sz. 
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kifejtette, hogy „az eladás jóhiszeműleg történt, és a magyar 
plébános, Horváth Sándor, mint látszólagos törvényes örökös 
[kiemelés – S. A.], vagyonmentés [címén – S. A.] rendelkezett az 
egyébként már régebben molesztált [sic! – S. A.] ingatlan felett.” 
A bíboros is azon a véleményen volt, hogy jó lenne megállapítani, 
hogy a magyar plébánost „mennyiben illette meg a rendelkezési 
jog, illetőleg mennyiben volt a magyar lelkipásztorkodás 
érdekében az eladás sürgős és indokolt.”96 
A brailai magyar iskolaügy két világháború közötti 
továbbgyűrűződését követve láthatjuk, hogy a kérdés jóval túlnőtt 
a brailai magyar kisközösség alapfokú oktatási igényeinek 
lehetővé tételén, áttételesen a bukaresti magyarság anyanyelvű 
hitéletének biztosítása lett a tét. A történet egészéből leszűrhető az 
a tanulság, hogy a történelmi Magyarország határain kívüli 
magyar entitások (moldvai csángók, bukovinai székelyek, regáti 
magyarok) sorskérdései – a magyar kisebbségi jogvédelem 
megsokszorozódó feladatai ellenére – továbbra is a magyar 
kormányzati politika homlokterében maradtak. Igaz ugyanakkor, 
hogy még egy olyan, első ránézésre bagatell kérdés is, mint egy 
alapfokú iskola és iskolaépület tulajdonviszonyainak rendezése, 
magyar szempontból hosszú, évtizedeken át tartósan megmaradó 
politikai cselekvéskényszert indukált. Az elsődleges érintett, a Szt. 
László Társulat hirtelen egy sokszereplős politikai-felekezeti 
mezőben (magyar kormány, román kormány, Szentszék, 
Bukaresti Katolikus Érsekség, romániai görögkatolikus egyház, 
szerzetesrendek: ferencesek, jezsuiták stb.), találta magát, a 
legalapvetőbb érdekei érvényesítéséhez a magyar állami 
intervenció, a jogi út és ezekkel együtt az alkupozíció erősítése, a 
nemzetközi nyomásgyakorlás, a partnerség kényszere stb., illetve 
mindezek időnkénti kombinációja sem vezetett el. 
                                                        
96 A vatikáni követség jelentése Kállay Miklós külügyminiszternek. Róma, 
18.09.1942. Ibid. 354/1942. res. pol. sz. 
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В настоящото изследване обект на изучаване е развитието 
на брачността сред русите в България през 20-те години до 
средата на 30-те години – с акцент върху смесените бракове.  
Защо – русите? През междувоенния период в България 
руската „бяла” имиграция е сред най-значителните демо- 
графски явления. Тогава руската диаспора наброява 20.000 
души1, в преобладаващата си част (80–90%) нови имиг- 
ранти – бежанци, установили се в България след Октом- 
врийската революция от 1917 г.; старата руска общност 
отпреди войните включва потомците на казаците старо- 
обредци, заселили се в българските земи в началото на 
ХІХ в. и живеещи в две компактни селища около Варна и 
Силистра, ветераните от руската армия, останали в 
България след 1878 г., и трудовата миграция от началото 
на ХХ в.2 При това съотношение между старите и новите 
членове на общността основните й (демографски) 
характеристики (които безспорно са сред факторите за 
развитието на брачността) – доминираща принадлежност 
                                                        
1 Според преброяването на населението в България от 1926 г. – 19.590 
души по матерен език руски.  
2  Атанасова, Е. Руснаци. – В: Имиграцията в България. Съст. А. 
Кръстева. С., 2005, 120; Кьосева, Ц., България и руската емиграция, 
20-те-50-те години на ХХ в. С., 2002, 144. 
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към източното православие, градски характер и липса на 
равновесие между двата пола в полза на мъжете – 
очевидно се определят от чертите на новата руска 
имиграция.   
Защо – брачността? Брачността е ключова демографска 
характеристика, пряко свързана с възпроизводството на 
населението; влияе се от и оказва влияние върху ражданията, 
умиранията и миграциите. През разглежданата епоха бракът 
представлява ядрото на семейството, в което пък се 
осъществява развитието и смяната на поколенията, първата 
социализация на децата, формирането на личността, и в 
този смисъл той има отношение към процеса на 
интеграция на русите в българското общество. 
В изследването открояваме спецификите в тяхното 
„брачно поведение” въз основа на българската статистика 
за движението на населението, която дава ежегодни 
сведения за ражданията, умиранията и женитбите на 
населението (от 1881 г. нататък). По отношение на русите 
откриваме сведения по народност само за женитбите до 
1935 г. Чрез анализа на тези статистически данни 
проследяваме динамиката на брачността и етнически 
смесените бракове сред руските имигранти в България в 
териториален разрез градове-села и за двата пола, 
разкриваме предпоставките и нагласите в българската 
обществена среда като техен приемник за реализирането 
на (смесени) бракове.  
 
БРАЧНА СТРУКТУРА  
 
Изучаването на брачната структура на руската имиграция 
е от съществено значение, защото чрез нея може да се 
установи какъв е демографският механизъм за нейното 
„физическо” оцеляване. Броят и относителният дял на 
принадлежащите към категориите население по брачно 
състояние (в случая за разглежданата епоха „семейни”, 
„несемейни”, „разведени” и „овдовели”) зависи от неговия 
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възрастов състав. Така например, там, където преобладават 
децата, броят на семейните е по-малък и обратно. Затова 
относителните дялове на съответните категории население 
по брачен статус се изчислява не спрямо цялото население, 
а спрямо населението способно да сключва брак, като се 
има предвид определена гранична възраст (15 години за 
жените, 18–20 години за мъжете). Българските преброя- 
вания не дават сведения за русите в България по брачно 
състояние, нито пък по възраст. За да получи необходимата 
информация, сръбският изследовател на руската емиграция 
на Балканите М. Йованович се обръща към друг вид 
исторически извори. Той изучава списъци с лични данни 
за руските имигранти в град Варна от периода 1919–1922 
г., съхраняващи се в Държавния архив на Руската феде- 
ция, и въз основа на случайна извадка от 2238 души пред- 
ставя брачната структура на тамошните руски имигранти 
над 18-годишна възраст – тук отразена в графика 13. 
Статистическите данни от графика 1 регистрират висок 
процент на несемейни сред руските имигранти в гр. Варна, 
което на пръв поглед изглежда доста необичайно имайки 
предвид традиционната брачност в Русия. В началото на 
ХХ в. за населението в по-голямата част на Русия е 
характерно ранно встъпване в брак и състояние на 
брачност практически на всички мъже и жени на възраст 
до петдесет години. По това време обаче в Русия вече се 
забелязва процес на упадък в патриархалното общество. 
Съществуващата от векове традиционна система на 
„брачно поведение” започва постепенно да се измества – в 
посока от западните региони на страната към източните – 
от нов модел, за който е характерно по-късно встъпване в 
първи брак и значителен относителен дял на неженени 
мъже и неомъжени жени. През 20-те години на ХХ в. 
Европейска Русия е сред страните с най-висока брачност в 
                                                        
3 Йованович, М. Русская эмиграция на Балканах: 1920–1940. М., 2006, 
402, табл. 56. 
Брачност, брачна структура, смесени бракове сред 
русите в България през междувоенния период 
 - 231 - 
 
света, което се определя главно от преобладаването на 
средните и големите възрасти в разпределението на насе- 
лението по възраст и от ниската средна брачна възраст4. 
Установеният висок относителен дял на несемейните сред 
руските имигранти във Варна се предопределя от значи- 
телния контингент военни в състава на руската емиграция 
в самото начало на 20-те години. 
Според статистическите данни от графика 1 структурата 
на руската имиграция във Варна с оглед на брачния статус 
по пол съответства на някои общи, принципни положения 
в демографията, които в случая са подсилени от фактора 
„война”. Мъжете руси дават по-голям процент несемейни, 
докато при жените по-голям е относителният дял на 
семейните и овдовелите. По-големият процент на задомените 
рускини се обяснява с обстоятелството, че техният брой е 
значително по-малък от този на мъжете. Във вариацията 
на мъжете руси повече от половината са семейни (54.1%) 
и въпреки това е висок относителният дял на несемейните 
(43.2%). А това означава, че от Русия са емигрирали много 
несемейни мъже, докато несемейните жени, напуснали 
страната, са сравнително малко (17.6%). През последните 
десетилетия на ХІХ в. и първите десетилетия на ХХ в. 
жените емигрират все още рядко, или поне значително 
по-рядко от мъжете, което е свързано с тяхното подчинено 
и зависимо от мъжете положение в патриархалното об- 
щество и дори, когато емигрират, те тръгват заедно с 
мъжете си; редки са случаите, когато те се решават да 
тръгнат сами.  
 
                                                        
4 През 1926 г. (не разполагаме с данни за 1920 г.) например семейните в 
Русия са 65.7% от населението над 15-годишна възраст. По това време 
вече не маловажен фактор за този висок показател на брачност са 
моралните норми на новата комунистическа идеология, проповядваща 
по-строги нрави. Вж. Мишайков, Д., Д. Чанков. Населението на 
България. С., 1935, 77.  
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Графика 1. Структура на руските имигранти в гр. Варна, 
над 18-годишна възраст, по брачно състояние, 1919–1922 г., 
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Впечатление прави големият относителен дял на вдови- 
ците – значително по-голям от този на вдовците – което е 
свързано не само с чисто демографски явления като 
по-голяма смъртност при мъжете на средни и високи 
възрасти, по-голяма продължителност на живота при 
жените, по-често встъпване в брак от вдовците отколкото 
от вдовиците, но и с масовото избиване на мъжете по 
време на войната.  
Във вариацията на разведените руски имигранти във 
Варна сме свидетели на пълно отсътвие на разведени 
мъже и наличие на съвсем малко разведени жени. По 
принцип разведени се срещат и сред мъжете, но много 
по-малко отколкото при жените. И причината не е в това, 
че мъжете се развеждат по-рядко, а че е по-чест случаят 
мъжете да искат развод с цел да встъпят в брак с друга 
жена. Други фактори, определящи бракоразводността са 
темпераментът и моралът на населението, законодателните 
                                                        
5 Пак там. 
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постановления и през разглеждания от нас период, разбира 
се, нормите, които налагат вероизповеданията или домини- 
ращото вероизповедание. За разлика от православните 
страни, в католическите разводите са по-малко, защото 
църквата не ги позволява. В патриархална Русия обаче 
разводът се разглежда от православната църква като 
най-тежък грях и се разрешава само при изключителни 
обстоятелства. Затова разводите до 1914 г. са голяма 
рядкост. Още повече, че с промяната на обществените 
условия, с постепенната еманципация на жените още в 
дореволюционно време се променят и възгледите за 
съпружеството и отношението към развода6.  
 
ДИНАМИКА НА БРАЧНОСТТА 
 
Динамиката на брачността въздейства пряко върху отделни 
страни от икономическия и социалния й живот. Основа- 
вайки се на определени традиции, като обществена 
институция бракът претърпява сравнително бавни промени. 
Понякога се наблюдават колебания, които могат да бъдат 
предизвикани от войни, икономически кризи, масови 
миграции и др.7 Настъпващите в брачността изменения 
представляват интерес от гледна точка на връзката й с 
възпроизводството8. Динамиката в брачността на русите в 
България изучаваме, изхождайки  
от демографското разбиране за нея като процес, който се 
измерва чрез количеството на сключените бракове, а също и  
от разбирането за брака като най-често срещания 
семеен модел, узаконяващ отношенията между мъжа и 
                                                        
6  Иванова, Е. И. Трансформация брачности в России в ХХ веке: 
основные этапы.  
http://demoscope.ru/weekly/knigi/konfer/konfer_010.html (28.08.2014) 
7 Жекова, В. Промени в брачността и раждаемостта в България. С., 
2011, 19. 
8 Пак там, 11. 
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жената, и като необходима подготовка за раждане на дете9.  
При ограничените възможности на наличните статисти- 
чески данни за руската имиграция у нас – използваме 
най-общия показател за измерване на честотата на 
браковете и динамиката на брачността, т. нар. общ коефи- 
циент за брачност, изчисляващ се в промили (‰) като 
съотношение между броя на браковете и цялото население 
(с каквито данни разполагаме за населението в България с 
руска народност). Разбира се, в случая сме наясно, че този 
показател е твърде общ и недостатъчно прецизен, защото 
се влияе от възрастовия състав на разглежданото население 
(за който нямаме статистически данни), а неговите „въз- 
ходи” и „падения” малко или много зависят от измененията 
на относителните дялове на мъжете и жените в най- 
активните брачни възрасти (за което също нямаме статисти- 
чески данни). Все пак, въпреки неговите недостатъци и 
поради липсата на възможност да се постигнат по-точни 
количествени параметри, смятаме, че той разкрива досто- 
верно общите тенденции и процеси в брачността на русите 
в България. Този общ коефициент на брачност при тях 
определяме за годините на преброяванията: от 8‰ брака 
на 1000 жители с руска народност през 1910 г. (т.е. за 
старата руска диаспора) той се покачва до 9,1‰ през 1920 г. 
– процес, наблюдаващ се и в Русия, и в България. По- 
нисък е от общия коефициент на брачност в Русия от 12‰ 
след гражданската война, в началото на 20-те години, като 
се има предвид, че зад тази средна цифра се крие различен 
коефициент на брачност за различните региони на стра- 
ната10, както и сравнително висока брачност в селата и 
ниска брачност в градовете, особено в големите градове: 
                                                        
9 Пак там. 
10 За градското население на Среден Урал, напр., през 1920 г. той е 
19,4‰. Вж. Чащин, А. Брачность городского населения Среднего Урала 
в 1920-1940 гг. – В: Актуальные проблемы исторических исследований: 
взгляд молодых учѐных. Екатеринбург, 2011, 190-197. 
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както пише руският демограф С. А. Новоселски ниската в 
сравнение със селското население брачност на гражданите 
е характерно явление за страните от земеделски и селско- 
стопански тип и освен в Русия, се наблюдава в Сърбия, 
България, Румъния, Унгария.11 В Русия се извършва транс- 
формация на брачно-семейните отношения, чието начало 
се забелязва още в последните военни години. Послед- 
валите промени се изразяват най-ярко в градското матри- 
мониално поведение. Влияние върху тези явления имат 
процесите на урбанизация и индустриализация. 
При руските имигранти (а и въобще) сключването на 
брак е икономически, социално и съсловно обусловено. 
Затова динамиката на тяхната брачност може да бъде 
разбрана само в контекста на обществено-икономическите 
промени, настъпили и в приемащата, и в изпращащата 
страна най-вече по време на и след Първата световна 
война. В България те оказват влияние върху семейната 
култура, която се освобождава от някои традиционни 
елементи и усвоява нови социални норми: колекти- 
вистичните традиции в семейните отношения постепенно 
се разрушават, а индивидуализмът се превръща в определяща 
нраствена норма. 12  В българското село се разпада 
семейната форма на многолюдната задруга и задружните 
семейни домакинства,13 налага се нов семеен модел – мало- 
численото индивидуално семейство, състоящо се от две 
генерации – брачна двойка и незадомени деца, а от 30-те 
                                                        
11 Новосельский С. А. Смертность и продолжительность жизни в России. 
М., 1916. За България също: Жекова, В., цит. съч., 20. 
12 Хаджийски, И. Бит и душевност на българския народ. Т. 2. С., 1974, 
132, 205. 
13 Многолюдната задруга или на т. нар. бащино неразделно семейство е 
основана на собствеността на бащата - глава на домакинството върху 
цялото движимо и недвижимо имущество, на задружния труд на члено- 
вете на домакинството и на колективното потребление. Негова характе- 
ристика е и консервативното отношение към жената. (Вж. Макавеева, Л. 
Българското семейство. Етно-социални аспекти. С., 1991, 135, 145).  
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Графика 2. Брой на браковете сред населението в 

















































































































































години нататък – по-малките четиричленни семейства.15 
Утвърждаването на индивидуалното семейство води до 
промени в отношението към жената, която излиза от своята 
социална анонимност, започва да играе важна роля в 
стопанския живот на малкото индивидуално семейство16. 
Но и в индивидуалното семейство мъжът продължава да е 
главната фигура, а жената все още заема второстепенно 
място. Затова, за да създаде „домашно огнище” мъжът се 
нуждае от материална основа. И като се добави неустано- 
веното положение на руските бежанци в началото на 20-те 
                                                        
14 Източници на графика 2 и на таблици 1-8: Движение на населението в 
Царство България през 1909, 1910, 1920-1926 г. С., 1914–1916, 1926-1930; 
Женитби, бракоразводи, раждания и умирания изобщо за Царството и 
по околии 1909, 1910, 1927-1935 г. С., 1931–1938. 
15 По данни на: Жекова, В., цит. съч., 140. 
16 Макавеева, Л., цит. съч., 148. 
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години, а също и различни психологически, социални и 
икономически фактори, свързани с процеса на емиграцията 
им, то тогава са разбираеми настъпващите промени в 
брачността сред русите в България, ясно е защо тогава 
общият й коефициент е доста по-нисък отколкото средния 
показател за цялата страна – 14‰.17 (Междувпрочем до 
войните последният обикновено варира между 8‰ и 10‰ 
и леките изменения се дължат на увеличаване на брако- 
способното население в резултат от нарастването на 
населението; осъществяването на отложените поради 
войните бракове през 1919 и 1920 г. водят до тогавашния 
скок в общия коефициент на брачност в България.18 В 
Русия този скок се наблюдава през 1918–1919 г.19) А през 
1926 г. общият брачен коефициент в руската общност се 
покачва повече от два пъти, за достигне 21.1‰20 при 10‰ 
за България21 (естествено, като се вземе под внимание, че 
през междувоенния период България е сред страните с 
най-ниска брачност в света и с най-нисък относителен дял 
на разведените22). Тази висока стойност на общия брачен 
коефициент сред руската имиграция се определя (както е 
видно от графика 2) от мъжката брачност, която именно 
тогава достига пиковата си точка и безспорно има връзка с 
подобряването на условията за живот на руските имигранти, 
                                                        
17 Даскалов, Р., Българското общество 1878–1939. Т. 2, 16. 12,8‰ е 
брутният коефициент според Жекова, В., цит. съч, 21. 
18 За 1919 г. брутният коефициент на брачност достига най-високото си 
равнище до 2007 г. – 16,8‰. Вж. Жекова, В., цит. съч, 21.                        
19 В Петербург общият коефициент на брачност достига 23,2‰, което 
според С. А. Новоселски е световен рекорд (Новосельский, С. А. Демо- 
графия и статистика. М., 1978, 103). 
20 За 1934 г. коефициентът не може да бъде изчислен, тъй като данните 
от статистиката за женитбите са регистирарни по народност, а преброя- 
ването от тази година не предоставя такива.  
21 Данаилов, Г. Т., Изследвания върху демографията на България. – Сб. 
БАН, кн. ХХІV, 1930, 245. 
22 Мишайков, Д. Основен курс по демография. С., 1941, 77. 
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със специалните мерки по тяхното трудоустрояване, пред- 
приети от правителството на Андрей Ляпчев. В еволюцията 
на брачността при мъжете–руси се наблюдава прогресивно 
спадане след 1931 г. до 1933 г., т.е. във времето на голямата 
икономическа криза – явление, което тогава е характерно 
за населението на България и е регистрирано от брутните 
коефициенти на брачност, бележещи най-ниското равнище 
за целия период от 1918 до 1980 г.23 Изобщо през между- 
военния период кривата на мъжката брачност сред русите 
има доста причудлива динамика на формирането на брач- 
ните двойки за разлика от кривата на женската брачност, 
която е сравнително равномерна и няма такива скокове и 
падения.  
 
БРАЧНОСТТА В ГРАДОВЕТЕ И СЕЛАТА  
 
Българската статистика за движение на населението обна- 
родва данните за абсолютния брой на сключените бракове 
поотделно за градовете и селата, благодарение на което 
може да се проследи развитието на брачността на русите в 
България за градското и за селското население. Общ кое- 
фициент на брачност сред руските общности в бъл- 
гарските градове и села не може да бъде изчислен, тъй 
като данните от преброяванията за наличното руско насе- 
ление по градовете и селата не са обнародвани в корелация с 
народност руси както е в случая със сведенията за тяхната 
брачност. Затова използваме друг показател, който се 
основава само на данните от статистиката за движение на 
населението (женитби) по народност руси: във вариацията 
на всички сключени от русите по народност бракове 
изчисляваме относителният дял на техните бракове в 
градовете и селата. Според сведенията за женитбите сред 
русите от 1909–1910 г., т.е. в старата руска диаспора, 
брачността в градовете е два пъти по-малка отколкото 
                                                        
23 Жекова, В., цит. съч., 20. 
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брачността в селата. След 1920 г., т.е. в новата руска диа- 
спора е тъкмо обратното: в градовете през 20-те години тя 
обикновено надхвърля 63% като в редки случаи достига 
пикове от 82% (1921) или 71% (1923); през първата поло- 
вина на 30-те години по правило надхвърля 71% с един 
пик от 77% през 1934 г. (табл. 1). Имайки предвид, че за 
целия период до Втората световна война в България коли- 
чествено преобладаващо е селското семейство (което е 
както поризводствена, така и потребителска единица)24 и 
коефициентът на брачност в селата е значително по-висок 
от този в градовете25 стигаме до заключението за тъждест- 
веност между тенденциите в брачността на старата руска 
диаспора с тези в България и ясното различие в това отно- 
шение на новата руска диаспора; последното се дължи на 
обстоятелството, че новата руска диаспора се развива пре- 
димно като градска. 
 
Таблица 1. Бракове сред населението в България с руска 
народност в корелация градове–села, в % (1909, 1910, 
1920–1935 г.). 
 1909 1910 1920 1921 1922 1923 
Градове 30.4 30.0 63.9 81.8 64.9 70.8 
Села  69.6 70.0 36.1 18.2 35.1 29.2 
Общо  100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 
       
 1924 1925 1926 1927 1928 1929 
Градове 69.6 65.3 63.1 66.8 66.3 68.5 
Села  30.4 34.7 36.9 33.2 33.7 31.5 
Общо  100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 
       
 1930 1931 1932 1933 1934 1935 
Градове 65.7 71.3 72.9 71.6 77.0 69.8 
Села  34.3 28.7 27.1 28.4 23.0 30.2 
Общо  100.0 100.0 100.0 10..0 100.0 100.0 
                                                        
24 Земеделските семейства представляват 75% от всички семейства в 
България. По данни на Л. Беров. Цитирано по: Макавеева, Л., цит. съч., 133. 
25 Пак там, с. 20; Данаилов, Г., цит. съч., 244. 
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В таблица 2 представяме същия показател за брачността 
сред русите в българските градове и села, но разграничен 
за двата пола. Вариацията на мъжете–руси от старата руска 
диаспора (1909–1910 г.) се отличава с малък относителен 
дял на браковете в градовете и с голям относителен дял на 
браковете в селата. Същата е и тенденцията сред рускините, 
макар там относителният дял на браковете в градовете да е 
с пет–шест процента по-голям. Наблюдаваното явление е в 
съответствие с принципното положение на по-висока брач- 
ност на село и в България, и в Русия, макар в следво- 
енните години тя да се покачва и в градовете. В България, 
както и в много други източно-европейски страни моделът 
е ранна и висока (на практика всеобща) брачност (най-вече 
по селата) за разлика от страните в Западна Европа – с 
късна и не толкова висока брачност.26 Това демографско 
явление се обяснява с възможността при системата на 
дребно селско земевладение всички да си осигурят дом и 
известно количество земя (т.е. да могат да се изхранват) и 
с традицията на грижа за семейството, за неговото увели- 
чаване и за продължаването на рода.27 
За разлика от старата руска диаспора в новата (след 
1920 г.) относителният дял на браковете в градовете е два 
– два и половина пъти по-голям отколкото в селата – и при 
мъжете и при жените. При мъжете се забелязва тенденция 
към нарастване с няколко процента през 30-те години в 
сравнение с 20-те години, скок през 1934 г., след което 
следва спад до равнището от края на 20-те години. При 
жените от новата руска диаспора относителният дял на 
браковете в градовете е значително по-голям от този на 
мъжете, но... през първата половина на 20-те години делът 
 
                                                        
26 Данаилов, Г., цит. съч., 54–57, 92–93, 247–255; Тотев, А. Ю. Населе- 
нието на България, 1880-1980. Демографско-исторически очерк. – Год. 
на СУ, Юридически факултет, 1968, 12. 
27 Даскалов, Р., цит. съч., 2005, Т. 2, 16. 
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Таблица 2. Бракове сред населението в България с руска 
народност в корелация градове-села и по пол, 1909, 1910, 
1920–1935 г. 
   Мъже    
 1909 1910 1920 1921 1922 1923 
Градове 16.7 15.4 63.2 82.1 64.4 70.6 
Села  83.3 84.6 36.8 17.9 35.6 29.4 
Общо  100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 
       
 1924 1925 1926 1927 1928 1929 
Градове 68.7 64.9 62.5 66.3 65.8 68.6 
Села  31.3 35.1 37.5 33.7 34.2 31.4 
Общо  100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 
       
 1930 1931 1932 1933 1934 1935 
Градове 65.4 71.0 71.2 71.1 77.4 69.0 
Села  34.6 29.0 28.8 28.9 22.6 31.0 
Общо  100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 
   Жени    
 1909 1910 1920 1921 1922 1923 
Градове 23.8 22.2 84.2 92.3 79.5 74.0 
Села  76.2 77.8 15.8 7.7 20.5 26.0 
Общо  100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 
       
 1924 1925 1926 1927 1928 1929 
Градове 84.1 66.7 70.7 65.8 79.6 82.1 
Села  15.9 33.3 29.3 34.2 20.4 17.9 
Общо  100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 
       
 1930 1931 1932 1933 1934 1935 
Градове 75.9 73.7 84.1 73.9 80.8 72.0 
Села  24.1 26.3 15.9 26.1 19.2 28.0 
Общо  100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 
 
на браковете им в селата е много по-малък от този в градо- 
вете, което е свързано с количествената диспропорция на 
половете и с новите за имигрантките обществени и битови 
условия в селската среда на страната–приемник, към които 
те все още са в процес на приспособяване.  
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СМЕСЕНИ БРАКОВЕ 
 
В тесния смисъл на понятието етнически и/или религиозно 
смесената (хетерогенната) брачност представлява честотата 
на встъпване в такива бракове по отношение на общото 
количество на сключените бракове. В широкия смисъл на 
понятието смесената брачност е процес на образуване и 
функциониране на съпружески двойки от различни етноси 
или вероизповедания, обуславящ се от социално-културни 
норми. Проблемът за разпространението и честотата на 
(етнически и/или религиозно) смесените бракове е широко 
обсъждан в демографските и социологическите изследвания. 
Там те са осмисляни като един от най-важните фактори на 
етническата интеграция и асимилация. Американският 
социолог Милтън Гордън разглежда етнически смесените 
бракове или т. нар. „брачна асимилация” като трето 
измерение на адаптацията и като неизбежен резултат от 
структурната асимилация”, т.е. като широко мащабно 
навлизане на членовете на дадено етническо малцинство 
във формалните и неформалните обществени структури и 
институции, където „институцията семейство е един от 
основните обществени образования”28. Сами по себе си 
хетерогенните бракове са знак за активно междуетническо 
взаимодействие. Вследствие от тях се създават семейства, 
които се явяват непосредствена микросреда за процесите 
на интеграция и естествена асимилация (без това да е 
задължително). В този смисъл те са един от „мостовете” за  
сближаването на етносите – в частност, на русите с бълга- 
рите и с етническите групи в България, защото предполагат 
нагласа за трайно установяване в страната–приемник. 
Ръстът на техния брой и относителен дял свидетелстват за 
ролята им в етнокултурните и етносоциалните процеси. В 
смесените семейства основен тип взаимодействие между 
                                                        
28 Gordon, M. Human Nature, Class and Ethnicity. New York: Oxford Univ. 
Press, 1978, 71.  
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различните култури е интеграцията; културите, срещащи 
се там не се самоунищожават, а съществуват в много- 
образни съчетания и проявления. Различията в ценностната 
система – като показатели за вътрешнокултурни различия 
– изпълняват ролята на фактори, усложняващи междуетни- 
ческите взаимоотношения, и обратно, високата степен на 
близост на контактуващите групи по психологически пара- 
метри създават предпоставки за толерантност и възникване 
на механизми на взаимодействие. Разпространението на 
етнически смесени бракове сред дадено население зависи 
от много фактори. Важни детерминанти са демографските 
показатели на етническите групи в него, като численост, 
характер на териториалното разпределение (дисперсно 
или етнически еднородно), възрастово–половата и 
брачната структура, тип на демографското възпроизводство, 
миграционната им активност, но също културата им, 
изповядваната религия, традициите, обичаите, начина на 
живот, манталитета, народопсихологията и пр. Всички те, 
влияещи заедно, водят до разпространението на смесената 
брачност в различна степен за отделните региони. Основни 
фактори за хетерогенните бракове между руси и българи и 
руси и представители на други етнически групи в България 
е дисбалансът между мъжете и жените в руската общност 
(и по-точно казано голямото числено превъзходство на 
мъжете) и наличието на много лица без брак. Специално за 
смесените бракове между руси и българи не са за пре- 
небрегване като фактори също и езиковата близост и 
еднаквото вероизповедание – източното православие. Що 
се отнася до смесените бракове между руси и представители 
на други етнически групи в България ще отбележим, че от 
една страна, за тях благоприятства наличието на търпими, 
толерантни взаимоотношения, и от друга страна страна, ги 
възпира главно „другостта” на религиозната принадлеж- 
ност и свързаните с нея брачни традиции.  
Въпреки че руската имиграция идва от страна, където 
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историческото развитие е предопределило полиетническия 
характер на населението и където живеят представители 
на десетки етнически и народностни групи, което априори 
би следвало да предполага благоприятни условия за осъ- 
ществяването на смесени бракове, де факто ситуацията не 
е такава. В началото на ХХ в. етнически смесените бракове 
са малко разпространени в Русия. Това се обяснява с 
преобладаването на селското население, което е слабо 
дисперсно в етническо отношение и не предразполага към 
широко взаимодействие на етносите. Но разпростра- 
нението на браковете между хора от различни етнически и 
народностни групи не зависи пряко от етническата разно- 
родност на населението, диспропорцията на половете и 
други специални демографски характеристики. Основен 
фактор, влияещ върху честотата на смесените бракове, са 
религиозните забрани на бракове с друговерци и дъл- 
боките социално-културни различия между етносите в 
даден регион. В изпращащата страна – Русия броят на етни- 
чески смесените бракове започва да расте след Октом- 
врийската революция от 1917 г., като значителна роля в 
разрастването на смесената брачност играят отслабва- 
нето на регламентиращата роля на църквата в сферата на 
междуличностните взаимоотношения при хора с различна 
етническа принадлежност, разпространението на грамот- 
ността, признаването на равноправието между различните 
националности от страна на съветската власт, урбанизаци- 
онните процеси, масовите миграции в годините на колекти- 
визацията, депортацията и преселването на цели народи29.  
В страната–приемник България, сред българите, които 
са доминиращия и съответно определящия общите тенден- 
ции в смесената брачност етнос, има много малък относи- 
телен дял на смесените бракове – през целия междувоенен 
период (табл. 3). Една от причините за това е консерватив- 
                                                        
29  Алексахина, Н. А. Динамика межэтнического взаимодействия в 
Российской федерации. Open Society Institute, Praha–Budapest, 1999, 24. 
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ното българско семейно право, намиращо се под влияние 
на обичайното и на каноническото право. Брачното законо- 
дателство в България има религиозен характер, което 
означава, че правните норми, регулиращи венчаването, се 
определят от съответните духовни власти (а не от 
законодателния орган на държавата Народното събрание). 
За българския етнос това е Екзархийският устав на 
Българската православна църква, 30  според който тя не 
признава за действителни браковете, сключени само по 
граждански ред, и още – определя като главно условие за 
сключване на църковния брак еднаквостта на религиозната 
принадлежност на бъдещите съпрузи. Тоест според каноните 
на Българската православна църква браковете на християни с 
нехристияни са забранени; смесени бракове се допускат 
само между православни и инославни християни, като 
встъпващите в брак правят това пред православен свещеник 
и задължително подписват декларация, че децата им ще 
бъдат православни31 . Все пак Българската православна 
църква проявява търпимост по отношение на брак между 
православен български поданик и инославна чужденка и 
обратно, венчани от инославен свещеник; според практиката 
на Светия Синод такъв брак се счита за незаконен – по 
каноническото право, но се търпи от православната църква, 
защото не е нищожен по право, а е само унищожаем, ако 
някоя от страните поиска това32. В сравнение с етносите, с 
които съжителстват и които са отчетени от статистиката на 
                                                        
30 Създаден през 1883 г., приспособен в Княжеството през 1895 г. и до- 
пълнен през 1897 г. 
31 Бобчев, Ст. Черковно право. Съкратен курс из лекциите по черковно 
право, четени на Юридическия факултет. С., 1927, 324; Айтова, А. 
Религиозният брак в България (1879–1945). – Съвременно право, 2013, 
№ 5, 55. 
32 Танчев, Хр. Екзархийски устав с тълкуванията и наредбите на Светия 
синод, Върховния касационен съд, Министерствата и съответните законо- 
положения. Второ изд. с изменения и допълнения, внесени до края на 
1931 г. Т. ІІ. Ч. 6. Бракове. С., 1932, 25–26. 
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движението на населението (арменци, евреи, гърци, итали- 
анци, немци, румънци, сърби, татари, турци, цигани и др.) 
сред българите относителият дял на смесените бракове е 
изключително малък – след Първата световна война 
нараства от 0.8% до 1.2% (табл. 3). Единствен след тях, с 
най-ниско дялово участие на смесените бракове е турският 
етнос. При турците брачните норми се определят от 
Корана и Устава за духовното устройство на мюсюлманите 
в България от 1919 г. За разлика от другите вероизповедания 
представени в България, които дават равноправно поло- 
жение на лицата от женски пол, в исляма чрез брака мъжът 
добива изключителното право на собственост върху лич- 
ността на съпругата си.33 Според таблица 3 най-висока 
смесена брачност се среща при сърбите – 100%, които 
стоят най-близо до българите в езиково отношение и също 
са православни. Висока смесена брачност показват още и 
други малки етнически групи западноевропейци - на първо 
място немците (поддържащи постоянно висока смесена 
брачност), а на второ италианците, което безспорно се 
дължи на обстоятелството, че в повечето европейски 
страни брачното право е светско, гражданският брак е 




Таблица 3. Относителен дял на населението в България от 
различни народности, живеещо в смесени бракове спрямо 
цялото брачно население от същите народности през 
дадената година, общо и по пол, 1910, 1920, 1923, 1926, 
1929, 1932 и 1934 г. 
                                                        
33 Гълъбов, Г. Мюсюлманското право с кратък обзор върху историята и 
догмите на исляма. С., 1924, с. 8–9, 51; Айтова, А., цит. съч., 47–48. 
34  В Прусия гражданският брак е въведен през 1847 г., в 
Австро-Унгария през 1868 г., а в България – като задължителна и 
единствена валидна форма на бракосъчетание през 1945 г. Вж. Айтова, 
А., цит. съч., 45–46. 
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 1910 1920 1923 1926 1929 1932 1934 
    Общо    
Арменци 13.5 16.3 12.3 9.9 13.7 23.3 24.2 
Българи 0.8 0.6 0.8 1.2 1.2 0.4 1.0 
Гърци 14.2 13.9 14.6 46.1 56.8 73.4 60.0 
Евреи 1.7 0.7 1.8 3.4 3.6 8.2 6.5 
Италианци 54.5 64.7 91.7 100.0 85.7 95.6 100.0 
Немци 80.0 57.1 76.2 81.7 91.5 81.4 82.5 
Румънци 12.2 7.7 9.6 12.4 28.6 30.6 61.9 
Сърби 41.2 100.0 96.1 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 
Татари 7.1 13.5 10.5 14.3 2.2 9.3 30.2 
Турци 0.4 0.3 0.5 0.6 0.5 0.4 0.8 
Цигани 1.6 7.7 1.7 1.1 0.5 1.2 1.2 
Общо 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 
    Мъже    
Арменци 11.7 15.0 11.6 8.4 13.3 19.3 18.3 
Българи 0.4 0.2 0.3 0.3 0.3 0.4 0.4 
Гърци 5.7 4.7 6.9 29.1 34.7 46.9 44.5 
Евреи 0.0 0.6 0.5 1.0 0.9 2.9 2.4 
Италианци 28.6 62.5 88.9 100.0 80.0 93.3 100.0 
Немци 50.0 37.5 61.5 73.2 79.4 75.0 60.0 
Румънци 5.3 4.4 5.5 7.0 15.5 14.0 40.8 
Сърби 92.3 100.0 95.0 95.0 100.0 14.0 100.0 
Татари 2.8 8.6 10.0 6.7 2.1 3.9 16.7 
Турци 0.3 0.2 0.4 0.3 0.3 0.4 0.5 
Цигани 0.1 7.7 0.8 0.5 0.4 0.5 0.6 
Общо  100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 
    Жени    
Арменки 2.3 1.7 1.7 1.7 0.5 6.1 8.6 
Българки 0.4 0.4 0.8 1.1 1.0 0.8 0.6 
Гъркини 9.5 1.0 8.8 30.9 43.9 65.3 41.2 
Еврейки 1.8 0.2 1.3 2.5 2.8 5.6 4.3 
Италианки 44.4 14.3 75.0 100.0 66.7 88.9 100.0 
Немкини 75.0 42.3 61.5 63.3 87.3 72.9 76.3 
Румънки 7.7 3.7 4.8 6.3 17.8 21.8 48.4 
Сръбкини 80.0 100.0 85.7 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 
Татарки 4.5 5.9 10.5 8.7 0.0 5.8 18.9 
Туркини 0.1 0.3 0.1 0.3 0.2 0.2 0.3 
Циганки 1.5 0.0 0.9 0.6 0.1 0.5 0.7 
Общо  100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 
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църковният брак е загубил предишната си значимост в 
разбиранията на европейците. Тенденция към покачване 
се наблюдава при арменците, гърците, евреите. Тук не 
бихме казали, че съществува връзка между размера на 
етническата група и нейното участие в междуетническа 
брачност. Но все пак този фактор не бива да бъде изцяло 
пренебрегван, тъй като той определя честотата на между- 
етническите контакти и съотношението на половете „на 
пазара на браковете”35. 
Русите от новата диаспора се отличават с изключително 
високи нива на смесена брачност през целия разглеждан 
период. През първата половина на 20-те години тя е около 
85%, от 1924 до 1927 г. достига над 90% с пик през 1926 г. 
от 92.5%, от края на 20-те години до 1934 г. е като варира 
между 80% и 89% и внезапно спада през 1935 г. до 
равнището от 1921 г. В сравнение с останалите етнически 
и народностни групи в България старата руска диаспора 
(по данни за 1909–1910 г.) също показва високо равнище 
на смесена брачност (табл. 3), но все пак то си остава 
около два пъти по-ниско от това на новата (табл. 4).  
 
Таблица 4. Относителен дял на населението в България от 
руска народност, живеещо в смесени бракове спрямо цялото 
брачно население от руска народност през дадената година, 
1909, 1910, 1920–1935 г. 
1909 1910 1920 1921 1922 1923 1924 1925 1926 
30.4 45.0 85.5 75.2 84.7 84.4 91.6 91.5 92.5 
         
1927 1928 1929 1930 1931 1932 1933 1934 1935 
90.9 88.2 86.4 87.3 83.9 89.4 80.9 81.1 76.5 
 
Смесената брачност сред русите в корелация градове– 
села изчисляваме като относителен дял на русите в България, 
живеещи в смесени бракове в градовете и селата спрямо 
                                                        
35 Алексахина, Н. А., цит. съч., 26. 
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всички руси в България, живеещи в смесени бракове 
(табл. 5). Тя е по-висока в градовете отколкото в селата. 
 
Таблица 5. Относителен дял на населението в България от 
руска народност, живеещо в смесени бракове, спрямо 
цялото брачно население с руска народност през дадената 
година в корелация градове-села, 1909, 1910, 1920–1935 г. 
 1909 1910 1920 1921 1922 1923 1924 1925 1926 
Градове 85.7 66.7 59.1 76.9 62.2 70.2 67.7 65.7 63.0 
Села  14.3 33.3 40.9 23.1 37.8 29.8 32.3 34.3 37.0 
Общо  100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 
          
 1927 1928 1929 1930 1931 1932 1933 1934 1935 
Градове 67.4 62.9 66.1 64.2 71.1 71.8 71.2 75.6 70.1 
Села  32.6 37.1 33.9 35.8 28.9 28.2 28.8 24.4 29.9 
Общо  100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 
 
Таблица 6. Относителен дял на населението в България с 
руска народност, живеещо в смесени бракове, в корелация 
градове-села, по пол, 1909, 1910, 1920–1935 г. 
 1909 1910 1920 1921 1922 1923 1924 1925 1926 
Мъже  
Градове 66.7 100.0 77.1 68.5 80.1 82.8 89.9 91.7 92.1 
Села  0.0 0.0 96.4 95.0 91.0 85.3 94.4 90.5 92.8 
Жени 
Градове 80.0 100.0 31.3 19.4 20.0 24.3 35.1 25.0 31.0 
Села  6.2 21.4 66.7 66.7 22.2 23.1 14.3 7.1 8.4 
          
 1927 1928 1929 1930 1931 1932 1933 1934 1935 
Мъже  
Градове 91.5 85.7 83.1 84.7 83.3 86.5 80.0 78.7 75.4 
Села  89.2 92.1 93.1 90.9 84.1 92.3 80.7 85.4 75.5 
Жени 
Градове 25.9 18.6 6.5 20.5 14.3 50.9 17.7 16.7 19.4 
Села  7.1 9.1 20.0 21.4 6.7 40.0 8.3 30.0 7.1 
 
Според анализа на смесената брачност сред русите в 
радовете и селата по пол в старата руска диаспора 
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(1909–1910 г.) в селата при мъжете изобщо няма смесени 
бракове, при жените има известен процент, но той не е 
голям, докато в градовете смесените бракове достигат до 
сто процента и при двата пола (табл. 6). (Изразено с друг 
показател над шестдесет процента от всички смесени 
бракове – и в старата, и в новата руска диаспора са 
сключвани предимно в градовете.) Градското население се 
проявява като по-активен фактор в сключването на бракове с 
други народностни и етнически групи. Това явление е 
свързано преди всичко с обстоятелството, че градът, акуму- 
лирайки в себе си представители на различни етноси, 
допринася за „размиването” на етническите граници. Висо- 
кото равнище на социална мобилност на градското насе- 
ление и липсата на силен социален контрол водят до зани- 
жаване на значимостта на фактора етническа принад- 
лежност в сферата на сключването на смесени бракове.36 
В новата руска диаспора (където дисбалансът между поло- 
вете е силно изявен в полза на мъжете) във вариацията на 
последните смесените бракове са в пъти повече отколкото 
при жените; освен това те са характерни по-скоро за 
селата отколкото за градовете, а във вариацията на жените 
през половината от разглеждания период (1923–1928, 1932, 
1935 г.) е тъкмо обратното. 
Според таблица 7 процентът на мъжете в старата руска 
диаспора (по данни за 1909–1910 г.), живеещи в смесени 
бракове е много малък – най-вече с българки и изобщо 
нямат бракове с жени от други етнически групи. За разлика 
от тях мъжете от новата руска диаспора (които тук не могат 
да бъдат разграничени от старата по признак руска народност, 
но все пак те са определящи, тъй като са доминиращи по 
численост) се отличават с най-висока смесена брачност в 
сравнение с останалите етнически и народностни групи в 
България и тази тенденция е трайна и валидна за целия 
разглеждан период; тя достига пиковите си точки от 1924  
                                                        
36 Пак там. 
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Таблица 7. Относителен дял на браковете на мъжете в 
България по народност руси в корелация с народността на 
встъпилите в брак с тях жени, в %, 1909, 1910, 1920–1934 г. 
Жени по 
народност 
1909 1910 1920 1921 1922 1923 1924 1925 1926 
Българки 11.1 15.4 79.0 68.7 80.4 80.1 88.1 86.4 89.2 
Рускини 88.9 84.6 15.8 26.8 16.0 16.5 8.7 8.8 7.7 
Сръбкини 0.0 0.0 2.6 0.9 0.9 0.4 0.3 0.8 0.0 
Др. славянки 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.4 0.0 1.0 0.5 
Арменки 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.9 0.0 0.3 0.0 0.2 
Гъркини 0.0 0.0 0.0 1.8 1.4 1.7 0.9 0.8 1.0 
Еврейки 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.9 0.0 0.0 0.9 0.0 0.0 
Италианки 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.5 
Немкини 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.9 0.0 0.2 0.0 
Румънки 0.0 0.0 1.3 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.3 0.8 0.5 
Татарки  0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.4 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 
Французойки 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 
Циганки 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.9 0.0 0.0 0.5 0.2 0.2 
Др. не слав. 0.0 0.0 1.3 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 1.0 0.2 
Общо  100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 
          
 1927 1928 1929 1930 1931 1932 1933 1934 1935 
Българки 86.2 83.8 82.7 84.0 81.5 85.2 74.6 75.9 71.9 
Рускини 9.3 12.0 13.8 13.0 16.5 11.8 19.8 19.8 24.5 
Сръбкини 0.3 0.0 0.3 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 1.2 
Др. славянки 0.8 1.6 0.3 0.3 0.8 0.7 2.6 0.5 0.6 
Арменки 0.0 0.5 0.0 0.3 0.3 0.4 0.5 0.0 0.6 
Гъркини 1.1 0.3 1.0 0.0 0.3 0.0 0.5 1.4 0.0 
Еврейки 0.0 0.0 0.5 0.0 0.0 0.4 0.0 0.9 0.0 
Италианки 0.0 0.3 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.5 0.6 
Немкини 0.8 0.3 0.3 0.0 0.3 0.4 1.0 0.5 0.0 
Румънки 0.6 0.3 0.8 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.5 0.0 0.0 
Татарки  0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 
Французойки 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.6 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.5 0.6 
Циганки 0.3 0.3 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.4 0.0 0.0 0.0 
Др. не слав. 0.6 0.3 0.0 0.0 0.3 0.0 0.5 0.0 0.0 
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до 1927 г. – 91–92%, след което намалява. Те създават 
предимно хетерогенни бракове – главно с българки – от 
1922 до 1931 г. над 80% от браковете са с българки, 
най-много такива бракове са сключени през 1926 г. – 89.2%. 
Минимален е относителният дял на мъжете-руси, чиито 
брачни партньорки са други славянки, арменки, гъркини, 
немкини (табл. 7). Жени от други, неславянски народности, 
с които мъжете-руси сключват бракове са: от местното 
население – най-често с гъркини, понякога тези бракове 
надвишават 1% и почти достигат до 2%, арменки, румънки 
и еврейки; от западноевропейките – с немкини, италианки 
и французойки, но тези бракове са редки – под 1%; под 
0,5% са браковете с циганки (табл. 7).  
Както при мъжете, така и при жените от старата руска 
диаспора в България брачните партньори са предимно от 
същия, т.е. руския етнос; относителният дял на смесените 
бракове е нисък, те се сключват с представители на бъл- 
гарския етнос (табл. 8).  
В сравнение с мъжете–руси при рускините относи- 
телният дял на браковете с българи е значително по-голям. 
Във вариацията на жените наблюдаваме и друга особеност: 
и в старата, и в новата руска диаспора смесените бракове с 
българи са еднакво характерни; тяхната крива обаче е 
скокообразна, силно варираща от 7% (1929) до 43% (1931). 
За разлика от мъжете-руси рускините от новата диа- 
спора сключват бракове предимно със свои сънародници, 
смесената брачност не е така характерна за рускините както 
за мъжете–руси, дори тази тенденция се засилва – до 1926 
г. достига равнища 70–80%, а след това 80–90%. Смесени 
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Таблица 8. Относителен дял на браковете на жените в 
България с руска народност в корелация с народността на 
встъпилите в брак с тях мъже, 1909, 1910, 1920–1934 г. 
Мъже по 
народност 
1909 1910 1920 1921 1922 1923 1924 1925 1926 
Българи 19.0 33.3 31.6 23.1 18.2 22.0 25.0 19.0 19.5 
Руси 76.2 61.1 63.2 76.9 79.5 76.0 68.1 81.0 75.7 
Сърби 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 2.4 
Др. славяни 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 2.3 0.0 2.3 0.0 2.4 
Арменци 4.8 5.6 0.0 0.0 0.0 2.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 
Гърци 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 
Евреи 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 
Италианци 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 
Немци 0.0 0.0 5.2 0.0 0.0 0.0 2.3 0.0 0.0 
Румънци 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 
Татари 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 
Турци 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 
Французи 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 
Цигани 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 
Др. не слав. 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 2.3 0.0 0.0 
Общо 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 
          
 1927 1928 1929 1930 1931 1932 1933 1934 1935 
Българи 17.1 13.0 7.1 17.3 10.5 42.8 6.5 13.5 12.0 
Руси 80.5 83.4 91.1 79.3 87.7 50.8 84.8 80.8 84.0 
Сърби 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 
Др. славяни 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 1.9 0.0 
Арменци 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 1.6 2.2 0.0 4.0 
Гърци 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 1.6 0.0 0.0 0.0 
Евреи 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 
Италианци 0.0 1.8 0.0 0.0 0.0 1.6 0.0 0.0 0.0 
Немци 0.0 0.0 1.8 1.7 1.8 1.6 4.3 1.9 0.0 
Румънци 0.0 0.0 0.0 1.7 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 
Татари 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 
Турци 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 1.9 0.0 
Французи 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 
Цигани 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 
Др. не слав. 2.4 1.8 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 2.2 0.0 0.0 
Общо 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 
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В сравнение с мъжете–руси рускините много по-рядко 
се омъжват за представители на друга, различна от 
българската, етническа група: по-чести са хетерогенните 
бракове с немци за периода след 1929 г. (но и сред жените 
от старата руска общност се срещат такива – регистрирани 




По статистическата информация за брачното състояние на 
русите в България през междувоенния период старите 
заселници не могат да бъдат разграничени от новите 
имигранти. Статистическите сведения за „женитбите” от 
времето преди войните подсказва, че моделът на брачност 
в старата руска диаспора се отличава съществено от този 
на новата, доближавайки се до характерния за страната. 
Но тъй като новите заселиници са доминиращото мно- 
зинство, то те и определят характеристиките на брачността 
сред русите в България през междувоенния период. Тя се 
отличава с твърде висок за страната общ брачен коефициент 
от 21.1‰ (1926), който през 20-те години показва тенденция 
към повишаване. Това явление се дължи на наличието на 
голям брой неженени мъже (в преобладаваща си част бивши 
военни) в (предполагаема, тъй като няма данни за възрас- 
товата характеристика) брачна възраст. Но не само... През 
1930 г. поредното издание на Екзархийския устав отразява 
едно очевидно често срещано явление (след като Светия 
Синод предприема законодателни мерки) – става дума за 
това, че в България (мъжете)–руси – загубили вяра във 
възможността някога да се върнат в родината си – се женят 
повторно, независимо от това, че имат семейства в Русия. 
Така руските бежанци не спазват едно от условията за 
сключване на брак – лицата да не се намират в брачни 
връзки с други лица37 и предизвикват реакцията на Светия 
                                                        
37 Правилник за воденето на подведомствените на духовните съдилища 
Брачност, брачна структура, смесени бракове сред 
русите в България през междувоенния период 
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Синод, който тогава въвежда „предпазна” мярка – да се 
уведомяват чрез окръжно екзархийските началства, че 
занапред при благославяне на бракове между българи и 
руси свещениците трябва да изискват от русите удосто- 
верение, издадено от началника на руските православни 
общини в България, че те са свободни да встъпят в брак.38 
Във вариацията на мъжете–руси брачността бележи 
спад по време на и след световната икномическа криза от 
края на 30-те години. Развиващата се като градска руска 
диаспора има значително по-високи нива на брачност в 
градовете отколкото в селата, като се наблюдават различия 
във вариациите по пол: при жените браковете в градовете 
се отличават със доста по-голям относителният дял в 
сравнение с мъжете. Що се отнася до смесената брачност 
междуетническите бракове на русите в България се случват 
в рамките на едно и също вероизповедание – православ- 
ното, преимуществено с българите. Въз основа на анали- 
зираните статистически данни с право можем да кажем, че 
няма друга общност в България през разглеждания период, 
която трайно да поддържа толкова високи показатели по 
този фундаментален показател за интеграция, което само по 
себе си говори за наличието на нагласа и у имигрантите– 
руси и у приемащото българско общество за преодоляване 
на консервативността и патриархалността.  
 
                                                                                                          
дела с Екзархийския устав в Царството. Ч. ІІІ–ІV. С., 1928, 41. 
38 Параграф 973 на Екзархийския устав. Вж. Танчев, Хр. Екзархийски 
устав с тълкуванията и наредбите на Светия Синод, Върховния касаци- 
онен съд, Министествата и съответните законоположения. Второ изд. с 
изменения и допълнения, внесени до края на 1931 г. Т. ІІ. Ч. 6. Бракове. 
С., 1932, 18. 
«Наша критика не должна вылиться в 
крикливую перепалку».  
Почему разоблачение югославского 
«ревизионизма» в советской прессе конца 
1950-х годов не достигло остроты 









Процесс советско-югославского сближения, начавшийся 
после смерти Сталина,1 достиг своей кульминации в июне 
1956 г., когда делегация Федеративной народной респуб- 
лики Югославии (ФНРЮ) и Союза коммунистов Югославии 
(СКЮ) во главе с И. Брозом Тито совершила более чем 
20-дневную поездку по СССР, которая получила подроб- 
нейшее освещение в советской прессе.2 Многотысячный 
                                                        
1 См.: Едемский, А. Б. От конфликта к нормализации. Советско-югославские 
отношения в 1953–1956 годах. М., 2008. 
2  См. постановления Президиума ЦК КПСС от 22 мая 1956 г. «Об 
освещении в советской печати вопросов советско-югославских отношений 
в связи с приездом в СССР т. Тито» и от 25 мая «О подготовке материалов с 
нашей стороны для югославской печати и радио»: РГАНИ, ф. 3, оп. 14, д. 24, 
л. 22; д. 26, л. 36–37. В соответствии с первым из этих постановлений во 
всех центральных органах советской прессы были опубликованы статьи, 
посвященные успехам, достигнутым в деле нормализации советско- 
югославских отношений со времени поездки в Белград в мае–июне 1955 г. 
партийно-правительственной делегации СССР. В «Правде» была пере- 
печатана программная статья главного идеолога Союза коммунистов 
Югославии Э. Карделя  «О руководящей роли СКЮ в социалистическом 
строительстве». – Правда, 1956, 2, 3 июня. 
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митинг советско-югославской дружбы на стадионе «Дина- 
мо» 19 июня 1956 г. призван был символизировать полное 
преодоление взаимного недоверия. Важнейшим итогом этой 
поездки стало подписание межпартийной декларации. 3 
Однако при всей серьезности приготовлений и громкости 
пропагандистских фанфар сверхзадача переговоров так и 
не была решена, результатами июньского визита Тито в 
СССР в Кремле не были довольны. 
Осознавая выгоду более тесного экономического сотруд- 
ничества с СССР, Югославия в то же время нисколько не 
хотела поступаться своим суверенитетом и продолжала 
дистанцироваться от советского лагеря, не проявив, в част- 
ности, никакого желания к вступлению в Организацию 
Варшавского договора (ОВД) и Совет экономической 
взаимопомощи (СЭВ). Подписанная межпартийная Декла- 
рация носила явно компромиссный характер со стороны 
КПСС, в ней ничего не говорилось ни о единстве двух партий, 
стоящих на общей идейной платформе, ни о принадлежности 
Югославии к социалистическому лагерю. Протоколы 
заседаний Президиума ЦК КПСС отражают разочарования 
советской стороны в итогах переговоров с югославами. 
При утверждении документа на Президиуме ЦК было 
принято решение «сказать югославским товарищам, что 
мы не удовлетворены текстом декларации, но спорить не 
будем».4 При этом Москву весьма заботил вопрос о том, 
                                                        
3  Совместное заявление Правительств СССР и ФНРЮ в связи с 
государственным посещением Советского Союза президентом ФНРЮ 
И. Броз Тито и Декларация об отношениях между СКЮ и КПСС были 
подписаны утром 20 июня. См.: Правда, 1956, 21 июня. 
4 РГАНИ, ф. 3, оп. 14, д. 35, л. 2. Подробнее об обсуждении проблем 
советско-югославских отношений на заседаниях руководства КПСС см.: 
Стыкалин, А. С. Записи заседаний Президиума ЦК КПСС 1950-х – 
первой половины 1960-х годов как источник по изучению 
советско-югославских отношений. – В: Россия и Сербия глазами 
историков двух стран. Спб, 2010, 244–271. Идя на компромисс с 
лидерами СКЮ, руководство КПСС, конечно, не могло не осознавать, 
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что лидеры братских партий стран «народной демократии» 
могут воспринять декларацию об отношениях между КПСС 
и СКЮ как свидетельство начавшегося принципиального 
пересмотра характера отношений между компартиями. 
Это заметил проницательный и хорошо информированный 
посол ФНРЮ в СССР В. Мичунович, сделавший соответ- 
ствующую запись в дневнике. Чтобы в корне пресечь 
любую попытку в странах Восточной Европы извлечь 
нежелательные для Москвы выводы из опубликованного 
документа, представители КПСС, отметил он, на сове- 
щании руководителей стран советского блока (состояв- 
шемся  сразу после отъезда Тито из СССР) «ясно дали 
понять лидерам стран лагеря, что то, что они подписали 
с Тито, не имеет значения для политики СССР по 
отношению к государствам и коммунистическим партиям 
стран лагеря».5 Только польский и венгерский вызовы 
октября 1956 г. (неповиновение Москве обновленного 
руководства Польской объединенной рабочей партии во 
главе с В. Гомулкой, а через считанные дни после этого 
венгерское восстание) заставили советских лидеров нес- 
колько по-иному взглянуть на методы сохранения единства 
социалистического лагеря, усомниться в эффективности 
прежней восточно-европейской политики СССР, при всей 
видимой всеохватности контроля над советской сферой 
влияния не способной, как это показали особенно вен- 
герские события, обеспечить стабильность в регионе. На 
заседании Президиума ЦК КПСС от 30 октября 1956 г. при 
обсуждении текста Декларации об отношениях между 
социалистическими странами речь шла о том, что ходом 
событий обнаружился кризис в отношениях СССР со 
странами «народной демократии», а также был поставлен 
                                                                                                          
что своим смелым сопротивлением сталинскому диктату югославские 
коммунисты завоевали немалый авторитет и уважение как в рамках 
мирового коммунистического движения, так и далеко за его пределами. 
5 Micunović, V. Moskovske godiné 1956/1958. Zagreb, 1977, 93. 
«Наша критика не должна вылиться в крикливую 
перепалку». Почему разоблачение югославского …  
 - 259 - 
 
вопрос о необходимости определенной корректировки 
концепции внутриблоковых отношений с учетом требова- 
ний равноправия.6 
Это было в конце октября, но уже за четыре месяца до 
этого, сразу после отъезда Тито из СССР, положение дел в 
Польше и Венгрии (волнения в г. Познани 28 июня, размах 
оппозиционных критических выступлений на дискуссиях 
Кружка Петѐфи в Будапеште) усилило не только озабо- 
ченность советских лидеров происходящим, но и раздра- 
жение по поводу претензий югославов на поиски своего 
пути к социализму, тем более что на югославский опыт 
охотно ссылались активизировавшиеся оппоненты правящих 
режимов в странах Восточной Европы (отчасти также и 
сторонники далеко идущих реформ в СССР).7 Эта озабо- 
ченность нашла отражение в закрытом письме лидерам 
компартий стран социалистического лагеря, а также Фран- 
ции и Италии, от 13 июля, принятом на заседании Прези- 
диума ЦК КПСС. В письме было акцентировано внимание 
на разногласиях с СКЮ, чье руководство отказалось 
заявить об идеологическом единстве с КПСС на основе 
марксизма-ленинизма и принадлежности Югославии к 
социалистическому лагерю. Были подвергнуты критике 
претензии югославов на слишком большую независимость 
                                                        
6 Фурсенко, А. А. (Гл. ред.). Президиум ЦК КПСС, 1954–1964. Т. 1. 
Черновые протокольные записи заседаний. Стенограммы. М., 2003, 187–191. 
7  Донесения советских посольств из ряда восточноевропейских столиц 
свидетельствовали о немалом влиянии югославского примера на те силы в 
странах «народной демократии», которые были явно не удовлетворены 
избранным темпом и характером десталинизации в СССР (См., например, 
донесения из Венгрии: Орехова, Е. Д., В. Т. Середа, А. С. Стыкалин (Ред., 
сост.). Советский Союз и венгерский кризис 1956 года. Документы. М., 1998. 
См. также донесение из Польши от 29 сентября, в котором говорилось о том, 
что редколлегия газеты «Попросту» находится под большим влиянием 
югославского посольства в Варшаве: Президиум ЦК КПСС, 1954–1964. Т. 2. 
Постановления, 1954–1958. М., 2006, 453). Реальный опыт строительства 
социализма в Югославии при этом часто идеализировался. 
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во взаимоотношениях с другими коммунистическими и 
рабочими партиями, расцененные руководством КПСС как 
стремление «обеспечить себе роль посредника, возможность, 
по сути, самостоятельно вести переговоры со всеми 
партиями, свободно лавировать и добиваться определенного 
лидерства».8 «Кажется, они уже раскаялись, что подписали 
эту декларацию», – записал посол Мичунович 3 июля под 
впечатлением от только что опубликованного постановления 
ЦК КПСС «О преодолении культа личности и его последствий», 
воспринятого как определенный шаг назад в сравнении с 
решениями XX съезда КПСС, и от своих непосредственных 
контактов с кремлевской элитой, с некоторой стыдливостью 
отзывавшейся о советско-югославской декларации.9 За месяц 
до этого, в дни пребывания Тито в Москве, председатель 
Совета министров СССР Н. А. Булганин, дав 5 июня завтрак 
в Кремле в честь югославского лидера, поднял тост «За друга, 
за ленинца, за нашего боевого товарища!», и эта характе- 
ристика, опубликованная на следующий день в «Правде», 
была растиражирована в прессе всего мира. Между тем, 
всего через месяц, в свете новых событий в Восточной 
                                                        
8 РГАНИ, ф. 3, оп. 14, д. 37, л. 23. В информации ЦК КПСС, разосланной 
низовым парторганизациям КПСС для ознакомления, также отмечалось, 
что «у югославских товарищей есть еще иное, чем у нашей марксистско- 
ленинской партии, понимание некоторых важных принципиальных 
вопросов». 
9 Micunović V., Op. cit., 97. О письме ЦК КПСС компартиям от 13 июля 1956 г. 
«Об итогах советско-югославских переговоров в июне 1956 г.» в Белграде 
узнали из конфиденциальных источников (от венгерских коммунистов– 
реформаторов, передавших в посольство ФНРЮ копию письма). Как сам 
факт посылки закрытого письма, так и его содержание вызвали неудо- 
вольствие лидеров СКЮ. Уже позже, после венгерской революции, в 
ходе межпартийной переписки руководство СКЮ упрекало лидеров КПСС в 
двойной игре – речь идет о противоречии между публичными декла- 
рациями и закрытыми документами, в которых без ведома югославских 
коммунистов им даются оценки, расходящиеся с открытыми заявлениями 
(Письмо от 7 февраля 1957 г.; РГАНИ, ф. 89, пер. 45, док. 83, 84). 
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Европе, ее сочли несвоевременной. 29 июня Булганин был 
подвергнут критике на заседании Президиума ЦК КПСС 
(«Преждевременно заявление т. Булганина. Назвал т. Тито 
ленинцем. Неосторожен – сказать об этом надо»).10 Заявле- 
ние Булганина было названо преждевременным и в вышеупо- 
мянутом письме зарубежным компартиям от 13 июля. Позже, 
в условиях уже произошедшего заметного охлаждения 
советско-югославских отношений, Хрущев на встрече с 
делегацией югославских журналистов в мае 1957 г. так 
объяснял свою позицию: «Булганин имел неосторожность 
и назвал Тито ленинцем. Вы судите о нас как хотите, но мы 
называем ленинцами тех людей, с которыми не имеем 
расхождений идеологического порядка, когда мы по вопро- 
сам политики имеем точку зрения, которая, мы считаем, 
основывается на ленинских позициях. Мы считали по целому 
ряду вопросов, по которым имели различные точки зрения, 
что Югославия еще не встала на ленинские позиции, но мы 
считали, что вполне возможно развивать дружеские 
отношения. Потом уже сблизиться и потом найти полное 
единство взглядов. Это нормально. Булганина же мы 
покритиковали. А вы знаете, как мы критикуем? Если 
критикуем Тито и других, то Булганину попало больше, 
потому что он член Президиума. Мы ему сказали  почему 
ты так сказал? Мы смотрим так  у нас есть расхождения, 
пойдут ли у нас события так, что будут изживаться эти 
расхождения, а они могут и увеличиваться, а члены партии 
читают международную прессу, это понятно, коммунисты 
других стран также читают. И вот когда мы говорим 
«ленинец», а Ленин  это значит у нас полное единство 
                                                        
10 Президиум ЦК КПСС, 1954–1964. Т. 1, 145. Упреки, адресованные 
Булганину, фактически означали признание правоты В. М. Молотова, 
который в мае 1955 г. критиковался некоторыми соратниками среди 
прочего за нежелание признать в Тито «ленинца». Ср.: «нельзя бросаться 
обвинениями – ‘антиленинец’» (А. И. Микоян, Запись заседания Прези- 
диума ЦК КПСС от 19 мая 1955 г. Там же. 141).  
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взглядов, а вдруг не будет этого? Тогда что же, в дураках 
окажемся? Чтобы не получилось так, мы осудили 
Булганина, а когда мы давали информацию, мы написали. 
Английская контрразведка ознакомилась, или получила 
этот документ в Венгрии».11 
В июле 1956 г. советское руководство было озабочено 
ситуацией в Венгрии, где активизировавшаяся внутри- 
партийная оппозиция усилила нажим на партийного лидера 
М. Ракоши, в конце концов смещенного. 12 июля при 
обсуждении на Президиуме ЦК КПСС положения в Венгрии 
был сделан акцент на подрывной деятельности импери- 
алистов, которые «ослабить хотят интернациональные 
связи под флагом самостоятельности пути», «хотят 
разобщить и поодиночке разбить» социалистические 
страны.12  На первый план однозначно выходит лозунг 
единства социалистического лагеря, тогда как требования 
расширения самостоятельности в поисках путей к социализму 
признаются неактуальными. Эта позиция нашла отражение и 
в центральной партийной прессе тех дней, хотя критики 
особой линии СКЮ пока еще избегали – слишком свеж у всех 
был в памяти торжественный прием, оказанный Тито в 
СССР. 13  Первое упоминание югославских реалий, 
подспудно содержавшее критику политики СКЮ, пришлось 
лишь на конец августа – «Правда» опубликовала (без особых 
коммен- тариев) заметку о продолжающемся преследовании 
в Югос- лавии коминформовцев.14 
Таким образом, уже в июле 1956 г. руководство КПСС 
видело опасность формирования в лице титовской Югос- 
лавии альтернативного идеологического центра в мировом 
коммунистическом движении, создающего реальную угрозу 
раскола в нем. Этому способствовала и сохранявшаяся 
                                                        
11 См. запись беседы: РГАНИ, ф. 52, оп. 1, д. 618, л. 1155. 
12 Президиум ЦК КПСС, 1954–1964. Т. 1, 149. 
13  См. редакционную статью «Правды» от 16 июля 1956 г. 
14  В белградском окружном суде. Правда, 1956, 31 августа. 
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независимая внешняя политика Югославии, последова- 
тельная в осуществлении линии на неприсоединение – 
встречаясь с деятелями стран «третьего мира», Тито 
неизменно выступал с критикой противостоящих друг другу 
военных блоков. В Кремле, однако, еще не потеряли 
терпения – слишком велико было стратегическое значение 
Югославии. Ради закрепления позиций СССР в Средизем- 
номорье стоило поработать. Еще более важно было проде- 
монстрировать миру единство или близость позиций КПСС 
и СКЮ, а значит отсутствие югославской схизмы в между- 
народном коммунистическом движении. Попытки мягко 
«образумить» Тито были предприняты Хрущевым в ходе их 
неформальных встреч на Адриатике и в Крыму в сентябре – 
начале октября 1956 г. ФНРЮ сравнили с солдатом, идущим 
«не в ногу» со всей ротой (т.е. содружеством стран, строя- 
щих социализм), просили воздержаться от проявления 
симпатий к оппозиционерам в странах Восточной 
Европы15 и предпринять сближение с теми странами, в 
отношениях с которыми сохранялась напряженность (с 
Венгрией, Болга- рией, Албанией). 16  Под давлением 
Москвы Тито принял у себя в Белграде нового лидера 
Венгерской партии трудя- щихся Э. Герѐ, однако 
возвращение венгерской делегации в Будапешт 23 октября 
                                                        
15 В Венгрии в канун революции в условиях обострившегося до предела 
кризиса сталинской системы югославская модель все сильнее продолжала 
притягивать к себе партийных реформаторов. Югославский фактор, выступая 
в разных ипостасях, оказывал заметное влияние на внутриполитическую 
ситуацию в стране. Подробнее см.: Стыкалин А. С. Прерванная революция. 
Венгерский кризис 1956 года и политика Москвы. М., 2003. 
16 См.: «Есть один путь к социализму, но могут быть разные методы, разные 
формы». Записки Н. С. Хрущева в Президиум ЦК КПСС по итогам встреч с 
И. Броз Тито. – Источник. М., 2003. № 6. См. также: РГАНИ, ф. 5, оп. 28, д. 
403, л. 2-18. О трудностях в нормализации венгеро-югославских отношений 
см.: Стыкалин А. С. Советско-югославское сближение (1954 – лето 1956 гг.) и 
внутриполитическая ситуация в Венгрии. – В: Человек на Балканах в эпоху 
кризисов и этнополитических столкновений XX века. Спб, 2002, 323–345. 
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совпало с началом мощного вос- стания, для подавления 
которого были приведены в действие советские войска, 
что лишь усилило ожесточен- ность повстанческого 
сопротивления.  
Руководство СКЮ после нескольких дней ожиданий 
солидаризировалось с курсом нового венгерского прави- 
тельства Имре Надя на расширение национального сувере- 
нитета, возложив главную вину за создавшееся положение 
на прежнее руководство, своей политикой подорвавшее 
веру многих трудящихся в перспективы социализма (что 
нанесло урон интересам сил социализма во всем мире). 
Поддержав И. Надя в его решимости опереться на возник- 
шие в те дни рабочие советы, Тито в то же время довольно 
скептически отнесся к идее восстановления многопар- 
тийности в Венгрии, поскольку речь могла в перспективе 
пойти об утрате коммунистами власти. Он выражал также 
озабоченность в связи с угрозой анархии и возможными 
выступлениями реакции, причем по мере развития 
событий его обеспокоенность только усиливалась. К гра- 
нице с Венгрией были подтянуты югославские войска. В 
ночь со 2 на 3 ноября на о. Бриони в Адриатике Тито, 
приняв Н. С. Хрущева и Г. М. Маленкова, дал, как известно, 
согласие на советскую военную акцию в целях приведения 
к власти в Венгрии более надежного правительства (пре- 
дложенная югославами кандидатура Я. Кадара как главы 
этого правительства не вызвала возражений советской сто- 
роны). Тито также выразил готовность, связавшись с 
Надем, склонить его подать в отставку, что облегчило бы 
реализацию советских силовых планов, к этому времени 
уже единственно способных, по его мнению, спасти 
«завоевания социализма» в Венгрии.17 
Как известно, в результате венгерских октябрьских– 
ноябрьских событий произошло заметное ухудшение 
                                                        
17 Едемский, А. Б. По следам конкретных консультаций на Брионах 2–3 
ноября 1956 г. – В: Славянский альманах, 2010. М., 2011, 462–488. 
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советско-югославских отношений. Все началось с того, что на 
рассвете 4 ноября, с началом решающей советской военной 
акции, действующий премьер-министр Имре Надь, осудив 
перед всем миром эту акцию в своем выступлении по радио, 
укрылся затем в югославском посольстве. В Москве это 
восприняли как явное нарушение брионской договоренности. 
Ведь на Бриони, где Н. С. Хрущев и Г. М. Маленков всю ночь 
напролет обсуждали с И. Броз Тито, Э. Карделем и А. 
Ранковичем пути решения венгерского вопроса, речь шла о 
возможном содействии Белграда в нейтрализации неугодного 
руководству СССР правительства. Лидеры Югославии, 
имевшие влияние на венгерских коммунистов-реформаторов 
из команды И. Надя, фактически, по согласованию с Москвой, 
взялись за то, чтобы уговорить их добровольно само- 
устраниться, уступив место у руля другому правительству, 
способному железной рукой пресечь анархию и навести 
порядок. Об укрытии же в югославском посольстве 
политиков, перед этим выступивших с антисоветскими 
заявлениями, отнюдь не договаривались. 
Проходит неделя, и 11 ноября Тито на партактиве в 
хорватском городе Пуле решил сыграть на опережение, 
информировав публику о секретной брионской встрече, не 
дожидаясь, когда весь мир узнает о советско-югославской 
договоренности по свержению венгерского правительства 
из уст лидеров КПСС (это нанесло бы слишком сильный 
удар по репутации Югославии как нейтрального, внебло- 
кового государства). Между тем, несогласованная утечка 
информации была воспринята в Москве как грубое 
нарушение устоявшейся в мировом коммунистическом 
движении этики межпартийных взаимоотношений. Но 
мало того, выступая в Пуле, Тито, к острому раздражению 
Москвы, назвал венгерский кризис в определенной мере 
следствием советской политики (неравноправные отношения 
в социалистическом лагере не могли не вызвать анти- 
советских настроений). Использование советских войск 
Александр Стыкалин 
 
 - 266 - 
для подавления демонстрации 23 октября он счел грубой 
ошибкой. С другой стороны, Тито осудил И. Надя за 
уступки реакции и выразил готовность поддержать новое 
правительство Я. Кадара, сформированное в СССР, – ведь 
надо было не только отмежеваться от СССР в целях 
сохранения своего лица в глазах международного общест- 
венного мнения, но и каким-то образом оправдать свое 
согласие с интервенцией. Речь Тито уже не могла не 
остаться без отклика официальной Москвы. «Правда» 19 
ноября опубликовала обзор ее основных положений, а 23 
ноября выступила с острой критической статьей. 18  В 
связи с венгерскими событиями Москва обвиняла Белград 
в нарушении договоренностей, в умышленном создании 
затруднений правительству Кадара, в неспособности 
отмежеваться от попыток реакции использовать югославский 
пример и опыт в интересах борьбы против социализма. 
При этом советская публика долгое время так и не была 
информирована о пребывании Имре Надя и его соратников 
в югославском посольстве в Будапеште, «Правда» об этом 
вскользь сообщила только в 20-х числах ноября, когда 
после выхода из посольства они были задержаны 
советскими спецслужбами и депортированы в Румынию 
вопреки их воле и возражениям югославской стороны, 
отмежевавшейся от незаконной акции.   
Прошел почти месяц после известной речи Тито в Пуле, и 
7 ноября второе лицо в СКЮ и его главный идеолог Э. 
Кардель, выступая в Союзной скупщине ФНРЮ, раскри- 
тиковал бюрократический социализм советского образца, 
противопоставив ему венгерские рабочие советы.19 Тогдаш- 
                                                        
18 См. редакционную статью «Правды» от 23 ноября 1956 г.: «За дальнейшее 
сплочение сил социализма на основе марксистско-ленинских принципов». 
19 «Революционную борьбу» в Венгрии он назвал «первым крупным 
примером насильственного сведения счетов с теми преградами для 
дальнейшего развития социализма, которые являются продуктом 
окрепшей бюрократической политической системы», вызывающей в 
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ний посол Югославии в СССР В. Мичунович позже 
вспоминал, что никогда не видел Хрущева столь же 
взбешенным, как в ходе встречи, состоявшейся в тот 
декабрьский день 1956 г., когда ему принесли информацию о 
программной речи Карделя, к тому же распространенной 
югославской делегацией в ООН.20 Через считанные дни, на 
декабрьском пленуме ЦК КПСС, советский лидер дал волю 
эмоциям: «Тито болтает всякие глупости о новых путях 
какого-то югославского строительства социализма, а этот 
путь мы знаем что такое: получать подачки за то, что 
прислуживаться перед американскими империалистами. 
Конечно, тут большого ума не требуется для строительства 
такого югославского социализма, а нам, рабочему классу 
Советского Союза под руководством Ленина, пришлось 
самим первым пробивать дорогу и строить свое государство, 
                                                                                                          
обществе «бессознательное стихийное возмущение». Альтернативой 
этой системе Кардель считал противостоявшие кадаровской власти 
(находившейся под полным советским контролем) рабочие советы – 
выросшую на венгерской почве «единственную реальную 
социалистическую силу, которая, вероятно, очень скоро избавилась бы 
от чуждых антисоциалистических влияний, если бы взяла на себя 
главную ответственность за власть на предприятиях». Силовые 
действия СССР по свержению правительства И.Надя, на его взгляд, 
могли бы быть оправданы лишь в том случае, если бы привели к 
изменению политической системы, тормозящей социалистическое 
развитие, в противном же случае история осудит акт военного 
вмешательства. Дальнейшее же присутствие советских войск в Венгрии 
югославские лидеры в любом случае считали фактором, не 
благоприятствующим урегулированию конфликта. Как бы то ни было, 
Кардель в Скупщине в декабре, как и Тито за месяц до этого в Пуле, 
критикуя советскую политику, вместе с тем заявил о признании 
Югославией приведенного к власти в Венгрии по инициативе Москвы 
правительства Я. Кадара и о готовности сотрудничать с ним. 
20  О частых встречах Мичуновича с Хрущевым в этот период дает 
представление его более поздняя книга, в основе которой лежат записи 
1950-х годов: Mićunović, V., Moskovske godine 1956/1958. Beograd, 1984. 
Запись их беседы от 11 декабря см.: Ibid., 204–208. 
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накапливать средства, строить свои заводы, свою индус- 
трию, и это действительно достойно подражания для 
других стран рабочего класса, что Советский Союз, более 
отсталая по сравнению с другими, западными государствами 
страна, первый завоевал власть рабочего класса и первый 
создал самую могущественную индустриальную страну из 
отсталой и настолько поднял промышленность, культуру 
своего народа, что разбил самого мощного врага во 
вторую мировую войну, и в результате нашей победы 
живет сейчас и учит югославскому социализму сам Тито, 
потому что если бы не было нашей победы, то его бы 
[войск] не хватило позавтракать гитлеровской армии».21 
Между КПСС и СКЮ развернулась острая полемика в 
закрытой переписке,22 дискуссия перекинулась и в прессу. В 
отличие от привычной пропагандистской практики, в 
соответствии с которой позиции оппонентов КПСС в лучшем 
случае излагались в пересказе, текст выступления Карделя 
был опубликован в журнале «Коммунист»23 в сопровождении 
статьи одного из наиболее либеральных идеологов КПСС, 
главного редактора этого журнала специалиста по 
политэкономии, а в будущем академика А. М. Румянцева. 
Статья имела характерное название: «Социалистическая 
действительность и "теории" тов. Карделя»24  
Критика в прессе была значительно сдержаннее 
некоторых закрытых, главным образом рассчитанных на 
внутрипартийную аудиторию заявлений. Ясно одно: в 
Москве ни в коей мере не хотели создавать видимости 
возвращения к ситуации 1948-1949 гг., когда динамика 
советско-югославского конфликта набрала такие обороты, 
                                                        
21 РГАНИ, ф. 2, оп. 1, д. 198, л. 103–104. 
22  Письмо ЦК СКЮ в адрес ЦК КПСС от 3 декабря 1956 г. см.: Советс- 
кий Союз и венгерский кризис 1956 года. Документы. С. 730–737. 
Последующую переписку см.: РГАНИ, ф. 89, перечень 45. док. 83, 84. 
23 Коммунист, 1956, № 18, 35–51. 
24 Там же, 11–34. 
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когда Тито и окружение, обвинявшиеся поначалу в ревизи- 
онизме и национализме, после процесса по делу Ласло 
Райка (Венгрия, сентябрь 1949 г.) были публично объявлены 
шпионами и убийцами, и в соответствии с этой установкой 
работал вплоть до самой смерти Сталина весь пропаган- 
дистский механизм стран советского лагеря. В закрытой 
межпартийной переписке и беседах с советским послом в 
Белграде Н. П. Фирюбиным югославские лидеры, рассчиты- 
вавшие на продолжение выгодного для них экономического 
сотрудничества и, конечно, не желавшие вновь оказаться в 
положении изгоев в мировом коммунистическом движении, 
получали заверения в том, что возврат к прошлому 
невозможен, – с советской стороны будут приложены 
усилия для устранения возникших наслоений, но только 
не за счет «принципиальных идеологических уступок». Та 
же установка была изложена в ряде писем руководителям 
«братских партий»: давая отпор «неверным утверждениям» 
югославов, КПСС считает, однако, необходимым держаться в 
полемике спокойного тона, не обостряя отношений по 
государственной линии и продолжая поддерживать контакт 
по партийной линии.25  
С югославской стороны, однако, существовали реальные 
опасения возвращения к ситуации 1948 г. Пригласив 27 
января 1957 г. Н. П. Фирюбина на охоту, Тито много говорил 
о том, что он «очень обеспокоен нашими теперешними 
отношениями» и много думает над тем, «каким образом 
поправить и развивать дальше добрые отношения между 
обеими партиями и нашими государствами».26 Обеспоко- 
енность возросла после того, как в конце марта советский 
премьер Н. А. Булганин на митинге советско-венгерской 
дружбы публично заговорил о причастности югославов к 
идейной подготовке венгерской «контрреволюции» и это 
                                                        
25 РГАНИ, ф. 3, оп. 14. 
26 Там же, оп. 12, д. 173, л. 35–36; оп. 14, д. 96, л. 25–28. 
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нашло отражение на страницах «Правды»27 и могло быть 
истолковано во всем мире как начало новой массиро- 
ванной пропагандистской кампании антиюгославской на- 
правленности. Эти ожидания не оправдались, напротив, в 
апрельских публикациях «Правды», освещавших приезд в 
СССР партийно-правительственной делегации Албании, и в 
том числе в двустороннем коммюнике по итогам перего- 
воров 28 , подчеркивалась необходимость нормальных 
межгосу- дарственных отношений и сотрудничества СССР и 
стран народной демократии с Югославией. 
Вместе с тем в Венгрии в это время уже начали готовить 
судебный процесс по делу Имре Надя, который позже, в 
июне 1958 г., был обвинен в пособничестве контрреволюции, 
причастности к антигосударственному заговору и казнен. В 
Белграде очень боялись, что суд над И. Надем сыграет такую 
же роль, какую сыграл в 1949 г. судебный процесс по делу 
другого венгерского коммунистического политика, Ласло 
Райка, – антиюгославская кампания, инициированная 
Сталиным в 1948 г., после сфабрикованного дела Райка 
взошла, как уже отмечалось, на новый виток. «Предста- 
вители югославского посольства в Будапеште при каждой 
беседе с венгерскими товарищами пытаются подчеркнуть 
ненужность организации процесса над Имре Надем», – 
доносил 21 июня в Москву из Будапешта дипломат В. А. 
Крючков, будущий председатель КГБ29 Обозначившаяся в 
этих условиях склонность Белграда к далеко идущим 
уступкам не укрылась от венгерского лидера Я. Кадара, 
говорившего 6 июня новому советскому послу в Венгрии Е. 
И. Громову (сменившему незадолго до этого Ю. В. 
Андропова) о том, что югославы в последнее время предпри- 
нимают очевидные попытки улучшить отношения с СССР и 
его союзниками. Посол, следуя сохранявшейся линии центра 
                                                        
27 Правда, 1957, 28 марта. 
28 Правда, 1957, 19 апреля. 
29 АВП РФ, ф. 077, оп. 38, папка 192, д. 036, Т. 2, л. 193. 
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на укрепление единства мирового коммунистического дви- 
жения (а в это время уже была начата работа по подготовке 
широкого совещания компартий, первого после XX съезда 
КПСС), в ответ заметил, что если эти попытки являются 
искренними, надо предпринять встречные шаги, не идя 
вместе с тем на идеологические компромиссы. 30  Зная о 
большом международном авторитете маршала Тито (в том 
числе и в формирующемся движении неприсоединения) и 
о популярности югославской модели социализма среди 
коммунистов-реформаторов всего мира, отлучать СКЮ от 
мирового коммунистического движения в Москве сочли 
нецелесообразным, ибо югославская схизма угрожала более 
широким расколом в лагере борцов за коммунизм. 
Кампания в советской прессе с критикой югославского 
ревизионизма так и не была в это время, вопреки некоторым 
ожиданиям, инициирована. Более того, в Москве возоб- 
ладала точка зрения о необходимости дополнительных 
усилий в целях улучшения советско-югославских отношений. 
В повестку дня заседания Президиума ЦК КПСС от 31 мая 
был внесен пункт «О Югославии». Решено было «проявить 
инициативу по вопросу созыва совещания руководителей 
партий социалистических стран» с участием Югославии.31 
Был утвержден текст соответствующего письма для ЦК 
СКЮ.32 3 июня посол СССР Н.П. Фирюбин был принят 
Тито, который заверил его, что ЦК СКЮ будет со своей 
стороны укреплять и развивать советско-югославские 
отношения, заметив одновременно, что перед совещанием 
братских партий было бы целесообразно провести 
двустороннюю встречу делегаций КПСС и СКЮ для 
взаимного прояснения позиций.33 Провал антихрущевского 
путча в июне 1957 г. привел к удалению из партийного 
                                                        
30 Там же, д. 035, л. 54. 
31 Президиум ЦК КПСС, 1954–1964. Т. 1, 256. 
32 Там же, Т. 2, 673. 
33 РГАНИ, ф. 3, оп. 14, д. 131, л. 2–3, 37–41. 
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руководства В. М. Молотова (всегда скептически 
относившегося к перспек- тивам советско-югославского 
сближения), что, вне всякого сомнения, благоприятно 
повлияло на готовность лидеров СКЮ активизировать 
контакты с КПСС. В июле 1957 г. в СССР по приглашению 
Хрущева отдыхали наиболее влиятельные соратники Тито – 
Э. Кардель и А. Ранкович. 18 июля они были приняты Н. С. 
Хрущевым. 34  Первая же после брионских переговоров 
начала ноября 1956 г. встреча Хрущева и Тито состоялась 
1–2 августа 1957 г. на нейтральной территории – в Румынии. 
Был обсужден широкий круг проблем, предприняты 
небезуспешные попытки сблизить позиции по спорным 
вопросам (суть событий в Венгрии, проблема рабочих 
советов и т.д.), выражена решимость и дальше работать 
над устранением препятствий, затрудняющих развитие 
двусторонних отно- шений. Москва заверила Белград в 
отсутствии намерений использовать дело И. Надя для 
раздувания антиюго- славской пропагандистской кампании 
(а несколько позже настояла на том, чтобы венгерское 
руководство не прово- дило судебный процесс до 
предполагаемого совещания компартий с участием 
югославов и вообще не выпячи- вало антиюгославских 
обвинений).35 
Руководство СКЮ в принципе выразило готовность 
принять участие в планируемом совещании компартий 
социалистических стран – приглашение придавало уверен- 
ности в том, что повторения ситуации 1948–1949 гг., т.е. 
разрыва с советским лагерем и шумной антиюгославской 
кампании в прессе, не будет. Тем не менее, ознакомившись с 
проектом декларации предстоящего совещания, югославы 
                                                        
34 Известия, 1957, 19 июля. 
35 См. соответствующую записку зав. новым, созданным в 1957 г., отде- 
лом ЦК КПСС по связям с коммунистическими и рабочими партиями 
социалистических стран Ю. В. Андропова от 29 августа (РГАНИ, ф. 89, 
перечень 45, док. 75, л. 1–2). 
«Наша критика не должна вылиться в крикливую 
перепалку». Почему разоблачение югославского …  
 - 273 - 
 
дали знать приехавшим в Белград советским эмиссарам Ю.В. 
Андропову и Б. Н. Пономареву, что его не подпишут.36 
Деятелям СКЮ особенно не понравился в представленном 
Москвой проекте декларации тезис о борьбе с ревизи- 
онизмом. Небезосновательно спроецировав его на свою 
партию, Кардель заметил, что подписание СКЮ документа 
подобного содержания может создать впечатление, что 
югославские коммунисты, неоднократно обвинявшиеся в 
ревизионизме (не только при Сталине, но и позже, в том 
числе в связи с позицией, занятой в отношении венгерских 
событий), признают свои мнимые ошибки, выступают с 
самокритикой. В действительности же они отнюдь не 
считают звучавшую критику справедливой и не собираются 
сдавать своих позиций. Вообще публикация декларации, 
указывающей на существование социалистического лагеря, 
по мнению лидеров СКЮ, заставит многих подумать о 
возрождении распущенного в апреле 1956 г. Коминформа 
(теперь уже с участием югославов), что неизбежно обострит 
разногласия в рядах коммунистов разных стран и вызовет 
негативную реакцию в мире. С другой стороны, жесткость 
некоторых положений декларации (там, где дело касалось, в 
частности, критики американского империализма), по 
мнению югославских деятелей, может только сыграть на 
руку реакционным кругам на Западе, которые, ссылаясь на 
коммунистическую угрозу, развяжут массированную про- 
пагандистскую атаку на социалистические страны. Не желая 
связывать себя подписанием жестких заявлений от имени 
социалистического блока, югославы вместе с тем совсем 
не хотели снова оказаться в положении изгоев в комму- 
нистическом движении. Они высказались за многообразие 
                                                        
36 О содержании бесед можно судить по запискам Андропова и Поно- 
марева в ЦК КПСС от 15 и 18 октября 1957 г. Были посланы из Москвы 
для информации лидерам социалистических стран и известны по 
венгерской публикации: Top secret. Magyar–jugoszláv kapcsolatok, 1956– 
1959. Dokumentumok. 1997, 216–219. 
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форм контактов между компартиями, проведение совещаний 
и дали принципиальное согласие приехать в Москву в дни 
празднования 40-летнего юбилея октябрьской революции 
для участия не только в юбилейных торжествах, но и во 
встречах с представителями братских партий всего мира. 
В Москве Хрущев пытался оказать давление на юго- 
славскую делегацию во главе Карделем, заставив-таки ее 
подписать Декларацию совещания компартий социалис- 
тических стран, но безуспешно. Не подписав Декларации, 
довольно жесткой по своим формулировкам, принятой под 
давлением китайской компартии, югославы в то же время 
подписали другой программный документ мирового 
коммунистического движения – Манифест мира, опубли- 
кованный от имени представителей всех 68 приехавших на 
торжества в Москву компартий.  
Хотя попытка Москвы заставить Белград играть по 
своим правилам снова закончилась полным фиаско, 
руководство КПСС и на этот раз воздержалось от того, чтобы 
встать на путь конфронтации с СКЮ и инициировать 
массированную проработку югославов в прессе. Вплоть до 
мая 1958 г. «Правда» фактически воздерживалась от 
публикации статей с критикой югославского «ревизионизма». 
В условиях постепенно назревавших советско-китайских 
разногласий, борьбы двух коммунистических держав за 
влияние важно было блюсти хотя бы видимость сохранения 
единства коммунистического движения. Публичная критика 
ревизионизма СКЮ развернулась лишь через несколько 
месяцев после московских совещаний, после принятия на 
VII съезде СКЮ в апреле 1958 г. новой Программы партии, 
признанной в Москве как ревизионистская (заявленный 
тезис о неприятии блоковой политики давал повод для 
обвинений югославов в постановке на одну доску НАТО и 
ОВД, фактическом проведении знака равенства между 
политикой СССР и США). Теперь установки меняются. Зная 
о крайне негативном отношении лидеров китайской 
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компартии к новой программе СКЮ, руководители СССР 
решили принести югославов в жертву сохранению 
советско-китайской дружбы. С публикации «Правдой» 9 мая 
большой редакционной статьи с критикой программы 
СКЮ 37  набирает силу антиревизионистская кампания 
ярко выраженной антиюгославской направленности. Она не 
ограничивалась советской прессой, велась в масштабах всего 
социалистического лагеря. 38  Однако и в это время 
сохранилась установка «и в дальнейшем поддерживать 
нормальные отношения с Югославией, прежде всего по 
государственной линии, а не вести дело на разрыв с ней», 
что нашло отражение в материалах майского пленума 1958 
г. и решениях Президиума ЦК КПСС, принятых в те же 
недели. Наша критика, отмечалось в 
вышепроцитированном уста- новочном документе, «не 
должна вылиться в крикливую перепалку; не следует 
размениваться на мелочи, задевать национальные чувства 
югославов. Критика должна быть принципиальной, 
аргументированной и вестись в спокойном тоне, не впадая в 
крайности 1949–1953 гг.».39 В Кремле и на Старой площади 
извлекли уроки из прошлого, по пути сталинских 
агиткампаний принципиально решено было не идти, это 
было бы в ущерб влиянию КПСС, учитывая, что 
несправедливая и грубая критика не казалась многим в мире 
убедительной, а скорее приносила обратный эффект – лишь 
                                                        
37 В единстве и сплоченности марксистско-ленинских партий – залог 
дальнейших побед мировой социалистической системы. – Правда, 1958, 9 мая. 
38  Причем, статьи из органов прессы социалистических стран 
перепечатывались и в «Правде». Так, 6 мая была опубликована статья 
из «Женьминь жибао» «Современный ревизионизм должен быть 
осужден!», с которой, собственно говоря, и началась в международном 
масштабе антиревизионистская кампания. 8 мая «Правда» перепе- 
чатывает статью из органа КПЧ «Руде право»: «Взгляды, несовмес- 
тимые с марксизмом-ленинизмом». 
39  Закрытое письмо ЦК КПСС партийным организациям о советско- 
югославских отношениях (май 1958 г.). РГАНИ, ф. 3, оп. 14, д. 207, л. 75. 
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способствовала повышению авторитета югославских ком- 
мунистов как носителей антисталинской альтернативы в 
мировом коммунистическом движении.40 С другой стороны, 
Югославию решили проучить, прибегнув к методам эконо- 
мического давления. Речь идет об одностороннем перес- 
мотре планов экономического сотрудничества и отсрочке в 
предоставлении обещанных Советским Союзом Югославии 
кредитов. 
В дальнейшем критика югославского ревизионизма в 
советской печати явно идет на спад. Как отмечалось в 
документе ЦК КПСС, относящемся к апрелю 1959 г., «нет 
необходимости уделять в нашей печати много внимания 
политике руководства Югославии. Больше того, повышенное 
внимание к Югославии отвечало бы интересам югославских 
руководителей, желающих, чтобы о их политике и идео- 
логии много писали, чтобы их политика занимала все 
более видное место, что не отвечает ни удельному весу 
Югославии на международной арене, ни влиянию юго- 
славских руководителей в международном рабочем и 
коммунистическом движении».41 
Тем не менее дежурная критика югославского «ревизи- 
онизма», иногда довольно резкая, звучала в выступлениях 
Хрущева и других советских лидеров, в том числе на съездах 
зарубежных компартий. Эта критика в значительной мере 
была данью компромиссу между КПСС и КПК. В ноябре 
1960 г. КПСС согласилась на включение довольно резкого 
выпада в адрес СКЮ в итоговый документ следующего 
                                                        
40 Хрущев на майском пленуме ЦК КПСС 1958 г. сам много говорил о 
нелепости и неубедительности обвинений в адрес югославов, звучавших 
при Сталине. Как можно было Тито и его окружение обвинять в 
сотрудничестве с нацистской Германией, когда весь мир знал, что уж 
они-то сражались с нацистами «как дай Бог каждому», вопрошал 
советский лидер (См.: РГАНИ, ф. 2, оп. 1, д. 318, л. 31–36). 
41  РГАНИ, ф. 5, оп. 33, д. 99, л. 90. Обзор «Ревизионистское 
извращение теории и практики марксизма-ленинизма». 
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большого совещания компартий.42 Эту цену опять-таки 
решено было заплатить ради сохранения хоть на короткое 
время дававшего трещину союза КПСС с китайской ком- 
партией. Однако принесение югославов «в жертву» единству 
с КПК оказалось на этот раз совсем не эффективным, 
достигнутая на совещании 1960 г. компромиссная платформа 
между двумя великими коммунистическими державами 
смогла лишь на считанные месяцы отсрочить открытый 
конфликт между КПСС и КПК. На конъюнктурный характер 
критики указывает продолжавшееся сотрудничество между 
КПСС и СКЮ на международной арене. 17 февраля 1961 г. на 
Президиуме ЦК КПСС были утверждены указания послу 
СССР в ФНРЮ для беседы с Тито в связи с предстоящим 
возобновлением работы XV сессии Генассамблеи ООН. 
Послу было поручено изложить югославскому лидеру суть 
линии СССР по некоторым важным проблемам между- 
народных отношений. При этом посол должен был исходить 
из того, что «позиции Югославии и Советского Союза по 
многим международным вопросам в основном совпадают и 
что полезно было бы и впредь по вопросам, представляющим 
взаимный интерес, консультироваться».43  
Решительный сдвиг в советско-югославских отношениях 
относится к маю 1962 г. Зная, что подходит срок, когда 
Москва в соответствии со своими прежними декларациями 
должна вернуться к вопросу о предоставлении Югославии 
обещанного еще в 1956 г. кредита, Тито 6 мая, выступая на 
партактиве в Сплите, однозначно заявил о готовности 
СКЮ встать на сторону КПСС в углубляющемся кон- 
фликте между КПСС и КПК. Всего через 10 дней, 16 мая, 
Хрущев, находившийся с визитом в Болгарии, в своей речи 
отметил, что сейчас у СССР сложились с Югославией 
«нормальные, более того, хорошие отношения» 44 . В 
                                                        
42 Правда, 1960, 6 декабря.  
43 РГАНИ, ф. 3, оп. 12, д. 867, л. 75.  
44 Правда, 1962, 17 мая.  
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итоговой советско-болгарской декларации от 21 мая 
критика реви- зионизма вопреки уже сложившейся в 
последние годы практике обошлась без упоминания 
югославов. Впрочем, в установочных статьях идеологов 
КПСС, опубликованных в «Правде», критика Программы 
СКЮ как образца сов- ременного ревизионизма и после 
этого продолжала звучать.45 
Как бы то ни было, новая ситуация, сложившаяся в 
мировом коммунистическом движении, теперь работала на 
советско-югославское сближение. Публично заявленная Тито 
в мае 1962 г. готовность (при всех разногласиях с КПСС) 
однозначно поддержать ее в идеологических спорах с 
китайской компартией дала довольно мощный толчок 
новому подъему в советско-югославских отношениях. 
Причем, в условиях глубокого раскола между СССР и КНР в 
Москве смирились наконец (зная о крайне негативном в то 
время отношении Пекина к белградским «ревизионистам») с 
особым статусом Югославии среди социалистических стран 
и в общем приостановили все заведомо бесплодные попытки 
вовлечь нейтральное социалистическое государство, заинте- 
ресованное прежде всего в тесном экономическом сотруд- 
ничестве с СССР, в советский блок. Записи заседаний Прези- 
диума ЦК КПСС отражают стремление лидеров КПСС, не 
отрицая существующих разногласий с руководством СКЮ, 
вместе с тем защитить югославскую сторону от китайских 
нападок.46 10 февраля 1963 г. в открытой дискуссии с 
идео- логами КПК «Правда» отмечала, что в СКЮ и 
ФНРЮ «происходят положительные процессы в сторону 
сбли- жения с социалистическим содружеством, с мировым 
                                                        
45 См.: Пономарев, Б. Н. Победоносное знамя коммунистов мира. - 
Правда, 1962, 18 ноября. 
46 См. краткие записи заседаний от 30 декабря 1962 г. (по итогам 
состоявшихся перед этим встреч Хрущева и Тито в СССР, первых после 
длительного перерыва), 29 января и 12 марта 1963 г.; Президиум ЦК 
КПСС, 1954-1964. Т. 1, 664, 695–696, 700. 
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комму- нистическим движением». Новая советская 
концепция, сфор- мулированная в ходе обсуждения на 
Президиуме ЦК КПСС содержания полемической статьи 
«Правды», заключалась в следующем: спорные вопросы 
между КПСС и СКЮ остаются, но своей товарищеской 
критикой «мы должны содействовать процессу освобо- 
ждения [югославов] от ошибочных позиций, помогать 
изживать недостатки».47 
Начало возымело продолжение. Посетив 20 августа – 3 
сентября 1963 г. Югославию, Хрущев, хотя и не скрывал 
своей неудовлетворенности в связи с упорным нежеланием 
правительства этой страны синхронизировать свою 
внешнюю политику с линией советского блока,48 вместе с 
тем, по некоторым сведениям, настолько увлекся моделью 
«самоуправления», что после возвращения домой распо- 
рядился всерьез заняться изучением югославского опыта в 
целях внедрения элементов самоуправления на советских 
предприятиях. Правда, отвечавший за связи с соцстранами 
секретарь ЦК КПСС Ю.В. Андропов, всегда скептически 
относившийся к югославской модели, не торопился 
выполнять это поручение. С отставкой Хрущева в октябре 
1964 г. оно отпало само собой.49  
В дальнейшем советско-югославские отношения в 
целом отличались относительной стабильностью и устой- 
чивостью при сохранении некоторой дистанции Социа- 
листической федеративной республики Югославии (СФРЮ) 
                                                        
47 Там же, 696. Поводом для полемики стали нападки идеологов КПК на 
отдельные положения, прозвучавшие в докладе Н. С. Хрущева на сессии 
Верховного Совета СССР 12 декабря 1962 г. «Современное международное 
положение и внешняя политика Советского Союза» и его речи на VI съезде 
Социалистической единой партии Германии (СЕПГ) 16 января 1963 г. в 
Восточном Берлине.  
48 «Не следует обольщаться, что у нас 100%-ное единство, этого нет», – 
говорил Хрущев на заседании Президиума ЦК КПСС 4 сентября (Там 
же, 736). 
49 См.: Бернов, Ю. В. Записки дипломата. М., 1995, 81–82. 
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от социалистического лагеря и признании со стороны 
КПСС права Югославии на свой путь к социализму как 
порождение конкретных и неповторимых специфических 
условий (серьезный кризис двусторонних отношений в 
августе 1968 г., когда Югославия не поддержала силовую 
акцию в отношении Чехословакии, был преодолен сов- 
местными усилиями). 










A kelet-európai szocialista országok közül Bulgária volt az 
egyetlen, amely 1944-től egyszer sem okozott gondot a Szovjet- 
uniónak. Hiszen itt az államszocialista rendszert nem veszély- 
lyeztették belső társadalmi megrázkódtatások, és az ország vezetői 
is hűségesen igazodtak a mindenkori szovjet politika irány- 
vonalához. A szovjetek mindezekért kitüntetett bánásmódban 
részesítették Bulgáriát. A lakosság létszámarányát tekintve 
Bulgária volt a gazdaságilag leginkább támogatott kelet-európai 
ország egészen a gorbacsovi peresztrojka kezdetéig.
1
 Az élet- 
színvonal emelkedésének, az 1960-1970-es években, illetve a 
bolgár lakosság hagyományos russzofil beállítottságának 
köszönhetően – melynek okai a közös ortodox hitben, és az öt 
évszázados török uralom alóli felszabadítás miatt érzett hálában 
keresendők – a bolgár társadalom egy jelentős része, a többi 
szocialista országtól eltérően nem tekintette az államszocializmust 
egy gyűlölt, idegen hatalom által ráerőszakolt rendszernek.2  
Mindez, továbbá néhány, általunk a későbbiekben megtár- 
gyalásra kerülő tényező azt eredményezte, hogy a Bolgár 
Kommunista Párt (BKP) a többi kelet-európai testvérpárttól 
                                                        
1 Lévésque, J. 1989 – Egy birodalom végjátéka. A Szovjetunió és Kelet- 
Európa felszabadulása. Bp., 2001, 163. 
2 Dillon, P., F. C. Nykoff. Creating Capitalism. Transitions and Growth in 
Post–Soviet Europe. Cheltenham, UK, MA, USA, 2002, 116, 119; Gornev, 
G., P. Boyadjieva. Social Injustice and the Crisis of Legitimacy. – In: 
Coenen-Huther, J. (Ed.). Bulgaria at the Crossroads. New York, 1996, 109. 
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eltérően szilárd társadalmi beágyazottsággal bírt. Ennek köszön- 
hetően a BKP képes volt irányítása alatt tartani a peresztrojka 
által generált események menetét 1989–1990-ben, és a külföldi 
megfigyelők legnagyobb meglepetésére egész Kelet-Európában 
egyedüliként megnyerte az első szabad választásokat. A bolgár 
rendszerváltás menete abban is különbözött a közép-kelet-európai 
országokban bekövetkezett eseményektől, hogy az 1980-as 
évek közepétől megjelenő ellenzék túl gyenge és szervezetlen 
volt ahhoz, hogy nyomásgyakorlással változtatásokra kény- 
szerítse a BKP-t. Ráadásul, a kommunista pártból egészen 
1989-ig hiányzott a reformkommunista, valamint szociálde- 
mokrata nézeteket valló belső ellenzék – az időszakonként 




„A Kommunista Párt Központi Bizottságának 1989. 
november 10-i plénuma […] menesztette Todor Zsivkovot 
(pártfőtitkárt – M.J.), a nyílt népi nyomás teljes hiányában. […] 
Így a demokratikus ellenzéket megfosztották a győzelem 
élményétől, és a Kommunista Párt azzal büszkélkedhetett, 
hogy ő volt a demokratikus változások kezdeményezője az 
országban”. Csak Todor Zsivkov bukása után kezdődtek meg 
a nagy ellenzéki tömegdemonstrációk, és attól kezdve az 
ellenzéki szervezetek gyakran éltek ezzel a nyomásgyakorlási 
eszközzel a rendszerváltás – az e tanulmányban már nem 
tárgyalandó – évei során. A szomszédos balkáni szocialista 
országokhoz képest Bulgáriában sikerült megelőzni az etnikai 
feszültségek kirobbanását azzal, hogy az eseményeket politikai 
mederbe terelték. Végül – ez a legfontosabb momentum az 
államszocializmus lebontása szempontjából – a BKP és az 
ellenzéki szervezetek, közép-európai mintára, kerekasztal tárgya- 
                                                        
3 Ágh, A. Emerging Democracies in East Central Europe and the Balkans. 
Cheltenham, Northampton, 1998, 235; Drezov, K. Bulgaria. Transition 
Comes Full Circle, 1989–1997. – In: Pridham, G., T. Gallagher (Eds.). 
Experimenting with Democracy. Regime Changes in the Balkans. London, 
New York, 2000, 196–197. 
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lásokon kötött megállapodásokban határozták meg a demokra- 
tikus átalakulás menetét. Ezt a folyamatot politikai szempont- 
ból az 1991 nyarán elfogadott új alkotmány koronázta meg.
4
 
Tanulmányom mégis Todor Zsivkov hatalmi pozíciójából 
való eltávolításával zárom. Szimbolikusan ezzel az eseménnyel 
zárul az államszocializmus kora Bulgáriában. A gyakorlatban 
viszont ekkor gyorsult fel az államszocializmus rendszerét 
lebontó rendszerváltás folyamata. Mivel tanulmányomnak 
nem célja a rendszerváltás eseményeinek komplex és mélyre- 
ható elemzése – ezt egy korábbi dolgozatomban már megtet- 
tem
5
 –, a rendszerváltásnak csak az 1989. november 10-ig, a 
pártfőtitkár menesztésig tartó folyamatait veszem górcső alá. 
 
A SZTALINIZMUS ÉVEI 
 
1944. szeptember 9-én – két nappal az után, hogy a Szovjetunió 
hadat üzent a németbarát bolgár cári kormánynak, és megkezdte 
az ország megszállását – a bolgár hadsereg kommunista szimpa- 
tizáns tisztjeinek közreműködésével (Zveno politikai kör) a 
Bolgár Munkáspárt (BMP – kommunisták) sikeres államcsínyt 
hajtott végre. Ezt követően megalakult az addig illegálisnak 
minősülő baloldali pártokat és politikai csoportokat tömörítő 
Hazafias Front (HF, közkeletű magyar elnevezéssel: népfront) 
kormánya - tagszervezetei a BMP, a Bolgár Földműves Népi 
Szövetség (BFNSZ), a Bolgár Munkás Szociáldemokrata Párt 




A Hazafias Frontot uraló kommunisták a térségben egyedül- 
álló módon már a két világháború között is jelentős társadalmi 
                                                        
4 Lévesque, J., Op. cit., 163; Ágh, A., Op. cit., 234; Drezov, K., Op. cit., 196. 
5 Miczov, J. Rendszerváltás Bulgáriában (A többpártrendszer kialakulása és 
megszilárdulása 1989 és 1991 között). – In: Krausz T., Mitrovits M., 
Zahorán Cs. (Eds.). Rendszerváltás és történelem. Tanulmányok a kelet- 
európai átalakulásról. Bp., 2010, 193–224.  
6 Csíkhelyi L. Bulgária. – In: Kardos, J., Simándi, I. (Eds.). Európai politikai 
rendszerek. Bp., 2000, 120. 
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befolyással rendelkeztek, különösen a városi értelmiség köreiben. 
A szeptember 9-i fordulat után, hónapok alatt negyed millióra 
duzzadt a párt taglétszáma, amiben döntő szerepet játszott a 
bolgár lakosság hagyományos oroszbarátsága. A belügyi és 
igazságügyi tárcák birtokában a kommunisták rögtön a hatalomra 
jutás után megkezdték a proletárdiktatúra kiépítését, noha szovjet 
utasításra egészen 1947-ig – amikor is bekövetkezett a Szovjet- 
unió és nyugati szövetségesei közötti szakítás, és elkezdődött a 




A HF-kormány programjának megfelelően 1944 végén 
népbíróságokat állítottak fel a Bulgáriát náci német szövet- 
ségesként a világháborúba beléptető, és a hazai antifasiszta 
ellenállókat üldöző háborús bűnösök elítélésére. A kommunisták 
célja az általuk monarcho-fasisztának minősített, cári tekin- 
télyuralmi rendszerhez kötődő polgári rétegek megfélemlítése, 
illetve azok prominens személyiségeinek megsemmisítése volt.  
Összesen 11.122 ember felett ítélkeztek. Köztük volt három 
régens, huszonkét korábbi miniszter, százharminc parlamenti 
képviselő, és más hivatalos személyek. Az elítéltek közül 2830 
főt halálbüntetéssel és 1305-öt életfogytiglani fegyházzal 
sújtottak. Összeurópai viszonylatban, az ország lakosságának 
nagyságához, illetve a megbukott cári rezsim „puhaságához” 
képest kirívóan kemény ítéletek születtek. A kommunisták 
számára komoly gondot okozott az a tény, hogy a többi 
kelet-európai országhoz mérten a bolgár politikai elit és az 
értelmiség épségben átvészelte a háború viszontagságait. A 
megtorlással a kommunisták elérték a polgári pártok likvidálását, 
ugyanakkor a jobboldali érzelmű értelmiséget is sikerült 
rendszabályozniuk. Ez volt az oka annak, hogy a rendszerváltás 
idején a jobboldali ellenzék nem volt képes önálló tényezőként 
fellépni, és csak 1991-re tudta magát megszervezni.
8
 
                                                        
7 Crampton, J. R. A Concise History of Bulgaria. Cambridge, 1997, 184. 
Dimitrov, V. Bulgaria. The Uneven Transition. London, New York, 2001, 23.  
8 Csíkhelyi, L., Op. cit., 121. Bideleux, R., Jeffries, I. The Balkans. A 
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Lezajlott továbbá az államigazgatásnak a politikailag 
megbízhatatlan káderektől való megtisztítása; rövid időn belül 
több ezer személyt bocsátottak el. A hadsereg átszervezése 
azonban egészen 1946-ig elhúzódott, mert szovjet kívánságra a 
bolgár hadsereg részt vett a Németország elleni hadműveletekben, 
és szükség volt a régi tiszti állományra. 1945 januárjában jelent 
meg egy fontos törvényerejű rendelet a néphatalom védelméről, a 
fasiszta ideológia, a rémhírterjesztés, a hadsereg demoralizálása 
és Bulgária nemzetközi tekintélyét sértő cselekedetek üldözéséről. 
Ez a jogszabály szolgált alapul az ellenzéki és egyházi vezetők 
ellen indított koncepciós perek sorához.
9
 
A kommunisták számára az agrárpárt, a BFNSZ képezte a 
legfőbb akadályt a proletárdiktatúra kiépítésének útjában. 
Bulgária szegény agrárállam volt, és lakosságának 80%-a ekkor 
még falun élt. Ráadásul Bulgáriában nem létezett nagybirtok, 
mivel a megművelhető földterület döntő része kisbirtokok 
formájában paraszti kézen volt. Éppen emiatt a bolgár kommu- 
nistáknak nem volt lehetőségük arra, hogy földosztás ígéretével 
paraszti tömegeket állítsanak maguk mellé, ahogyan azt a lengyel, 
magyar, román és csehszlovák elvtársaik tették. Így a BFNSZ, 
noha az 1930-as évek elején több frakcióra esett szét, továbbra is 
az ország legjelentősebb pártjának számított. A kommunista 
politikusokat különösen aggasztotta, hogy 1945-től fokozatosan 
növekedett az agrárpárt Nikola Petkov által vezetett szárnyának a 




1946 szeptemberében népszavazást tartottak az államforma 
megváltoztatásának kérdéséről, melynek sikerét követően 
megszüntették az alkotmányos királyságot, és Bulgária népköz- 
társasággá vált. Majd pedig, 1946 októberére alkotmányozó 
nemzetgyűlési választásokat írtak ki, ahol a rendőri terror ellenére, 
a Nikola Petkov vezette agrárius csoport és a szociáldemokraták 
                                                                                                          
Post-communist History. London, New York, 2007, 86. 
9 Csíkhelyi, L., Op. cit., 121–122. 
10 Bideleux, R., I. Jeffries, Op. cit., 87; Crampton, R., Op. cit., 187. 
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szakadár ellenzéki frakciója megszerezte a szavazatok 30%-át.
11
 
Az ellenzék megtörése 1947 nyarán következett be. Nikola 
Petkovot letartóztatták, és kémkedés vádjával egy koncepciós 
perben halálra ítélték, majd kivégezték. A vezetőjét elveszítő 
agrárpárti ellenzék feloszlott. Egyedül a Hazafias Frontban részt 
vevő BFNSZ frakció maradhatott meg, amely elismerte a 
kommunisták vezető szerepét és programját. Ezzel a BFNSZ 
egészen 1990-ig koalíciós partnerként vett részt népfrontkor- 
mányokban, de nem rendelkezett tényleges beleszólással a 
hatalomba. Ami ezután következett, már csak formalitás volt. 
1946 decemberében az alkotmányozó nemzetgyűlés elfogadta az 
1936-os szovjet alkotmány mintájára kidolgozott ún. dimitrovi 
alkotmányt – Georgi Dimitrov volt a kommunista párt vezetője, 
és az ország miniszterelnöke 1946 és 1949 között. A társadalmi 
bázisát elveszítő szociáldemokrata párt 1948 elején beolvadt a 
BMP-be, amely az év végén hivatalosan is visszavette régi nevét, 
a Bolgár Kommunista Pártot (BKP).
12
 
Az ellenzéki politikai pártok és a hozzájuk fűződő civil 
szervezetek felszámolása után, 1949 elején az ortodox egyházat is 
az állam alá rendelték, eltiltották az oktatástól, és megfosztották 
saját anyagi forrásaitól. Két évre rá leváltották az egyházfőt, az 
exarchát, és rangemeléssel pátriárkátust hoztak létre. Az 
autokefáli ranggal megszakadt a hierarchikus kapcsolat a 
konstantinápolyi pátriárkával. A kis létszámú katolikus és 
protestáns egyházakat gyanús nyugati kapcsolataik miatt 
teljesen felszámolták, papjaikat pedig börtönbe zárták. Mivel 
Törökország vált Bulgária fő hidegháborús ellenfelévé, 
fokozott figyelem irányult az iszlám vallású török kisebbségre, 
melynek tagjait ki akarták űzni az országból. 1951-ig –amikor 
is a török kormány lezárta a Bulgária felőli határait – csaknem 
150 ezer török hagyta el Bulgáriát.
13
 
A rendszer ellenségeit üldöző politika hullámai elérték a 
                                                        
11 Uo. 
12 Crampton, R., Op. cit., 189–190; Csíkhelyi, L., Op. cit., 107.  
13 Dimitrov, V., Op. cit., 24–25. 
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hatalmon lévő kommunista párt tagságát is. Ennek oka a 
Szovjetunió és Jugoszlávia között 1948-ban bekövetkező szakítás 
volt. 1944 és 1948 között a jugoszláv és a bolgár pártvezetés 
szovjet jóváhagyással tárgyalásokat folytatott egymással egy 
balkáni konföderáció létrehozásáról. A tárgyalások akadozva 
haladtak, mert a bolgárok a két ország egyenlő alapon történő 
egyesülését szorgalmazták, míg a jugoszláv fél a hetedik 
köztársaságként kívánta volna beléptetni Bulgáriát a már létező 
délszláv államba. Az álláspontok közeledésének jeleként 
megállapodtak abban, hogy Bulgária átengedi saját délnyugati 
országrészét, az ún. pirini Macedóniát, amely egyesülne a 
jugoszláv Macedóniával. Ez a politika rendkívül népszerűtlenné 
vált a bolgár lakosság körében, mert ezáltal a kommunista 
pártvezetés elismerte a macedón nemzet létét, és feladta azt a 
hagyományos bolgár nemzeti álláspontot, miszerint Macedónia 
szláv lakosai tulajdonképpen bolgárok, és a bolgár állam egyik 
fő célja egész Macedónia Bulgáriához való csatolásával 
egyesíteni a széttagolt nemzetet.
14
 
1948 februárjában Sztálin kritikával illette a jugoszláv és 
bolgár kommunisták a szovjetekétől túlzottan önállósuló 
politikáját. A bolgár pártvezetés, Georgi Dimitrovval az élen, 
teljes önkritikát gyakorolt. Georgi Dimitrov 1949-ben 
bekövetkező halálával megkezdődött a pártvezetésen belüli 
harc a főtitkári posztért. A világháborút Moszkvában átvészelő 
kommunista vezetők – a moszkoviták –, élükön Vălko 
Cservenkovval (Dimitrov sógora), megragadták az alkalmat, 
hogy „titoizmus” és „nacionalista elhajlás” vádjával 
félreállítsák a legesélyesebb utódjelöltet, a népszerű „hazai” – 
azaz a világháború idején, Bulgáriában végig illegalitásban 
tartózkodó – kommunistát, Trajcso Kosztovot, aki többször is 
bírálta a szovjetek Bulgáriával szembeni gazdaságpolitikáját. 
Kosztovot letartóztatták, egy kirakatperben halálra ítélték, és 
1949 decemberében kivégezték. A Kosztov-perrel kezdetét 
vette a bolgár kommunista párt történetének legnagyobb belső 
                                                        
14 Jelavich, B. A Balkán története, II. Köt., 20. sz. Bp., 1996, 281–282.  
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tisztogatása, melynek során több mint százezer párttagot 
zártak ki, és sújtottak különböző büntetésekkel.15 
A Kosztov-per után Vălko Cservenkov kezébe került a 
pártfőtitkárság és a kormányfői pozíció. Cservenkov vezetősége 
idején lépett Bulgária a klasszikus sztálini gazdasági- és 
társadalmi fejlődés útjára. Az ipar és a kereskedelem államosítása 
már 1947-re befejeződött, és 1947-ben életbe lépett az első két 
éves terv. 1949-ben kezdődött az első öt éves terv az ország 
gyorsütemű iparosítására. Bulgária ipara addig főleg kézmű- 
iparból, és mezőgazdasági termékeket (pl. dohány) feldolgozó 
iparból állt. A két világháború közötti kormányok iparfejlesztő 
intézkedései is csak a könnyűipart lendítették fel. A nehézipari 
ágazatok (vas- és acélipar, gépgyártás, vegyipar és energia- 
termelés) fejlődése még nem tekinthető szignifikánsnak, mivel 
Bulgária nem rendelkezett a nehéziparhoz szükséges fekete- 
szénnel, vassal és olajjal. Ezeket, a nyersanyagokat a Szovjet- 
unióból kellett importálni. Ugyanez vonatkozott a szükséges 
gépi berendezésekre és a szakember gárdára is.
16
  
Az erőltetett nehézipar-fejlesztés azért érhetett el sikereket, 
mert a nyersanyagokat és a technológiát a szovjetek nagyon 
kedvező áron szállították, és biztosították a gyenge minőségű 
bolgár iparcikkek számára a felvevőpiacot. A vas– és acélgyártás 
meghonosításával, valamint a gyors villamosítással létrejött a 
modern gazdaság alapja. Az agrárszektorból az iparba történő 
munkaerő-átcsoportosítással lassan megoldódott a túlnépesedett, 
falun rekedt szegénység problémája, ezáltal egészségesebbé vált a 
társadalom szerkezete. Az 1950-es évek elején az életszínvonal az 
erőltetett modernizáció következtében romlott, mert a városokban 
súlyos lakáshiány alakult ki, és kevés volt a fogyasztási cikk. 
A lakásépítés nem tudott lépést tartani a városokba áramló új 
munkások számának növekedésével, illetve a nehézipar fejlesztése 
                                                        
15 Bideleux, R., I. Jeffries, Op. cit., 87. 
16 Jelavich, B., Op. cit., 318–319; Berivói (Boér) F. Bulgária. Bp., 1941, 5–6; 
Berend I. Válságos évtizedek. Közép- és Kelet-Európa a két világháború 
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miatt elhanyagolták a fogyasztási cikkeket termelő ágazatokat. 
Mégis, ekkor hozta létre az állam a mindenki számára elérhető 
közoktatást, egészségügyi hálózatot, és a jóléti rendszer alapjait.
17
 
Az első ötéves terv részét képezte a mezőgazdaság teljes 
kollektivizálása, és a szovjet típusú termelőszövetkezetek kiala- 
kítása. Ez azonban jelentős paraszti ellenállásba ütközött, amit 
1951-re sikerült ugyan letörni, de így is csak a parasztság felét 
sikerült beterelni a termelőszövetkezetekbe. Mindenesetre, a 
mezőgazdasági termelés drasztikusan visszaesett, mert az új 
termelőszövetkezetek nem rendelkeztek elegendő vetőmaggal, 
állatállománnyal, gépekkel és vegyszerekkel. A kollektivizálást 
egy újabb hullámban, 1957-1958-ban sikerült befejezni sokkal 
átgondoltabb módon. A parasztságnak ezúttal engedélyezték 
háztáji gazdaságok kialakítását és művelését, valamint a 
termelőszövetkezeteket is ellátták a szükséges eszközökkel. 
Ettől kezdve a mezőgazdasági termelés mennyisége és 
minősége nagymértékben javult.18 
 
TODOR ZSIVKOV HATALOMRA KERÜLÉSE, ÉS AZ 
ÁLLAMSZOCIALIZMUS VIRÁGKORA 
 
Sztálin 1953 márciusában bekövetkező halála után megrendült 
Cservenkovnak és körének helyzete. Az új szovjet főtitkár, 
Nyikita Hruscsov által kezdeményezett desztalinizáció, a 
kapcsolatok javítása Jugoszláviával, valamint a hidegháborús 
feszültség csökkentése érdekében indított enyhülési politika 
következtében Bulgáriában is gyengült a rezsim szigora. 1953 
márciusában, a plovdivi dohányipari munkások tiltakozó meg- 
mozdulásaira válaszul a pártvezetés ígéretet tett, hogy a módo- 
sított második ötéves ipari tervben javítanak a lakásviszonyok 
siralmas állapotán, és a nehézipari beruházások visszafogása 
mellett nagyobb hangsúlyt helyeznek a fogyasztási és könnyű- 
iparok fejlesztésére. Befejeződtek a politikai tisztogatások, a 
                                                        
17 Dimitrov, V., Op. cit., 25; Jelavich, B., Op. cit., 319. 
18 Crampton, R., Op. cit., 192–193; Dimitrov, Op. cit., 26.  
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munkatáborokat pedig bezárták. A szovjet példát követve 
szétválasztották a párt- és állami funkciókat. 1954 áprilisában 
a BKP VI. kongresszusán Cservenkov bejelentette, hogy meg- 
válik a pártfőtitkári pozíciótól, és csak a miniszterelnökséget 
tartja meg. A BKP főtitkára egy 43 éves, hazai kommunista, 
Todor Zsivkov lett. Zsivkov megválasztása egyben a korábbi 
tisztogatások során a pártból kizárt hazai vezető kommunisták 
rehabilitálását, és újbóli hatalomra kerülését is jelentette.
19
   
Todor Zsivkov 1961-ig a fokozatosan visszaszoruló Cser- 
venkovval, és a rehabilitált korábbi belügyminiszterrel, Anton 
Jugovval együtt kormányozta Bulgáriát. Eközben, Hruscsov 
támogatását élvezve, lassan kiszorította a pártból a doktriner 
moszkovita kommunistákat, és helyükre sokkal pragmatikusabb, 
fiatal, hazai kommunistákat helyezett. Hruscsov Sztálin bűneit 
feltáró beszéde az SZKP XX. kongresszusán jelentősen 
megerősítette Zsivkov pozícióit Cservenkovval szemben. 1956. 
április elején a BKP Központi Bizottságának (KB) plénumán 
Zsivkov a szovjet példa fontosságát hangsúlyozva bírálta 
Cservenkov személyi kultuszát, és a lenini normák megsértését. A 
kritika hatására Cservenkov kénytelen volt lemondani a 
miniszterelnökségről Anton Jugov javára. Viszont kormányfő- 
helyettesként meg tudta őrizmi befolyásának egy részét. A 
változások következtében a párton belüli hangnem kritikusabbá 
vált, a sajtóban egyre többen követelték a demokratikus jogok 
szélesítését, főként a szólásszabadság határainak 
újragondolását. Érezhetővé vált a kulturális olvadás.20  
A desztalinizáció keresztülvitele során a bolgár kommunista 
párt vezetői nagyobb egységet tudtak felmutatni, mint a lengyel 
és magyar elvtársaik, ami biztosította a BKP számára a társa- 
dalom feletti ellenőrzést. 1953 májusában megrendszabály- 
lyozták a vezetés szerint túlzott liberalizációt követelő 
párttagokat és értelmiségieket. Az 1956-os őszi lengyelországi 
megmozdulások, és a magyarországi forradalom megke- 
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ményítették a BKP álláspontját. Újabb tisztogatásokra került 
sor mind a párton belül, mind pedig az ország szellemi 
életében. Ezreket, köztük sok frissen szabadult politikai 
foglyot tartóztattak le, és küldtek vissza az ismét megnyitott 
munkatáborokba. Mindazonáltal a BKP ún. „áprilisi irány- 
vonala”, amely Zsivkovnak a BKP KB 1956 áprilisi plénumán 
elhangzott beszéde alapján nagyobb párton belüli demokráciát 
és kulturális liberalizálást irányzott elő, napirenden maradt 
azért, hogy legitimálhassa a jövő reformprogramjait.21 
A BKP részben azért is tudta viszonylag könnyen kezelni a 
desztalinizáció által előidézett válságot, mert a bolgár társa- 
dalom szerkezete továbbra is az európai félperiféria jegyeit 
hordozta magán. Bulgáriában csak a parasztság felől érkez- 
hetett volna érdemi ellenállás a BKP uralmával szemben. A 
parasztság ellenkezését azonban megtörte Nikola Petkov 
pártjának szétverése 1947-ben, valamint a földek nagy részének 
kollektivizálása 1950–1951-ben. A munkásosztály, amely az 
1956-os lengyel és magyar események fő társadalmi bázisát 
alkotta, Bulgáriában ekkor kezdett számbelileg is jelentős 
csoporttá válni, de még nem rendelkezett szilárd öntudattal. A 
falusi nyomorból felemelkedett első generációs munkások 
tömegei éppen az államszocialista rendszertől várták sorsuk 
további jobbra fordulását. A világháborút követő népbírósági 
tisztogatásokat túlélő értelmiség pedig, a további üldözést 
elkerülendő, szorgosan igyekezett hozzáidomulni a rendszer 
által felemelt új szocialista értelmiséghez.
22
 
1958-ra befejeződött a földbirtokok kollektivizálása, és a 
meglévő termelőszövetkezetek jelentős részét a termelés 
racionális ösztönzése érdekében összevonták (3450-ről 932-re). 
Ekkor újra napirendre került az ország gyors iparosításának 
terve. A kínai példa hatására 1959-ben a pártvezetés úgy 
döntött, hogy átveszik a Nagy Ugrás bizonyos elemeit, és az öt 
éves tervet három év alatt fogják teljesíteni. A nagyszabású 
                                                        
21 Dimitrov, V., Op. cit., 28; Csíkhelyi, L., Op. cit.   
22 Dimitrov, V., Op. cit., 28. 
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lakossági mozgósítások ellenére, 1961-re ez a célkitűzés teljes 
mértékben kudarcot vallott a megvalósíthatatlan tervek és a 
szűkös anyagi feltételek – tőke és nyersanyaghiány – miatt. A 
kormány a sikert csak a korábbi tervmutatók megváltoztatásával 
tudta igazolni. Miután a szovjet–kínai szakítás megtörtént, a BKP 
lemondott a kínai modell követéséről.23 
Todor Zsivkov sikeresen elhárította magáról a felelősséget a 
Nagy Ugrás kudarcáért. Ahhoz, hogy riválisait félreállíthassa, 
kapóra jött számára Hruscsov újabb antisztálinista kirohanása 
1961-ben, az SZKP XXII. kongresszusán. 1961 végén kizárták 
Cservenkovot a KB-ből, majd pedig a pártból is. 1962 májusában 
Hruscsov hosszú látogatást tett Bulgáriában, ahol nyilvánvalóvá 
vált, hogy a szovjet pártfőtitkár, Jugov helyett Zsivkovot támogatta. 
A BKP soron következő, VIII. kongresszusa elmozdította Jugovot 
a kormányfői bársonyszékből, és a szocialista törvényesség 
megszegésének vétke miatt a pártból is kizárták. Zsivkov ezzel 
teljesen megszilárdította a hatalmát, és a pártfőtitkári pozíció 
mellé a miniszterelnöki tisztséget is megszerezte.
24
 
Zsivkov 1964-re, annyira megszilárdította a párton belüli 
helyzetét, hogy sikeresen átvészelte Hruscsov bukását. 1965 
áprilisában az állambiztonsági szervek sikeresen megakadályoztak 
egy Zsivkov eltávolítását tervező maoista összeesküvést. A 
szervezkedés élén Zsivkov egykori partizántársa, Ivan Todorov- 
Gorunja tábornok állt, aki elfogatása előtt öngyilkos lett. A többi 
összeesküvő – összesen kilenc személy, köztük három tábornok – 
meglepően enyhe ítéletben részesült (3-15 év kényszermunka). A 
további tisztogatás csak három év múlva következett be. Ettől 




A Bolgár Kommunista Párton belül nem alakult ki a 
magyar, lengyel és csehszlovák testvérpártokhoz hasonlóan 
reformkommunista szárny. A zsivkovi kormányzást bíráló halk 
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24 Dimitrov, V., Op. cit., 29. 
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hangok is csak a párt radikálisan baloldali doktriner része felől 
voltak nagyritkán hallhatók. Ezek a párttagok az 1960-as és 
1970-es évek konszolidálódott Zsivkov-rezsimjét a marxizmus- 
leninizmus elárulásával, és a dekadens nyugati életmód bulgá- 
riai meghonosításával vádolták, miközben visszasírták az 
1940-1950-es évek aszketikus fegyelmét. Noha Zsivkov mindig 
szilárdan kézben tartotta a hatalom gyeplőit, és megle- hetősen 
óvatos és konzervatív politikát folytatott, annyiban azért igazuk 
volt a szélsőbaloldali bírálóknak, hogy a szovjet politikai 
irányvonal rezdüléseire gondosan ügyelve, Zsivkov saját maga 
játszotta el a reformer szerepét. A nagy gonddal kidolgozott, és 
látványosan kezdeményezett gazdasági reformokat szükség 
esetén, mindig a kellő időben csendesen leállította, miközben a 
hivatalos közbeszédben azok továbbviteléről folyt a diskurzus. 




Erre a sorsra jutottak az 1965-ben, a gazdaság dinamizálására 
elindított reformok is. A központi gazdaságirányítás vissza- 
fogásával a vállalatok nagyobb önállóságot kaptak, és saját 
terveket készíthettek. Az 1968-as csehszlovákiai események 
tapasztalata azonban a reformkísérlet leállításához vezetett, és a 
párt visszatért centralizált tervutasításos rendszerre. Tovább- 
gyűrűző hatásként a BKP szigorította a különböző társadalmi 
szervezetek feletti ellenőrzését, és a párton belül is fokozottan 
számon kérték a „vasfegyelmet”.27 
A visszatérő központosítás és az ideológiai konformitás 
Bulgária 1971-es alkotmányában tükröződött, valamint az ugyan- 
ekkor kidolgozott új pártprogramban is. Az 1971-es alkotmány 
kinyilatkoztatta „a szocializmus győzelmét” Bulgáriában, és „az 
együttműködést és kölcsönös segítségnyújtást a Szovjetunióval”. 
Az alaptörvény leszögezte a kommunista párt vezető szerepét a 
társadalomban és az államban. Hangsúlyozta az állami szervek és 
a társadalmi szervezetek szocialista jellegét. Újdonság gyanánt 
                                                        
26 Drezov, K., Op. cit., 197–198; Dimitrov, V., Op. cit., 30–31. 
27 Crampton, R., Op. cit., 198. 
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bővítette az állampolgárok társadalmi-gazdasági jogait: a munká- 
hoz (ami egyben kötelesség is volt), a pihenéshez, a biztosításhoz, 
az ingyenes oktatáshoz és az egészségügyi ellátáshoz való jogot. 
Bevezetésre került a „fejlett szocialista társadalom” fogalma. 
Hatalomtechnikai szempontból pedig a legfontosabb újítás a 
hatalom egységének kinyilvánítása volt. Ezzel a megállapítással 
nyíltan összemosták a törvényhozó és a végrehajtó hatalom 
szerepkörét. A hatalom egységének megtestesítésére létrehoztak 
egy állandóan működő új szervet, az államtanácsot, amely 
egyesítette a döntéshozatalt és a végrehajtást. Az államtanács 
elnöke lett az állam feje. Todor Zsivkov lemondott a presz- 
tízsértékét veszítő miniszterelnökségről, hogy a párt az állam- 
tanács elnökévé választhassa őt.28  
Az új pártprogram leszögezte, hogy a BKP továbbra is az 
1956-os „áprilisi irányvonalat” követi. A szocializmus felépü- 
lésével mégis szükség van egy új stratégiára, amely tovább- 
vezeti a pártot és a nemzetet az érett szocializmus, és az 
egységesített társadalom építésének útján. Ez az egységesítés az 
ország homogenizációját takarta, ami az 1970-es években még a 
városi és a vidéki életmód, illetve a szellemi és fizikai munka 
közötti határokat kívánta megszüntetni. Később, az 1980-as 
években ez a homogenizáció etnikai dimenziókat kapott, amennyi- 
ben az etnikai kisebbségeknek a többségi bolgár nemzetbe történő 
beolvasztásához – illetve elüldözéséhez – szolgáltatott ideológiai 
hátteret. A pártprogram értelmében, az érett szocializmus építése az 
extenzív növekedésről az intenzív gyarapodásra való áttérést 
jelentette. Ez a tudományos-technikai forradalom révén valósulhat 
meg, ami növeli a termelékenységet és a jólétet.
29
   
Az 1971-ben bevezetett újítások nem sokat módosítottak 
Todor Zsivkov rendszerén. Legfőbb jellemzője továbbra is a 
Szovjetunió mindenkori politikájához való hűséges igazodás volt. 
Ebben odáig ment, hogy Zsivkov előbb Hruscsovnak, majd pedig 
Brezsnyevnek is felvetette, hogy Bulgária a tizenhatodik 
                                                        
28 Csíkhelyi, L., Op. cit., 107–108; Bideleux, R., I. Jeffries, Op. cit., 88. 
29 Crampton, R., Op. cit., 198–199. 
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tagköztársaságként csatlakozna a Szovjetunióhoz. Mindkétszer 
elutasításban részesült: Hruscsov nem óhajtotta a szovjet állam 
nyakába venni a bolgár gazdaság terheit, Brezsnyev viszont 
tartott az esetleges nemzetközi diplomáciai bonyodalmaktól.
30
 
A fokozatos gazdasági fejlődés alapját a hatvanas években 
elindított, a korábbinál ésszerűbb iparosítás biztosította. A 
szükséges nyersanyagok teljes hiánya miatt az iparfejlesztés attól 
vált gazdaságossá, hogy a Szovjetunió a világpiacinál sokkal 
kedvezőbb áron szállította Bulgáriának a szenet, vasat és olajt. Így 
épülhettek meg a bolgár szocialista nehézipar óriásai, mint a Szófia 
melletti Kremikovci acélgyára, a burgaszi olajfinomító, a sztara 
zagorai (műtrágya) vegyiművek, és a Marica-Iztok vízerőmű.31  
A bolgár gazdaság fejlődését nagymértékben elősegítette a 
KGST keretei között megvalósuló munkamegosztás. A bolgárok 
készségesen vállalták a mezőgazdasági szállító szerepét. Bulgária 
elsősorban a Szovjetuniót látta el kertészeti, mediterrán és más 
feldolgozott mezőgazdasági termékekkel. Cserébe technológiai 
támogatást kapott az iparilag fejlettebb KGST tagoktól. 1965-től 
import szovjet alkatrészekből szereltek össze személyautókat és 
tehergépkocsikat Bulgáriában. Az ország specializálhatta magát a 
hajóépítés, a vasúti gördülőanyag és a villamos targoncagyártás 
terén. 1975-re a szállítóeszközöket készítő ágazatok tették ki 
Bulgária ipari termelésének egyharmadát. Meghonosodott a 
számítástechnikai iparág is: mágneslemezeket és egyéb szá- 
mítógépalkatrészeket állítottak elő a kelet-európai piac számára. 
A látszólag nagyívű ipari fejlődésnek azonban volt egy igencsak 
komoly gyengesége, amely úgymond egyoldalúvá tette az elért 
sikereket: a viszonylag gyenge minőségű, és alacsony technikai 
színvonalat mutató bolgár termékek jelentős részét verseny- 
képtelenségük miatt nem lehetett értékesíteni keményvalutáért 
a világpiacon. Ezeket az árukat elsősorban a Szovjetunió vette át, 
illetve a többi KGST ország. Nem is csoda, hogy Bulgária volt az 
a szocialista ország, amely leginkább függött gazdaságilag a 
                                                        
30 Bideleux, R., I. Jeffries, Op. cit., 88; Crampton, R., Op. cit., 200. 
31 Dimitrov, V., Op. cit., 29. 
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Szovjetuniótól. A hetvenes évek közepén a bolgár külkeres- 
kedelemi ügyletek közel 50%-a a Szovjetunióval került le- 
bonyolításra. A többi KGST országot is ide számítva, ez az 
arány megközelítette a 80%-ot.
32
  
A Zsivkov-rendszer és az ország belpolitikai életének 
stabilitását az 1960-as, 1970-es években a lakosság életszín- 
vonalának fokozatos emelkedése biztosította. A párt nagyobb 
figyelmet szentelt a fogyasztási cikkek biztosítására, a lakás- 
viszonyok javítására, illetve az oktatás és az egészségügy fej- 
lesztésére. Az emberek nagy többsége elégedett volt életkörül- 
ményei javulása miatt, ugyanakkor apátiával viseltettek a 
politikai élet iránt. Az 1940-es és 1950-es évek politikai terrorja 
megszűnt. A rendszer elszigetelt és kis létszámú bírálóit 
rendőrségi vegzatúrákkal törekedtek elhallgattatni.33  
Ellenben a zsivkovi rezsimet a külföldi nyilvánosság előtt 
is diszkreditáló ellenzékieket a legdrasztikusabb eszközökkel 
igyekeztek elhallgattatni. 1977 szeptemberében egy merénylő 
oltotta ki a londoni utcán sétáló ellenzéki író, Georgi Markov 
életét, aki pellengérre állította a bolgár politikai elit életvitelét. 
Ez volt a hírhedt esernyős gyilkosság. Két hétre rá sikertelen 
merényletet hajtottak végre Párizsban a bolgár titkosszolgálat 
működéséről adatokat kiszivárogtató Vladimir Kosztov ellen.34 
Noha a BKP-n belül nem léteztek a hivatalos pártvonaltól 
eltérő reformista vagy ultrakonzervatív csoportok, Todor 
Zsivkov mégis nagy gondot fordított a személyes hatalmát 
veszélyeztető utódjelöltek eltávolítására. Egy korabeli 
bon-mot szerint Bulgáriában a legveszélyesebb pozíciónak 
számított másodiknak lenni Zsivkov után. Zsivkov több ízben 
távolított el a pártvezetésből számára veszélyt jelentő 
személyeket (1966-ban Mitko Grigorovot, 1977-ben Venelin 
Kosztevet, és 1984-ben Alexandăr Lilovot). Arra azonban 
ügyelt, hogy biztosítsa számukra a kényelmes visszavonulást 
                                                        
32 Bideleux, R., I. Jeffries, Op. cit., 89; Crampton, R., Op. cit., 200–201. 
33 Crampton, R., Op. cit., 200–201. 
34 Ibid., 202. 
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valamilyen jól fizető állásba. Ezzel a kemény, de nagylelkű 
vezető képét próbálta sugározni a környezete felé.35 
A Zsivkov-érában mégis a korábbiakhoz képest szokatlan 
káderstabilitás jellemezte a politikai életet. Az ellenőrzést szigorúan 
kézben tartva, Zsivkov előszeretettel adott át döntéshozatali 
jogköröket alárendeltjeinek. Munkatársai kiválasztásánál 
elsősorban nem a szakmai alkalmasság szempontja dominált, 
hanem a közös partizán múlt, vagy a látványos pártaktivista 
tevékenység. Zsivkov, más országok kommunista vezetőitől 
eltérően, nem volt a nép számára elérhetetlen, mert 
kifejezetten élvezte az érintkezést az egyszerű emberekkel a 
különböző rendezvényeken. Ez egy fajta populista jellemvonás 
volt, amelyet tovább erősített a róla kialakított szerénység képe. 
Zsivkov sosem engedélyezte személyének túlzásba vitt dicsérését, 
például úgy, ahogy a román Nicolae Ceauşescu tette.36 
Ceauşescu rendszeréhez hasonlóan a zsivkovi politika sem 
nélkülözte a nacionalista vonásokat. Az 1968-as csehszlovákiai 
bevonulást követően a BKP is leállította a gazdasági reform- 
kísérleteket, és visszatért a konzervatív államszocialista 
vonalhoz. A visszarendeződés miatt csökkenő ideológiai 
elkötelezettség a társadalom körében szükségessé tette a párt 
legitimációjának újabb eszközökkel történő erősítését. A 
társadalom bolgár nemzeti öntudatának fokozása erre kiválóan 
alkalmasnak tűnt. Pedig ez külpolitikai vonatkozásban komoly 
elvi nehézségeket okozott a pártnak, hiszen a bolgár diplomácia 
az internacionalizmus jelszavával mindig konzekvensen követte 
az éppen aktuális szovjet külpolitikai irányvonalat.
37
 
Az egységes szocialista nemzet létrehozását kitűző 1971-es 
pártprogram elfogadása után meg is kezdődtek az asszimilációs 
törekvések a kisebb etnikai csoportok, a cigányok, valamint a 
bolgár származású és nyelvű muszlim pomákok beolvasztására. 
Mindaddig, az 1960-as évek folyamán csak tétova lépések 
                                                        
35 Dimitrov, V., Op. cit., 30. 
36 Ibid. 
37 Crampton, R., Op. cit., 203. 
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történtek a cigányok és pomákok beolvasztására. 1962 áprilisában 
a BKP Politikai Bizottságának (PB) plénuma határozatot fogadott 
el a cigányok, tatárok és pomákok török irányultsága ellen. A PB 
határozat kívánatosnak tartotta a kulturális váltást e népcsoportok 
életmódjában, és javasolta a személynevek önkéntes alapon történő 
megváltozatását. A tiltakozások hatására a BKP PB 1964 
májusában elítélte a bolgár lakosság és a párttagság körében 
megjelenő nacionalista törekvéseket. Mégis 1970 júliusában újabb 
döntés született a cigányok és a pomákok egy részének 
átnevezéséről. Az 1971-es pártprogram elfogadása után 
megkezdődtek a hatósági intézkedések, és 1973-ra 200 ezer ember 
változtatta meg a nevét. A cigány nyelvű kiadványok 
megjelentetését leállították, s ezután csak bolgár nyelven 
jelenhettek meg könyvek és sajtótermékek. Bezárt a népszerű 
szófiai cigány színház is. A pomákokat pedig büntetés terhe mellett 
egyenesen kötelezték, hogy muszlim személyneveiket lecseréljék 
szláv nevekre. A legnagyobb etnikai kisebbséget alkotó törökséget 
– leszámítva sajtótermékeik számának csökkentését, és a kiván- 
dorlásukat elősegítő intézkedéseket – nem érték súlyosabb 
atrocitások az 1970-es évek során. 1968-ban Bulgária és Török- 
ország egyezményt kötött az 1950-es évek kivándorlásai során 
szétszakadt családok törökországi újraegyesítésének előmoz- 
dítására. Az egyezmény tíz éves érvényességi ideje alatt körül- 
belül 130 ezer török hagyta el végleg Bulgáriát.
38
 
A macedón kérdés szintén jó lehetőséget biztosított a BKP 
számára a nemzeti érzelmek legitimációs célú felhasználására. 
A jugoszlávokkal 1948-ban bekövetkező szakítás után a 
macedón, mint önálló etnikai kategória többé nem létező 
fogalommá vált Bulgáriában. Bármilyen macedón ügyben tett 
lépés Bulgárián belül összekapcsolódott a délszláv államhoz 
fűződő viszonnyal. 1948 után akárhányszor elhidegült Moszkva és 
Belgrád viszonya, a szófiai hivatalos körök azonmód megkezdték a 
retorikai kirohanásokat a jugoszláv Macedónia ellen. A bolgár 
                                                        
38 Crampton, R., Op. cit., 203. Nedelcheva, T. Will the Ethnic Crisis be 
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vezetés számára akkor keletkezett komolyabb probléma, amikor 
Hruscsov elhatározta, hogy javít a szovjet-jugoszláv kapcsolatokon. 
A szovjet ösztönzések ellenére bolgárok végig bizalmatlanok és 
kritikusak voltak a jugoszlávokkal szemben. Ugyanakkor a 
problémakör kezelése sosem csúszott ki Zsivkov ellenőrzése 




A bulgáriai nacionalizmus 1970-es években bekövetkező 
felerősödésének legérdekesebb mozzanata nem is annyira 
magához Todor Zsivkovhoz fűződik, mint inkább a lányához, 
Ljudmila Zsivkovához. Apja igen gondos neveltetésben 
részesítette az 1942-ben született Ljudmilát – így tanulhatott 
Oxfordban is –, mert saját hivatali örökösének szánta. Politikai 
pályáját kulturális vonalon kezdte: 1971-ben kinevezték a párt 
kultúráért és művészetért felelős bizottságának elnökhelyettesévé. 
1975-től vezetőjévé vált a bizottságnak, s hamarosan ellen- 
őrzése alá került a rádió, a televízió és a nyomtatott sajtó is. 
Ettől kezdve egészen az 1981-ben bekövetkezett haláláig az 
ország kultúrpolitikájának teljhatalmú irányítója volt.
40
 
Ljudmila Zsivkova tevékenysége jelentős kulturális olvadást 
hozott a közéletben. Személye rendkívüli népszerűségnek 
örvendett az értelmiség körében, mert Zsivkova nagy érdeklődést 
tanúsított a bolgár történelmi múlt, és a bolgár kultúra teljesít- 
ményeinek újraértékelése iránt. Ráadásul Zsivkova különösen 
vonzódott a marxizmustól távol álló miszticizmushoz. Ő szervezte 
meg 1981-ben a bolgár államiság 1300 éves évfordulója 
alkalmából rendezett nagyszabású állami ünnepséget, amely a 
bolgár nemzeti öntudat és büszkeség külvilág felé történő 
manifesztációja volt. Ettől kezdve a némi szocialista mázzal 





                                                        
39 Crampton, R., Op. cit., 203–204. 
40 Dimitrov, V., Op. cit., 31; Crampton, R., Op. cit., 204.  
41 Crampton, R., Op. cit., 204–205; Csíkhelyi, L., Op. cit., 113.  
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A NYOLCVANAS ÉVEK VÁLSÁGA, ÉS  
TODOR ZSIVKOV BUKÁSA 
 
Az 1970-es évek végére a Zsivkov-rendszer elérte fejlődési 
lehetőségeinek határait. Összességében ekkor úgy tűnt, hogy 
Bulgária hatalmas erőfeszítések árán nagyrészt sikeresen 
behozta történelmi lemaradását az európai centrum-területekhez 
képest: agrárállamból ipari országgá vált. Az agrárnépesség az 
összlakosság ötödére zsugorodott, ugyanakkor széles első- és 
másodgenerációs munkásosztály jött létre, s a városi középrétegek 
is megerősödtek. A szovjet mintájú tervutasításos extenzív 
gazdaságfejlesztés lehetőségei azonban végleg kimerültek. Az 
életszínvonal emelkedését biztosító gazdasági növekedés 
lelassult, majd csökkenni kezdett. Ez alapjaiban veszélyeztette 
a rendszer stabilitását és legitimációját. 1985-ig, Mihail 
Gorbacsov hatalomra kerüléséig, a gazdasági visszaesést 
többé-kevésbé még sikerült kompenzálni a világpiaci ár alatt 
kapott szovjet nyersanyagok re-exportjával. Egy 1979-ben 
hozott döntés alapján a pártvezetés 1982-től elindította az Új 
Gazdasági Mechanizmust a termelékenység növelése, vala- 
mint a bolgár termékek és szolgáltatások minőségének javítása 
érdekében. Előirányozták a decentralizálást és a piaci mecha- 
nizmusok bevezetését a gazdaságirányításba. A vállalatok 
nagyobb önállóságot kaptak, és ösztönözték a munkások 
részvételét a termelés irányításában.
42
 
Az egész nagyszabású kísérlet azonban 1984-re teljes ku- 
darcba fulladt, aminek okai elsősorban a kedvezőtlen nemzet- 
közi körülményekben keresendők. Az 1979-től kiéleződő szovjet- 
amerikai ellentétek – az ún. kis hidegháború – megnehezítették 
a fejlesztésekhez szükséges nyugati technológia importját. Az 
Európai Gazdasági Közösség is igyekezett piacvédelmi okokból 
távol tartani saját belső piacáról az egyedüliként versenyképes 
bolgár mezőgazdasági termékeket. A világpiacra szánt exportból 
származó keményvalutát pedig jórészt adósságszolgálatra 
                                                        
42 Ágh, A., Op. cit., 234; Dimitrov, V., Op. cit., 31.  
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kellett fordítani. 1979 és 1985 között sikerült is lecsökkenteni 




Az egyre fokozódó gazdasági válság arra sarkallta a kom- 
munista vezetőket, hogy újabb eszközökkel próbálják meg- 
tartani a hatalom megrendülő stabilitását. A gondok elken- 
dőzésére, és a tömegtámogatás elnyerése érdekében előtérbe 
került a nemzeti kérdés. A bolgár népesség romló demográfiai 
mutatóinak javítása érdekében napirendre került az etnikai 
kisebbségek fokozottabb integrálása és asszimilációja a többségi 
bolgár nemzetbe. A pomákok sikeres névváltoztatásának 1970-es 
évekbeli tapasztalataiból kiindulva 1984 decemberében a BKP 
KB elindította az ún. „újjászületési folyamatot” a  lakosság 
körülbelül 10%-át kitevő török kisebbség számára. Todor 
Zsivkov egy beszédében kifejtette, hogy a bulgáriai 
törökség utolsó maradványai az 1970-es években kivándoroltak 
Törökországba. Akik maradtak, azok valójában (muszlim) 
bolgárok, és most megkapják a lehetőséget, hogy visszatérjenek a 
bolgár nemzet kebelére. A párttörténészek által kidolgozott 
elmélet szerint a bulgáriai törökség nem az oszmán időkben 
vándorolt be Anatóliából, hanem annak a türk nyelvű ősbolgár 
népcsoportnak a leszármazottai, akik nem olvadtak be a középkor 
folyamán a szláv többségbe. Ezeket a türk nyelvű bolgárokat az 
oszmán hatalom térítette át az iszlámra, akárcsak a bolgár nyelvet 
beszélő pomákokat. A tetszetős elmélet szerint mindezt 
alátámasztja, hogy Északkelet Bulgáriában is fennmaradtak a 
türk nyelvet beszélő keresztény gagauzok, akik ugyancsak az 
ősbolgárok el nem szlávosodott leszármazottai.44 
A nemzeti kommunistává átalakuló rezsim beemelte az 
„újjászületési folyamat” ideológiai rendszerébe a hagyományos 
bolgár nacionalizmus egyik alappillérét, a vallást is, csak hogy 
                                                        
43 Crampton, R., Op. cit., 206–207; Dimitrov, V., Op. cit., 31. 
44  Csíkhelyi, L., Op. cit., 113–114. Димитров, Стр. Тюркоезичието, 
стереотипите на мислене и националото помирение. – Векове, 1990, N 2, 
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fokozza az akció népszerűségét a bolgár lakosság körében. A 
hagyományos bolgár nemzeteszme szerint csak az tekinthető 
igazi bolgárnak, aki szláv – bolgár nyelvű és kultúrájú – és 
ortodox keresztény. Ezzel viszont az „újjászületési folyamat” 
egy általános iszlám-ellenes élt is kapott.
45
 
Az „újjászületési folyamat” első lépése gyanánt a ható- 
ságok felszólították a török kisebbség tagjait, hogy két héten 
belül önként válasszanak maguknak szláv neveket egy előre 
összeállított listáról. Akik ezt elmulasztották megtenni, vagy 
ellenálltak, azok hatóságilag kaptak új nevet. Nem számítva 
azokat a tüntetéseket, melyeket eme felszólítás a török lakta 
települések némelyikén kiváltott, az akció a hivatalos vára- 
kozásoknak megfelelően országszerte rendben lezajlott. A neki- 
bátorodott államhatalom ezután egyre több korlátozó intéz- 
kedést hozott. Megszűnt a török nyelvű sajtótermékek kiadása 
és rádióadások sugárzása. Bezárták a török tannyelvű iskolákat. 
Sőt, betiltották a török nyelv nyilvános használatát, és számos 
maradinak és embertelennek minősített muszlim szokás – például 
fejkendő viselése a nőknél, körülmetélés – gyakorlását.46 
Ezek a lépések viszont már komoly tiltakozást váltottak ki. 
Az ellenszegülő törökök egyre nyíltabban kezdték használni 
eredeti neveiket, demonstratív módon törökül beszéltek, válto- 
zások álltak be továbbá a vallásgyakorlásukban is, ugyanis 
sűrűbben látogatták a mecseteket. Egyre hevesebb tömegmeg- 
mozdulások történtek, és megszerveződött az illegális ellenállás 
is. 1985-ben megalakult a földalatti Török Mozgalom a Nemzeti 
Felszabadításért nevű szervezet. A hatóságok az ellenállás 
elfojtása mellett döntöttek. A földalatti török mozgalom kétszáz 
vezető aktivistáját letartóztatták. Hadiállapotot vezettek be az 
ország törökök lakta vidékein, és egy nagyszabású katonai erő- 
demonstráció keretében pacifikálták az elégedetlenkedő lakos- 
ságot. A rendszer belpolitikai stabilitását erősíteni hivatott 
asszimilációs akció külpolitikai szempontból mégis hatalmas 
                                                        
45 Bideleux, R., I. Jeffries, Op. cit., 91; Nedelcheva, T., Op. cit., 150. 
46 Dimitrov, V., Op. cit., 31; Nedelcheva, T., Op. cit., 145–146. 
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öngólnak bizonyult. A török kormány kezdeményezésére 1985 
és1987 között számos nemzetközi szervezet, mint például az 
ENSZ Emberjogi Bizottsága, az Amnesty International és az 




A nemzetközi nyomás hatására a bolgár kormány enyhített az 
„újjászületési folyamat” politikáján, és új stratégiát jelentett be. 
Sor került néhány műemlék mecset látványos felújítására, és 
családegyesítési célból a kormány kiutazási vízumot biztosított a 
Törökországba utazni vágyók számára, ami persze jelentős 
kivándorláshoz vezetett. Ezzel a török kisebbség ügyét sikerült 
egy időre – 1989 májusáig – a háttérbe szorítani, ennek ellenére 
Bulgária rossz nemzetközi megítélése és elszigeteltsége egy 
szemernyit sem javult. A bolgár pártvezetést az érintette a 
legérzékenyebben, hogy az 1985-ben hatalomra kerülő új 
szovjet pártfőtitkár, Mihail Gorbacsov számára Todor Zsivkov 
személye és politikája egyre inkább tehertétellé vált.
48
  
A gorbacsovi peresztrojka mind politikai, mind gazdasági 
szempontból felkészületlenül érte Zsivkovot. Természetesen a 
bolgár pártvezér már hozzászokott ahhoz, hogy alkalmazkodjon a 
Szovjetunióból érkező impulzusokhoz. Ezekhez mindig 
hozzáadott valami saját, „eredeti” koncepciót, így a többi 
kelet-európai kommunista vezetőnél sokkal könnyebben tudott 
idomulni a peresztrojka szlogenjeihez, és a vele járó 
intézkedésekhez. A divatos eszméket kedvelő Zsivkov számos 
értelmiségi szemináriumot szervezett, melyeken ő maga elnökölt. 
Ezekre a szemináriumokra a peresztrojka „sztárjainak” számító 
szovjet személyiségeket is meghívta. Ugyanakkor, több politikai 
és társadalmi kérdésekről íródott művet küldött Moszkvába 
véleményezésre, amelyek ott nem arattak túlzottan nagy sikert.
49
 
A peresztrojka első időszakában, az „uszkorenyie” jel- 
szavával a gazdaság fejlődésének gyorsítása, és az új techno- 
                                                        
47 Nedelcheva, T., Op. cit., 146; Bideleux, R., I. Jeffries, Op. cit., 91. 
48 Crampton, R., Op. cit., 210; Nedelcheva, T., Op. cit., 146. 
49 Lévesque, J., Op. cit., 164. 
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lógiák bevezetése révén a termelékenység növelése volt a cél. 
Ekkor Zsivkov a nyugati technológiai transzferre – vagy sokkal 
inkább annak reményére – alapozva egy nagyszabású, mikro- 
elektronikai termékek gyártását célzó programot indított be, 
hogy Bulgária Kelet-Európa „kis Japánjává” válhasson. A 
tervbe vett technológiai áttörés kudarca egy-két év alatt 
világossá vált, és Bulgária kénytelen volt a Szovjetunióhoz és 
a KGST-hez fordulni gazdasági segítségért.
50
   
A Szovjetunióval fenntartott kapcsolatok megrendülése a 
demokratizálásra, és a politikai átalakításokra hangsúlyt fektető, 
1987. januári SZKP KB plénum után vált nyilvánvalóvá. Zsivkov 
kijelentette, hogy Bulgáriában nincs szükség további politikai 
reformokra, mert a BKP 1956-os „áprilisi irányvonala” már 
megfogalmazta a megfelelő intézkedéseket. Gorbacsov elítélte 
Zsivkov álláspontját, és valódi reformok megindítását sürgette. 
Válaszként Zsivkov nagyszabású beszédet mondott a BKP KB 
1987. július 27-29-i ülésén A szocializmus továbbfejlesztési 
koncepciójának alapjai a Bolgár Népköztársaságban címmel. A 
beszédben megfogalmazódó ún. „júliusi koncepció” hivatalosan 
is felváltotta a BKP addigi „áprilisi irányvonalát”. A szocializmus 
egy olyan új modelljének kidolgozására fektette a hangsúlyt, 
amely tekintetbe veszi az új történelmi realitásokat.
51
 
A BKP új programja leszögezte a párt társadalomban 
betöltött szerepének megváltozását. A párt ettől kezdve csak 
ihlető forrásnak tekintendő, és egyre több teret kell engedni a 
társadalmi szervezeteknek. A hatékonyság növelése érdekében 
valóságos támadás indult a középszintű állami- és pártbürokrácia 
ellen. Körülbelül 30 ezer funkcionáriust bocsátottak el, az 
ország közigazgatási körzeteit huszonnyolcról nyolcra csök- 
kentették, és számos minisztériumot megszüntettek vagy reor- 
                                                        
50 Ibid. 
51 Csíkhelyi, L., Op. cit., 114. A szocializmus továbbfejlesztési koncepciójának 
alapjai a Bolgár Népköztársaságban. (Todor Zsivkov beszéde a BKP KB 1987. júl. 
28-29-i ülésén) (Részletek). – In: Pándi L. (Ed.). A kelet-európai diktatúrák bukása 
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ganizáltak. Új törvények egész sorát fogadták el a munkáról, a 
vállalatok és szövetkezetek önállóságának növeléséről, és 
garantálták az igazgatók választás útján történő kinevezését. 




A felgyorsított reformintézkedések ellenére Zsivkov nem tudta 
megnyerni a szovjet vezetés bizalmát. Ennek jeleként 1988 
márciusában visszahívták Szófiából a már hosszú ideje ott szolgáló 
Grekov szovjet nagykövetet, és helyére a Gorbacsov bizalmát 
élvező Viktor Sarapov érkezett. A szovjeteknek eme lépését 
Zsivkov saját személyének barátságtalan elutasításaként értékelte. 
1988 júliusában – nem sokkal a Gorbacsov hatalmát megerősítő 
SZKP XXIX. kongresszusa után – Zsivkov gyors és látványos 
lépéseket tett párton belüli helyzetének megerősítésére. Először 
mondvacsinált indokkal félreállította a szovjetek által is preferált 
fiatal, energikus Sădomir Alexandrovot, akit már a BKP berkein 
belül is Zsivkov esetleges utódának tekintettek (az összeeszkábált 
titkosszolgálati jelentést, miszerint Alexandrov apósa a 
világháború idején információkat adott át a cári hatóságoknak, 
még Moszkvában is hitetlenkedve fogadták). Ezután egy 
politikai bizottsági ülésen Zsivkov bejelentette, hogy megválik 
tisztségeitől. A meglepett PB tagok egyhangúan elutasították 
lemondási szándékát. Ezzel a lépésével Zsivkov több mint egy 
évre megszilárdította helyzetét a BKP élén.
53
  
Zsivkov rendszerének problémái mégis ez alatt a szűk 
néhány esztendő alatt váltak visszafordíthatatlanul súlyossá. A 
tömeges és rosszul időzített átszervezések a gazdaság 
szétzilálódásához vezettek. A visszaeső gazdasági teljesítmény, és 
a számos szovjet szubvenció megszűnésének pótlására a kormány 
nagy értékű kölcsönöket vett fel a nyugati pénzpiacokon. 1985 és 
1989 között Bulgária külső államadóssága több mint három- 
szorosára növekedett: 2,4 milliárd dollárról 9,2 milliárdra. A sok 
hitel viszont arra már nem volt elegendő, hogy megállítsa a 
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53 Ibid., 165–166. 
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lakosság életszínvonalának gyorsuló ütemű csökkenését. A 
sorozatos szovjet figyelmeztetések hatására Zsivkov lassított 
ugyan a strukturális átalakítások ütemén, de újítási kedve töretlen 
maradt. 1989-ben kijelentette, hogy az állami vállalatok többségét 
félig privatizált vegyes vállalatokká alakítják át. Ennek verge- 
hajtására azonban már nem jutott idő.54 
A szovjet-bolgár kapcsolatok 1989-re mélypontra jutottak. 
Teljesen megszűnt a szovjet gazdasági támogatás és nyers- 
anyagszállítás. A hatalmas szovjet piac bezárult a bolgár termékek 
előtt. Egy 1989. februári szovjet értékelés szerint Bulgáriában 
lényegében csak szimulálták a peresztrojkát, ami nagyrészt 
Zsivkov személyes ambícióinak volt köszönhető. A szocializmus 
új elméleti modelljének megteremtéséről szóló nagyhangú 
nyilatkozatok a gyakorlatban csak folyamatos átszervezéseket 
eredményeztek. Ide-oda tologatták a kádereket, miközben egyre 
nőtt az elnyomás. A szovjetek szerint mindez diszkreditálta a pártot, 
a szocializmust, és árnyékot vetett magára a peresztrojkára is. 
Ugyanakkor Zsivkov továbbra is teljes mértékben ura volt a 
helyzetnek, amit manipulatív módszerinek és a jól szervezett 
adminisztratív apparátusának köszönhetett. A szovjet dokumentum 
megállapítása szerint az elégedetlenség egyre növekedett mind a 
párton belül, mind pedig a lakosság körében.
55
 
Bulgáriában 1985 előtt csak elvétve lehetett ellenzéki 
szamizdat irodalomhoz hozzáférni. A pártközeli értelmiségi körök 
ugyan folyamatosan kitermeltek másként gondolkodó alkotókat, 
azonban az állambiztonsági szervek olyan sikeresen távol 
tartották ezeket a személyeket egymástól és a társadalomtól is, 
hogy semmiféle ellenzéki csoportosulás vagy mozgalom nem 
alakulhatott ki. A Szovjetunióból érkező glasznoszty, illetve a 
                                                        
54 Ibid., 166; Dimitrov, V., Op. cit., 31. 
55 Csíkhelyi, L., Op. cit., 114. Az SZKP KB Nemzetközi Osztályának 
feljegyzése Alekszandr Jakovlev részére: Az európai szocialista való 
kapcsolatok fő kérdéseiről, 1989. február. – In: Baráth M., Rainer M. J. 
(Eds.). Gorbacsov tárgyalásai magyar vezetőkkel. Dokumentumok az 
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súlyosbodó gazdasági válság és életszínvonal-romlás gyorsan 
előidézte a párthoz közeli városi értelmiség és a középrétegek 
körében az ellenzékiség különféle formáit. Mivel a bolgár nyelv 
közel áll az oroszhoz, a peresztrojka eszméi közvetlen erjesztő 
hatást válthattak ki a bolgár társadalomban. 1986-tól hirtelen 
megnőtt a Bulgáriában is fogható, addig unalmasnak tekintett 
szovjet TV-csatornák nézettsége, és egyre többen – köztük sok 
párttag is – előfizetett a különféle szovjet napilapokra és 
folyóiratokra. A megjelenő – egyelőre kis létszámú –, immár a 
párttól független új csoportosulások aktivistái között 
domináltak az elégedetlen párttagok. Ezekkel szemben az 
államhatalom már nem mert közvetlen megtorlást alkalmazni, 
mivel a Szovjetunió követése volt a meghirdetett cél.
56
  
A formálódó bolgár ellenzék környezetvédelmi és emberi 
jogi kérdések felvetésén keresztül kezdte meg a pártállam 
bírálatát. Természetesen egyelőre fel sem merülhetett az 
ellenzéki pártformációk megalakításának gondolata. Helyette 
az ellenzéki értelmiségiek tiltakozó társadalmi mozgalmakat 
szerveztek a szocialista iparosítás súlyos környezetromboló 
hatásai, és a török kisebbséget elnyomó állami politika ellen. A 
környezetvédelem kérdése Bulgáriában is az 1986-ban 
bekövetkező csernobili atomerőmű–katasztrófa kapcsán merült 
fel. Az első komolyabb ellenzéki szervezet a Duna–menti Rusze 
városában alakult meg. 1987-től kezdve a ruszei kisgyermekes 
anyák tiltakozó megmozdulásokat szerveztek a város levegőjét 
szennyező giurgiui vegyikombinát működése ellen. Támo- 
gatásukra a város értelmisége létrehozta a Rusze Bizottságot. 
Az országos mozgalommá terebélyesedő tiltakozás követelte a 
bolgár kormánytól, hogy tegyen lépéseket a román félnél a határ 
menti vegyi üzem bezárása érdekében. A mozgalom 1989. április 
11-én hivatalosan is felvette az Ekoglasznoszt elnevezést. 
Meghirdetett programjában az ökológiai politika demokratikus 
társadalmi ellenőrzésén túl már a sajtószabadság igénye, és a 
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többi emberi jog követelése is megfogalmazódott.
57
  
Nyugaton először 1987 januárjában figyeltek fel a bolgár 
másként gondolkodók tevékenységére. Ekkor hat disszidens 
beadványt nyújtott be az Európai Biztonsági és Együttműködési 
Értekezlet (EBEÉ) bécsi konferenciáján a „bulgáriai emberi 
jogok és alapvető szabadságok” hiányát hangsúlyozva. Ez a kis 
csoportosulás 1988. január 17-én megalakította a Független 
Szervezetet az Emberi Jogok Védelmére, azzal a céllal, hogy 
adatokat gyűjtsön az emberi jogok bulgáriai megsértéséről, és 
segítse a bolgár kormányt az emberi jogok minél nagyobb fokú 
biztosításában. A nemzetközi figyelem hatására a hatalom 
látványos intézkedésekkel létrehozta a kincstári Emberi Jogi 
Bizottságot, hogy ezzel is bizonyítsa, hogy valóban törődik az 
emberi jogokkal, és kifogja a szelet az ellenzéki vitorlákból.
58
  
Az első tisztán politikai célokat kitűző szervezetet száztíz 
vezető értelmiségi hozta létre a szófiai egyetemen, 1988. 
november 3-án. A tömörülés felvette a Nyilvánosságot és 
Átépítést Támogató Független Vitaklub elnevezést – közkeletű 
nevén, Peresztrojka (Vita)klub. A klub megalapításában részt 
vett néhány magas rangú BKP funkcionárius is, akiket ezért 
kizártak a pártból. Ez mindenesetre komoly figyelmeztető 
jelzés volt a hatalom számára, hogy a disszidens gondolatok 
beszivárogtak a pártapparátus struktúrái közé. A Vitaklub 
elnökévé az egyik legnevesebb bolgár másként gondolkodót, a 
filozófus Zselju Zselevet választották. Zselev 1982-ben publikálta a 
fasizmus és szocializmus összehasonlításáról szóló – azonnal 
be is tiltott – művét, amellyel országos hírnévre tett szert.59  
                                                        
57  Crampton, R., Op. cit., 214. Perry, D. M. From Opposition to 
Government: Bulgaria’s “Union of Democratic Forces” and its Antecedents. 
– In: Höpken, W. (Hrsg.). Revolution auf Raten. Bulgariens Weg zur 
Demokratie. München, 1996, 29. Az Ekoglasznoszt társadalmi mozgalom 
politikai program- nyilatkozata. – In: Pándi L. (Ed.). A kelet-európai diktatúrák 
bukása,1985–1990. Szeged, 1993, 182–184.  
58 Perry, D. M., Op. cit., 28. 
59 Ibid., 29. Kapronczay, P. Bulgária a rendszerváltás felgyorsulásának korában. 
– In: Glatz F. (Ed.). Proletárdiktatúrákból a polgári demokráciákba (1989–1992). 
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Todor Zsivkov bukásáig nem indulhatott meg az ellenzéki 
csoportok és mozgalmak pártokká szerveződése az egypárti 
hatalom szilárdsága miatt. A pártosodás későbbi viszonylag 
gyors lezajlását mégis elősegítette az a tény, hogy 1989 
elejétől elkezdődött az addig szigorúan állampárti felügyelet 
alatt álló szakszervezeti mozgalom bomlása. A kezdeményezés 
ezúttal is a városi értelmiség felől érkezett. 1989. február 11-én 
Konsztantin Trencsev vezetésével Plovdivban megalakult az 
értelmiségiek és művészek szakszervezete, a Podkrepa 
(Támogatás). A radikálisan antikommunista szakszervezet 1989 
végére több foglalkozási ágra is kiterjesztette érdekvédelmi 




Todor Zsivkov rezsimjének bukását felgyorsította az 1989 
májusában ismét fellobbanó nemzetiségi konfliktus, amely két 
következménnyel is járt: elmélyítette a gazdaság válságát, és 
fokozta Bulgária nemzetközi elszigeteltségét. Az etnikai krízist 
teljesen banális módon egy rémhír váltotta ki: miután a bolgár 
parlament elfogadta világútlevélről és a kettős állampolgárságról 
szóló törvényt, szárnyra kapott az a feltételezés az észak-kelet 
bulgáriai török kisebbség körében, hogy a kivándorolni szán- 
dékozókat Ankara nem fogadja be, ha megváltoztatták a 
nevüket. 1989. május 19. és 31. között a török lakosság 
tüntetésekkel és tömeges éhségsztrájkokkal tiltakozott nemze- 
tiségi jogainak és vallásszabadságának korlátozása miatt. Az 
etnikai zavargások átterjedtek a dél-kelet bulgáriai török lakta 
vidékekre is. A megmozdulások megfékezésére a hatóságok 
kijárási tilalmat hirdettek az érintett területeken, és csak a 
katonaság és a karhatalom bevetésével tudtak véget vetni a 
tiltakozásoknak, ami halálos áldozatokkal is járt.
61
  
1989. május 29-én Todor Zsivkov a rádióban és televízióban is 
                                                                                                          
Rendszerváltások Európában és a nagyvilágban. Bp., 2004, 115–116. 
60 Perry, D. M., Op. cit., 30; Kapronczay, P., Op. cit., 117. 
61 Molnár É., Nagy Z., Vladár T. (Eds.). Földindulás Kelet-Európában, 
1989-1990, Bulgária. Bp., MTI Sajtóadatbank, 15. 
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sugárzott beszédében a bulgáriai mohamedán lakosság lázításával 
vádolta Törökországot, és felszólította a török kormányt, hogy 
nyissa meg országa határait az áttelepülni szándékozók előtt. A 
szaporodó nehézségeket a rezsim a bolgár lakosság naciona- 
lista érzelmeinek felkorbácsolásával próbálta palástolni. A nyár 
folyamán előbb Szófiában, majd pedig országszerte kormány- 
párti tömeggyűlések szervezésére került sor, amelyeken Zsivkov 
beszédével összhangban követelték a török kormány „bolgár 
belügyekbe történő beavatkozásának” beszüntetését, és az 
áttelepülni szándékozó bulgáriai muzulmánok előtt a török 
határ megnyitását. Természetesen elítélték és hazaárulással 
vádolták a török kisebbség jogai mellett többször is felszólaló 
Peresztrojka Vitaklubot és a Podkrepa szakszervezetet.
62
 
A bolgár nyomás hatására a török hatóságok megnyitották 
a határt, de a meginduló menekültáradat rövid időn belül 
humanitárius válsághelyzetet idézett elő Törökországban. Mire 
1989. augusztus 22-én a török kormány ismét lezárta a határt, 
már legalább 350 ezer személy emigrált török földre (1989 
végéig közülük 150 ezren visszatértek Bulgáriába). A török 
kisebbség exodusa súlyos munkaerőhiányt és ellátási gondokat 
idézett elő Bulgáriában. Elsősorban a mezőgazdasági termelés 
(pl. dohánytermelés) esett vissza, de számos ipari üzem is 
leállni kényszerült. A kormány munkaerő átcsoportosítási 
kísérletei nem sok eredménnyel jártak.
63
 
Az etnikai konfliktus ismét jelentős nemzetközi presztízs- 
veszteséget okozott Bulgáriának. 1989. szeptember 26-án a 
strassbourgi Európai Parlament felszólította Bulgáriát, hogy 
vessen véget erőszakos asszimilációs politikájának, de egyben 
figyelmeztette Törökországot is, hogy szüntesse be a bulgáriai 
muszlim lakosság irányában kifejtett propagandisztikus tájé- 
koztatást. Az Iszlám Konferencia Szervezetének külügymi- 
niszteri értekezlete is hasonló szellemben nyilatkozott, és 
felszólította mindkét államot, hogy kezdjenek tárgyalásokat a 
                                                        
62 Perry, D. M., Op. cit., 32; Földindulás Kelet-Európában, Op. cit., 16. 
63 Kapronczay, P., Op. cit., 122–123. 
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bulgáriai török kisebbségről, és a menekültek helyzetének 
rendezéséről. Az ügyben döntő jelentőséggel bírt, hogy az 
amerikai kormány biztosította Ankarát támogatásáról, ugyanakkor 
a szovjetek is jelezték Szófiának, hogy nem kívánnak belekeve- 
redni Bulgária nemzeti kérdésébe. A magára maradt bolgár 
kormány 1989. október 30-án, Kuvaitban, tárgyalóasztalhoz 
ült török partnerével, de csak abban tudtak megállapodni, hogy 
folytatják a tárgyalást. A két ország viszonyának normalizálása, 
és a bulgáriai török kisebbség helyzetének rendezése így már 
csak a Zsivkov-rendszer bukása után történhetett meg.
64
  
A végső lökést Todor Zsivkov hatalomból történő eltávo- 
lításához – a nemzetközi elszigeteltség mellett – az ellenzék 
tevékenységének felerősödése idézte elő 1989 októberében. A 
bolgár ellenzék aktivizálódását az a szerencsés körülmény 
segítette elő, hogy 1989. október 15. és november 3. között 
nemzetközi ökológiai konferenciát rendeztek Szófiában, a 
helsinki záróokmányt aláíró harmincöt ország képviselőinek 
részvételével. Az Ekoglasznoszt és a többi ellenzéki csoport 
kihasználta a konferenciára akkreditált nemzetközi sajtó rájuk 
irányuló figyelmét. A konferencia ideje alatt több nemzetközi 
sajtótájékoztatót és felvonulást szerveztek, bírálva a bolgár 
kormány környezetkárosító és a szabadságjogokat sértő 
politikáját. A hatóságok kezdetben az aktivisták letartózta- 
tásával reagáltak, de a nemzetközi felháborodás hatására végül 
kelletlenül engedélyezték a felvonulásokat, amelyek egyre 
nagyobb tömegeket vonzottak. 1989. november 3-án az Eko- 
glasznoszt már egy 4 ezer fős, nyíltan demokráciát követelő 
tömeggyűlést tartott Szófiában.65 
A kelet-európai államszocialista rendszerek egymás utáni 
összeomlása, és az ellenzék látványos megerősödése a BKP 
vezetői előtt is felvetette a társadalmi robbanás, valamint a hatalom 
elveszítésének rémképét. A hatalomelvesztéstől való félelem, 
                                                        
64 Földindulás Kelet-Európában, Op. cit., 16–17; Crampton, R., Op. cit., 
215. 
65 Földindulás Kelet-Európában, Op. cit., 17. 
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illetőleg a szándék, hogy kézben tartsák a megállíthatatlan 
változásokat, cselekvésre ösztönözte a kommunista párt legfelsőbb 
vezetését, amely a gorbacsovi peresztrojka megvalósításán túl nem 
igazán óhajtotta az addigi hatalmi monopólium elvesztésével 
járó nyugati típusú többpártrendszer kialakulását. Egyetlen 
akadály állt az útjukban: Todor Zsivkov személye. A szovjetek 
hallgatólagos támogatását élvezve, Zsivkov legközvetlenebb 
munkatársai közül Petăr Mladenov külügyminiszter, Andrej 
Lukanov KGST-be delegált miniszterelnök-helyettes, valamint 
Dobri Dzsurov tábornok, honvédelmi miniszter, több más PB-tag 
támogatásával összeesküvést szerveztek azzal a céllal, hogy 
Zsivkovot elmozdítsák a párt éléről. Habár Zsivkov tudta, hogy 
mi készülődik ellene (november 8-án Dzsurov informálisan 
visszavonulásra szólította fel), már nem maradt elég ereje ahhoz, 
hogy a PB november 10-i ülésén megakadályozza menesztését 







Todor Zsivkov távozása a hatalomból felgyorsította a politikai 
változások ütemét. A BKP új vezetése elsősorban saját 
helyzetét igyekezett stabilizálni a párt és az ország élén. A 
Politikai Bizottság 1989. november 16-i ülésén leváltottak 
több Zsivkov-párti tagot, s újakat kooptáltak – köztük a 
korábban Zsivkov kegyeiből kieső Alexandăr Lilovot. A 
rákövetkező napon az egypárti parlament leváltotta Zsivkovot 
az Államtanács éléről. Mladenov lett az új államfő. Beiktatási 
beszédében kijelentette, hogy a legfontosabb feladat a totali- 
tarizmusból a demokráciába való békés átmenet biztosítása az 
ország számára. Ígéretet tett új nemzetgyűlési választások 
megrendezésére, és a gazdasági rendszer reformjára. A demokra- 
tikus jogállammá átalakuló Bulgária számára egy új alkotmány 
                                                        
66 Ágh, A., Op. cit., 236; Dimitrov, V., Op. cit., 35–36; Lévesque, J., Op. cit., 
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kidolgozását ígérte, amely igazságosan rendezi majd a nemzeti 
kérdést és a nemzeti egység tartós pillére lesz. Mladenov kitért 
az ország ökológiai helyzetére is. A külkap- csolatok terén az 
Európa felé történő gazdasági és politikai nyitást szorgalmazta, 
miközben hitet tett a Szovjetunióhoz fűződő történelmi 
barátság és együttműködés fenntartására.67 
Az államfő ígéretei nem fékezték le az ellenzék aktivizálódását. 
1989. november 18-án az ellenzéki csoportok kezdeményezésére 
150 ezren tüntettek Szófia főterén Zsivkov felelősségre vonását, az 
új alkotmány kidolgozását, és a demokratikus szabadságjogok 
biztosítását követelve. Ez volt az első igaz ellenzéki tömeg- 
demonstráció, és ettől kezdve egészen 1990 végéig az ellenzék 
rendszeresen élt a békés utcai nyomásgyakorlás eme 
eszközével, hogy elfogadtassa követeléseit a BKP vezetőivel. Az 
ellenzék tevékenységének felerősödése elindította a pártosodás 
folyamatát, ami nagyon rövid idő alatt, 1990 elejére lezajlott.68 
                                                        
67 Földindulás Kelet-Európában, Op. cit., 17. „A bogár nép és Bulgária érdeke 
mindenek felett fog állni” (Petăr Mladenov államfő nemzetgyűlési beszéde) 
(1989. nov. 17.). – In: Pándi L., Op. cit., 185–187.  
68  Földindulás Kelet-Európában, Op.cit., 17. Kănev, Kr. From 
Totalitarianism to a Constitutional State. – In: Coenen-Huther, J. (Ed.), Op. 
cit., 53; Kapronczay, P., Op. cit., 117. 
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Analyzing the problems of cooperation between Comecon 
member-states (Council for Mutual Economic Assistance) 
concerning economic activities regarding the ‘developing’ 
countries of the Third world has an important significance for 
testing the capabilities of Moscow to impose its ideas of 
collaboration in the community as a whole, as well as for 
studying the obstacles for the ‘developing’ countries in the 
communist bloc in accomplishing the paramount objective of 
acceleration of the modernization process. A specific comparison 
between the Bulgarian and Hungarian economic performance 
gives suitable ground in this direction. The research is confined 
by the Oil crisis of 1973 as long as its consequences reflected 
negatively all spheres of relations in Comecon. 
Designed by Stalin as a form of control over the East 
European Soviet satellites through supranational structures of 
economic binding, Comecon was constituted in 1949. Lacking 
practice in arranging imperial mechanisms, the communist 
Kremlin was unable to promote significant initiatives in the 
early years of the Comecon development and the head office 
started its actions with initiatives of redirecting the foreign 
economic relations of member-states within the boundaries of 
the organization, predominantly in bilateral trade form. 
However, increasing economic difficulties forced the East 
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European countries, even in Stalin’s lifetime, to undertake 
certain sole steps aiming to stimulate economic relations with 
the so-called Third world countries. Trying mainly to compensate 
deficiencies of convertible currency, the communist regimes 
imagined it could be earned by exports of overstocks in light and 
heavy industry output, like artificial fertilizers, in addition to a 
few agricultural commodities. In contrast to Bulgaria, the 
Hungarian People’s Republic (HPR) succeeded to certain 
traditions regarding the economic relations with the Latin 
American countries and despite the fact that it was one of the 
camp of the defeated in the World War II it rapidly restored its 
economic contacts. For the period between 1948 and 1955 
Budapest was successful to reach the pre-war level of the trade 
volume with the Latin America. The share of these countries in 
the Hungarian export increased to 4%.
1
 
The People’s Republic of Bulgaria (PRB) ought to pave the 
way for enforcing economic relations with the developing 
countries solely as well, but in comparison to Hungary, the 
achieved results were of limited size in addition to the different 
direction, in which these contacts developed, namely, the 
historically and geographically close region of the Middle East. 
After signing of the peace treaty in 1947 Sofia was successful 
only in restoration its economic relations with Egypt, although 
lacking potential of imposing the Bulgarian economic interests.
2
 
According to a Politburo resolution of February 1953, a 
Bulgarian trade delegation visited numerous developing countries 
in the Middle East, Asia and Africa in the autumn of the same 
year. The members of the delegation reported that there were 
passable conditions for the development of profitable trade, 
                                                        
1 Domeny, J., The History of Hungarian-Latin-American Relations after the 
Second World War: A Brief Account.  
http://www.coldwar.hu/html/en/publications/latin.html 
2 Филипова, Н. Българската дипломация в Египет, Сирия и Ирак във 
времето на Студената война (средата на 50-те – средата на 70-те години 
на ХХ в. С., 2008, 32–34. 
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especially in key points like Lebanon, Syria and Iran, but added 
that the coordination between the communist regimes was of 
critical importance and at first level, as regards jointly arranged 
transportation of goods. The Bulgarian Black sea port of Bourgas 
could be, even under the estimation of an authoritative 
Lebanese mediatory company, developed as a convenient sea 
transport exit for Hungarian and Czechoslovakian commodities 
as well. Similar joint venture would guarantee a loading of sea 
vessels at maximum effectiveness, decreasing transport 
expenses for all of the participating countries.
3
  
For the underdeveloped Bulgaria it also seemed 
inappropriate that every Comecon-state solely ‘discovered’ and 
was practicing the more profitable forms of trade, not 
announcing them before the allies. In the above mentioned 
report it was pointed out that Hungary had already outpaced its 
allies and was benefiting from employing local mediatory 
companies, which were interested in increasing the sales of the 
Hungarian trade surplus for the agreed opportunity to share 
sales earnings. The Bulgarian experts added that not simply the 
lack of coordination, but the rivalry between member-states of 
Comecon was irritating as long as each of the state 
organizations was trying to secure the implementation of plan 
targets. It was unmistakably concluded that the Bulgarian 
industrial products were hardly salable even on the markets of 
the ‘developing’ countries due to high production costs and their 
poor quality.
4
 In such a context, any ideologically grounded 
behavior of coordinated price policy was illusionary.  
The Hungarian foreign trade initiatives aroused Sofia’s envy 
as well as for the sole breakthrough in the Egyptian market, going 
beyond trade exchange and developing more profitable forms of 
economic infiltration. By 1955 a Hungarian state company had 
already constructed six bridges in the country on the Nile River 
                                                        
3 The Central State Archives of the Republic of Bulgaria (hereafter CSA), F. 
259, Inventory 9, Doc. 47, 1–11, 18, 56.  
4 Ibid., 8–10. 
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and that year Hungary became the first communist country to 
offer Cairo a construction of a plant for artificial fertilizers.
5
 
Demonstrating independent creativity in the construction 
branch, in 1956 a Bulgarian company started building such 
projects in Syria at loss or at small profit, trying to pay 
attention over the Bulgarian constructors’ professional potential 
and the negotiators’ ‘conciliatoriness’.6 
In the pursuit of securing his sole power positions on the 
political Olympus in Kremlin, Nikita Khrushchev launched in 
the mid-1950s a series of actions that had to distinguish 
categorically his policy from Stalin’s approach and to 
contribute to attempts at stabilizing the tottering imperial 
building of the Communist bloc. Khrushchev’s new political 
and economic approach regarding the ‘developing’ countries 
had to make an essential contribution towards the fulfillment 
of his imperial ambitions. At the 20
th
 congress of the 
Communist party of the Soviet Union the countries 
‘emancipating from colonialism’ were given an ideological 
‘inauguration’ by the Soviet leader being recognized as a part 
of the powers of the ‘progress’ entitled to transfer mankind to 
the just final point of history, communism, via socialism.
7
 
Along with Khrushchev’s clear political message, the 
triggering of economic relations of the communist bloc with 
the Third world countries was of even more critical importance. 
Stalin’s death allowed the satellites to share their economic 
difficulties more frankly. Moscow believed that the role of 
Comecon was not only to develop intra-communist economic 
relations but also to enhance and coordinate trade relations of 
the Soviet Union and its satellites with the Third world, and 
more importantly, to coordinate initiatives of the USSR and 
                                                        
5 The Diplomatic Archives of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Republic of 
Bulgaria (hereafter DA–MFA), Inventory 7 secret /7s/, Doc. 393, 18. 
6 DA–MFA, Inv. 15, Doc. 782, 25. 
7 Хрущёв Н.С., О культе личности и его последствиях. Доклад XX 
съезду КПСС. - Известия ЦК КПСС, 1956, № 3, 25–30, 40. 
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the East European regimes as regards ‘lending economic and 
technical assistance’ to the ‘developing’ countries. These aims and 
mechanisms were also given appropriate ideological explanations. 
However, lifting the ideological curtain, it was evident that 
the ‘pure’ purposes of the communist assistance did not differ 
from the strategy of the West qualified as neo-colonial. The 
simple logic of the Comecon states was to secure direct supplies 
of cheap industrial raw materials from the ‘developing’ countries 
due to various basic and unexpected complications: increasing 
deficits within the Comecon community, Moscow’s incapacity to 
cover those deficits, the expensive experiment of their import in 
Comecon from the Western markets, paying in convertible 
currency. Reciprocally, in Comecon simply planned that such 
imports could be covered by exports of the communist 
overproduction of industrial goods, machinery, manufacture 
equipment and labor force as well. Securing the achievement of 
that goal was of critical importance too. According to rough 
Comecon analyses at the end of 1955 the overproduction was 
estimated at 2 billion rubles.
8
 Even underdeveloped countries 
like Bulgaria were out of capacity to buy machinery overstocks of 
the developed Central European communist states because of the 
lack of financial resources – Sofia announced before the 8th 
Session of Comecon of June 1957 that by 1960 the ambitions of 
the Comecon machinery producing countries to sell their 
products on the Bulgarian market had to be cooled down.
9
  
However, according to the communist ideological dogma, 
it was needed to continue investing into the branches of heavy 
industry, regardless the fact that their selling was hard to be 
provided. With the envisaged difficulties of selling industrial 
output within Comecon space and on the Western markets, the 
‘developing’ countries were assumed as an easily achievable 
target. 
                                                        
8 Никова, Г. The Council for Mutual Economic Assistance and Bulgaria /in 
Bulgarian. С., 1989, 107. 
9 CSA, F. 1B, Inv. 5, Doc. 3273, 8–10. 
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Taking into account many negative circumstances for the 
communist bloc like the constant propaganda threat about the 
communist economic and political enslavement, in addition to 
traditional trade links between the ‘developing’ countries and 
the former metropolises, the important mission to coordinate 
actions of its member-states with the uppermost task to avoid any 
intra-organizational contest fell on Comecon. The Bulgarian 
leadership was the most supportive of the proclaimed idea for 
extending Comecon’s relations with the Third world as well as 
for a directive order of coordinating the economic initiatives of all 
communist countries. During Bulgarian foreign trade 
representatives’ consultations with the government in June 
1957 the party leader Todor Zhivkov warned about the danger 
of economic ‘draining’ of Comecon in case actions of different 
states in the ‘developing’ countries were left to follow market 
logic and a contest between them was not prevented.
10
 As 
regards all other spheres of intra-communal economic activities, 
Sofia expected that the developed communist states demonstrated 
their good will and ‘proletarian internationalism’11 lending 
assistance to Bulgaria while sustaining economic losses.  
Sofia’s stand under the slogan ‘let us behave in the spirit of 
Comecon decisions’ could be easily explained by the experience 
recorded in numerous analyses – already accumulated by the 
early 1960s – on non-competitiveness of the Bulgarian industrial 
goods even as regards the underestimated markets of the 
‘peripheral’ Third world.12 For similar sorts of machinery the 
Hungarian trade organizations offered better price levels 
compared to the Bulgarian ones. Those achievements 
supported the Hungarian efforts to increase sales and to contend 
successfully even the Czechoslovakian positions.
13
 It became 
clear that coordination couldn’t be reached even regarding an 
                                                        
10 CSA, F. 1B, Inv. 5, Doc. 270, 251–252. 
11 CSA, F. 1B, Inv. 6, Doc. 3273, 9. 
12 DA–MFA, Inv. 8s, Doc. 714, 2–4. 
13 CSA, F. 473, Inv. 1, Doc. 37, 88; CSA, F. 473, Inv. 2, Doc. 35, 104. 
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easily surmountable issue like organizing joint exhibitions for 
machinery products and every communist state, pursuing 
maximum profits, organized separate representations.
14
 
Rivalry covered all areas and Bulgarian foreign trade 
organizations experienced losses when Hungarian organizations 
succeeded in underbidding market offering lower prices for 
processed vegetables,
15
 a sphere in which Bulgaria assumed to 
be a Comecon producing leader. It is reasonable to suggest that 
those Hungarian goods were in fact of Bulgarian origin, 
exchanged via bilateral trade clearing system.  
Despite the clear difficulties with the coordination at the 
level of external for the Comecon trade relations, in the late 
1950s head bodies of the organization were developing plans 
for cooperation regarding the more profitable and long-term 
forms of economic activity in the Third world – those of 
design and construction of industrial plants, execution of 
infrastructural projects and export of labor force of different 
professional spheres and qualification. For the 1957–1959 
period the members of the Comecon Commission of industrial 
equipment exports repeatedly were discussing necessity of 
joint initiatives, however such were executed only by the 
developed communist states. It was also estimated that in 
order to make a significant breakthrough in the ‘developing’ 
countries the Comecon states had to secure additional financial 
resources for crediting of their economic initiatives. Regardless 
Comecon decisions, Hungary acted solely also in this direction. 
In the beginning of 1960s Hungarian state organizations exported 
industrial equipment for 86.7 billion rubles and gave credits 
for construction of power plants and other industrial projects.
16
  
As a result of the discussed negative circumstances, in 
addition to financial weakness and the low level of industri- 
alization of the Bulgarian economy, Bulgarian construction 
                                                        
14 CSA, F. 259, Inv. 13, Doc. 46, 40. 
15 CSA, F. 473, Inv. 2, Doc. 35, 106. 
16 Nikova, G., Op. cit., 251–252, 256–259. 
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organizations were rarely chosen as sub-contractors only by 
Soviet state firms. In the beginning the Bulgarian organizations 
could take part in joint projects thanks to credits given by Moscow 
to the ‘developing’ countries. Under such conditions in 1960 the 
Bulgarian “Techno export’ started building a plant for drying onion 
in Egypt earning a minimum profit. By the beginning of 1960s 
Bulgaria was solely ‘lending technical assistance’ in 
construction business in the Third world for 75 million rubles.
17
  
Discrepancy between the Soviet appeals and actions 
concerning the communist cooperation regarding economic 
activities in the Third world became evident at the meeting of the 
Warsaw Pact in February 1960, when Nikita Khrushchev 
‘blundered accidentally’ that ‘the socialist countries will continue 
lending assistance to the developing countries in a form of 
bilateral agreements’. 18  For the 14th Comecon Session in 
February 1961 the official report declared that Comecon 
member-states were developing 552 industrial and infrastructural 
projects in the Third world. However – as if it had been written 
without Soviet participation – the analysis summarized that about 
90% of the mentioned economic activities were performed by 
Soviet organizations while simultaneously criticizing non- 
coordinated approach at Comecon level, poor cooperation, too 
long terms of accomplishment of the industrial projects, 
technological backwardness of the exported manufacturing 
enterprises. The report concluded that if those failures were 
not overcome, the very future development of those activities in 
the ‘developing’ countries would be threatened by collapse partly 
due to the Western contest, including supra-state international 
trusts, partly due to successful maneuvering of the Third world 
regimes between the two Cold war blocs.
19
 And again, going 
round in vicious circle, at its meeting on December 20, 1962, the 
                                                        
17 CSA, F. 1B, Inv. 6, Doc. 4384, 26; DA–MFA, Inv. 21, Doc. 3616, 39; 
DA–MFA, Inv. 21, Doc. 3616, 37-40, 58-59. 
18 CSA, F. 1B, Inv. 6, Doc. 4093, 26–28. 
19 CSA, F. 1B, Inv. 6, Doc. 4384, 21–26. 
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Executive Committee of Comecon launched ‘Common principles 
of the economic cooperation of Comecon member-states with the 
developing countries’, and the next year – an ‘Order for 
participating in auctions’, framework suggestions that had to be 
followed by all communist states.
20
 Moreover, what would 
become a time-bomb, particularly in crisis situations, was the fact 
mentioned on the Session of December 1962 that from the 
whole volume of activities concerning ‘lending economic and 
technical assistance’ to the ‘developing’ countries, amounting to 
4.4 billion devaluated rubles, 80% was performed at credit.
21
 
Already by the end of the 1950s the Bulgarian leadership 
realized that the cooperation with the developed Comecon 
countries in performing joint economic projects in the Third 
world was an illusionary ambition. Aiming to circumvent the 
problem of the non-competitiveness of the Bulgarian industry, 
Sofia noticed in ‘the aspiration for achieving full political and 
economic independence on behalf of the newly liberated from 
colonialism countries’ a possibility for ever growing exports of 
Bulgarian arms and military equipment. Without illusions 
regarding the loud resistance that the realization of such an 
ambition would provoke within the ally Warsaw pact space, the 
Bulgarian Politburo was determined to obtain allowance for sales 
of arms manufactured under Soviet licenses, as well as for the 
increase of the Bulgarian arms production and sales on the 
markets of the ‘developing’ countries. In the beginning of 1960s 
Sofia boosted negotiations for such exports to Indonesia, 
Tunisia, Morocco, Syria, Guinea, and Ghana with an aspiration 




Crises were particularly indicative about the resistance to 
coordination in Comecon regarding economic links to the 
Third world – for instance, in situations of deterioration of 
                                                        
20 CSA, F. 1B, Inv. 6, Doc. 4990, 18; CSA, F. 1244, Inv. 1, Doc. 2435, 55, 93. 
21 CSA, F. 1B, Inv. 6, Doc. 4990, 19. 
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political relations between the communist camp and a certain 
state or a union of Third world states; at a time of internal 
political and/or economic complications in some ‘developing’ 
country; in cases of more complicated crisis environment like 
a regional war. One of the first cases of the crisis series 
developed when the first quasi-republican Iraqi dictator Abd 
Al-Karim Qasim was overthrown in February 1963 by Ba’athist 
forces. The communist regimes which succeeded in developing 
their economic relations with this strategically and economically 
important region in the period between the Iraqi ‘revolution’ and 
1963 were discredited by the new government in Baghdad. 
However, despite the clear political base of the foisted economic 
‘sanctions’, the Comecon states did not agree on elaborating joint 
defensive economic strategy. The Bulgarian embassy was even 
complaining that none of the other communist states was 
sustaining economic restrictions similar to those imposed on 
Bulgarian trade and construction enterprises. The economic 
losses due to the anti-Ba’athist propaganda maintained by the 
supported by the Bulgarian government Arab radio stations, 
following actively Moscow’s initiatives, were not compensated 
by the other communist regimes on Iraqi ground.
23
 Not earlier 
than the beginning of 1965 and only in the face of the threat of 
collapse of the Bulgarian economic activities in Iraq some of the 
communist trade representatives in Baghdad decided to make a 
suggestion for their governments in order to liberate Sofia from 
the burden of being a horn for joint venture communist 
enterprise of criticizing Iraqi government.
24
 Apparently that 
proposal was not taken into account, and Todor Zhivkov had to 
solely give explanations to the Egyptian leader Gamal Abdel 
Nasser during the meeting in Cairo in November 1965.
25
  
In the following two years the changes in the Third world 
were even more provocative for the positions and skills of the 
                                                        
23 DA–MFA, Inv. 19s, Doc. 610, 3. 
24 DA–MFA, Inv. 21, Doc. 1314, 46–47. 
25 Filipova, N., Op. cit., 163–164. 
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communist regimes to respond properly to upheavals. As a 
result of military coups two of the ‘friendly’ regimes in 
strategically significant points in Asia and Africa were 
overthrown – Sukarno’s regime in Indonesia and Nkrumah‘s 
government in Ghana. In the Middle East Israel struck 
crushingly the Arab regimes who were supported by Moscow 
and its allies, which discredited the Arab socialism and 
destabilized politically, economically and financially the 
governments in Cairo and Damascus. Observing that series of 
‘failures’ in the Third world, in June 1967 members of the 
Bulgarian politburo even questioned the communist ideological 
prognosis about the forthcoming worldwide victory of socialism, 
just ten years after Khrushchev’s confirmations.26 
In the analyses about the consequences of the crises in the 
Third world at Comecon level it was concluded that the 
recommendations of the early 1960s for the development of 
intra-communal coordination regarding trade strategy, credit 
policy, design and construction of industrial and infrastructural 
projects, and lending professional labour force were not followed 
by member-states.
27
 Communist countries continued to compete 
and by 1968 the cooperation in ‘economic and technical 
assistance’, i.e. construction of industrial enterprises and lending 
labour force was just 1% of the whole volume of Comecon 
agreements with the ‘developing’ countries. Bulgaria was 
executing agreements for ‘economic and technical assistance’ for 
62 million rubles, and Hungary – for 107 million rubles. However, 
the volume of utilized but outstanding credits for those activities 
significantly arose. By 1968 the sum of all Comecon credits for 
Third world was estimated at 3.372 million rubles, and the 
Bulgarian and Hungarian shares – respectively 12.6 million 
rubles and 50.8 million rubles
28
 but Ghana and Indonesia asked 
                                                        
26 Ibid, 186. 
27 CSA, F. 1B, Inv. 6, Doc. 5165, 47-48.; CSA, F. 1B, Inv. 6, Doc. 5755, 96. 
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officially credit payments to be put on installment plans.
29
 
Comecon countries were unable to demand the following of 
time-tables for credit payments as long as the biggest part of 
credits for the ‘developing’ countries like agreements with Ghana, 
Indonesia, Syria and Egypt was under clearing payment system. 
That way of payment seemed plausible in the beginning of 1960s, 
but in the crisis period of the late 1960s a huge indebtedness to 
the communist camp was generated. In addition, the Third 
world governments increasingly insisted that the Comecon 
states should buy production of the industrial plants they had 
constructed.
30
 However, such requests were firmly against the 
initial Comecon strategy – to sell, not to buy industrial goods 
of poor quality. 
Deterioration of the conditions for the fulfillment of the 
formulated paramount Comecon targets was evident when 
discussing trade exchange between the communist and Third 
world countries since it was under clearing payment system as 
well. Hungary noted that the accumulation of enormous 
clearing assets in trade with Syria and Egypt was hard to be 
paid in the situation when partners refused to ‘sell’, in 
sufficient amount, the goods preferred by Hungary, like cotton, 
and unilaterally increased its price. As a result, Hungary had to 
significantly decrease the clearing crediting of the export of 
Hungarian machinery and new industrial plants, regardless 
Budapest’s deep interest in increasing such sales.31 After the 
June war of 1967 Egypt and Syria stopped balancing the 
clearing trade with Bulgaria as well, and Sofia had to increase 
crediting of the export of the Bulgarian bestsellers – arms, 
wheat, and artificial fertilizers – due to the deterioration of the 
economic and financial state of the ‘friendly’ regimes and as a 
result of the negative ‘side effects’ of ‘clearing’ that gave 
opportunity to blackmail the partner. Simultaneously, the 
                                                        
29 CSA, F. 1244, Inv. 1, Doc. 2435, 137. 
30 Ibid., 91. 
31 CSA, F. 259, Inv. 18, Doc. 117, 203–204. 
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export of Bulgarian machinery was decreasing for the falling 
demand and lack of profits.
32
 
The negative tendencies for the economic activities of the 
communist countries that developed in the Third world in 
crisis situations forced the contest between the Comecon states. 
The foreign trade organizations of each communist country 
rushed to improve their balances and to take the maximum 
among the small amount of the partner’s commodities. Despite 
the coordination problems in Comecon, in the end of 1960s the 
head office reported also initiatives of cooperation on the markets 
of the ‘developing’ countries – 1% of the whole amount of 
‘economic and technical assistance’ given by the bloc. Among 
those initiatives were the Hungarian-Bulgarian company 
Intransmach delivering equipment for metallurgic plants, as well 
as transport equipment to Algeria, Iran and Turkey; cooperation 
between the two countries for deliveries of equipment for canning 
industry in the Third world and also Soviet plans to hire 
Bulgarian and Hungarian companies as sub-contractors.
33
  
The issue of increasing deficit of industrial raw materials 
became clearly problematic for Comecon in the mid-1960s. 
According to an analysis of July 1964, reported at a meeting of 
the Executive committee of Comecon, by 1970 the deficits of oil, 
non-ferrous metals, synthetic rubber, and phosphorus containing 
raw materials would be increasingly high.
34
 A year later it was 
estimated that the shortage of solid and liquid fuels in Comecon 
would arise to 107 million tons, so for the depletion of the Soviet 
reserves in the European part of the state Moscow, would be 
incapable to cover the Eastern European demand.
35
 It should be 
added that by the beginning of 1970s the process of passing from 
solid to liquid fuels in Comecon states was in advance. In 1970 
Bulgaria and Hungary were the leaders in using liquid fuels, i.e. 
                                                        
32 Filipova, N., Op. cit., 206, 222–223. 
33 CSA, F. 1244, Inv. 1, Doc. 2435, 16, 136, 181. 
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oil and gas among communist countries – oil constituted 43.3% 
of the Bulgarian energy balance and 29.7% of the Hungarian one, 
while gas consumption counted 2.5% of the Bulgarian energy 
package and 14% of the Hungarian one.
36
  
In the beginning of 1966 the deficit of raw materials for 
the profitable chemical industry was estimated by Comecon 
experts to increase significantly – it was calculated that shortage 
of raw materials containing phosphorus would be 25% of all 
needed amounts, and between 10% and 20% regarding raw 
materials containing sulphur. Bulgaria’s needs of such imports 
were even bigger.
37
 In this context Moscow advised its 
satellites to intensify negotiations in the Third world aiming to 
provide increasing imports.
38
 In 1968 Comecon head advisors 
recommended also that member-states should examine 
possibilities for imports of copper, lead and iron ore, nickel, 
bauxite, and apatite. In the beginning of 1970s the Soviet 
Union repeated its advice to allies to raise imports of oil.
39
 
The problem was growing in the communist bloc with huge 
raw materials and energy consumption caused by the technolo- 
gical backwardness of the continuing industrialization process.
40
 
In the context of the additional intra-community difficulties 
each Comecon state contended the others to provide the needed 
amounts of raw materials from the ‘developing’ countries. 
Hungary outpaced Bulgaria starting importing oil from Syria 
in 1967, despite the poor quality of the Syrian oil. On other 
hand, it gave Hungary the opportunity to diminish negatives 
deriving from the clearing payment system. On its turn, in 
1967 Sofia presented an offer and in 1968 started deliveries for a 
mine and dressing plant for phosphates in Syria. According to the 
                                                        
36 Park, D. Oil and Gas in Comecon Countries. London, 1979, 97–98. 
37 CSA, F. 1B, Inv. 6, Doc. 6140, 59–60. 
38 Filipova, N., Op. cit. 139–140. 
39 CSA, F. 1244, Inv. 1, Doc. 2430, 12; Park, D., Op. cit., 102. 
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agreement, the Bulgarian deliveries would be paid by Syrian 
export of phosphor concentrates.
41
 
In the beginning of 1970 the significance of Algeria and 
Libya as oil suppliers for the Eastern European Soviet satellites 
arose due to the increased demand in the Mediterranean basin 
after the closure of the Suez Canal in 1967. Sofia was ambitious 
to make a breakthrough with the implementation of projects 
regarding extraction and processing of oil. However, even the 
most vociferous supporter of the idea for multilateral 
cooperation in Comecon, Bulgaria, re-oriented its efforts on 




The analysis of Comecon’s economic performance on the 
markets of the ‘developing’ countries of the Third world 
demonstrates contest rather than cooperation between its 
member-states. Moscow was not able to impose collaboration 
in this sphere and the economic units of the communist 
countries were in rivalry in the pursuit of fulfillment of 
separate economic targets. Unlike Budapest, Sofia was 
significantly supportive of the ideas of cooperation, trying to 
avoid the drawbacks stemming from the low level of 
industrialization of the Bulgarian economy. However, the 
Bulgarian leadership could not rely on the ideological 
paradigm of ‘lending assistance to the underdeveloped 
communist countries’ as Moscow was not able to develop 
either mechanisms of hard power to rule its satellites or 
mechanisms of soft power in order to convince member states 
that state interest should be diminished in favor of the interests 
of the whole community.  
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Resuming the main strategic axes of the Gaullist international 
attitude, the French President Georges Pompidou (20 June 1969 – 
2 April 1974) introduced a new region of special national interest 
in the French foreign policy – the Mediterranean. The American 
and the Soviet presence had already been registered there, but that 
was a security zone for France, which wanted to reinforce its 
positions in the Mediterranean. Paris undertook the course of 
closer relations with the littoral countries on the basis of 
former French mandated territories or colonies in the East and 




Until the late 1960s observed only, the Balkans, as part of the 
area, attained double significance. These countries were 
perceived in a wider geopolitical context, for example: the 
Turkish Straits and the proximity to the politically and 
economically valuable Iran, Lebanon and other Mideast Arab 
countries; or the Yugoslavian role in the so called Non-Aligned 
Movement. Therefore France intensified its efforts to enhance its 
influence in the region.
2
 On the other hand, the goodwill in 
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relations between the Balkan countries was seen as a counterpoint 
to the Super Powers confrontation and bloc policy. In this respect, 
the French Minister of Foreign Affairs Maurice Schumann 
delivered a meaningful speech before the National Assembly: 
“For a long time the Balkans used to give a detestable example 
to the world and now the opposite happens: the peace rules 
among all the regimes. Albania is supposed to represent the 
Chinese bridge. Yugoslavia has its own road to socialism, as well 
as Romania, which is a part of the Warsaw pact. Bulgaria is, on 
the contrary, a very instinctively, very historically and sincerely 
loyal country to the Soviet alliance. Finally, there is Greece of the 
colonels I have just talked about and Turkey whose regime in 
the present circumstances is rather indefinable. All these 
countries foreshadow the future conference for security and 
cooperation by the good relations they have with each other… 
Why have the Balkan countries taken this way? A kind of instinct 
pushes them not to want – in this part of the world, around or 
behind the Mediterranean – the fate that decisions would be 
entirely made without them.”3 The increased French activity 
was an important factor in the background of which tensions 
between Bulgaria and Yugoslavia aggravated. 
Due to internal disturbance (federal republics’ autonomy 
movement) Tito’s regime tried to redirect the social indignation 
to a common factor of irritation that was found abroad – Bulgaria. 
After several years of calm relations Yugoslavia returned to the 
controversial issue of the legitimacy of the Macedonian republic 
and the composition (Bulgarian or Macedonian) of the population 
of the Pirin region in Bulgaria,
4
 a behavior that escalated to an 
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open hostility after the Czechoslovakian events by imputing to 
Sofia an irredentist policy. Moscow’s aspirations to attract 
Yugoslavia back to the Socialist camp restrained Bulgaria to 
effectively defend its national positions. In this situation, Sofia 
was forced to diversify its friendships preparing them – just in 
case – for sort of alliance since the main ally, the Soviet Union, 
did not back it. As we shall see, Belgrade took advantage of 
the French interest in the Balkans as well. 
As was said above, in the late 1960s Paris began to pay 
more attention to Balkan relations. The Greek and the Turkish 
government competed for a French support in the Cyprus issue 
but France was unwilling to take side between two equally 
important strategic partners and, maybe, to be involved in an 
internationally complicated crisis. What was the French stance 
toward the Bulgarian-Yugoslavian dispute? 
To start with, French diplomats from the Embassy in Sofia 
frequented the Bulgarian ones in the Ministry of Foreign 
Affairs in order to inform themselves, making no suggestions. 
The same activity was developed in Belgrade, as French 
archives’ papers show. In the Quai an analysis was written on 
the basis of the collected data. 
French expectations were – after Gromyko’s visit to 
Belgrade, in September 1969 – the following the visit of the 
Bulgarian Minister of Foreign Affairs Ivan Bashev – to be 
successful. But it ended with failure and the Quai outlined the 
reasons arguing that Yugoslavia was responsible too, contrary 
to its assertions. Contradictions issued from the ideological 
differences as well as from the Macedonian question. 
Regarding this problem two points of view existed. Bulgaria 
denied having claims to change the border, but insisted on 
having the right to keep up the publications on the Macedonian 
question because there existed no Macedonian nation separately 
from the Bulgarian. However, Belgrade believed that the 
Zhivkov–Tito settlement – this issue was to be concerned only 
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in scientific researches (and to not be treated politically) – was 
used for a customized and tendentious publication from the 
Bulgarian Academy of Sciences. Yugoslavia, on the contrary, 
sustained the existence of a Macedonian nation the majority of 
which was integrated in a republic with the same name within 
the federation. But the Macedonians in the Pirin region were 
submitted to a violent Bulgarianization. And in Belgrade they 
were convinced that Bulgaria would use every chance in case 
of revision of the European borders or difficulties in case of 
Tito’s disappearance from the political scene to tear off Yugoslav 
territories. 
Both countries claimed that they were trying to maintain 
neighborhood relations but “in this respect, as if Bulgarians show 
more persistency as, it seems, less than three months after the 
events in August 1968 Sofia has taken the initiative to propose a 
meeting between Bashev and Tepavats.” In December 1969, it 
was carried out in Belgrade and after this Yugoslavia issued a 
communiqué which gave the impression that the two Ministers 
didn’t come to an understanding. The French Embassies in Sofia 
and Belgrade revealed that Tepavats asked Bashev to recognize 
the existence of the Macedonian nation and the belonging of the 
population of the Pirin region to it referring to the recognition in 
this sense by Georgi Dimitrov. Ivan Bashev shortly replied that he 
wasn’t authorized to discuss the issue and offered an agreement 
renouncing the use of force in relation to the border between the 
two countries. “If these reports are true, they confirm that the 
Yugoslav side didn’t seem to show a spirit of reconciliation.” The 
Quai had several assumptions about the reasons for this behavior 
of Belgrade: either determination for a final settlement of the 
Macedonian question, or irritation of the Bulgarian support of 
the limited sovereignty doctrine, or to discredit Bulgaria before 
Moscow as antagonistic, or the suppression of internal problems 
by provoking Yugoslav unity against traditional rival in the 
Balkans. The Ministry concluded that the Macedonian issue 
was a Balkan dispute, an old and insoluble contradiction which 
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periodically sharpened “given the traditionally volatile and 
complex nature of the Yugoslav relations with the countries of 
the socialist camp.”5 
Bashev’s proposal (an agreement renouncing the use of force) 
was not made only to appease Belgrade and to present a 
well-meaning reassurance. On the one hand, the Yugoslav 
campaign representing Bulgaria as belligerent harmed the 
international image of the latter. On the other hand, Belgrade’s 
declarations about a Macedonian minority in the Pirin region 
were imminent threat to the Bulgarian national security. That is 
why Bulgaria was motivated in supporting the idea of the 
Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe, because all 
participating countries would engage to respect the principles of 
territorial integrity, inviolability of borders, national sovereignty 
etc. Also, Sofia had not forgotten the short-lived anti-Bulga- 
rian Balkan Pact in the 1950s (Greece, Turkey, Yugos- lavia), 
so from the beginning of the 1960s, the years of détente, Bulgaria 
pursued a consistent policy of establishing political, economic 
and cultural cooperation with its neighbors in order to prevent 
another anti-Bulgarian sentiments and alliances. Paradoxically, 
its relations with NATO members Greece and Turkey showed 
the most progress. The Bulgarian approach to the establishment 
of a lasting peace and cooperation in the Balkans greatly 
impressed Paris although, in principle, the Quai was always 
supposing the promotion of the Soviet interests. However, the 
analysis of the Ministry showed that for the moment it was 
more sympathetic to the positions and the efforts of Bulgaria. 
The Quai continued its observations. In March 1970, in 
Paris the regular political consultations between delegations of 
the Ministries of Foreign Affairs of Bulgaria and France took 
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place. The chief of the Quai Political Directorate, Jacques de 
Beaumarchais asked the Bulgarian Deputy Minister Gero 
Grozev whether there was a specific reason for the deterioration 
of the relations between Bulgaria and Yugoslavia in 1968. Grozev 
explained that in relation to the celebration of the 90
th
 anniversary 
of the Bulgarian Liberation in the newspapers features appeared 
about the San Stefano Treaty which served as a pretext to Belgrade 
to launch a campaign against Sofia, asserting that Bulgaria raised 
territorial claims. And after the Czechoslovakian events it deployed 
troops on the border “although the Yugoslav leadership knew 
perfectly well that Bulgaria had no offensive intentions. Apparently, 
thus they wanted to settle some of their internal problems.”6 
For many years Yugoslavia was ignored by France as 
General de Gaulle couldn’t forgive to Tito the death sentence of 
lieutenant-colonel Draža Mihailović (1946), Serbian leader of the 
Yugoslav resistance in the Second World War and a repre- 
sentative of the Yugoslav government in exile in London, 
recognized by the French resistance of General de Gaulle, with 
whom the French President studied at the Military school 
(1930s). Given this background, Tito was a usurper, an illegi- 
timate communist leader. The undisguised anti-French behavior 
of Yugoslavia in the Suez crisis, the Algerian war (in 1959 the 
Ambassadors were temporarily recalled) etc. created another 
tensions. De Gaulle spoke of Yugoslavia as an artificial and 
ephemeral state. During the presidency of Georges Pompidou 
some improvement of relations between France and Yugoslavia 
occurred, but didn’t evolve to a special closeness.7 However, at 
first Sofia didn’t know how the dialogue would develop and the 
                                                        
6 ЦДА, ф. 1477, оп. 26, а.е. 2583, л. 35–41; Note du MAE, Direction des 
Affaires Politiques, Sous-direction d’Europe Orientale, a.s. les consultations 
franco-bulgares: séance du 17 mars. ADMAE, Série Europe 1961–1970, 
Sous-série Bulgarie, cote 173. 
7 Troude, G. La Yougoslavie titiste vue par les diplomates français (1955–1974). 
– Balkanica. Annual of the Institute for Balkan Studies – Serbian Academy of 
Sciences and Arts. Belgrade, XL (2009), 2010, 167–181. 
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Bulgarian leadership was anxious about the visit (22–24.04.1971) 
of the Prime Minister Jacques-Chaban Delmas to Yugoslavia. 
The Bulgarian Embassy in Paris reported that similar political 
positions were expressed (the Mediterranean should belong to 
the Mediterranean countries; the principle of national indepen- 
dence was discussed).
8
 Uneasy, Sofia feared the worst – that 
Belgrade would take advantage of that better climate to initiate 
a united front with France against Bulgaria. That was the reason 
for Sofia to seek ways to prevent such an alliance by undertaking 
political gestures (including the release of a French citizen 
imprisoned for ideological subversion). 
At the same time, Bulgaria became aware that sparing 
statements served the Yugoslav propaganda and Sofia had to 
voice its position. First, Bulgaria had accepted the reality of the 
existence of a Macedonian republic within the Yugoslav fede- 
ration, but definitely rejected Belgrade’s attempts to manipulate 
the past in order to legitimize a Macedonian nationality and 
language. The Medieval Bulgarian state, named Bulgarian in 
Turkish, Greek, Austrian, French and other documents, the 
Ottoman conquest in the Balkans, the Liberation and the 
fragmentation of Bulgaria trough the Berlin Treaty, the 
controversial division of the former administrative region of 
Macedonia between Bulgaria, Greece and Serbia in the Balkan 
War (1912) were recalled. “Proving that historically back to the 
Middle Ages there was a Macedonian nation the Yugoslav side 
went so far as to claiming that there was a Macedonian minority 
in Bulgaria at present and, in particular, that the population of 
Blagoevgrad district which was precisely the part that Bulgaria 
joined after the Balkan war was a Macedonian population. We 
couldn't agree with that because this population had never been 
                                                        
8 Information of Pavel Pavlov, a Second Secretary at the Bulgarian Embassy in 
Paris, about the official visit of the French Prime Minister Jacques-Chaban Delmas 
to Yugoslavia, 22–24.04.1971, Paris, 27.04.1971. ЦДА, ф. 1Б, оп. 81 (Section 
“Foreign Policy and International Relations” of the Central Committee of the 
Bulgarian Communist Party, France, unprocessed fond). 
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Macedonian since, as I said, there was no Macedonian people, 
nation, language and culture in the past. Throughout the 
development of the Bulgarian state this population was 
considering itself Bulgarian, with Bulgarian self-consciousness, 
its language, schools and customs were Bulgarian.”9 
In the meantime, while taking care of world public opinion 
Sofia never ceased its attempts to persuade Belgrade to settle the 
dispute. At the insistence of Bulgaria three meetings at different 
levels were held but they were unsuccessful. The last one was 
between the Deputy Ministers of Foreign Affairs (April 1971) 
and despite the expressed consent of Yugoslavia for further talks, 
no forthcoming meeting outlined. Bulgaria also hoped that the 
dispute would not affect bilateral relations as a whole. However, 
relations were almost completely frozen but in the field of 
economic cooperation.
10
 The Bulgarian démarches were caught 
in Paris: „It must be noted that in this area the Belgrade leaders 
apparently demonstrate more susceptibility than their colleagues in 
Sofia who, without giving up their basic positions, assert gladly 
willing to improve their bilateral relations.”11 The French 
Minister of Foreign Affairs Maurice Schumann who visited 
Bulgaria (10–11.11.1971) praised its Balkan policy which he 
called „model” of the CSCE.12 
However, Sofia did not loosen its national security vigilance. 
The concern was visible in the argumentation of the resolution of 
the Politburo of the Central Committee of the Bulgarian 
Communist Party on “directions and tasks of foreign policy 
                                                        
9 ЦДА, ф. 1477, оп. 27, а.е. 2792, л. 22–24; Conversations franco-bulgares 
entre M. de Beaumarchais et M. Grigorov (Vice-ministre des Affaires Etrangères), 
Sofia, 17.06.1971. ADMAE, Série Europe 1970–1976, Sous-série Bulgarie, cote 
3168. 
10 ЦДА, ф. 1477, оп. 27, а.е. 2792, л. 24; Conversations franco-bulgares 
entre M. de Beaumarchais et M. Grigorov (Vice-ministre des Affaires 
Etrangères), Sofia, 17.06.1971. Ibid. 
11 Note du MAE, Direction des Affaires Politiques, la Sous-direction d’Europe 
Orientale, a.s. la Bulgarie et ses voisins balkaniques, Paris, 11.06.1971. Ibid. 
12 ЦДА, ф. 1477, оп. 27, а.е. 2777, л. 121. 
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activity of the People’s Republic of Bulgaria toward France and 
the development of Bulgarian-French relations in the course of 
1972–1975” (early 1972): “The policy of the PR of Bulgaria 
toward France contributes to the protection of the Bulgarian 
national interests in the Balkans and assists, in particular, that 
France does not hold unfavorable position for PR of Bulgaria on 
controversial Balkan issues.” And the French interest in the 
Balkans “reveals opportunities to reinforce the position of PR of 
Bulgaria in this region of the world, in particular against a trend 
of some Balkan countries to get close on anti-Bulgarian basis. 
For the realization of the PR of Bulgaria’s national interests in 
the Balkans, the level of the Bulgarian-French relations should not 
be lower than that of France’s ties with other Balkan countries, 
some of which marked a significant progress in recent 
years.”13 
French documents showed that Bulgaria had no reason to 
worry. Information of the end of 1972 representing the ethnic 
composition of the population of Bulgaria noted the minorities 
– Gypsies, Turks and Pomaks, without mentioning Macedonian 
minority.
14
French neutral position on the Bulgarian–Yugoslav 
dispute went on contenting to quote the existing views – 
Yugoslavia claimed that it certainly can talk about Macedonian 
“national minority” in Bulgaria, referring to the first censuses 
after the war. “In no way, meet the Bulgarians, for which 
Macedonians and Bulgarians for centuries form one people 
and which commemorate – to the chagrin of Yugoslavs – the 
role of famous Macedonians in the history of Bulgaria.”15 
After all, Sofia was right to fear. In March 1973 French 
parliamentary elections took place, a month later new government 
                                                        
13 ЦДА, ф. 1477, оп. 28, а.е. 2927, л. 6, 10. 
14 Note du MAE, Direction des Affaires Politiques, la Sous-direction d’Europe 
Orientale, a.s. la situation intérieure de la Bulgarie, Paris, 22.11.1972. ADMAE, 
Série Europe 1970–1976, Sous-série Bulgarie, cote 3168. 
15 Note du MAE, Direction des Affaires Politiques, la Sous-direction d’Europe 
Orientale, a.s. la Bulgarie et ses voisins balkaniques, Paris, 22.11.1972. Ibid. 
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was named and along with the change in the Ministry of Foreign 
Affairs – now led by Michel Jobert – French attitude toward the 
Macedonian issue totally altered, i.e. the Yugoslav propaganda 
made its way. On 20 April 1973 the French Ambassador Pol le 
Gourriérec visited the Deputy Minister of Foreign Affairs Nenko 
Chendov and, as usual, he interested about the development of 
Bulgaria’s relations with its neighbors. But to the preceding neutral 
question on the progress of the settlement of the Macedonian issue 
he inserted a comment – “they speak in Yugoslavia that part of the 
Macedonians lives in Bulgaria” – which he would be allowed only 
by explicit instructions. Even more disturbing was that this remark 
came at a time when Paris was preparing to receive the Yugoslav 
Minister of Foreign Affairs Miloš Minić. Michel Jobert spoke very 
kindly about talks with him on 28 May 1973 and he highlighted 
identical interests of France and Yugoslavia regarding the view that 
the international problems should not be decided by the two Super 
Powers and also their common desire for the reduction of 
tension in the Mediterranean by settling the Middle Eastern 
crisis according to the UN resolutions. Jobert pointed out that 
the Yugoslav neutrality and the French membership in NATO 
and the EEC was not an obstacle for them to rediscover and to 
work together for the success of the CSCE.
16
 
At the same time Peter Mladenov visited Greece where he 
signed, among other documents, Declaration of principles of 
neighborliness, understanding and cooperation. This act 
contributed to the strengthening of the positive image of Bulgaria 
and it certainly impressed Paris, judging by the words of Pol le 
Gourriérec: “This is a very important document that Bulgaria 
signed for the first time with a non-socialist country.” He 
believed that this was the result of the realistic policy of the 
Bulgarian government to develop and reinforce relations between 
                                                        
16 ЦДА, ф. 1477, оп. 29, а.е. 2768, л. 14–15; Toast de M. Michel Jobert 
pour le dîner offert à M. Milos Minic, Ministre yougoslave des Affaires 
Etrangères, du lundi 28 mai 1973. ADMAE, Série Europe 1970–1976, Sous- 
série Bulgarie, cote 3169. 
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the Balkan countries, regardless the differences in their social 
systems, in a spirit of understanding and cooperation. In this 
respect, “he said that the positive evaluation and position of 
France toward the realistic and peaceful policy of Bulgaria in the 
Balkans has not changed since the visit of the former French 
Minister of Foreign Affairs Schumann to Bulgaria in September 
1971.”17 But the statement didn't concern the Macedonian issue. 
The Quai prepared information and it reminded that the 
dispute worsened since the Greek Minister of Foreign Affairs had 
spoken in April 1973 about the artificial nature of the 
Macedonian people and its language. The paper presented the 
following positions: according to Yugoslavia, there was a 
Macedonian nation which was divided and, after having 
established the federative republic of Macedonia, its citizens in 
Bulgaria and Greece should be given the status of a minority; 
Greece had always denied the existence of a Macedonian 
minority on its territory; after the war Bulgaria recognized the 
presence of a Macedonian national minority in its territory that 
was reported in the census too. Obviously Belgrade kept silent 
that even before the end of the Second World War Stalin adopted 
the idea of Tito (Soviet ally in the war unlike Sofia) for the 
establishment of a South Slav federation by Yugoslavia, Albania 
and Bulgaria under the auspices of Moscow, a federation in 
which the three parts of the former Macedonia (Aegean, Vardar 
and Pirin) will be merged; that later Stalin ordered that the Pirin 
region get cultural (Macedonian) autonomy and in consequence 
Bulgarian authorities forced the population to be reported as a 
Macedonian in the census. Although the project failed the 
procedure was repeated in 1956 in accordance with the Soviet 
directive to improve relations with Yugoslavia that worsened in 
1949.
18
 After Tito-Stalin split, the French report continued, 
                                                        
17 ЦДА, ф. 1477, оп. 29, а.е. 2768, л. 19–20. 
18 Калинова, Е., Op. cit., 713–727; Sfetas, Sp. The Bulgarian–Yugoslav Dispute 
over the Macedonian Question as a Reflection of the Soviet-Yugoslav Controversy 
(1968–1980). – Balkanica. Annual of the Institute for Balkan Studies – Serbian 
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Bulgaria undertook a violent campaign against the Macedonian 
Republic arguing that this population and its history were 
Bulgarian and, in parallel, in the census data Macedonians in 
Bulgaria “decreased (about 2000 in 1965 and 1500 now).” The 
document noted the mollifying of the Bulgarian irredentist 
position (sic!) since USSR–Yugoslavia relations thawed out, 
as well the recent statement of Peter Mladenov before the 
French Ambassador that Bulgaria recognized the nascence of a 
Macedonian nation within the Federative Republic of 
Macedonia and its language.
19
 
Few months later, the Quai repeated the opinion mentioned 
above. French concept of the Macedonian issue hasn't changed. 
It noted that Sofia made more efforts to get this issue out of the 
way of the development of the bilateral relations because 
Brezhnev’s word had more weight in Bulgaria than in Yugoslavia, 
while the Yugoslav press made jokes from appeasing Bulgarian 
statements. The Quai also reminded Kosygin’s words (September 
1973) about the “Macedonian people who conquered its freedom ... 
in socialist Yugoslavia.” The report noted that the recent visit of 
Miloš Minić to Bulgaria (early November 1973) aimed to thaw out 
relations between Sofia and Belgrade but the Macedonian issue 
remained a bone of contention in which both Bulgaria had to 
comply with the Soviet directive for the pursued unity with 
Yugoslavia, but also showed itself very unyielding.
20
 The report 
was prepared in connection with the forthcoming visit of Peter 
Mladenov to France (21–24 November 1973). The Bulgarian 
                                                                                                          
Academy of Sciences and Arts. Belgrade, XLIII, 2012, 243–246. 
19  Fiche du MAE, Direction des Affaires Politiques, la Sous-direction 
d’Europe Orientale, a.s. la question macédonienne, Paris, le 5 Juillet 1973. 
ADMAE, Série Europe 1970-1976, Sous-série Bulgarie, cote 3169. 
20  Note du MAE, Direction des Affaires Politiques, la Sous-direction 
d’Europe Orientale, a.s. la question macédonienne, Paris, le 12 Novembre 
1973; Note du MAE, Direction des Affaires Politiques, la Sous-direction 
d’Europe Orientale, a.s. la politique extérieure de la Bulgarie, Paris, le 14 
Novembre 1973. ADMAE, Série Europe 1970–1976, Sous-série Bulgarie, 
cote 3170. 
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Ambassador Ivan Budinov warned that Sofia can expect Michel 
Jobert to “pose certain questions firmly bordering the 
pressure.”21 What the Quai did not know was that during the 
Brezhnev’s visit to Bulgaria (September 1973) Todor Zhivkov 
managed to acquire the support of the Soviet leader on the 
Macedonian issue with the argument of the pro–Soviet 
nationalism of Bulgaria and anti-Soviet nationalism of 
Yugoslavia.
22
 This commitment was the reason for the fact 
that, for the first time, a Bulgarian Foreign Minister spoke out 
and stood firm against counterfeiting and claims of the 
Yugoslav propaganda: 
“Mr. Jobert: – Can I ask you a question that you could find a 
little indiscreet, a little strange? Are there any cases in which 
people of nationality, adjacent to Bulgaria, seek refuge in Bulgaria? 
Mladenov took the hint and talked bluntly about the 
Macedonian issue: – There was a time when Bulgaria was a 
great empire. Historians know, one of the largest countries in the 
world. But now we are satisfied with our borders. So we have no 
territorial claims. [...] We proposed to all our neighbors to sign 
an agreement or any document in which we say we have no 
territorial claims. [...] It seems that some neighbors, however, 
have claims on our territory. It would be unsuccessful. I have said 
on another occasion: if we are to defend the national territory, so 
we will. But we are convinced that we would not come to that. 
Mr. Jobert: – [Questions about Greece and Turkey] Why 
the border is not on the Struma?
23
 
                                                        
21 ЦДА, ф. 1477, оп. 29, а.е. 2767, л. 251, 259. 
22 Калинова, Е., Op. cit., 743-744. 
23 In his memoirs Mladenov said that Michel Jobert opened the map of the 
Balkans, said that the borders in the Balkans seem artificial and asked whether 
the border between Bulgaria and Yugoslavia was much more logical to go 
along the river Mesta (since both in the Bulgarian and in the French verbatim 
report was mentioned the Struma River, probably due to faded memories 
Mladenov mistakenly quoted the Mesta River – A/N, I.G.), i.e. he implied that 
the Pirin region had to be part of the Socialist Republic of Macedonia. 
Младенов, Петър. Животът – плюсове и минуси. С., 1992, 60. 
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Mr. Mladenov: – [...] The reasons must be numerous. Why 
not on the Struma, but why not on the Vardar?
24
 The map of 
Bulgaria was many times remade. We want to retain our 
country in its current borders. We want nothing from anyone 
but we will give nothing to anybody. The region you show 
consists part of the Bulgarian population. 
We believe we will keep Bulgaria as it is at present. The 
guarantee of it is our friendship with many countries in the 
world including our friendship with France.”25 
When Peter Mladenov returned in Sofia he prepared a report to 
the party leadership on the results of his visit to France. On the 
specific topic he made the following summary: “Peter Mladenov 
stated in general outlines the PRB policy in the Balkans. Mr. 
Jobert's short replies on Balkan issues showed greatly that our 
position on these issues is not very well known to the French 
Minister of Foreign Affairs. A separate conversation with Jobert on 
this topic took place.”26 In his memoirs Mladenov said that after 2 
hours of talks Michel Jobert and he had a coffee break. The French 
Minister asked about the border between Bulgaria and Yugoslavia. 
Mladenov explained that in the past the border had been deep into 
the current Yugoslav territory, but Bulgaria didn't claim to change 
it. He wanted to know what Jobert would say if someone disputed 
the border between France and Germany and asked for the 
transfer of Alsace and Lorraine to Germany. According to 
Peter Mladenov the French Minister of Foreign Affairs asked 
to forget this conversation and never spoke about this topic.
27
 
Bulgarian and French diplomatic archives as well as historians 
indicated Yugoslavia’s internal problems as a reason for the 
                                                        
24 About 150 km into Macedonian territory from the Bulgarian border, the 
Vardar River passes through the administrative centre of Skopje. 
25 ЦДА, ф. 1477, оп. 29, а.е. 2756, л. 127–130; Entretiens entre M. Jobert 
et M. Mladenov, 22.11.1973 à 10 h 30. ADMAE, Série Europe 1970–1976, 
Sous-série Bulgarie, cote 3170. 
26 ЦДА, ф. 1477, оп. 29, а.е. 2756, л. 180. 
27 Младенов, П., Op. cit., 60. 
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campaign against Bulgaria. Analysis of that era assumed that the 
Yugoslav leadership demonstrated firmness and it attacked 




A modern interpretation of the period of tension notes that 
Bulgaria was aimed at in its role of the most loyal satellite of 
the Soviet Union as an expression of disagreement and protest 
against the Brezhnev doctrine whose initiator Belgrade did not 
dare to oppose directly.
29
 Applying the Cold War means 
Yugoslavia deployed propaganda activity about its victimization 
among potential allies. Washington, where federative nationalist 
movements were known, only contented to quote that “Belgrade 
is convinced that Moscow supports the Bulgarians on the 
Macedonian question, which to the Yugoslavs is tantamount to 
support of Bulgarian claims on Yugoslav territory (e.g., Socialist 
Republic of Macedonia and three border enclaves in Serbia)”.30 
Most likely the US administration did not want to be involved 
in a local conflict that would risk SALT negotiations with the 
Soviet Union or, worst, a new war. Moreover, the US diplomatic 
documents disclosed that between the United States and 
Yugoslavia existed some tension because Belgrade pretended to 
                                                        
28 Bernard, M. Profitant de l’amélioration de ses relations avec Moscou 
Belgrade durcit sa position dans la querelle sur la Macédoine. – Le Monde, 
5.09.1973. – http://www.lemonde.fr/archives 
29 Баева, И. Източна Европа през ХХ в. Идеи, конфликти, митове. С., 2010, 
341. 
30 Telegram From the Under Secretary of State (Katzenbach) to the Department 
of State, Belgrade, 18.10.1968. Foreign Relations of the United States, 
1964–1968, Vol. XVII – Eastern Europe. Washington DC, 1996, 522; National 
Intelligence Estimate, Washington, April 13, 1967. Op. cit., 487; Telegram From 
the Department of State to the Office of the Permanent Representative to the 
North Atlantic Treaty Organization, Washington, 21.06.1971. FRUS, 1969–1976, 
Vol. XXIX – Eastern Europe; Eastern Mediterranean, 1969–1972. Washington 
DC, 2007, 562; Airgram A-385 from the Embassy in Yugoslavia to the 
Department of State, July 23, 1973. FRUS, 1969–1976, Vol. E–15, Part 1 – 
Documents on Eastern Europe, 1973–1976. Washington DC, 2008, Doc. 62. 
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be a leader and spokesman of developing countries and 
Yugoslavia frequently insulted the United States at the UN. 
But Tito’s leadership did not give up and continued to take 
advantage of opportunities. The French policy of settlement of 
influence in the Balkans was accompanied by Belgrade’s attempts 
to establish a strong partnership and – as a consequence – to enlist 
Paris to the Yugoslav position on the Macedonian issue. And 
Bulgaria was trapped by the Soviet policy to attract Yugoslavia to 
the East and had to be delicate in its statements to third parties. 
Initially, France was unwilling to intervene in the dispute, assessing 
it as ancient and complex (i.e. insoluble). But gradually the 
Yugoslav propaganda prevailed and Belgrade’s position was 
evaluated as more convincing and truthful. One can only speculate 
as to where Paris would come in support of Yugoslavia given the 
general agreement, at the same time, for a CSCE whose guiding 
principle was to guarantee the security and territorial integrity of 
the countries in Europe. However, soon after the change in the 
French position Bulgaria assured the support and protection of the 
USSR. Provided with such a strong back, Sofia already stood up 
firmly for its position and thanks to the proficiency of the 
Bulgarian Minister of Foreign Affairs Peter Mladenov alleged 
Macedonian minority in Bulgaria was refuted and Paris distanced 
itself from the dispute. Of course, Belgrade kept trying and it 
sought support during the discussions of the CSCE.
31
 
                                                        
31 Григорова, И. Аспекти от българската политика на Балканите в контекста 
на подготовката и провеждането на Съвещанието за сигурност и 
сътрудничество. – In: Сборник с доклади и съобщения от международна 
конференция „135 години по-късно: България-Русия-Евразия”, проведена в 
СУ „Св. Кл. Охридски”, 27 февруари – 1 март 2013 г., under print. 
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A quarter of century after the collapse of the Communist system 
is a sufficient time for an evaluation of the changes and the nature 
of the transition, the lost opportunities and hence – the price, 
which the Bulgarian society had to pay for alteration of the 
political paradigm. The positives are visible – Bulgaria today is a 
member of NATO and the European Union. This determines its 
position in the new world order and allows finding a support for 
its needs of modernizing. If only the new elite really wants 
it. Because the ruling class of today is a product of some 
reduplication patterns, typical of Russia and the Ukraine, and not 
of the circulation practices known in Central Europe. This 
explains the peculiarities of the Bulgarian transition, which in 
other times and other places would have different dimensions.  
Two hundred years after the French Revolution, which blazed 
the trail for the real New Time, Europe became again a witness to 
the collapse of a system that seemed to be unshakable. The active 
revolutionary period in France took place over one decade – with 
the end of the Directoire exécutif (November, 10
th
 1799) began the 
rise of Napoleon, the future Emperor of France. The intensive 
transition time in post-communist Europe lasted also for ten years – 
in 1999 the NATO bombing in sovereign Serbia put the end of 
the bloody fight reshaping the political map of the Balkans after 
the Yugoslav breakup. It was at that time that Vladimir Putin 
replaced Yeltsin as president of Russia and started the new course, 
characterized by return to the Russian old imperial idea. But if 
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two centuries ago the events in France have played the role of 
social catalyst that corrected the evolution of the human 
society, those at the end of the 20
th
 century seemed rather as an 
attempt to return to one condition, considered by many people as a 
“normal”. Then what actually was 1989 – the year in which 
like domino tiles collapsed the Communist regimes in Europe?  
The unforced mastering of power in Czechoslovakia 
through peaceful protests allowed the change of system there to 
be defined as a Gentle Revolution. Later this term was adopted 
also for the changes in other countries of Eastern Europe. The 
Czechs are known as a quiet people with a melodious language. 
But they erupted in the “Prague Spring” 1968, as the attempt to 
build of socialism “with a human face” was crushed by the 
Warsaw Pact forces and this postponed the Perestroika with two 
decades. What happened at the end of the 1960s was a part of the 
chain of events, followed the process of de-Stalinization in the 
Soviet Bloc – with the “thaw” in the East–West relations and the 
cultural changes in the Western societies. As if the “loosening” of 
the system in the East influenced the social movements in the 
West and proved that all people are related, despite existing 
differences – an early presentiment of the coming world globa- 
lization.  
The 1980s were in many respects an antipode of the 1960s. 
The world became much more pragmatic. Instead of rebels and 
dreamers the new generation was dominated by the fixed on the 
practical success young people – success now and at any cost. At 
that time the balance between the two superpowers was already 
broken. Although expected, the death of Brezhnev 1982 shook 
the Soviet society. In the same way like Beria took for a short 
time after Stalin’s decease the helm of the state apparatus, to be in 
his turn offset with N. Khrushchev, who carried out “the first 
Soviet Perestroika,” the power now was given to Yuri Andropov 
– the boss of the Russian KGB, bypassing K. Chernenko. The 
new “first man” tried to reform the rotting society (by enforcing 
the labor discipline, struggle against the corruption and imple- 
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mentation of a kind of “dry mode”), but only to strengthen the 
“neo-Stalinism”. The atmosphere of insecurity and fear became 
visible when the the South Korean passenger plane was shot 
down in the USSR in 1983 that killed 269 people. At this time 
Andropov was already chronically ill. Three months later, in 
February 1984, his position was occupied by Konstantin 
Chernenko, in order to be vacated again “naturally” a year later. 
This quadrille of the authorities, under which within three years 
the Soviet Union changed three top leaders, was a sign of the 
deeper political, economic and moral crisis. It was influenced also 
by the rise of the conservative powers in the Anglo-American 
world. The “Strategic Defense Initiative,” announced by Ronald 
Reagan, together with the increase of defense expenditure, the 
measures to limit the Russian access to high technologies and 
the support of anti-Soviet forces in the global scope (the “Soli- 
darity” movement in Poland, the Mujahedeen in Afghanistan, 
etc.) contribute to the economic erosion of the USSR. 
The internal weakness of the country and the pressure used 
by the USA forced the Soviets to seek a younger leader, who could 
ensure the stabilization of the rule, offering new solutions for the 
long-lasting problems. The choice of Mikhail Gorbachev was – 
according to some interpretations – suggested by the KGB, where 
the project of perestroika has started already in Andropov’s time. 
Gorbachev was one of Andropov’s reliable people. This is evident 
from his first steps as a new secretary-general, who also attempted 
to reduce the alcoholism with raised prices and prohibition of 
spirits in public places. Later the concept of glasnost was added 
that reminds of the Khrushchev’s disclosure of the crimes, 
committed by the Stalin’s regime. “Glasnost and perestroika” 
[publicity and restructuring] – this was the motto of the 
Gorbachev’s time or the idea of transparency by managing the 
reforms in the Communist system. The glasnost was however 
selective – days passed before Kremlin decided to confess the 
nuclear accident of Chernobyl, and the perestroika seemed not to 
be driven by any clear concept. The impression was rather, as one 
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gropes after the way on the principle of “trial and error” and then 
adjusts to the results. However, the glasnost created prerequisites 
for the broader public support to the perestroika – a motion of spirit 
that was stronger and more embracing as that in the post-Stalin’s 
period. The way taken by the new Soviet leadership reminded the 
politics of Khrushchev, sharply criticized by Mao Zedong as retreat 
of the Marxism – “this is not a Communism, but revisionism, in 
which the Communist party and its functionaries start to play the 
role of the bourgeoisie, which has an interest in restoring the 
capitalist society.” The subsequent events confirmed his words and 
support the thesis that the totalitarian Communism was destroyed 
intentionally by the high nomenclature in the Eastern Bloc 
countries. The development has been encouraged (if not directed) 
also by relevant forces in the West. These common efforts from 
both sides of the “Iron curtain” have led to that moment, in 
which – according to the Theory of chaos – the accumulated 
sand cone collapses and gives the start of a new construction.  
Its determination is very contradictory. In view of the turn 
ensuing 1989 in Eastern Europe this was a revolution that 
changed the commanding administrative system to multi-party 
governance and a market economy. As far as, however, people 
who took an advantage of the new conditions had had by then 
some key positions in the society, the turn was more of 
“alteration.” And by taking into consideration the struggle 
between the two systems that lasted for decades, the end of the 
Cold War was marked with the capitulation of the Communist 
Bloc that stamped its further development. In this sense, 1989 
marks also the beginning of the recovery of a system, which in 
many respects was considered to be overcome. 
Then was it agreed the restoration of the capitalism that 
started in Eastern Europe after the Gentle Revolutions? Reliable 
data allow us to answer this question with more certainty are still 
missing. But they could help to understand the differences in the 
way to overcome the totalitarian past. In any case, one gets the 
impression of the recurrence of used forms, methods and tactics 
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when the changes occurred in particular countries. As if this overall 
transition was “directed” by two opposite centers that continued 
in a new way the struggle for dominance in the already 
modified conditions. From ideological aspects, this was a fight 
between the neo-liberalism in its conservative type and the 
communism being forced to reforms that through the “socialism 
with a human face”, the “democratic socialism” and the classical 
social democracy found asylum in the left wing of liberalism, that 
allowed the ruling elite to achieve one smoother metamorphosis. 
Such was the evolution of M. Gorbachev, who at various times 
defined himself as a Communist–Leninist, as a social democrat or 
as a liberal. The same path is passed also by his followers, in 
particular by the head of the Bulgarian opposition at the 
beginning of the 1990s – the first president of the country, Dr. 
Zheliu Zhelev.  
Probably, in the other countries of the former Eastern Bloc 
there was also such a rethinking of values in the spirit of the wind 
from Moscow. But this affected mainly the ex-Communists 
ruling by then, as the so called reformers renamed the party – 
instead of “communist” it became, for example, the “socialist” 
party in Bulgaria, the party of “democratic socialism” in the GDR, 
etc. In the most Eastern countries, however, there were long 
traditions of resistance (Hungarian uprising in 1956, the “Prague 
Spring” in 1968, the Polish Solidarność since 1980, etc.), around 
which united the efforts of the democratic opposition. It was 
connected in some places with a national[istic] “flavor” – the first 
mass demonstration against the regime in the Czechoslovakia, for 
example, took place on 25
th
 March 1988 not in Prague but in 
Bratislava and this was a harbinger of the future separation of the 
Federation. On September 11
th
 the same year 300.000 people 
demonstrated for independence of Estonia, and it made the 
national Supreme Council to declare on November 16
th
 Estonia 
for a sovereign state. On 23
rd
 August 1989, on the occasion of the 
50
th
 anniversary of the Molotov–Ribbentrop pact, two million 
people formed a human chain of 600 km from Tallinn and Riga 
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till Vilnius with the request for a full sovereignty of the Baltic 
States. Already in the early February 1989 in Poland started to sit 
the so-called Round Table, on which the conditions for the 
transition period were agreed, and in September was made there 
the first non-communist government. The requests in Hungary for 
free elections and a multiparty system in February in the same 
year led to a policy of opening to the West. On 27
th
 June the 
foreign ministers of Hungary and Austria removed symbolically 
the “Iron curtain” by cutting the wire enclosure on the frontier 
near the city of Sopron. In the early September, the Hungarian 
authorities allowed citizens of the GDR to leave the country on 
the path to West Germany, and on 23
rd
 October (the 
anniversary of the uprising in 1956) Hungary was already 
declared as an independent democratic Republic. From Poland 
and Hungary the events were transferred to countries with more 
conservative regimes. The seeming refusal of Kremlin from 
interference in the internal Affairs of the satellite states 
contributed to changes in these countries, which, in turn, put 
pressure on the slowed down Soviet perestroika. A month after 
the celebration of the 40
th
 jubilee of the GDR, during which 
Gorbachev warned his German comrades, that the “life penalizes 
the latecomers”, resigned Erich Honecker. On the 9th September 
as a result of alleged “lack of co-ordination” or “rashness” fell 
the Berlin Wall – the most emotional event in this “year of 
miracles”. It outshined the news about overthrowing one day later 
of Todor Zhivkov, the doyen of the Communist dictators in 
Eastern Europe, whose removal was apparently agreed with the 
Soviet ambassador in Sofia Viktor Sharapov. In the following 
month a change in power took place in Czechoslovakia, and in 
the second half of December unrests broke out in Rumania, the 
result of which was 1104 killed people inclusive the “first 
family,” Elena and Nicolae Ceauşescu. 
So, at the turn of the 1990s Eastern Europe strikes out in a 
new direction. A period of transformation began. The transition 
was different in the particular countries. After few attempts at 
Remembering the Changes in 1989 – a General Approach 
 - 351 - 
 
reforms, the GDR ceased to exist, attached to the unified 
Germany. There, it was not necessary to make experiments, 
because the powerful German economy supported the integration 
of the Eastern provinces, although at the price of slowdown in its 
own growth. Moscow received 13 billion DM for its consent to 
the reunification of Germany and for the early return of its armed 
forces while the five “new lands” within the Federal Republic 
became a part of the territory of NATO and the EU. The other 
countries of the former Eastern Bloc have had a different 
development. It was faster or slower, depending on the proximity 
or remoteness to the “Old Europe” and in unison with the German 
interests. The states of Central Eastern Europe – Hungary, Poland, 
the Czech Republic and Slovakia – were able to quickly overcome 
the initial problems and have built over time a well-functioned 
market economy, attracting foreign capitals. Similar was the 
development in the Baltic States – the traditional German 
influence there prevailed over the Russian neighborhood to such 
an extent that Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania separated from the 
USSR turned out to be more prepared for the EU admission than 
Bulgaria and Rumania, which started earlier the transition 
process. In both countries the “new socialists” succeeded to retain 
for a longer time their position in the society, adapting elements 
from the Russian model to the Balkan cultural milieu. The most 
difficult was the change in Russia itself – there one needed to 
initiate a coup d’etat, to achieve the public catharsis, allowed the 
introduction of such an order, which the “reformer” Gorbachev 
was not even dared to offer. The collapse of the USSR was a 
logical consequence of the inability to manage a situation with 
already exhausted methods and tools. But the problems arisen in 
some successor states could not endanger the general course of 
development in the post-Soviet space. Although the democracy 
remained to a great extend a façade, and the “appropriation” of 
the national wealth by handful of chosen people created one 
rather oligarchic type of rule, the transition there has reached also 
such a stage, in which there is no way back.  
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What have the people won and what have they lost in the 
next two decades? The profit is clear – they were released 
from an imposed system, which under the veil of Marxism 
served to the imperial goals of a foreign country. They 
acquired the opportunity to determine their own future. Just as 
the “glasnost” preceded the “perestroika,” the democratization 
was conditio sine qua non for implementation of economic 
reforms. But unlike the experience with overcoming totalitarian 
past in Spain and Germany, the transition from a planned state 
economy to a market one had no precedent. Hence – the 
problems of choice. Shall it happen quickly or smoothly, 
whether on the basis of the neo-liberal economic rules or of 
experiences with the social state, shall the removing of state 
property be through “cash” or “mass” privatization – the 
dispute went over this in the struggle for power between the 
reformed left- and right-wing political forces, claimed to be a 
“face of change.” 
A certain role was played also by the historical continuity 
and the political culture in the particular countries. It was because 
of this that nations, united once in the Austria-Hungary, “drew” 
faster forward in their development, while those of the 
European South-East have had major problems. Bulgaria 
offers a typical example as a country, puzzling between three 
historically impacts of the oriental Balkan heritage (from 
South), the Russian cultural penetration (from North-East) and 
the European impetus for modernization (from West). These 
influenced its specific development in the whole transitory 
period. A few strokes:  
While the experiments with the introduction of a market 
economy followed the movement of the “political pendulum,” 
the national wealth changed its owner – the state enterprises, 
brought to bankruptcy through a drain of funds, were sold for 
symbolical prices, and agriculture lands were fragmented to be 
returned “in real borders” without engaging with their cultivation. 
This affected the economy (many industry branches collapsed), 
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whose focus was shifted on the tourist business. The health care 
reform made the health more expensive but not improved, and in 
the education the process has led to the closure of schools and 
kindergartens. Art and culture have been left on self-help; the 
intentional support of the oriental “pub” folk-music caused 
changes in the mentality of a whole generation. The development 
of the science has ceased to be a state priority, despite all words in 
its support. Fill funds in elite sport has not stopped its decline. 
Smuggling of drugs and growth of the prostitution – phenomena, 
patronized by representatives of the executive power – 
additionally ruined the public morality. With the mimicry of the 
nomenclature, that transformed its political power into economic 
one, the success of the transition in Bulgaria is more and more 
questionable. Although incorporated in the EU, it will be long to 
overcome some deficits, which root in the way of life and 
mentality of a people, formed in the struggle for survival and 
inherited unaltered to the present. 
Following blindly foreign models, all forces ruled till now 
are responsible for the situation, in which the “state” is seen in 
the grown administration, but not in its effectiveness, the 
country becomes more and more a territory of corruption and 
impunity, and the ageing nation continues to melt, also 
because of the “leaking” abroad of its young potential. The 
transition in Bulgaria destroyed the old system of values, 
forming a kind of society, comparable rather with those in 
Latin America than in Europe. This contradicts to its primary 
purpose and raises serious questions about the prospects of 
that country in the new world order.  
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In the late 1980s the Bulgarian Academy of Sciences (BAS) as an 
academy of socialist type was a combination of a club of the most 
prominent scientists and scientific research centers, whose 
structure was connected with the historical tradition and the 
strong influence of the organization of science in the USSR. It 
played a leading role in the production of fundamental knowledge, 
while applied research was left to the branch institutes and 
universities were engaged with educational functions. The view 
of the linear development of innovation was reflected in the 
extensive growth of research institutes and their specialisation, 
coupled with an increase of scientific personnel. As early as the 
second half of the 1980s BAS faced the need to transform and 
adapt to the ever-increasing introduction of market principles 
in the economy expressed in the program targeted funding of 
science and in the pressure for economic impact of scientific 
knowledge, which gave priority to studies of applied nature. 
After the radical political change which started with the 
fall of the Berlin Wall on November 9, 1989, in Bulgaria as in 
the other Eastern European countries, the Academy lost its 
privileged position of a major producer and “legislator” of know- 
ledge. Western experts regarded it as a “Stalinist” academy which 
had no place in the new conditions. These views were supported 
by the local scientific and political elites. For that reason the 
pressure on BAS to undergo radical reform was extremely high. 
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The beginning of the reforms was put by the Law on BAS 
adopted and published on October 15, 1991, which restored 
the autonomy of the academy that had been abolished by the 
Law on BAS of 1947. It preserved, but separated its two main 
components – the Assembly of Academicians and Corresponding 
Members with a main function to elect people of their academic 
rank, and the research institutes. The latter appointed their 
representatives in the new supreme body – the General Assembly 
of Scientists. But the law stipulated that only an academician 
or a corresponding member could be elected President of BAS. 
It introduced the principle of mandates, autonomy, representati- 
veness and deideologisation. The General Assembly of Scientists 
was formed nn these principles, which elected the Presidency of 
BAS and its executive body – the Executive Council.  
After the adoption of the Law on BAS in October 1991 
elections were held in the various institutes and the first General 
Assembly of Scientists was constituted as a new body in the most 
important scientific institution which was undergoing a process of 
democratisation. It functioned from November 18, 1991 until the 
end of 1995 and played a very important role in the recent history 
of BAS. It was to adopt the new statute of BAS on June 29, 1992, 
select the new interim and permanent leadership of the Academy 
and would even act as Board of Directors until the enactment of 
the new statute. This General Assembly would carry out the 
decommunisation of BAS and its first optimisation in view of the 
new conditions by adopting and implementing “Concept for 
reorganization and restructuring of BAS”, which ended up 
with major changes and layoffs.  
The work of the first General Assembly of Scientists may 
be recovered from the preserved shorthand records that are 
kept in the Current Archive of BAS.
1
 How was decommunisation 
of the academy carried out, what conflicts it has brought forth 
and how were they resolved is the subject of this article. 
                                                        
1 Unfortunately, the shorthand records from of the first two sessions of this 
important General Assembly are not preserved. 
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The first General Assembly began its work with reduced 
membership before final elections were being held in all units, 
as in some institutes the elections were annulled and 
procedural disputes were running. Only at the fourth meeting 
was the Assembly constituted of 199 people, whereas the 
number fixed by the Law was 200.  
The composition of the first General Assembly shows that in 
determining the destiny of BAS scientists in active creative age 
took part, who were most interested to keep their jobs in the 
Academy. According to the chairman of the mandate commission 
almost half of them were associate professors and made equal to 
senior research associates of second degree. They constituted 
48% of all members. 52% were members with a higher degree 
and title: 41% professors, 7% academicians and 7% corresponding 
members. The bulk of the delegates were aged between 45–65 
years, but 49% of them were under 55 years. These data show 
some rejuvenation of the BAS management. According to the 
criterion of administrative–scientific position the majority of the 
delegates at the General Assembly were representatives of the 
managing stuff of the institutes and the central leadership elected 
after 1988. From the 86 units in the General Assembly 59 
directors, 24 deputy-directors and 16 scientific secretaries were 
elected or in total they accounted for 51% of all delegates. From 
the central leadership of BAS in the General Assembly the 
President of BAS, three out of the four Vice-Presidents, two out 
of the four major scientific secretaries and eight of the 28 
members of the Presidium were elected. Among the 
non-elected were Corr. Mem. Alexander Yankov and the former 
Scientific Secretary General Corr. Mem. Ivan Iliev. In the 
competition for participation in the first General Assembly 3500 
research associates or 70% of the BAS average personnel were 
involved. The elections were held in several rounds and 139 
delegates were elected on first try. However, it was generally 
considered that the elections were made without clear and 
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comprehensive rules, which required annullements and re-voting.
2
 
The first General Assembly worked out Provisional Rules 
of Procedure and elected governing bodies. The Assembly 
elected as its Chairman (initially as interim, and from the third 
session as permanent) Assoc. Prof. Yordan Vasilev. 
Assoc. Prof. Yordan Vasilev (b. 1935) was at that time a 
prominent figure in the anti-communist opposition.
3
 Apparently 
his big political asset had contributed to his election as Chairman 
of the General Assembly, although he was a representative of a 
humanities institute. Not accidentally, the following general 
assemblies would always be chaired by members of the non-hu- 
manitarian sciences, whose institutes were dominant in number 
and staff at the Academy. For this discrepancy between the two 
types of institutes and their representation in the General 
Assembly, which acquired political overtones, spoke also the 
representative of the Institute of History Prof. Ivan Bozhilov. 
He was outraged by the article of Prof. Dimitar Nenov from 
the Institute of Physical Chemistry, a member of the General 
Assembly and the Democracy Clubs in the newspaper Vek 21, 
which claimed that former State Security had manifested less 
interest only in scholars from the natural sciences and therefore 
they had bigger freedom to publish and go abroad, so only 
                                                        
2 ТА на БАН, 4 заседание на І ОС, 9.12.1991, 9–12. 
3 Having hard political destiny, especially in the 1940s and 1950s, after 1966 he 
was able to find a place in the literary circles and to become a research associate 
at the Institute of Literature, where he habilitated in 1990. With the perestroika 
began his active political activity, initially as a member of the Club for Support of 
Glasnost and Perestroika, then in the UDF. He was the first editor of the 
newspaper of the UDF – “Demokraciya” (Febr.–Aug. 1990). Vassilev was 
deputy to the 7th Grand National Assembly and was a member of the the group of 
the 39 deputies, who refused to sign the Constitution. He was elected deputy 
tothe 36th National Assembly (1991–1994), and even headed the National 
Security Committee, but he resigned when his wife, the famous Bulgarian writer 
and poet Blaga Dimitrova became Vice-President in 1992. However, from time 
to time public allegations appear that Vassilev was an agent of the State Security. 
– See, for example: http://www.blitz.bg/article/29400. 
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their academic ranks were legitimate, as they had received 
recognition from outside and they were the only ones able to 
make the reform in BAS.
4
 
The first General Assembly had to face a difficult case. 
The leadership of the Academy had resigned, the new election 
had been postponed, but it turned out that until a new statute 
was adopted, a new leadership could be elected only according 
to the old statute in the format envisaged by it – only by the 
Assembly of Academicians and Corresponding Members. 
Meanwhile, the former Chairman Acad. Sendov went on leave in 
order to participate in the presidential race.
5
 Corr. Mem. Ivan 
Yuhnovsky was charged with the position. At the same time the 
Presidium of BAS had not submitted a collective resignation.
6
  
The General Assembly resolved the problem radically by 
considering that the entire leadership, including the Presidium 
had resigned, as in the new law such authority was non-existent.
7
 
Therefore, it assumed the role of Executive Council, a body 
which under the new law had the functions of the Presidium, 
and elected interim leadership of the Academy. The only 
appointed and elected candidate was Acad. Yordan Malinowski. 
Yordan Malinowski (1923–1996) was a renowned physical 
chemist, founder and director of the Central Laboratory of 
Photoprocesses at BAS since its establishment in 1967 until 
1992. Corresponding Member of BAS since 1979, and Acade- 
mician since 1989.
8
 Particularly as a scientist of international 
reknown and greater organizational experience he was nominated 
and elected by the delegates at the General Assembly: “A worthy 
                                                        
4ТА на БАН, 3-то заседание на І ОС, 2.12.1991, 6. 
5 The first direct presidential elections were held on Jan. 12–19, 1992 and 
were won at the second round by the leader of the UDF the philosopher Dr. 
Zhelyu Zhelev. Vice-President was the famous poet and writer Blaga 
Dimitrova, wife of Yordan Vasilev. 
6 ТА на БАН, 3-то заседание на І ОС, 2.12.1991, 62, 49. 
7 Ibid., 45. 
8 Почина акад. Йордан Малиновски. – Сп. БАН, 1996, № 1, 1. 
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man, worthy scholar and a good organizer.”9 His candidacy was 
the only one and it was not spontaneous. As he said himself, 
“This issue was discussed a lot. For a long time I hesitated 
whether to take that position and that responsibility, ... but I 
decided that ... I have no civil right to refuse, if you charge me 
with it.”10  
The General Assembly approved also interim Vice-Chairmen 
of the Academy in the person of Corr. Mem. Ivan Yuhnovsky 
and Prof. Velizar Velkov,
11
 as well as the five scientific 
secretaries proposed by Malinowski to assist his work. These 
were the very active participants in the General Assembly: the 
physicist Alexander Vavrek, the biophysicist Boris Tenchov, the 




The first General Assembly elected also various committees: 
for financial and economic check of the status of the Academy, 
for the statutes, for the archives, for attestation of the scientists 
and the research units, for ethics and deformations. 
In the course of the election of these committees there was 
an ongoing debate about the future of BAS, what research had 
to be done, the nature and the means of funding them, which 
was quite in the spirit of the liberal autonomy of the institution 
provided by the law.  
The drafting of the new Statute was entrusted to a group 
headed by the Director of the Institute for Legal Studies prof. 
Veselin Karakashev, who was an active participant in the work 
on the statutes since 1989.
13
 In this connection, the General 
Assembly raised the question of the place and the fate of the 
                                                        
9 ТА на БАН, 4-то заседание на І ОС, 9.12.1991, 84. 
10 Ibid., 87. 
11 Velizar Velkov (1928–1993) was an eminent Bulgarian archaeologist and 
historian, from 1989 until his death he was Director of the Institute of 
Archaeology with Museum at BAS.  
12 ТА на БАН, 6-то заседание на І ОС, 23.12.1991, част І, 91. 
13 Ibid., 113. 
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corps of academicians and corresponding members as consti- 
tutive part of the Academy, regardless of the fact that it was 
fixed in the newly adopted Law on BAS. At that time the 
academic corps consisted of 50 academicians, of whom 9 full- 
time employees in BAS, and out of 84 corresponding members 
– 28 were full-time employees in BAS.14 
According to Prof. Dimitar Nenov the public regarded 
BAS as a totalitarian structure that had to be broken down, and 
the scientists – as a scientific potential which had to be 
preserved. In order to reconcile these two opposing views on 
the future of the academy, in Nenov’s opinion BAS had to 
develop as a European scientific center. There was no place in 
it for the corps of academicians reserved under the new Law, 
which Nenov called “appendix” and which was anyway excluded 
from the management of the academy by the Law.
15
 That is 
why BAS was proposed to establish itself only as an academy 
similar to the Bulgarian Literary Society and the other scholars 
to be integrated into a national research center.
16
 
It was also proposed “the corps of academicians and 
corresponding members to dissolve itself.” 17  The 
academicians and corresponding members themselves were 
called upon to "resign" if they considered that there was a 
"political element" in their election.
18
 There was also the idea 
of eliminating the requirement of the law that the chairman of 
the academy has to be academician or corresponding 
member.
19
 In view of the optimalization and restructuring of the 
academy, the attestation was suggested to be extended to all 
scientists, including the academicians and the corresponding 
                                                        
14 ТА на БАН, 4-то заседание на І ОС, 9.12.1991, 9. 
15 Ibid., 107. 
16 ТА на БАН, 4-то заседание на І ОС, 16.12.1991, 108–109. 
17 ТА на БАН, 4-то заседание, 23.12.1991, ч. І, 32. 
18 ТА на БАН, 6-то заседание, 23.12.1991, ч. ІІ, 141. 
19 Ibid., 115. 
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members.
20
 The most radical delegates proposed to remove 
that title at all and to return to the naming existent before 
September 9, 1944 – Member of BAS. Much criticized was 
the intermediate degree “corresponding member” as unnecessary 
and without precedent in modern world practice. The highly 
negative attitude towards academicians and corresponding 
members in the first General Assembly naturally brought forth 
the idea to postpone the elections for academicians and 
corresponding members and to change the method of election of 
academicians and corresponding members.
21
 Quite expectedly 
these views were not considered, as under the Law the General 
Assembly had no such prerogatives. 
However, at its meeting on January 20, 1992 what the General 
Assembly could actually do was to deprive academicians and 
corresponding members from the privilege to be members of the 
Scientific Councils of the institutes by rights. This privilege, given 
to them by the Provisional Rules for the election of scientific 
councils that was adopted in 1990 before the adoption of the Law 
on BAS remained valid only for the directors of the units.
22
 
In the first General Assembly discontent was expressed 
also with the so called party nomenclature in science. It came 
to the fore in the conditions of a radical change of the system 
in Bulgaria. In November 1991 the anti-communist opposition 
represented by the UDF won the elections and formed the first 
anti-communist government. On Decmber 12, 1991 at the 
proposal of the Movement for Rights and Freedoms, which 
supported the UDF, the 36
th
 National Assembly passed a law 
for the confiscation of the properties of the Bulgarian 
Communist Party and the other totalitarian organizations. In 
the public BAS was also perceived as such. The mentioned 
fact that in 1990 a number of institutes and departments of the 
party's ideological academy – the Academy of Social Sciences 
                                                        
20 Ibid., 144. 
21 Ibid., 123. 
22 ТА на БАН, 8-мо заседание, 20.01.1992, 142.  
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and Social Management (AONSU) – were assigned to BAS, 
and that a number of their researchers also accepted a job in 
BAS also contributed to that. In such a situation at the first 
General Assembly the party secretaries in the institutes and in 
the BAS headquarters were called upon to voluntarily abstain 
from elections and participation in the management, in order 




As an important step to overcome the poor image of the 
BAS and as a message that the Academy distinguished itself 
from the former regime of management of science, Prof. Maxim 
Mladenov from the Institute of Balkan Studies proposed to 
establish a Committee on the illegal attitude towards individual 
researchers in the past, in view of the repressive policy towards 
the Institute of Bulgarian Language in the 1980s. This proposal 
was supported, because the members of the General Assembly 
were dissatisfied with the work of the existing such committee 
headed by Corr. Mem. Al. Yankov.
24
 
These proposals in the General Assembly were directly 
related to the critical public attitudes and apparently they would 
deepen the conflict between the delegates at the Assembly and 
the corps of academicians and corresponding members as 
emanation of the “communist academy”. Criticizing the BAS 
became fashionable in the press and the electronic media. The 
Academy failed to defend its positions, and to convince the 
public that it was conducting reform. Yet, attempts at that were 
made not only in the field of political declarations, as were the 
cases of BAS statements on the occasion of the overthrow of 
Nicolae Ceausescu (22.12.1989), and the war in Yugoslavia. 
                                                        
23 Similarly, in the Hungarian Academy of Sciences were integrated all 
scientific institutions – also from the former Central Committee of the 
Hungarian Socialist Party – the Institute for Political Sciences and from the 
Ministry of Foreign Affairs – the Institute for Foreign Policy. (ТА на БАН, 
4-то заседание на І ОС, 9.12.1991, 115–117, 118). 
24 Ibid., 119–120. 
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At its second meeting, the General Assembly adopted a 
declaration on the events in Yugoslavia, which was read on 
national television by the Vice-President of BAS Corr. Mem. 
Ivan Yuhnovsky. This act was highly appreciated by Y. Vasilev: “I 
think it had a very good effect on the status of the academy, not 
only as scientific but also as social factor in our country.”25 
BAS failed to stop the attacks, even though it also conducted 
scientific expertise. Thus it assisted, according to Eng. Plamen 
Tsvetanov, longtime head of the Laboratory “Energy Systems 
Analysis” at the Institute for Nuclear Research and Nuclear Energy 
of BAS, to develop a complex expertise for a failed round table 
of BAS, the State Planning Committee and the Ministry of 
Energy within the Grand National Assembly on the issue of the 
construction of second nuclear power plant in Bulgaria “Belene”, 
whose construction began in 1988 and was suspended. But in the 
words of Tsvetanov: “After several thematic discussions on model 
results for economic development, perspective energy demands 
and energy supply, it became clear that it was possible to do 
without „Belene‟ and our partners left the roundtable. It was 
decided to publish a book with five separate parts and their teams 
of authors.”26 All studies and findings of the team were against 
the construction of NPP “Belene”. The book had particular 
influence on stopping the construction.
27
 
A major part of the problems related to BAS were in direct 
relation to the future of science in Bulgaria under the conditions 
of the neoliberal transition, which called for the rejection of 
                                                        
25 ТА на БАН, 3-то заседание на ОС, 2.12.1991, 5. 
26 So, despite the fact that I was the coordinator of the book and responsible for its 
first part, this is a unique book with more than 50 authors from BAS, Energoproekt 
and other institutions. The five parts of the book are: 1) Socio-economic 
development and feasibility of the construction of NPP “Belene”; 2) Technical 
design of NPP “Belene” and technical level of its facilities; 3) Seismicity of the 
site, seismic risk and design characteristics; 4) Impact of NPP “Belene” on the 
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active government support of the autonomous structures and 
gave preference to universities as centers for science. Thus, 
according to Minister Prof. Nikolay Vassilev, if in BAS 70% 
cuts were made and 20% in SU, that would solve the problems 
of science.
28
 This created tensions between BAS and the Sofia 
University “St. Kliment Ohridski”. Inside the Academy there was 
a tension between the humanities and natural sciences, and 
between ideological and non-ideological institutes.
29
 The target 
of criticism were the Institute for Philosophical Research and 
the Institute for Contemporary Social Theories, and some 
other institutes, such as the institute of the former president of 
BAS Acad. Angel Balevski, accused that he became part of 
Todor Zhivkov’s inner circle and therefore increased its staff 
unduly. Another institute that caused negative attitude was the 
Institute of Hydrology and Meteorology. That made its 
representative in the General Assembly Corr. Mem. Stoicho 
Panchev read a statement in defense of the right of the institute 
to be affiliated to the Academy.
30
 
The tightened budget capacity generated debate also about 
the nature of the scientific activity of BAS and its future. Most of 
the members of the General Assembly insisted on that the 
Academy had to remain a center for basic research, which would 
of course justify its budgetary funding. Along with that the 
delegates at the General Assembly and the leadership of BAS 
were aware that attestation was needed to optimize the Academy, 
the number and the size of the institutes. Various opportunities for 
the conduction of the attestation were discussed. There were ideas 
for international expertise,
31
 but because it would be expensive, 
                                                        
28 ТА на БАН, 8-мо заседание на І ОС, 20.01.1992, 101. 
29 ТА на БАН, 5-то заседание на І ОС, 16.12.1991, 109. 
30 ТА на БАН, 10-то заседание, 3.02.1992, 12–14. 
31 The Academies of Sciences in Lithuania and Latvia and later Estonia were 
subjected to international expertise from Scandinavia, which resulted in the 
establishment of the academy as a club of academicians and the institutes were 
put under the authority of the Ministry of Science. Симеонова К. Стратегии в 
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the attestation was suggested to carry out by the Institute for 
Science Studies. The representative of the Institute for Science 
Studies Prof. Kostadinka Simeonova acknowledges that the task 
was too complex and had many unknowns. So the opinion that 
the assessment should be done by a committee of represent- 
tatives of the main research directions who knew best the 
specifics of the institutes and scientific life in Bulgaria got the 
upper hand.
32
 Thus new conflicts emerged – not only within 
the Academy but also between the Academy and the government.  
Attestation meant cuts in institutes and scientific staff. In this 
connection, on December 23, 1991 CL "Podkrepa", BAS released 
a statement, which promised full support “for the realization of 
all radical proposals and solutions that are socially equitable by 
declaring that CL „Podkrepa–BAS‟ will not protect the inefficient 
and incompetent staff.”33 As the Chairman of the General 
Assembly summarized, this statement had to reassure the 
members of the General Assembly after its hearing: “We will not 
have unnecessary turmoil when specific payroll issues are being 
decided.”34 There were suggestions of radical members of the 
General Assembly to make savings by introducing temporary 
employment contracts. But Malinowski opposed to that. He 
insisted the cuts to be made in accordance with scientific 
criteria approved by the General Assembly.
35
 
This led to the election of the 25 member committee headed 
by the interim President of BAS. It included representatives of 
all eight scientific fields. The committee had to develop criteria 
to evaluate the performance of researchers and a strategy for the 
development of scientific research at BAS. It was clear that 
most attention would be paid to the so-called ideological 
                                                                                                          
трансформирането на Академиите на науките от социалистически тип. – In: 
БАН по пътя на реформите 1989-2000, С., 2000, 13, 16.  
32 ТА на БАН, 12-то заседание на І ОС, 17.02.1992, 11. 
33 ТА на БАН, 6-то заседание на І ОС, 23.12.1991, ч. І, 45–46. 
34 Ibid. 
35 Ibid., 122; 6-то заседание на І ОС, 23.12.1991, ч. ІІ, 69. 
Iliyana Marcheva 
 - 366 - 
institutions. Therefore it was even suggested a small committee 
to be formed to examine the activities of these institutions and 
to prepare a draft decision on the existence of these units. That 
was assessed as a sign to the public that the Academy was 
actually reforming and was ready for “moral cleansing.”36 The 
decision of the General Assembly of December 23, 1991 to 
provide access for any researcher to his personnel file, was 
taken in view of such cleansing
 37
 A little later at its 7
th
 Meeting 
held on January 13, 1992 the General Assembly adopted the 
addition to the Provisional Rules of Procedure that except for 
the right of access to any information about the people, the 
members of the General Assembly had the right of access to 
information about companies and business organizations, etc.
38
 
The preparation for attestation in BAS ran parallel with the 
debates about the reforms in science that were carried out in the 
36
th
 National Assembly. It was also getting ready to assess and 
attest the entire scientific potential of the country. The 
Committee on Science and Education of the 36
th
 National 
Assembly, headed by the Professor of Medical Statistics 
Dimitar Sepetliev,
39
 a deputy from the Movement for Rights 
and Freedoms, which supported the government, took a 
decision on that issue on December 18, 1991. It was 
recommended for the Ministry of Education and Science to 
                                                        
36 ТА на БАН, 6-то заседание на І ОС, 23.12.1991, ч. ІІ, 90, 98, 112. 
37 Ibid., 136. 
38 ТА на БАН, 7-мо заседание на І ОС, 13.01.1992, 5.   
39 Dimitar Sepetliev is Professor of Medical Statistics and Economics of 
Medicine at the Medical University in Sofia and the University of National 
and World Economy, deputy from the Movement for Rights and Freedoms, 
then independent in the 36th National Assembly in 1991–1994. He was the 
representative of Bulgaria in the World Health Organization, who flew over 
Chernobyl and accompanied the Director General of IAEA. He “illegally” took 
samples from the soil and earth to submit them for objective study to be reported 
at a symposium in Copenhagen in 1987. http://www.blitz.bg/article/2015; 
http://www.dnevnik.bg/bulgaria/2008/03/24/475214_stanishev_poluchavane
to_na_nauchni_stepeni_i_zvaniia/-  
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prepare a decree for the Council of Ministers, which was to 
include measures for verification of the scientific potential of 
Bulgaria, 60% of which was actually concentrated in BAS. 
According to the Committee’s decision, a temporary moratorium 
for the award of degrees and titles was declared, the retirement 
age of the habilitated from BAS and the universities was made 
equal, and the scientists retired in 1991 were reinstated to work 
without increasing the staff of the Academy. The delegates at the 
first General Assembly were introduced to the decisions and the 
bill prepared on their basis at its 8
th
 meeting held on January 20, 
1992. Unfortunately, they could not get acquainted with the 
motives for that bill, as there were not such.
40
 
Regarding the motives, the delegates at the General Assembly 
could judge only the continuing negative attitudes towards the 
Academy, all in the spirit of the neo-conservative approach to the 
reform in science. It was expressed in proposals to the National 
Assembly to close down the institutes which were to be added 
to the universities. It required 17% staff cuts as early as January 1, 
1992, i.e. of 2000 people out of 12742, because instead of the 
promised 650 million BGN 440 million BGN were given at an 
average wage of 1650 BGN in BAS. For the sake of comparison, 
the ministerial salary at that time was 3050 BGN. That was also 
the salary received by the President of BAS. In this hostile 
environment for the Academy, it was not accidential that the 
President of BAS lost his temper when listening to the long 
debate on the future of the Academy, instead of constructive 
proposals for reform. He had good reason for that, as he knew 
that the IMF as a major creditor had estimated that in the next 
4–5 years in a country like Bulgaria the number of researchers in 
the Academy had to reduced to 5–6 thousand people. The then 
12–15 thousand people consumed too large GDP percentage 
per capita. The IMF made comparison with the former GDR, 
where there were 25 thousand scientists in a population of 17 
                                                        
40 ТА на БАН, 8-мо заседание на І ОС, 20.01.1992, 28–30, 97. 
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million people.
41
 For that reason Acad. Malinowski urged the 
General Assembly to focus on the attestation in order to avoid 
the verification of the common view among the public, 
expressed by the former nuclear physicist, monk, presenting 
himself as an anticommunist Christophor Sabev (at that time 
very popular person), who had said that in Bulgaria only St. 
Synod and BAS were not reformed.
42
 
In such a situation the decommunisation of BAS became 
an extremely important signal to the government and society 
that the Academy was reforming itself. Decommunisation had 
different dimensions and brought up new conflicts – between 
scientists and academicians, between humanities and natural 
sciences specialists. Thus, at the 11
th
 meeting on February 10, 1992 
87 people voted “for” the General Assembly to recommend to the 
management of the Academy to revoke the disciplinary dismissal 
of Research Associate Yanko Yankov from the Institute of State 
and Law. He was fired in 1982 for not going to work, but two 
years later he was subjected to political persecution and after 
1989 he was among the popular anti-communist politicians.
43
 
In connection with the decommunisation a New Committee 
on Ethics and Deformations was elected, headed by the mathe- 
matician Prof. Nikolay Yanev. He claimed that he had expe- 
rienced the problems of the old system, being three years 
Doctor of Science (DSc), without being able to habilitate.
44
 
The committee included: Nikolay Yanev, Yordan Yordanov, Al. 
Popov, Dimitar Velyanov, Alexander Trenev, Radomir Enikov, 
Nedyalka Mihova, Aglika Edreva, Trifon Tomov, Atanas 
Danailov, Hristo Nikolov and Yordanka Yurukova.
45
 
At the suggestion of this Committee (voted at its 12
th
 meeting 
of February 17, 1992) the General Assembly voted in every 
                                                        
41 ТА на БАН, 12-то заседание на І ОС, 17.01.1992, 41–42. 
42 ТА на БАН, 9-то заседание, 27.01.1992, 25. 
43 ТА на БАН, 11-то заседание на І ОС, 10.02.1992, 6–9. 
44 ТА на БАН, 10-то заседание на І ОС, 3.02.1992, 48. 
45 ТА на БАН, 11-то заседание, 10.02.1992, 66. 
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institute the General Assembly of Scientists to assess whether 
there had been deformations and persecution of scientists for 
political reasons and respectively to form such committeesThe 
possibility to investigate violations of the scholarly ethics too 
was discussed, but the voice of reason prevailed. Only the 
inquiries with regards to political reasons remained.
46
 And 
that was no accident. Thus Assoc. Prof. Lora Nikolova from 
the Institute of Nuclear Physics believed that it was unacceptable 
“while in BAS there were institutes such as the Institute of 
Balkan Studies established upon a decision of the Politburo of 
the Central Committee (CC) with the sole objective to carry 
out the line of the Bulgarian Communist Party (BKP) in 
science, ...we now have to fight for an increase in our wages, 
including those people who, to put it mildly, at least some of 
them have committed crimes against the Bulgarian people”.47 
At the proposal of the Committee a declaration was adopted 
that was to be completed by all members of the General Assembly. 
It was based on the “universal human values and scientific ethics” 
and aimed “to strengthen the public authority of the members 
of the General Assembly in the Academy and in the country” 
without having legal, but only moral value. The declaration 
included the following points: “1. I am not and have not been 
assistant to security authorities. 2. I was not involved in any 
way whatsoever in motivating and carrying out the „revival 
process‟. 3. I have not been initiator and participant in the 
political repression of others.”48 This declaration was proposed 
for signing to the management of the Academy and the directors, 
deputy directors and secretaries of scientific research units.
49
 
The General Assembly did not accept the proposal to be the 
organizer of a roundtable devoted to the deideologization of 
science, because the view prevailed that it was the work of 
                                                        
46 Ibid., 68–70. 
47 ТА на БАН, 11-то заседание на І ОС, 3.02.1992, 16. 
48 ТА на БАН, 11-то заседание на І ОС, 17.02.1992, 78–79. 
49 ТА на БАН, 13-то заседание, на І ОС, 24.02.1992, 36. 
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particular institutes and scientists.
50
  
The processes of decommunisation started to gain speed. 
At its 13
th
 meeting held on February 24, 1992 the Committee 
on Ethics and Deformations proposed steps for further “moral 
cleansing” of the Academy. It ran under the motto for de– 
Bolshevisation, de–ideologisation by denying that it was a 
“witch hunt”, “pursuit of those who think otherwise.”51 The 
General Assembly came to the following decision: “The General 
Assembly recommends the management of BAS and the 
research units for a period of five years not to allow the 
holding of high administrative positions of persons who had 
contributed to the ideologisation of science and the 
implantation of party style and criteria incompatible with 
scientific ethics and morality, as the secretaries of party offices, 
the Politburo of CC of BKP, members and secretaries of party 
committees of the United Centers, members and secretaries of 
departmental committees, etc., up the hierarchy, and counselors 
in the apparatus of the BKP. Under senior administrative 
positions it was understood heads of sections, scientific 
secretaries, deputy directors, and chairmen of the Scientific 
Council.”52 These lustration decisions were proposed to be 
supported by the institutes before the release of a law including 
similar texts.  
These decisions were discussed at a time when at the 
entrance to the main building of the Academy were glued 
posters with portraits and lists of members of the General 
Assembly – “red” academicians and quotes from them. The 
Committee on Ethics and Deformations declared that it had 
nothing to do with these posters. From the outraged statements 
of members of the General Assembly, such as Prof. Minko 
Minkov, Prof. Rosalia Biggs, Assoc. Prof. Vasil Sivov, Acad. 
Kiril Serafimov it became clear that it was all about scientists 
                                                        
50 Ibid., 40. 
51 Ibid., 47. 
52 Ibid., 36–37. 
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such as Acad. Evgeni Mateev, Mito Isusov, Todor Iv. Zhivkov, 
Acad. Kiril Serafimov. These posters were designed as dazibao, 
typical of the cultural revolution in China and they reminded a 
Tribunal against the people, not because of the academic 
qualities, but because of political affiliation.
53
 The opponents of 
these posters argued that they were unacceptable in the Academy 
and referred to scientists with great scientific achievements.
54
 
In this connection R. Biggs was discontended that the General 
Assembly refused to organize a round table on deideologisation 
and left it to “Podkrepa” to make such dazibao reminiscent of 
a wall newspaper from the times of the Komsomol.
55
 Prof. 
Stoyan Nedev from the Institute of Mathematics was the most 
adamant that “In my view the morality of a scientist does not 
go together with what is being suggested, if you like the 
existence of such a committee. For me it is difficult to imagine 
reconciliation of these things. Someone who knows the 
deformations, knows what we have experienced and at the 
same time has the morals of a scientist, in my view, his 
                                                        
53 Ibid., 52. 
54 Thus the famous demographer Prof. Minko Mintchev turned to the Assembly 
with the question: “Dear colleagues, I know and I understand that something 
could be pulled out of anything, but why we are not pointing to the contribution 
of Evgeni Mateev for developing a methodology which is now at the basis of the 
planning of the Common Market. He is one of the best experts and interpreters of 
the „method of Leontief‟, why is this contribution which is recognized in world 
literature not emphasized, but we are using things that are actually 
dishonest.” (ТА на БАН, 13-то заседание на І ОС, 24.02.1992, 3839). 
55 “I understand that a desire arises in us to deal with them in a rude manner. 
But this desire makes us use ways and methods that are degrading... Todor 
Zhivkov was shrewd enough and invited to himself many people. They will have 
to pay. But we are offending the institutes themselves. They have come here as 
delegates of their institutes. To hold them responsible there, to deal with them 
there. But as we go into the lobby and see next to the announcement about the 
General Assembly this wall newspaper that we see today, I find that unworthy. 
Moreover, according to the bill that is being prepared, these people will have to 
withdraw.” (ТА на БАН, 13-то заседание на І ОС, 24.02.1992, 42–43.)  
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reaction should be never again! And that's that.”56 
The proponents of the removal of the management of science 
in BAS upon decision of the institutes themselves before the 
adoption of the lustration law (which was the majority in the first 
General Assembly) referred both to arguments from the recent 
past, and the public opinion. They pointed to the important role 
of party-political approval for the career of each scholar, 
especially one with an academic rank, in socialist Bulgaria. Yuliy 
Toshev recalled that the order of approval of the habilitated persons 
until November 10, 1989 included a long chain of party units: the 
party committee of the institute, personnel committee of a United 
Center, party committee of a United Center, personnel committee 
of BAS, party committee of BAS, the City Committee of BKP, 
and for senior first [degree] and the professors – CC of BKP. 
The direct link between the party and the scientific career was 
emphasized. “A party secretary was a future professor, regard- 
less of the scientific qualities”. It was pointed out that this 
measure did not affect the ordinary members of BKP, but only 
12% of the former communists in science, who would receive 




The need for lustration before the adoption of the law was 
justified by the fact that in the elections for leadership of the 
institues held in 1989 “We do not notice any change in the 
administrative and scientific management of BAS. We have 
chosen only seven new faces – from the President to the scientific 
secretaries. I intend to ask the party secretaries to try to work 
with new faces for a certain period of time.”58 According to the 
Chairman of the General Assembly it was “incompatible with the 
morality of a scientist if he continues today to be a member of 
a party for which there is generally a public agreement that has 
                                                        
56 Ibid., 48.   
57 Ibid., 44–47. 
58 Ibid., 47.  
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committed a crime to the entire Bulgarian people.”59 Y. Vassilev, 
however, also had in mind that the party secretariatship was a 
kind of a burden and for that reason it was passed as a duty. 
Therefore he agreed that the decision of the General Assembly 
regarding lustration should be recommendatory so that to allow the 
institutes themselves to decide in each case. But lustration would 
ensure the termination of the relationship between scientific careers 
and the Communist Party. ... “Tell me in which scientific council 
in the Academy at least 55 percent, if not more, are not members 
of BKP. Is there such scientific council? It chooses the 
habilitated and non-habilitated scientists. We could not allow 
reproduction in this way. This will just not happen. And if we 
do so, there would be no Academy of Sciences. The society 
shall just throw us all out. It spends millions – half a billion, 
and we want to re-produce ourselves not by science, but along 
family or partisan line. As you can see, here no one from the 
UDF insists on being elected director. But except for one or 
two cases, is there a director who is not from BKP? It is not 
necessary to be a political figure. Just on the contrary.”60 In 
this connection Vassilev insisted on a discussion over the 
deideologisation and de-Bolshevistaion of science.  
Decommunisation made some of the people concerned 
resign. Thus at the meeting of the General Assembly held on 
June 29, 1992 the Chairman of the mandate commission the 
physicist Assoc. Prof. Al. Vavrek pointed out that due to 
resigning Acad. Evgeni Mateev, Corr. Mem. Stoyan Mihaylov, 
Prof. Al. Fol, Prof. Todor Iv. Zhivkov, Prof. Nikolai Genov, the 
economist Assoc. Prof. Hristo Pamukchiev, the physicist Prof. 
Anton Antonov, Assoc. Prof. Ivan Gotchev and others are 
replaced. Not all replaced were in connection with 
decommunization. Some resigned also because they went to 
work abroad. Among them was not Corr. Mem. M. Isusov. 
However, he completely distanced himself from the work of 
                                                        
59 Ibid., 49. 
60 Ibid., 55–57. 
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the Assembly, because he did not take part in the next stage of 
decommunisation which concerned directly historical science.  
This stage was the discussion and the accusation of BAS for its 
participation in the “revival process”. That was made by a 
specially formed committee by the General Assembly in January 
1992, which included: Chairman the historian Prof. Ivan Bozhilov 
and members: Prof. Maxim Mladenov (Institute of Balkan 
Studies), Prof. Elena Georgieva (Institute for Bulgarian Language), 
Prof. Docho Lekov (Institute of Literature), Prof. Yordan Yordanov 
(Institute of Cell Biology and Morphology), and Assoc. Prof. 
Georgi Markov (Institute of History).
61
 The committee 
worked seriously, discussing the composition and activities of the 
Problem Council to the Presidium of BAS and the Academic 
Council of Sofia University on the revival process.
62
 It 
examined the documents of that Council, and the publications 
of scientists included in it and of the BAS institutes on the issue. 
From the 40 pages report of the committee it is evident that the 
activities of the scientists basically followed the scientific traditions 
and were not a motive power for forceful change of the names of 
Bulgarian Turks in the winter of 1984/85. Moreover, the Problem 
Council
63
 created in 1986 after the renaming, included 
representatives of many other institutions, not just academic 
institutes. BAS, as the highest scientific organization was 
supposed to lead this supra-institutional unit.
64
 It had the highest 
                                                        
61 ТА на БАН, 34-то заседание на І ОС, 6.07.1992 след обед, 6. 
62 This Council included: Strashimir Dimitrov who replaced Ilcho Dimitrov as 
chairman of the board. Members: Tsvetana Georgieva, Todor Nikov, Doyno 
Doynov, Dzingiz Hakov, Nikolai Kaufman, Alexander Lilov, Emil Boev, Yordan 
Peev, Stefan Andreev, Ibrahim Tatarli, Mosko Moskov, Mincho Draganov, Veselin 
Traikov, Todor Iv. Zhivkov, Veselin Hadjinikolov, Kiril Kiryakov, Vera 
Mutafchieva, Evgeni Radushev, Petar Petrov, Nikolay Mizov, Paunka Gocheva, 
Hristo Hristov. (ТА на БАН, 34-то заседание на І ОС, 6.07.1992, след обед, 4–6).  
63 It was later renamed “Scientific Coordination Council on the Revival Process” 
and still later it began to be officially named “Scientific Coordination Council on 
the Problems of Development of the Bulgarian People and Nation”. 
64 ТА на БАН, 34-то заседание на І ОС, 6.07.1992 след обед, 14–15. 
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number of representatives, 19 out of 36. The emphasis in the work 
of that Council was on the study of the “Spread of Islam in the 
Balkans”, rather than the building of Bulgarian identity in the 
National Revival Period and the more modern and contemporary 
period throughout the 19
th




 Corr. Mem. 
Strashimir Dimitrov became the head of the Council soon after 
the withdrawal of Acad. Ilcho Dimitrov. It was also noted that 
strictly scientific research was predominant, and not 
propaganda activities, and also that in the system of BAS there 
was not a single associate who had speculated with the topic 
for the sake of a research career by serving directly to the 
events of 1984/85 and 1989. However, the Committee 
denounced the fact that in BAS a Scientific- Coordination 
Council had been created on similar problems, which had no 
special status and no additional funding, but because of the 
very fact of its existence and although it included “traditional 
research, caused severe damage on Bulgarian science that 
would be felt for a long time.”66 
These conclusions did not satisfy the General Assembly of 
the Scientists in BAS in general, as they sounded to them very 
dry, unemotional, and lacking moral conviction. The Committee 
and its Chairman were accused of “slipping on that issue quite 
academically, which was actually very nice and the report was 
full of facts that were very good as statistics. But it seemed that it 
avioded or could not reorganize its thinking in the other direction 
– the moral one.”67 The President of BAS even acknowledged 
that the conclusions in the report do “a disservice to the 
Academy, no matter how scientifically justified they are. I do not 
question them, but they will not be understood by the public and 
that will not be in our interest.”68 A reproach was adressed to the 
Committee that it did not analyze propaganda articles in the local 
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press because, according to Prof. Dimitar Nenov: “hardly 
anyone would take it upon himself to defend the assertion that 
there were no falsifications in science and that they were not 
conducted following an order... We could defend the Academy 
by saying the things as they were and saying that this is a 
different Academy, which has nothing to do with the former 
one”.69 Thus a decision was adopted that the Committee on 
Ethics and Deformations and the Committee on the Revival 
Process should prepare a decision condemning the participation 
of the Academy that was to be submitted to the General 
Assembly, indicating especially the participation of particular 




The Committee on Ethics and Deformations periodically 
reported to the General Assembly on the occasion of publications 
in the organ of the newspaper Democratsiya about cases of 
scientists on which the General Assembly had to take a stand. 
Thus at a meeting held on July 6, 1992 in connection with the 
publication in Democratsiya that two members of the Academy 
Acad. Mako Dakov and Corr. Mem. Ivan Popov had participated 
through their signatures in the decision of the Bulgarian 
government to send troops into Czechoslovakia in 1968, the 
General Assembly decided to condemn them morally with 
only one “against” and 20 “abstentions”.71 
Another important moment in the decommunization of BAS 
was the adoption and implementation of the law on lustration in 
science, known as the Law “Panev” after the name of his author 
Assoc. Prof. Georgi Panev from the UDF. It was effective from 
the end of 1992 to March 30, 1995 and was named “Act for the 
temporary introduction of certain additional requirements to the 
members of the scientific organizations and the Higher Attestation 
                                                        
69 Ibid., 67–68. 
70 Ibid., 86. 
71 ТА на БАН, 61-во заседание, 6.07.1992, 61. 
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Commission (HAC).”72 This law excluded from the management 
of science, i.e. membership in the scientific and faculty councils, 
in the HAC, heads of departments and sections, directors and 
their deputies for a period of five years of scientists who had 
occupied positions in the political structures of BKP by 
employment (party secretaries and members of party committees). 
Also scientists who were members of the supreme authorities of 
the former ruling Communist Party, and who were registered at 
the BKP, or worked in its ideological institutions, including 
teaching of ideological disciplines, as well as those involved in 
the “revival process” or who were associates – full-time or 
voluntary to the State Security and UBO. These conditions had to 
be certified by a declaration. To implement the law a moratorium 
was put on the procedures up to four months in which to hold 
elections and change the managements of the institutes, 
universities and specialized scientific councils to the HAC. 
Although the Law “Panev” was adopted by the 36th National 
Assembly on Dec. 24, 1992, it was discussed in the General 
Assembly of BAS because some scientists opposed to it, others 
supported it, and a request from the Constitutional Court was 
submitted to the General Assembly to determine the legitimacy 
of this law which had already been passed. It was made after 103 
MPs from the 36
th
 National Assembly and the President of the 
State had made a similar request to the Constitutional Court.
73
 
This reminded of an article in the procedure of the General 
Assembly from the time of the People’s Court in 1945, when 
the workforces had to show that they supported that Court.
74
 
And he expressed the dissatisfaction of a part of the members 
of the Assembly with this move of the Constitutional Court. 
Others, such as the Chairman of the General Assembly 
expressed resentment that the question was raised at all: “Here 
in the General Assembly written proposals to BAS are being 
                                                        
72 ДВ, 1992, N 104 (24.12.). Отм. ДВ, 1995, N 29 (30.03.). 
73 ТА на БАН, 44-то заседание на ОС, 18.01.1993, 82. 
74 Ibid., 84. 
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made to oppose the implementation of the law. I was surprised 
that a scientist could do that. (Applause). Democracy has its 
foundations already in Roman law, if I am not mistaken, Prof. 
Karakashev, „Dura lex, sed lex‟.”75 
Letters against the law were written by Acad. Bl. Sendov 
who insisted each member of the General Assembly to express 
in writing his attitude to this law. Another letter, together with a 
draft to the Constitutional Court regarding this law on 
decommunisation of science addressed Corr. Mem. Stoicho 
Panchev. Opponents of the law argued that the law imposed 
collective guilt on individuals, that their rights were violated 
for political reasons, and that the Academy would be cleansed of 
such people without such a law, as there was the Committee on 
Ethics and Deformations. In their view, the last elections have 
shown that in fact party careerists were not elected in the 
leadership of the institutes.  
The opponents also called for the need for respect the 
autonomy of BAS and the universities, and pointed out that this 
law would deprive of leadership in science eminent scientists, 
as the academicians Assen Hadzhiolov, Georgi Bliznakov, 
Rumen Tzanev, Assen Datchev, Lubomir Popivanov, and the 
corresponding members Gentcho Skordev, Dimitar Mishev, 
Nikolay Ganchev, Dimitar Elenkov, Constantin Kossev, Petar 
Kenderov, Stoicho Panchev, Toncho Zhechev.
76
 
The proponents of the law (Prof. Y. Yanev, Assoc. Prof. Al. 
Popov, Assoc. Prof. Enikov, Assoc. Prof. Tomov, Assoc. Prof. 
Trenev, Prof. Yordanov) on their part were preparing a response 
to the Constitutional Court. They expressed approval of the law, 
as it was in line with the public repudiation of the 45 years of 
totalitarian legacy. The party nomenclature in science has 
facilitated “imposing totalitarianism”. For, as a rule these were 
“mediocre people, who used unscientific methods and tools for 
                                                        
75 Ibid., 85. 
76 Ibid., 73–78. 
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making a scientific career.”77... “Conditions were created for a 
long time control over the development of the personnel and 
scientific problems from the positions of party norms and 
generations of leaders were created who had passed through the 
institution of party secretaries, and who now continue to pursue a 
policy of support for former political activists. Above all was 
placed the group of academicians and corresponding members, 
most of who had gone through all the stages of the party and state 
leadership and strictly watched for the implementation of party 
politics at all structural levels. The situation in the universities 
was even worse ...”78 The supporters of the law pointed to the 
fact that it was softer than the one adopted in the former GDR, 
where all employees and professors were fired with the right to 
apply for their places. In the Bulgarian version – though 
psychologically traumatized, the concerned individuals did not 
lose their jobs in the institutes, were not deprived of the right to 
practice their profession, but only could not elect (or be elected as) 
scientific personnel. It would later turn out that these people were 
elected, however, as reviewers, which suggests that the law was 
above all political. Not accidentally, the adoption of such a law, 
according to its supporters would strengthen the confidence in the 
Academy of the western partners, and also of the Bulgarian 
public. 
The supporters of the law pointed out that many of the 
provisions of this Law were applied in the Academy as early 
as 1992. These initiatives of the General Assembly were 
envisaged to be adopted and declarations similar to those 
required under the Law by the management of BAS to be 
completed also by the members of the General Assembly. 
They reminded also for the above mentioned address to the 
party nomenclature to refrain from participation in the 
management of science. The supporters also paid attention to 
the fact that the underlying principle of lustration had already 
                                                        
77 Ibid., 78. 
78 Ibid., 79. 
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been applied in the election of new leadership of BAS.  
All these arguments had to justify the position of the 
General Assembly to send an affirmative answer to the request 
of the Constitutional a Court. Eventually, at the meeting of the 
General Assembly held on January 25 a declaration was adopted 
in defense of the Law, with 94 “for”, 28 – “against” and 9 
“abstentions”.79 In addition to it and to the President Dr. Zh. 
Zhelev’s approval of the Law, at a meeting of the General 
Assembly held on February 1, 1993 an “Open Letter” was read 
to the Constitutional Court with additional arguments in support 
of the Law “Panev”.80 This shows that the law found the 
support of BAS for the lustration of leading members of BKP in 
science. It was confirmed by a decision №1 of the 
Constitutional Court of February 11, 1993. This Lustration Law, 
however, appears to be the only of its kind in Bulgaria. 
Lustration provisions are found only in the Law on Banks and 
Credit Activity of March 27, 1992. 
The actions of the first General Assembly on the 
decommunisation of BAS, despite its conflicting decisions, are 
clear signals to the government and society that the Academy 
was ready to part with its past in the hope of a better future. 
Unfortunately, these signals did not prove to be convincing 
enough, because the future of the Academy is filled with 
continuous efforts for survival in the conditions of the 
neoliberal transition.  
                                                        
79 ТА на БАН, 45-то заседание, 25.01.1993, 102. It was published in the 
BAS Magazine 1993, 1, 37–38. 
80 ТА на БАН, 46-то заседание, 1.02.1993, 81–85. 












According to the censuses of post-socialist era the Bulgarian 
population is continuously decreasing. Bulgaria is only one of 
the post-communist countries where the number of inhabitants 
has been declining for decades, but the degree and intensity of 
this process is prominent. The political, economic and social 
processes of transition from state directed economy to market 
oriented capitalism, the emerging social tensions after the fall 
of dictatorships, the ethnic conflicts and changes of state 
boundaries, the EU accession and changing opportunities of 
international migration had great influence on demographic 
processes in the Eastern part of Europe. 
The social problem of population decline is a multidisciplinary 
research area; even geographers investigate its territorial aspects 
beside sociologists, psychologists, anthropologists, biologists and 
historians. This work analyzes the demographic trends of the last 
decades in Europe, especially in post-communist states, and the 
background of population decline in this region and in Bulgaria. 
After this overview the study explores the spatial patterns of 
population decrease with the help of published census results and 
methods of data analysis and GIS technics. 
Threatening is not among the aims of this paper, the increasing 
of social tensions with the vison of national death is false and 
unnecessary. Exploring the territorial aspects of decline is an 
opportunity to understand the reactions of people and society 
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to the changing social, economic and political conditions. 
 
DATABASE AND METHODS 
 
The population number is in connection with the fertility and 
migration processes. These factors can be measured by 
demographic indicators. The informational revolution provides 
more opportunities to data analysis and makes the collection of 
comparable statistical data possible. Census results of countries in 
the world give the basis of demographic researches and 
construction of large databases makes the exploration of global, 
continental or regional demographic patterns and trends possible. 
This geographical study uses the methods of data analysis 
and technics of GIS for introducing the differences of 
population decline in post-socialist countries and mapping the 
spatial pattern of negative trends in Bulgaria. The census data 
of the states are available in the websites of national statistical 
institutes, but there are differences among countries in the time 
of censuses during the 20
th
 century. All states in our region 
held censuses in almost every decade after the Second World 
War; therefore it is possible to carry out time series researches. 
Lacks of data are displaceable with population estimates.  
Bulgarian territorial data were published after censuses of 
1992, 2001 and 2011; they are available in the website of the 
National Statistical Institute of Bulgaria (www.nsi.bg). The 
GIS database of this research includes demographic data of 
municipalities (EU level LAU 1, called obshtina in Bulgaria). 
 
POPULATON GROWTH IN EUROPE 
 
After the political and social changes of the 1990s many scientific 
works investigated the demographic patterns of Europe. 
Population processes in Europe generate some social problems to 
the new millennium. The fertility rate of Europe was the lowest in 
the world in the 1990s, and fertility differences among European 
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countries continued to diminish.
1
 These tendencies promise 
further population ageing and falling population growth, which 
cannot be compensated by the migration to Europe.  
Fertility trends show similarities in European countries after 
the Second World War, but the political and cultural background 
generated divergences among different regions of Europe. In 
Western and Northern Europe after the decline in fertility in the 
second half of the 1960s, countries enjoyed the period of relative 
stability for decades.
2
 The „Catholic fertility‟ of Southern Europe 
has disappeared in the last decades of the 20
th
 century; the 
Southern states had the lowest fertility in Europe in the 1990s.
3
  
Countries of the Eastern Block showed divergences in fertility 
in the second half of the 20
th
 century. The years of 1950s and 1960s 
were the period of declining fertility; the „baby boom‟ of Western 
states is missing, but they started the post-war era with higher 
fertility rates because of their rural and less developed economic 
background. The pro-natalist policies of Communist governments 
caused short-term effects on birth rates and generated the 
differences in fertility trends.
4
 Divergences disappeared after 
the fall of communism. The period of transition, the economic 
disruption, the rising unemployment and falling living standards 
resulted in declining fertility in every country. 
In the 21
st
 century Europe had to face with the challenges 
of population aging and population decline. Population growth 
is the lowest in Europe in comparison with the other regions of 
the World and the estimated turning point to decline is the year 
2025.
5
 Because of the low fertility rates the international 
                                                        
1 Coleman, D. New Patterns and Trends in European Fertility: International and 
Sub-National Comparisons. – In: Coleman, David (Ed.). Europe‟s Population in 
the 1990s. New York, 1996, 2. 
2 Ibid. 11. 
3 Ibid. 47. 
4 Ibid. 
5 Van Nimwegen, N., R. van der Erf. Europe at the Crossroads: Demographic 
Challenges and International Migration. – Journal of Ethnic and Migration 
Studies, 36, 2010, N 9, 1360. 
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migration has become the main engine of European population 
growth and it may delay population decline but could not 
reverse the trends.
6
 Differences in fertility rates and migration 
processes provide Western, Northern and Southern Europe 
slow population growth, but countries of Central and Eastern 
Europe are already experiencing population decline.  
 
POPULATION DECLINE IN THE POST-SOCIALIST 
COUNTRIES 
 
At the moment of regime change nearly 130.5 million people 
lived in the European satellite states of the USSR (this article 
classes also the Baltic States among satellite states besides 
Albania, Bulgaria, Czechoslovakia, Hungary, Poland, Romania 
and Yugoslavia). After the first decade of the new millennium 
the number of inhabitants in the seventeen countries of this 
region is less than 123 million. In the last two decades the 
demographic loss of the Post-Socialist countries was nearly 7 
million people (Fig. 1).  
Despite similarities in population processes, the political, 
historical, cultural and economic disparities resulted in different 
demographic reactions within this region to the changing 
conditions. Natural population decline has already appeared in 
Bulgaria, the Baltic States, Hungary, Romania and Germany. 
The negative migration balance is observed in Romania, 
Bulgaria, Poland and Baltic States. The population decline in 
the Eastern part of Europe is the result of not only the low 
fertility levels and emigration, but high levels of mortality too.
7
  
Vassilev explained the negative demographic trends of 
post-communist countries with the lowest fertility level, 
declining average life expectancy at birth, high morbidity and 
                                                        
6 Ibid., 1360. 
7 Coleman, D., R. Rowthorn. Who‟s Afraid of Population Decline? A 
Critical Examination of Its Consequences. – Population and Development 
Review, 37, 2011, 220. 
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mortality rates and population losses due to emigration.
8
 He 
related these processes with such economic and social problems 
like unemployment, increasing social inequalities, healthcare 
crisis, environmental pollution, high poverty rates, low real 




Figure 1. The change of population number (%) in the region of 
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 Sources: Censuses of States. 
 
Population decline in the Baltic States is the most 
conspicuous, which is the effect of not only the emigration of 
inhabitants of Russian origin, but also of the low birth rates 
too, as it mentioned above (Fig. 2). The rates of negative 
changes were the worst in Estonia in the 1990s (–12.5%), but 
in the 21
st
 century the trends showed improvement in this 
country (–5.5%). In Latvia and Lithuania the trends of 
declining strengthened in the new millennium (under –12%). 
Countries of East-Central Europe (the Visegrad Group) 
show divergences in population trends (Fig. 3). Besides the 
higher fertility of „Catholic Poland‟ the young, Slovakia 
                                                        
8 Vassilev, R. Bulgaria‟s Population Implosion. – East European Quarterly, 
40, 2006, N 1, 71. 
9 Ibid., 71. 
Margit Kőszegi 
 
 - 386 - 
entered later to the phase of demographic transition, therefore 
higher fertility rates provide delayed decrease to the country. 
Slovakia produced minimal population growth even in the first 
decade of 21
st
 century (0.33%). Poland produced decrease in 
population number in the 1990s (–1%), but these trends 
changed to minimal growth after the millennium.  
 
Figure 2. Changes in population number (%) in the Baltic 
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The same tendencies can be seen in the Czech Republic. 
This country produced modest and decreasing population 
growth in the second half of the 20
th
 century, which turned to 
decline in the 1990s (–0.7%), but the demographic trend 
reversed in the new millennium (3.25%). In Hungary falling in 
population growth is continuous after the Second World War; 
population decline is appeared before the fall of communism 
in the 1980s (under 3%). Improvement can be seen in 
decreasing tendencies in the 1990s (–1.7%), but it reversed in 
the 21
st
 cenury (–2.56%). 
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Figure 3. Changes in population number in countries of the 
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Balkan States are the less homogenous in demographic trends 
and processes (Fig. 4). Population growth in Albania, the poorest 
country of Europe was above 20% in the years of Socialism, but 
after the fall of communism this trend is immediately turned to 
decline (–3.6%), which continued in the 21st century (–7.7%). The 
same tendencies can be seen in the other Albanian state, Kosovo, 
where population decline appeared only after the turn of the 
millennium (–13%). Decrease in population number appeared after 
the fall of communism in Romania (–5%), and this tendency 
remained stable in the next decade (–7.2%). 
The elimination of population growth is continuous in Bosnia 
and Herzegovina after the Second World War, but mainly the war 
events reversed it to decline in the 1990s (–13.2%); the intensity 
of decrease slowed in the 21
st
 century (the rate of decline is 
only 0.7%). The decreasing rates of population growth in 
Croatia (6.4–4%) and in Serbia (8.4–1.2%) during the Socialist 
era turned to decline (–7.25% in Croatia, –4.15% in Serbia) in the 
war years of the 1990s, which persisted in the next decade too. 
War events avoided the former Yugoslav states of Macedonia, 
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Montenegro and Slovenia, therefore falling tendencies did not 
appear in these countries in the last decade of the 20
th
 century. 
Slow population growth prevailed in Slovenia (4.4%) and 
Macedonia (2%) after the millennium, but migration processes 
have caused decline in population number (–7.9%) for the 
independent Montenegro. 
 
Figure 4. Changes in Number of Population in Balkan States 
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DEMOGRAPHIC TRENDS IN BULGARIA 
 
After the fall of communism, Bulgarian scientists proclaimed the 
population decline. Donkov introduced the demographic processes 
of the 20
th
 century with demographic indicators.
10
 He 
confirmed the declining fertility in the country after the Second 
World War and emphasized the negative effects of internal 
migration to towns and cities, which resulted population aging and 
population decline in the rural areas. The demographic policies 
                                                        
10 Donkov, K. Bulgaria. – In: Rallu, Jean Louis and Blum, Alain: European 
Population. Paris, 1991, 257–275. 
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of the Bulgarian communist regime provoked fluctuation in 




Vassilev depicted the vison of a demographic catastrophe 
with serious political, economic and social consequences.
12
 He 
introduced the statistical indicators of this “implosion”: the lowest 
level of fertility in the world, the lowest birth rate in Europe, one 
of the highest mortality rates of Europe, replacement rate far 
below the fertility replacement level, decreasing marriage rates 
and rising divorce rates.
13
 The general decline of population in 
the end of the 20
th
 century is mainly the result of the highest 
negative birth rates in Europe and the emigrations of the 1980s 
and early 1990s.
14
 While in the 1980s it was the Bulgarian Turks 
emigrating from Bulgaria to Turkey, after the fall of 
Communism the emigrants were mainly highly skilled 
Bulgarians.
15




The reduction in fertility levels relates to the postponement or 
refusal of child bearing and marriage. The mode age group of 
reproduction was 20–24 years in the era of communism, but in the 
post-socialist period it shifted towards to 25–29 years.17  The 
decline of marriages is accompanied with the increase of 
divorces.
18
 Another change in the 1990s the extraordinary 
                                                        
11 Ibid., 262. 
12 Vassilev, R., Op. cit., 71–87. 
13 Ibid., 72–74. 
14 Rangelova, R. Bio-demographic Change and Socio-economic Trends in 
Bulgaria. – Economics and Human Biology, 1, 2003, 417. 
15 Georgieva, P. Bulgaria: The Double Edge of Economy and Demography. 
– Higher Education in Europe. 29, 2004, N 3, 364. 
16 Christov, Vl. et al., A Report on the Demographic Characteristics and the 
State of Men‟s Health in Bulgaria. – JMHG, 1, 2004, N 2–3, 92. 
17 Pamporov, Al. Patterns of Family Formation: Marriage and Fertility 
Timing in Bulgaria at the Turn of the Twenty-first Century – A Case Study of 
Sofia. – History of the Family, 13, 2008, 211. 
18  Taaffe, R. N. Population Structure. – In: Grothusen, Kl., D. (Ed.). 
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increase in extra-marital births.
19
 Child bearing is a personal 
choice, which is in relation with the changes in traditional 
attitudes towards life-course events. Persons would like stable 
positions in society and to maintain own household. In the first part 
of the 20
th
 century this independency meant a separate room. In 
the post-war era it changed to an apartment, but in the 
post-socialist period a separate house meant this security, which 
is suitable to the size of the family.
20
 According to Vassilev the 
norm of one-child families is the result of income losses and 
pessimistic expectations of future.
21
 
Most of the scientific works blame the transition processes, 
especially the painful economic transition for the high level of 
population decline, but some other social aspects must be 
mentioned, which are the features of the modern (and postmodern) 
European societies. The trends of falling fertility rates appeared 
earlier during the 20
th
 century, not only around the turn of the 
millennium. Taaffe collected the reasons of decreasing birth rates, 
like the increasing level of education, the lack of ability to care 
for children (both parent works and grandparents live far away 
from the city), the careers of women, the lack of domestic help 
and inadequate governmental stipends.
22
 
Besides the negative consequences to the economy, 
population decline burdens the future with another social 
problem, the situations of ethnic minorities in Bulgaria. The 
false minority politics of the Bulgarian communist regime 
resulted strained relations between Muslim minorities and 
ethnic Bulgarians in the 1980s. The excessive news about 
higher fertility rates of Roma and Turkish minorities, and the 
visions of national death indicate threatening in the majority 
and strengthen the ethnic conflicts in the 21
st
 century.  
                                                                                                          
Handbook on South Eastern Europe. Vol. 6. Göttingen, 1990, 438. 
19 Pamporov, Al., Op. cit., 211. 
20 Ibid., 215. 
21 Vassilev, R., Op. cit., 40, 2006, 1, 74.  
22 Taaffe, R. N., Op. cit., 440. 
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SPATIAL PATTERN OF POPULATION DECLINE IN 
BULGARIA AFTER THE FALL OF COMMUSNISM 
 
According to the 1992 census 8.487.332 people lived in Bulgaria. 
This number was 7.928.091 in 2001 and 7.364.570 in 2011. In 
the last two decades the population decline was 13%, more than 1 
million persons (1.122.752). In the transition era of the 1990s the 
rate of decrease was 6.58% (558.421 persons). After the fall of 
communism the economic and social crisis of the country 
influenced natural increase and migration processes. After the turn 
of the new millennium the trends and the intensity of demographic 
processes have not changed. In the first decade of the 21
st
 century 
the rate of decline was 7.12% (564.331 persons). The challenges 
of EU accession and the new employment opportunities main- 
tained the emigration process and the low birth rates. 
The spatial pattern of population decline after the fall of 
communism shows the presence of the processes that had 
appeared in the socialist era (Fig. 5). The rural areas produced the 
highest rates of decrease, but the cities show positive tendencies. 
The worst trends can be observed in the north-western region of 
the country. The fall in population number is more than 50% in 
three obshtinas of oblast Vidin (Bojnica –59.72%, Makresh 
–55.02%, Gramada –51.35%). The decline is more than 30 per 
cent in the whole oblast of Vidin (except in the town of Vidin, 
–26.42%). The trends are the same in the neighbouring Montana 
and Pleven oblast, where only the obshtinas of the greatest 
settlements, Kozloduj (–11.52%) and Pleven (–18.27%) show 
lower decrease. 
The western border region had great losses in the last 
decades too. The losses are more than 30% in the vast majority 
of the obshtinas in oblast Pernik and Kjustendil. Next to the 
Serbian border in obshtina Trekljano the population decline is 
62%, and 52% in obshtina Nevestino (Macedonian border). 
The pulling effects of the capital city can be recognised in the 
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higher rates of population decline within these municipalities. 
 
Figure 5. Changes in population number in the municipalities 
(obshtinas) of Bulgaria (1992-2011).  
 
Source: NSI of Bulgaria 
 
The population decrease is also higher in the southern and 
south-eastern areas of Bulgaria. The fall in number of inhabitants is 
more than 30% in every obshtinas of oblast Jambol (except in 
municipality of Jambol). The situation is the same in the southern 
obshtinas of oblast Kardjali and Haskovo (e.g. Madzharovo –59%). 
In the north-eastern region the population decline is more than 30% 
in the border obshtinas of Dobrich. Higher rates of decrease appear 
also in municipalities between Ruse, Razgrad and Veliko Tarnovo. 
The counterpoints of declining are the cities of Bulgaria. 
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The capital city of Sofia (8%) and the cities of the Black Sea 
coast, Varna (9.39%) and Burgas (1.14%) could increase their 
population number. The coastal settlements with their developing 
tourism are the most attractive places to the inhabitants (Nesebar 
18.4%, Aksakovo 13%). The population decline in Plovdiv 
(–0.8%) and in its neighbouring obshtinas is lower (under 
10%), as in the cities of Veliko Tarnovo (–5.5%), Haskovo 
(–7.7%) and Stara Zagora (–8.7%). The rates of decrease are 
lower also in the obshtinas of the south-western region. 
Ethnic Turks and Pomaks live in the obshtinas of Rodope 
Mountains. Their fertility indicators are better than that of 
ethnic Bulgarians. In the western obshtinas, the decline is smaller, 
but in the Eastern Rodope the migration processes strengthen the 
decrease. The economic features are also different in the two 
parts of the mountain. Western Rodope preserved its rural feature 
in the era of socialism, but the area of Kardjali was the scene 
of the hardest economic crisis in Bulgaria after the fall of 
communism. In the obshtinas of the North-Eastern region, where 
the number and rate of ethnic Turks is also higher, the rate of 
decline is under 10%. 
The spatial patterns of declining trends show differences 
before and after the millennium (Fig. 6). In most obshtinas the 
rates of decrease were higher, but in some areas the 21
st
 
century has brought positive changes. Deteriorating tendencies 
became stronger mainly in the northern parts of the country, in the 
obshtinas near Ruse and in oblast Vidin, Montana and Pleven. 
Positive changes have appeared in trends after the millennium in 
Sofia and in coastal settlements. In the obshtinas where the 
number and rate of ethnic Turks are higher, the negative 
tendencies have decreased, especially in the southern obshtinas 
of Kardjali oblast. These trends refer to the changing features 
of migration processes. The rural Turkish inhabitants choose 
migration mainly before the millennium; they are probably 
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Figure 6. Changes in population decline before and after the 
millennium in municipalities (obshtinas) of Bulgaria. 
 




Negative demographic trends and slowing population growth 
are common features not only in Europe, but also in the whole 
world. Decrease raises some serious social and economic 
questions, but the vision of national death is unnecessary and 
only increases the social tensions. 
The recent demographic decline of population in Bulgaria 
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is the result of the negative economic and social situation and 
the European cultural background. Low birth rates are typical 
in European countries and population decline can be measured 
in post-socialist states. 
The changing living conditions, the internal migration 
from rural areas to urban settlements, the collapsing larger 
families and the employment of women resulted lower 
population growth after the Second World War. The low 
fertility rates and the false minority policy caused population 
decline in Bulgaria in the 1980s. The tendency continued in 
the years of hard economic crisis after the fall of communism. 
The changing economic, social and living conditions and the 
EU accession influenced demographic processes in the new 
millennium; the decrease remained round 7%. 
The loss of population is higher in the rural areas, especially in 
the north-western region. The capital city of Bulgaria and cities of 
the Black Sea coast could maintain their population number, which 
indicates the internal migration directions and the reaction of the 
society to the challenges of the new millennium. 
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I. THE INTERNATIONAL ASSOCIATION OF LABOUR 
LEGISLATION 
 
Alongside with the establishment of the Second International in 
1900 in Paris, the International Association for Labour Legislation 
(IALL) can be considered the immediate forerunner of the 
International Labour Organization. The first directors of the 
Organization were Léon Bourgeois (in office: 1895–1896)1 and 
Ernest Manheim
2
. The Legislation was established to serve as a 
link among those industrialized countries which deemed the legal 
protection of their workers important; also to initiate the 
establishment the ILO, to secure the regular publishing of 
legislations in French, German, and English, to aid the revision of 
laws of different countries, and to supply these countries with 
adequate information on laws in force and their application. 
The IALL also gave a helping hand for contracting countries 
preparing their memorandums, the statistics dealing with laws 
protecting workers, international statistics, and to organize 
international congresses on international workers’ legislations. 
The first session of the IALL was held in Bern, in 1906, 
where immediately two drafts were accepted, namely the ban 
                                                        
1 Léon Victor Auguste Bourgeois (1851–1925) - the 64th Prime Minister of France. 
2 Ernest Aimé Joseph Manheim (1900–2002) - Belgian liberal politician. 
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of use of white phosphorus
3
 in match factories and regulation 
of working conditions. In 1913, also in Bern, another two drafts 
were submitted: child labor under fourteen was completely, yet 
over sixteen and in connection with women was generally 
prohibited. Unfortunately, owing to the First World War the 
letter draft could not be realized. 
But even the Legislation itself was not flawless. Employers, 
employees, and government delegates did not represent 
themselves in the IALL at all, only general practitioners, teachers, 
and lawyers were present, and owing to this, most of the times 
they were not always at disposal, therefore the Legislation was 
not able to function properly. Though great benefit of the 
IALL was that it paved the way for the ILO and three very 
important motives were preserved after the First World War: 
the practice of annual conferences, the institute of a central 
organization and the supervision of the implementation of 
conventions. During the twenty-five years of operation of the 




I.1. THE LEAGUE OF NATIONS 
 
In January, 1918, Woodrow Wilson (in office: 1913–1921)5, 
the twenty-eight President of the United States of America 
submitted the final part of his 14 points, in which the last point 
reflected the need of an international organization for labor 
maters. The contracting parties of this organization granted the 
political freedom and the territorial integrity for each other, 
promoted international cooperation, offered security for its 
members, secured long lasting peace, and helped to settle 
                                                        
3 White phosporus is a material produced from allotrope and used for for 
example the illumination of ammunition. The substance is flammable and 
therefore it is extremely dangerous to human health and life. 
4 International Association for Labour Legislation (IALL). City University, London. 
http://www.staff.city.ac.uk/tom.davies/IALL.html; Johnston, G. A. The International 
Labour Organization. Its Work for Socail and Economical Progress. London, 1970. 
5 Woodrow Wilson (1856–1924) – 28th President of the United States of America. 
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international disputes. Wilson’s idea of the League of Nations 
(Société des Nations) found widespread support, though faced 
with many unexpected obstacles; therefore, during his term 
Wilson was not able to see the United States among the 
contracting countries of the League. 
The horrors of the First World War provided a sound reason 
for establishing such an organization, which later on could even 
prevent a similar international catastrophe. Seeing the scale of the 
support, Wilson had taken the matters into his hands and travelled 
to Europe to the peace conferences which were to secure the end 
of the War. Here in Paris he propagated his ideas among the 
countries present and used all of his might to see the establishment 
of the League as a part of the Peace Treaty of Versailles (1919). 
Finally, alongside Wilson, great men, such as Georges Clemenceau 
(in office: 1917–1921)6 and David Lloyd George (in office: 
1916–1922)7 helped drafting the first section of the contract. 
The League had two main organs: the assembly, where 
five members seated, and the council, which consisted of five 
constant and four temporary members. This was further completed 
by the Permanent Court of International Justice.
8
 The Court was 
established in 1922, and was specified by the Covenant of the 
League of Nations. It had become the first such institute with a 
perpetual, international, and general jurisdiction. During its 
twenty-four years of operation, the Court had dealt with 
twenty-nine international litigious cases, out of which twenty-seven 
ended with consensus. Undoubtedly the Court also helped to 
clarify and to improve numerous international legislative questions. 
The functioning of the Court ceased in 1946; from that year on 
the primary judicial organization of the latter United Nations 
(UN), the International Court of Justice took its place.
9
 
                                                        
6 Georges Benjamin Clemenceau (1841–1929) - the 72nd Prime Minister of France. 
7 George Lloyd George (1863–1945) - the 52nd Prime Minister of Great-Britain. 
8 The League of Nations, 1920. Milestones: 1914–1920. U.S. Department of State. 
Office of the Historian. https://history.state.gov/milestones/1914-1920/league. 
9 International Court of Justice. Permanent Court of Justice. Publications of 
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According to the contracting nations, one of the most 
important roles of the League was to respect one another’s 
territorial sovereignty while they endowed the organization with 
every possible asset to protect peace. The League could carry this 
out by using economic sanctions or even military force. 
Beside the overwhelming support, the opposition had also 
raised its voice. Already in 1919, during the Paris peace 
conference they criticized Wilson’s participation in the estab- 
lishment of such organization, which at the ended resulted that 
the United States did not join the League.  
The United States has never joined the League and due to 
this fact the League proved less effective. In spite of this, 
Wilson had always agreed with its goals; from time to time the 
United States even helped the League. Finally, Wilson’s dream 
had come true, though the Paris Peace Conference had not 
realized its aims. By time the Conference had lost its credi- 
bility and had become too extreme in its instructions. 
The surfacing peril of another world war had furthermore 
strengthened the legitimacy of an organization similar to the 
League to settle international disputes. In accordance the 
American public and the Roosevelt (in office: 1933–1945)10 
cabinet supported the 1945 establishment the United Nations 




I.2. THE AFTERMATH OF THE FIRST WORLD WAR 
 
In 1918 the Germans launched the so called spring offensive 
(Kaisersclacht) owing to which they awaited the turn of the 
table, but the failure of the offensive had sealed the fate of the 
German Empire for good. In this very year Bulgaria also 
                                                                                                          
the Permanent Court of International Justice (1922–1946). 
http://www.icj-cij.org/pcij/?p1=9 
10 Franklin Delano Roosevelt (1882–1945) - the 32nd President of the United 
States of America. 
11 The League of Nations…, Op. cit. 
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surrendered
12
 and this was the time when Great-Britain found 
timely to organize a peace conference during which several 
questions in relation with the working class had to be considered. 
The establishment of an international labor committee could 
not be hindered any more for several reasons. Many nations, 
including the German Empire, would have liked to protect its 
workers, and so the German Emperor, Max von Baden (reign: 
1918)
13
 had pulled all strings for such a committee that would 
further strengthen the stability of the individual states. Another 
barely disguised aim of the committee was that it could provide 
ground for nations to settle their disputed political matters. 
The first memorandum (Joint Memorandum by the Home 
Office and Ministry of Labour) on the post-war situation of the 
working class was born in 1918. According to this, the task of the 
developed countries ought to have been to help the establishment 
of a committee. This should have been carried out before the 
restoration of the free market since afterwards it would have been 
hard to settle wages and labor circumstances; also the failure of 
all this would have sent the message that the peace conference 
would have only supported the trade interests of the capitalists.
14
 
In 1919 the war had already past and the preparations of 
the Paris peace conference had commenced. A second memo- 
randum also came to light which is related to Edward J. Phelan.
15
 
According to his memorandum the future organization must 
have to have to main organs: the office and an annual 
conference. Phelan supported an organization which would be 
above all nations, but would only be as effective as the contracting 
                                                        
12 The surrender of Bulgaria was sealed by the Treaty of Neuilly in Nov., 
1919. 
13  Maximilian von Baden (1867–1926) - prince and politician, 8th 
Chancellor of Germany (1918). 
14 Alcock, A. History of the International Labour Organization. London, 1971, 
18–19. 
15 The first international office-holder and the 4th Director-General of the 
ILO (1941–1948). 
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nations were willing to carry out the collective agreements. The 
idea faced many obstacles. The first was to determine the circle of 
non-governmental members. Although, according to the con- 
vention the given country should make the choice, to become 
aware of the full picture the participation of the employers and 
employees was required as well. Maintaining a healthy balance, 
as Phelan suggested, the governmental delegates should have 
two, the employer and employee delegates should have 
one-one votes. The second problem lied in the difference of 
levels of economic power among nations. This would mean 
that the economically more advanced countries might accept 
such conventions that the less advanced countries could not 
execute; consequently to accept a proposal, the two-third of all 
votes were required. The third problem was how to enforce 
nations to employ the accepted conventions. The solution to 
this would be if the nations provided supervision over each 
other, but even in this case the matter of penalties would have 
remained an open question. The fourth and final question was 
that the economically more advanced countries could have had 
more votes or not. According to Phelan this would be against 
the spirituality of the future organization and the less advanced 
countries would only see the downside of the collaboration.  
Despite all the progressive approach, Phelan’s suggestion 
had one great fault, though finally his proposal served the base 
for the latter International Labour Organization it did not have 
the disposal of an executive organ; now, only his memorandum 
had to be divided into articles. 
Phelan’s faults were amended by Harold Butler16, who, in 
his memorandum did think of an executive organ, the Gover- 
ning Body in which the great five, Great-Britain, France, the 
United States of America, Italy, and Japan took a seat. Besides the 
governmental delegates, non-governmental representtatives, 
                                                        
16  Harold Butler (1883–1951) - the Secretary-Genaral of the first ILO 
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delegates of employers and employees were also deputed. 
Butler’s aims are detailed in the Preamble.17 
Phelan and Butler’s memorandums together constituted 
the so-called Phelan-Butler Draft, which basically provides the 
composition of the governing body and deals with the 
avoidance of putting conventions into effect. Altogether 
twenty-four people had place in the governing body: twelve 
people from the great five, seven from other nations and six 
from the employer side and six from the employee side. The 
contracting nations had to make a report annually about the 
ratified conventions, and about those conventions they did not 
ratify with the addition of why it could not be done. The 
existing office is supplemented by the Permanent Court of 
International Justice, and most importantly it had to be an 
integrated part of the League of Nations. 
The Labour Council consisted of fifteen members: two 
from each of the great five and five from other countries; two 
from Belgium, and one from Poland, one from Cuba, and one 
from Czechoslovakia. Respect for the United States Samuel 
Gompers (1850-1924)
18





I.3. THE LABOR LEGISLATIONS OF THE PEACE 
CONFERENCES 
 
After the First World War it became obvious that that the 
capitalists had to give in to the working class and finally come 
up with some practical measures. By the 1920s the situation 
had become untenable and the governments had to intervene 





centuries the thought had become fit for to entrust the legal 
                                                        
17 Alcock, A., Op. cit., 21–24. 
18 American cigar manufacturer, the founder of the Americal Federation of 
Labor. 
19 Alcock, A., Op. cit., 24–26. 
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regulation of labor to an international organization. 
In the last years of the 19
th
 century, the discussion had 
commenced which prepared the 1919 founding conference. 
The initial congresses were held under the aegis of the Second 
International. The first important congress was held in 1889 in 
Paris, and later in Brussels (1891), in Zürich (1893), in London 
(1896), again in Paris (1900), in Amsterdam (1904), in Stuttgart 
(1907), in Copenhagen (1910), and as an exceptional conference, 
in Basel (1912). During these conferences, the participants listed 
all those points, which were deemed crucial by the working class. 
The four years of the war had shed light upon the fact that the 
everyday worker owed his country not just with his labor, but 
with his blood, therefore cardinal question of the conferences 
were the military service of the working class. Further points 
were the eight hour working day, the regulation and banning of 
the night, the women’s and children’s work, the protection of 
labor, the voting rights of women, education, the rights of labor, 
the regulation of the strike-rights and the role of trade unions. 
In 1919, based on the statements, memorandums, and 
suggestions of the different nations a declaration was set for the 
Versailles Peace Conference to be ratified, which finally 
practically became the Constitution of the ILO. The Constitution 
has two parts: the first consists of the suggestions and measures for 
the perpetual organization; the second explains the labor clauses. 
The first important conference after the War was the Bern 
Conference of 1919, which practically framed and prepared 
the program of the international charta of labor. Still, in the 
very same year, in Paris another conference took place, which 
further strengthened that the peace conferences after the War 
must deal with the labor legislations and the establishment of 
an institution dealing with such matters. During this the 
national key concepts should have conciliated with the 
national legislations, the supervision of all this ought to have 
been organized, and, among the frames of the organization, the 
proportion of the employers and employees must have been set. 
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The Peace Treaty also should have contained all of those 
points which were spoken of before the War; the regulation of 
working hours, the setup of a social security system, 
establishing the minimum level of wages, raising the national 
social regulations on international level, setting up a pension 
system, the reorganization of a labor supervision system and 
the regulations regarding women and children. 
The basis of the above outlined new, permanent and 
autonomous international organization is in part XIII of the 
Versailles Peace Treaty ratified on July 28, 1919. In accordance 
with this many general principles were drafted in the peace 
treaties bound with Austria in Saint-Germain, with Hungary in 
Versailles, and with Bulgaria in Neuilly. By these treaties 
every contracting country, which were also the members of the 
League of Nations, kept their pledge to the establishment of 
equitable criteria within the frames of the institute, and for the 






After the downfall of the Hungarian Soviet Republic (Magyar 
Tanácsköztársaság), the first phase of joining the International 
Labour Organization for Hungary had begun. In 1921 when 
Governor Miklós Horthy (in office: 1920–1944)21 appointed 
István Bethlen (in office: 1921–1931)22 as the Prime Minister of 
the Hungarian Kingdom. Still in 1921, Bethlen’s conservative 
party and Károly Peyer’s23 socialist party agreed, and together 
they worked out the so-called Bethlen-Peyer Pact. The Pact had a 
significant importance for both parties; neither of them desired 
another coup similar of the previous years. 
                                                        
20 Tatomir, N. A Munka Nemzetközi Szervezete. Bp., 1964, 5–7. 
21 Miklós Horthy (1868–1957) - the Governor of the Hungarian Kingdom. 
22 István Bethlen (1874–1946) - the 27th Prime Minister of the Kingdom of 
Hungary. 
23 Károly Peyer (1881–1956) - the Home Secretary of Hungary (1919) and one 
of the leading figures of the socialist movement between the two world wars. 
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This political compromise turned out to be favorable for 
both the conservatives and the socialists as well and the 
pressure on the socialists seemed to ease somewhat. The 
Hungarian Social-Democratic Party (Magyar Szolciáldemokrata 
Párt – MSZDP) could freely run in the elections and could 
represent itself at the parliament. For all this, they had to cease 
the organization of public servants, postmen, and railroad 
workers, the agitation of peasantry, and the organization of 
political strikes; they had to finish the association with the 
emigrant socialist politicians, and had to support Bethlen in 
every way in his foreign relations. In return, the MSZDP 
demanded that the workers’ organizations could continue 
working freely, that Bethlen should grant the right of freedom, 
and restore the institution of workers’ insurance. Thank to the 
pact, the MSZDP became one of the leading parties of the 
political palette until the 1930s. They supported the rights of 
workers, but had not yet given up class struggle and the 
organization of rural workers. With this Bethlen’s party 
officially acknowledged the MSZDP as a political factor, 
although it is also true that they did not desire to share political 
leadership with them. 
Hungary had stabilized and it was also pleasing for the 
West that the advance of Bolsheviks was halted. In 1922 the 
Bethlen administration asked for admission to the League of 
Nations which at the same time meant the admission to the 
International Labour Organization. Hungary now could again 
ask for Western loan, what happened in 1924, therefore the 
country was able to start rebuilding.
24
   
Although the organization had not yet voted Hungary into 
the Governing Body, but already in 1925 Hungarian officials 
were working for the Organization. At this time separate office 
had not been working in the country, but a local correspondent 
had been informing the Governing Body about the actual 
                                                        
24  Vass, V. A magyar demokratikus munkásmozgalom rövid története, 
1919-1944. Bp., 1999, 25–30. 
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happenings and also Hungary had appeared in the publications 
of the Organization several times. The aim of the Bethlen 
administration was safely allocate Hungarian delegates into 
most committees and with help of the Organization elevate the 
Hungarian labor to the levels of the age. For this end, until its 
resignation, the Bethlen administration had ratified numerous 
conventions. 
Hungary lost the Second World War. In the wartime years 
battles in the territory of Hungary, the leaving German forces, 
and the occupying Soviet Red Army practically devastated the 
country. The hardest hit sectors were the transportation, the 
agriculture and the manufacturing industry. 
Between 1945 and 1948 much of the country’s revenues 
were turned to the payment of indemnities. The economy was 
devastated which resulted in one of the greatest inflation of 
currency in the history of the world. The stabilization of 
economy could not be solved without Western help. 
After the War the structure of economy was characterized 
by the private property, but the systematical socialization had 
soon changed this situation. In 1946 the mines, which might 
even seem a logical step, were socialized but the following 
moves only served the consolidation of the communist 
authority. Consequently the biggest industrial firms (1946), in 
the banks (1947), the firms employing more than one hundred 
workers (1948) became socialized. By this time four of every 
five workers became a government employee. But the 
socializatios did not ceased; the companies employing more 
than ten workers (1949), the crafts employing more then three 
employees (1950) got into communist hands. By the 1950s the 
socialization was almost complete in Hungary, the idea of 
compensation had not even surfaced and company leaders 
were systematically removed by series of tresspasses.
25
  
                                                        
25 A magyar gazdaság átalakulása. Országos Széchenyi Könyvtár. 1956-os Intézet 
és Oral History Archívum. 2001.  
http://www.rev.hu/sulinet45/tanulm_gazd/gazd.htm 
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The forced change of regime and the complete control of 
communism over Hungary was born. The main figure behind 
this was Mátyás Rákosi (in office: 1945–1953)26. Under his 
control his party the Hungarian Communist Party (Magyar 
Kommunista Párt – MKP)27 defeated all of its political enemies 
and even assimilated the MSZDP. The political cleanup continued 
within his own party too; as a consequence he was able to realize 
a Soviet-style dictatorial socialism. Under his reign the politics 
criminalized and exploitation overshadowed the economy.
28
 
The relationship between the ILO and Hungary had 
suffered the greatest during the Rákosi era. In 1945 with the 
surrender of Japan the second Chinese–Japan war (1937–1945) 
was over, but right afterwards a devastating civil war had broke 
out. The communists had over the nationalists who had to flee 
to the island of Taiwan. The communists did not recognize this 
newly formed. Seeing the advancement of the communist the 
United States of America desired to protect the nationalists and 
it even used its naval fleet to confirm its standpoint in the matter. 
The scale of American intervention enraged the communists and 
as a guarantee of loyalty, the Hungarian delegation left the 
International Labour Conference in 1949 and kept aloof from 
the collaboration with the Organization until 1954.
29
  
In 1989–1990 Europe could witness Hungary’s second 
change of regime during which the governmental property and 
the single party system gave its way to the private property 
and the system of multiple party parliamentary representation. 
The influence of the government had significantly lessened 
                                                        
26 Mátyás Rákosi (1892–1971) - the leader of the Hungarian Kommunist 
Party (1945–1953) and the Secretary-General of the Hungarian People’s 
Republic (1952–1953). 
27 The leading political force after the occupation of the Red Army of 
Hungary (1944–1948). 
28 Bihari, M. Magyar politika. A magyar politikai rendszer történetének főbb 
szakaszai a második világháború után. 1945–1995. Bp., 1996, 12–13. 
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and the role of private property had strengthened, though the 
change did not completely meant breaking away from socialism; 
the system of traditions had been still haunting the country for 
several decades. At this time did Hungary become part of the 
European economy and government of laws. From 1996 
Hungary again became an ordinary member of the ILO. In the 
following twenty years the current political parties had 
managed to realize yet another twenty-one conventions.
30
 
Since 2000 Hungary serves as a donor country to the ILO 
which means that with the foundation of the IPEC 
(International Programme on the Elimination of Child Labour) 
program, the country financially contributes to the technical 
running of the Organization. The Nemzetgazdasági Minisztérium 
(Ministry for National Economy) has strong relationship with 
other ministries and the employer and employee organizations.
31
 
The participants are the following: From governmental side: a) 
Nemzetgazdasági Minisztérium (Ministry for National Economy), 
b) Központi Statisztikai Hivatal (Hungarian Central Statistical 
Office), c) Emberi Erőforrások Minisztériuma (Ministry of 
Human Resources), d) Külgazdasági és Külügyminisztérium 
(Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Trade); from employer side: a) 
Munkaadók és Gyáriparosok Országos Szövetsége – MGYOSZ 
(Confederation of Hungarian Employers and Industrialists), b) 
Vállalkozók és Munkáltatók Országos Szövetsége – VOSZ 
(National Association of Employers and Entrepreneurs); From 
employee side: a) Magyar Szakszervezetek Országos Szövetsége 
– MSZOSZ (National Confederation of Hungarian Trade Unions), 
b) Autonóm Szakszervezetek Szövetsége – AszSz (Autonomous 
Trade Union Confederation), c) Szakszervezetek Együttműködési 
Fóruma – SZEF (The Forum for the Co-operation of Trade 
                                                        
30 Bihari, M., Op. cit., 16–17. 
31 Magyarország és az ILO kapcsolata. Nemzetgazdasági Minisztérium. 
Szakmai Területek.  
http://ngmszakmaiteruletek.kormany.hu/akadalymentes/magyarorszag-es-az-
ilo-kapcsolata. 
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Unions), d) A Független Szakszervezetek Demokratikus Ligája 
– LIGA (Democratic League of Free Trade Unions), e) 
Munkástanácsok Országos Szövetsége – MOSZ (National 
Federation of Workers’ Councils), f) Értelmiségi Szakszervezeti 




Bulgaria is a member state of the International Labour Organi- 
zation since 6.12.1920 and a member of the United Nations 
since 14.12.1955. Bulgaria was among one of the first ten 
states that ratified the most Conventions of ILO. Bulgaria is 
represented by the Labour and Social Policy Minister at the 
ILO and its governing bodies, respectively. Since its admission 
to the ILO it has ratified 84 Conventions out of the 184 existing 
Conventions, which also include the 8 core Conventions: 1) 
Forced Labour Convention, 1930 (No. 29). Ratified: 22.09.1932. 
Convention is still in force, 2) Freedom of Association and 
Protection of the Right to Organize Convention, 1948 (No. 87). 
Ratified: 8.06.1959. Convention is still in force, 3) Right to 
Organise and Collective Bargaining Convention, 1949 (No. 98). 
Ratified: 8.06.1959. Convention is still in force, 4) Equal 
Remuneration Convention, 1951 (No. 100). Ratified: 
7.11.1955. Convention is still in force, 5) Abolition of Forced 
Labour Convention, 1957 (No. 105). Ratified: 23.03.1999. 
Convention is still in force, 6) Discrimination (Employment and 
Occupation) Convention, 1958 (No. 111). Ratified: 22.07.1960. 
Convention is still in force, 7) Minimum Age Convention, 1973 
(No. 138). Ratified: 23.04.1980. Convention is still in force, 8) 
Worst Forms of Child Labour Convention, 1999 (No. 182). 
Ratified: 28.07.2000. Convention is still in force. 
The above mentioned 84 Conventions had been ratified by 
the end 2002. It may be interesting to mention that the year of 
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2002, which was of great importance, as in June of that year 
Bulgaria became honorary member of the Administrative 
Commitee. Previously Bulgaria was only a substitute member 
of the Administrative Commitee. The ILO has long-lasting 
relationship with the Bulgarian government and the Bulgarian 
organizations of employers and employees, namely: from 
governmental side – with the Ministry of Labour and Social 
Policy, the National Statistical Institute, the Ministry of 
Education and Science, as well as the National Employment 
Agency; from employer side – with the Bulgarian Industrial 
Association, the Balkans Investment Consulting Agency; from 
employee side – with the Confederation of Independent Trade 
Unions of Bulgaria, the Confederation of Labour “Podkrepa”. 
Bulgaria’s connection is outstanding as, she does everything 
that she can to keep and preserve this good communication 
and connection with the International Labour Organization. It is 
worth mentioning that Bulgaria kept this good, frank and open 
relationship with the ILO, despite all troubles and problems that 
arise from the field of everyday labour. 










1. THEORETICAL BACKGROUND 
 
Interdisciplinary approaches offer solutions to various fields of 
research and such “multi-sources” are undoubtedly assisting 
linguistic analyses as well. It is namely the rediscovering of 
the already existing data that can sometimes shed light on 
certain linguistic issues.  
The present paper aims at revealing specific manifest- 
tations of Bulgarian–Hungarian language contact which differ 
largely in their parameters. It focuses on two realizations taking 
place at different periods of the development of the languages 
in question. The purpose is to highlight the linguistic outcome 
of certain geopolitical historic events in the contact of two 
non-neighbouring, genealogically and typologically distant 
languages, Bulgarian and Hungarian.  
 
1.1. The Area of Language Contact 
 
Undoubtedly, the phenomenon of language contact, and the way 
it affects the structure of languages, has been of great interest to 
linguists in recent years. This may be contributed also to the fact 
that in the early 21
st
 century we find linguistic “minorities” in 
virtually every country of the world. In modernity, having one 
mother tongue and residing in a country with another (different 
from the mother tongue) language is more of a regularly 
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encountered linguistic situation, rather than of a surprising one.  
The general opinion of the researchers – despite the 
differences which exist in regards to the degree of influence 
various language structures demonstrate as result of language 
contact – is that the bilinguist (a generalized term denoting 
also trilinguists etc.), as well as the so-called intercultural 
identification are the main factors triggering language change on 
the level of contact. Intercultural identification is a sociolinguistic 
term with a rather elastic definition when applied to linguistic 
analyses. It is well-known that there exist two basic types of 
language contact definitions: the so-called psycholinguistic, 
where the individual is in the center of research and treats cases 
of bilingusim, for example, and the sociolinguistic, where a given 
group of individuals exposed to more than one language is in the 
center of research. More specifically, a group where the mother 
tongue is different from the language of their residence, or are 
part of a multicultural society (as in Switzerland, Algeria, or 
Belgium, for example). Biolinguistics – a rather disputable 
interdisciplinary field – manages to integrate these two main 
approaches, departing from the individual and generalizing the 
systematically occurring idiosyncratic realizations. The research 
in this particular direction advances rather slowly, unfortunately, 




1.2. On the Parameters of Language Contact Analysis 
 
When aiming at tracing and systemizing the linguistic results 
of a given language contact we are bound to enter a rather rough 
terrain. The phenomenon of langue contatc itslef manifests in 
such large bounderies that it makes it a challange to post common 
frames for analyses. As a result, the attempts to construct a common 
apparatus for languge contact analyses are quite numerious. In this 
                                                        
1 Pöppel, E., Y. Bao. Temporal Windows as Bridge from Objective Time to 
Subjective Time. – In: Arstila, V., D. Lloyd (Eds). Subjective Time: the Philosophy, 
Psychology and Neuroscience of Temporality. Cambrige, 2014, 241–261.   
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respect, coming quite handy is the work of Thomason,
2
 where she 
presents a synthesis of the main parameters appearing in this 
research filed. This rather interesting and elaborated generalzation 
is given in an adapted form in the appendix below, since the main 
purpose here is to pinpoint a realization of a language contact 
and not to enter the theoretical discussions.   
A number of authors also argue for a so-called borrowing 
scale, which would allow to foresee what kind of elements are 
expected to be borrowed during a more intensive language 
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2 Thomason, S. G. Language Contact. Edinburgh, 2001. 
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In a nutshell, the main parameters give the following 
aspect of language contact „pre-planning”: firstly, vocabulary 
is borrowed before langauge structure, i.e. the lexical elements 
are the first ones to „cross” the language bourders. Further on, 
the words in peripherial stratum of the lexicon could be 
borrowed even in a non-intensive language contact. The 
increasing of the intensity of the language contact leads to the 
including of more/additional characteristics of the language 
donor in the borrowing process.  
The concept of intensity of contact, employed by a large 
number of linguists, is in fact quite vague. For example, how 
could this concept specify the level of intensity which is found 
in the language contact between English and Hungarian on the 
level of nation-state, i.e. in Hungarian language minorities in 
English language environment? Also, what is the level of 
intensity of language contact between Dutch and French in 
Belgium (potentially large number of bilinguists)? Although 
this concept is very appropriate and adequate in regards to 
language contact situations in general, it still remains rather 
subjective when applied to a linguistic-orientated analysis.   
 
2. BULGARIAN-HUNGARIAN LANGUAGE CONTACT: 
MANIFESTATIONS 
 
The two main moments of language contact between Bulgarian 
and Hungarian language are defined by the periods when 
substantial/compact groups of people – native speakers of each 
of the langauges – had direct contact (and subsequently the need 
of intensive language exchange).  
 
2.1. Bulgarian (Donor Language) - Hungarian (Recipient 
Langauge) 
 
It is not surprising, therefore, that the language contact which 
led to Slavic and more specifically, Bulgarian lexical mark on 
the Hungarian language, took place namely during the first 
Tracing Bulgarian–Hungarian Language Contact 
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encounter of Bulgarian and Hungarian speaking people, most 
probably in the Carpathian basin, during 9
th–10th century (as 
argued by Tóth
3
). The result of this language contact did not 
remain temporary, on the contrary, the Hungarian lexicon hosted 
permanently a substantial number of Slavic (incl. Bulgarian) 
lexical elements. Extensive and rich data lie in the works of 
Hungarian Slavists who have devoted much of their research 
namely to collect and identify lexical elements with Slavic 
origin.
4
 Here however we do not enter the large discussion 
regarding the exact Slavic donor language (which is occupying 
predominantely the publications in that field), since this is far 
from the focus of the current work. Rather, it should be noted 
that the presence of the Slavic loans in various lexicon layers 
(kinship terms, everyday life, church/state, calendar etc.) clearly 
reveals the fact that there has been a language contact, where 
language material from Bulgarian shifted into Hungarian. One 
quite interesting aspect is that it took place roughly a century 
ago, which leaves us with two main tools for the analysis: 
historical information and linguistic data (both from the 
perspective of the history of the langauge and present day state 
of the system), and minimizes the socio-pragmatic factor. 
 
2.2. Hungarian (Donor Langauge) – Bulgarian (Recipient 
Language) 
 
Approximately ten centuries after the first language contact 
between Bulgarian and Hungarian we witness another 
language transfer. This time the direction is from Hungarian to 
Bulgarian and it is manifested in the language of the Bulgarian 
minority which finds itself in Hungarian language environment 
during the first decades of the 20
th
 century. This particular language 
                                                        
3 Tóth, I. A magyar és szláv együttéles kérdései a Kárpát medencében. - In: 
Bibliotheca Slavica Savariensis III. Szombathely, 1996, 213–218; Тот, И. 
По въпроса за славянските заемки в угарски език. – БE, 2006, N 1, 91–98.  
4 Zoltán, A. Szavak, szólások, szövegek. Nyelvészeti és filológiai tanulmányok. 
Bp., 2005. 
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contact can easily find its place among the many other typical 
of the modernity language minorities all around the world. 
Bulgarian-speaking (as well as Hungarin-speaking, by the way) 
groups are found in quite some places, most often in the 
so-called traditional emmigrant destinations such as Australia, 
Canada, USA, South Africa, and also the more recent ones – 
Greece, Spain, United Kingdom, Germany. The previously 
mentioned destinations are the ones chosen by migrants nowadays 
(due to political and economic reasons). Bulgarian-speaking 
minorities are present in Rumania, Ukraine, Serbia, Greece, 
Turkey etc and they are the result of an earlier wave when large 
compact masses got “transfered” into non-Bulgarian language 
environment (due to migration or re-mapping of state bourders). 
The presence of Bulgarian-Hungarian language contact on 
the territory of Hungary clearly predefines the influence of the 
Hungarian language structures over the Bulgarian language. The 
mother tongue of the so-called “Bulgarian gardeners” (here we 
use this familiar for all who work with any Bulgarian-related 
issue term) has been the object of investigation and there exist 
some linguistic works (e.g. Menyhárt and her interesting 
observations on the language of the children in that minority)
5
. 
The impression is that the interest of the linguists who work with 
that language material is directed namely towards the Bulgarian 
of the gardeners in Hungary. The changes and metamorphoses 
which have occurred as a result of the language contact are traced 
in the recipient langauge. From the point of view of Hungarian 
language research it would be undoubtedly quite interesting to 
trace which Hungarian language structures have entered the 
“Bulgarian of the gardeners” the earliest and with least obsticales. 
Also, it is intriguing to follow the ways in which the phonological 
system reacts under the constant preassure of Hungarian.  
 
 
                                                        
5 Менхарт, К. Резултати в проучването на някои аспекти на двуезичието 
при българо-унгарски двуезични деца. – ЕЛ, 2011/2012, N 3-4, 51–65. 
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3. FINAL NOTES 
 
Undoubtedly, it is of prime interest to trace whether there 
exists a preference towards a given pattern in the borrowing of 
langauge material that appears universally, i.e. which is found 
in various langauges. The way to give an overall picture of the 
universality in the languge contact mechanisms is – naturally – 
by taking into account the langauge specific investigations. 
The present work is yet another small note which has marked 
two rather different but at the same time very rich language 




Table 1. Typologies of language contact: linguistic results and 
processes. 
1. Language change as a result of contact 
→ Typology of defining types and degrees of language change: 
- social factors; 
- intensity of contact; 
- presence or lack of partial language acquisition; 
- speakers‟ attitude; 
- linguistic factors; 
    -   universal markedness. 
→ Degree of integration of “imported” linguistic characteristics 
- typological distance between the recipient language and the 
donor language; 
- typology of the effects on the structure of the recipient 
language; 
- loss of characteristics; 
- adding characteristics; 
-   shifting characteristic. 
→ Typology of the mechanisms of language changes 
- code-switching; 
- language code shifting; 
- passive knowledge; 
    -   „negotiation‟. 
→ Strategies in foreign language acquisition 
- conscious decision; 
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- effects on native language acquisition. 
2. Extreme language interaction: typology of languages which have 
occurred as a result of contact, i.e. contact languages 
- pidgin languages; 
- Creole languages; 
- mixing on bilingual level. 
3. Typology of the „routes‟ of the dying languages 
- loss of language material; 
- changing/substituting grammar categories; 
- no structure loss, minimal borrowing. 
Source: Thomason, S. G., Op. cit., 2001, 60–77. 
Petar Miyatev (1906–1991) and 









Petar Dimitrov Miyatev was a prominent Bulgarian scientist 
who contributed to the development of the Bulgarian-Hungarian 
linguistic relations. He was born on July 20, 1906 in the town 
of Peshtera. He completed his primary education in Dolni 
Dubnik, a village in the Pleven district, and his secondary 
education in the town of Plovdiv. Petar Miyatev studied law at 
the Sofia University of “St Kliment Ohridski” and then transferred 
to history and archeology major. In 1927 he left “St Kliment 
Ohridski” University. In 1929 he obtained a sholarship from 
the Ministry of Education and in 1931 he graduated in Turkish 
and Slavic studies in Budapest. After completing his higher 
education, he defended his doctoral dissertation in philosophy 
titled “Contribution to the explanation of the Bashkir tribes and 
names” at the Budapest University. In 1940 his dissertation was 
published in Japanese. In 1931–1932 he completed specialization 
studies in Berlin and Istanbul.
1
 
In 1932 he became manager at the National Museum of 
Plovdiv. Since 1935 he began his research as a manager at the 
Oriental Department of the National Library. In 1942 P. Miyatev 
was sent to Hungary as a teacher of Bulgarian language at the 
Budapest University and a manager of the Bulgarian Cultural 
Institute. The Bulgarian language was included in the Slavic 
                                                        
1 НА-БАН, ф. 156. 
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Studies major at the Budapest University of “Péter Pázmány” in 
1875-1876.
2
 Then Aurel Meyer, a professor in Indo-European 
studies, taught the subject of Old Bulgarian grammar.
3
  
After his return to Bulgaria in 1945 he became a part-time 
professor at the Sofia University of “St Kliment Ohridski” in 
comparative grammar of Turkic languages and lectured on 
Introduction to Turkic Studies. Since 1947 he worked at the BAS.
4
 
At the beginning he worked as a manager of the Archives 
Department at the BAS, and later he became a senior fellow 
and worked at the Institute of History (BAS). In 1957 Miyatev 
became a candidate of historical sciences, and since 1964 he 
worked at the Institute for Balkan Studies (BAS). In 1971 he 
was appointed a professor at the Institute for Balkan 
Studies-BAS. For his 60-year anniversary P. Miyatev was 
awarded the “St Cyril and Methodius” medal.5 
Petar Miyatev published over 300 scientific papers and 
analyses in Bulgarian and foreign magazines and newspapers. 
His scientific interests were history and linguistics for many years. 
He compiled three volumes of documents from the archive of 
K. Ireček, one volume containing documents on the history of the 
Bulgarian Literary Society, and one volume documents from the 
Bulgarian and Serbian history, derived from the Hungarian 
archives. P. Miyatev was a Hungarian graduate and was among 
the founders of the Bulgarian archives
6
. 
A significant and valuable contribution of Miyatev was his 
work on compiling the first Hungarian-Bulgarian dictionary, 
released in 1956 by the BAS. 
                                                        
2 Ibid. 
3 Пейковска, П. Българистиката в Унгария. – В: Българистиката по 
света. С., 2009, 69. 
4 НА-БАН, ф. 156. 
5 Ibid. 
6 Пейковска, П. Творческото общуване между унгарски и български 
езиковеди от втората половина на ХIХ в. и първите десетилетия на ХХ 
век. – ЕЛ, 2011/2012, № 3-4, 156. 
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P. Miyatev worked also on the ethnic origin of the ancient 
Bulgarians and their relationship with other Turkic tribes and 
peoples. His works clarified important problems from the 
Bulgarian history related to the origin of the Bulgarians. He sought 
and published documents on the life of the Bulgarians during the 
Ottoman slavery, on the Bulgarian revolutionary movement, on the 
library science in Bulgaria, on the cultural and linguistic relations 
between Bulgaria and Hungary in the twentieth century etc. 
The interest in literary language was completely natural 
and logical, since it realized all spiritual culture of human 
society and all forms of social consciousness, social-political 
and administrative-legal ideas and concepts. 
The dynamic public life strongly influenced the rapid 
development of language links between the Bulgarian and 
Hungarian languages. This affected mostly the lexical layer of 
the language, which quickly reacted to public changes. The 
development trends in the vocabulary of the language were 
expressed with the rapid influx of new words that enabled the 
scholars to more accurately express the nuances of their 
thoughts and feelings.
7
   
The main driving forces of social development were the 
driving forces of the language’s dynamics too. 
The creation of the Hungarian-Bulgarian dictionary was 
according to the agreement on cultural cooperation between 
Bulgaria and Hungary. It was made under the leadership of 
Acad. Stoyan Romanski working at the Institute for Bulgarian 
Language-BAS, and the compilers were P. Miyatev and his 
wife Ireyn Oppelts-Miyatev. 
Undoubtedly, the vocabulary wealth helped establish closer 
ties between the two peoples through their mutual understanding 
by learning in both languages (Bulgarian and Hungarian). Thus, 
to people from one nationality would be easier to learn the 
language of other nationalities, to benefit from foreign 
                                                        
7 Виденов, М. Норма и реч. С., 1986, 79. 
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literature, and to gradually use and understand it.
8
 
In view of the tasks set for the creation of the Hungarian- 
Bulgarian dictionary all possible words from the contemporary 
Magyar language were included, even some old or obsolete were 
also compiled, as they were still alive in use. Completeness 
required also to include some colloquial and slang-words well 
known in literary language. Particular attention was paid to the 
use of phraseological entities, which was often explained with 
relevant phrases from the Bulgarian language. Proverbs and 
sayings were applied as examples because they best reflected the 
spirit of the language.
9
 Technical terms, geographical names, 
botanical and zoological names were presented in the dictionary 
because they were an essential part of the composition of the 
literary language. The dictionary was printed in parts and therefore, 
the desired unity was not possible to achieve, as it was the case 
with dictionaries compiled and printed entirely. For this reason a 
part of the material, the first ten volumes was printed in the old 
spelling, and as a result from the changes in the spelling of the 
Magyar language, the rest was written in the new orthography.
10
 
The dictionary was made with a view to its practical use to 
facilitate students of both languages in the use of the word wealth. 
In the preface of the “Magyar grammar” by Boris Paunov 
Petar Miyatev stated that Bulgarians lived in the Magyar 
country and worked mainly as gardeners who were had to 
learn the local language at great effort.
11
 The grammar of the 
spoken Magyar language was too simplistic, because this 
guide was mainly adapted to the spoken language. Miyatev 
noted: “The Magyar language is rich, sonorous and flexible. 
Its long, closed and open vowels give special musicality, 
which the student will understand only when advance a little 
                                                        
8 Миятев, П., И. Оппелц-Мятева, И. Унгарско-български речник. С., 
1956, 5.     
9 Ibid., 5. 
10 Ibid., 6. 
11 Миятев, П. Предговор. – В: Паунов, Б. Маджарска граматика. С., 1940, 1. 
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more in it. The accent is always on the first syllable and this 
even facilitates the correct pronunciation and makes it easily 
absorbed in this respect”.12 
In the paper “On the spoken Magyar language” Petar 
Miyatev detailed touches on the affiliation of the Magyar 
language, indicating its origin and noting some typical 
grammatical peculiarities. The author drew conclusions and 
stated that “The good relations existsing between the Bulgarian 
and Hungarian people require more studies of the Magyar 
language in Bulgaria. In Hungary, in Budapest, Hungarians have 
already started studying the Bulgarian language in a few 
educational institutions. The mutual knowledge of the languages 
will further strengthen relations between the two peoples”.13 
Being a supporter of the Bulgarian language in his paper 
“Bulgarian nicknames of Turkish origin” Petar Miyatev stated 
the following: “Apart the Turkish nicknames, nicknames of 
Greek origin or only Greek nicknames are used in Bulgaria. It 
would be useful that they would be replaced with Bulgarian 
also. To cleanse and bulgarise our language, especially there, 
where it will not cause any distortion, is a noble cause, which 
everyone loving the native Bulgarian language must contribute 
to. We do not create new works, we do not clutter the language 
with heavy and funny to use words, we want only our 
Bulgarian language, so we recommend discarding the other 
words, that is, in this case we recommend discarding the 
Turkish nicknames”.14 He concluded that, “We must bulgarize 
the nicknames of the Bulgarians too as the names of their 
villages were bulgarized”.15 
P. Miyatev closely examined language issues in his paper 
“On the Pronounciation and Transcription of the Magyar Names 
                                                        
12 Ibid., 1. 
13 Миятев, П. За говоримия маджарски език. – РР, 1940, № 2, 72. 
14 Миятев, П. Български прякорни имена от турски произход. – РР, 1937, 
№ 1, 20. 
15 Ibid., 21. 
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in Bulgarian Language”. “Like almost all other languages, the 
Magyar language also contains the above-mentioned loan-words 
from the Ural-Altaic languages, as well as loan-words from 
Latin, Greek, French, German and of other origin”, he stated16. 
Petar Miyatev noted that the sound system of Magyar 
language was differed too much from the Bulgarian one and 
this naturally caused difficulties with speech and transcription 
of the Magyar names. Two key points in the Magyar language 
were important: the Magyar language used long and short 
vowels, which was alien to the modern Bulgarian language 
and the accent always stood on the first syllable.
17
 
In the paper “Wrongly translated Magyar names to Bulgarian 
ones” Petar Miyatev paid serious attention to the mistakes that 
occurred in the periodicals such as newspapers and magazines. 
The paper was a call to the translators not to make mistakes in the 
translation of texts from the Hungarian lamguage
18
. 
The dynamics of the bilateral scientific exchange marked 
an ascending line that characterized certain unevenness in the 
pace of development. Bilateral scientific relations, although 
affected by the economic and political relationships, had also 
independent development, which was conditioned by the cultural 
needs of the two nations in various fields of science and by the 
spiritual attitude and the creative interests of the scientists 
themselves. P. Miyatev contrubuted greatly to the spiritual 
achievements in the Bulgarian-Hungarian linguistic relations. 
His linguistic studies helped the process of mutual cultural 
understanding and enrichment between the Bulgarians and 
Hungarians as a part of European culture. 
                                                        
16 Миятев. П. За изговора и транскрипцията на маджарските имена в 
българския език. – БЕ, 1953, № 3, 252. 
17 Ibid., 252. 
18 Миятев, П. Неправилно предадени на български маджарски имена –  
РР, 1938, № 6, 68-70. 
A nemzeti színszimbolikáról másképpen:  










Közismert, hogy a nyelv nem csupán a kommunikáció és a 
megismerés eszköze, egyben a nemzet kulturális kódja is, 
amely „meghatározott világképet is tartalmaz”.1 Benne tükrö- 
ződnek a nyelvhasználók élettapasztalatai és hagyományai. 
A jelen írás a nemzeti színek nyelvi realizációiról szól. 
Mind a magyar, mint a bolgár nemzeti zászló színei a piros, a 
fehér és a zöld, csak más sorrendben következik a három egyenlő 
szélességű vízszintes színsáv. Célom, hogy ismertessem, milyen 
helyet fogalalnak el ezek a színelnevezések a két nyelv szó- 
készletében, milyen beszédfordulatokban szerepelnek, mi 
indokolja használatukat, hogyan fejezik ki a nép eszmevilágát, 
milyen fogalmak kapcsolódnak hozzájuk, milyen asszociációkat 
ébresztenek. A három színnévnek mind konkrét, mind átvitt, 
szimbolikus jelentéseit vizsgálom (a teljesség igénye nélkül), 
nyomon követve azt a színes világképet, amely a rájuk vonatkozó 
frazeologizmusokból kibontakozik. Szem előtt tartom a nem 
lexikalizálódott, de gyakran együtt előforduló, több szóból álló 
szemantikai egységeket, az ún. kollokációkat is, valamint a 
vizsgált színlexémákkal alkotott összetett szavakat, amelyeknek 
egy részéhez a frazémákhoz hasonló képszerűség, érzelmi 
és/vagy jelentésbeli többlet fűződik hozzá. Ez a megközelítés 
                                                        
1 Bańczerowski, J. A világ nyelvi képe mint a szemantikai kutatások tárgya. 
- MNy, 1999, N 95/2, 190. 
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lehetővé teszi, hogy összehasonlítsuk saját valóságképünket az 
idegennel és így a másik ország kulturális reáliáinak világában 
találhassuk magunkat. 
A színek olyan nyelvi jelek, amelyeknek szemantikai 
struktúrája denotatív és szimbolikus jelentésekből áll. Hogy a szín- 
nevek mennyire tükrözik egy nyelvközösség gondolkodás- 
módját, a világhoz fűződő viszonyát, azt mi sem bizonyítja 
jobban, mint az a sok színnevet tartalmazó nyelvi alakzat, 
amely minden nyelvnek a sajátja. A hasonló értelemmel bíró, 
de más képi világú bolgár és magyar frazeológiai kifejezések 
közötti összehasonlítás feltárja a két kultúra képi és gondolati 
világában megmutatkozó hasonlóságokat és különbségeket.  
Felmerülhet a kérdés miért érdemes egyáltalán a szín- 
szimbolika nyelvi megközelítésével foglalkozni? Azért, mert 
ily módon a nyelvvel kapcsolatos fontos háttérismereteket 
szerezhetünk, és érdekes információkat kaphatunk a vizsgált 
nyelvekben rögzített világképről is. Gyakran nem is sejtjük, 
hogy amikor idegen nyelven beszélünk, vagy egy másik nyelvre 
fordítunk, mennyire körültekintőnek kell lenni a színlexémák 
használatával, mert nem mindig elég azok referenciális jelentését 
ismerni. A szín szemantikai mezője azért is érdemel különös 
figyelmet, mert nagyon jól szemlélteti az egyes nyelvek 
szóhasználatbeli eltéréseit. Habár a szivárvány színeit mindenki 
ugyanolyannak látja, a különböző nyelvek beszélői nem 
egyformán tagolják a színspektrumot, így az általuk használt 
színelnevezések száma sem azonos. Gyakorlatilag ugyanannak 
a színnek lehet más neve attól függően, hogy mit akarunk 
jellemezni vele. A magyar zászló felső sávja piros, de ugyanaz 
a szín a volt Szovjetunió zászlajában már vörös. Ezen kívül a 
színneveket tartalmazó szókapcsolatok nem mindig tükrözik a 
valóságot, sokszor nem színt, hanem valamilyen más ismertető- 
jegyet fejeznek ki. A fehérbor valójában nem fehér, hanem a 
vörösborhoz képest világos. A vörös melléknév a vér színével 
azonos, mégis előfordul olyan szókapcsolatban, amelyben a 
világossal ellentétes sötét változatot jelenti: a vörös káposzta a 
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valóságban sötétlila, a vöröshere színe is lila. A zöldbabnak és 
a zöldpaprikának is van olyan fajtája, amely színét tekintve 
sárga, a zöldhagymának is csupán a szára zöld. Amikor a zöld 
melléknévvel utalunk növényekre, zöldségekre, gyümölcsökre, 
elsősorban nem a színt vesszük figyelembe, hanem azt, hogy a 
növény új, friss, vitaminokban gazdag vagy még nem teljesen 
érett.
2
 A színnevek gyakran szerepelnek olyan szókapcsola- 
tokban, amelyek referenciája egyáltalán nem vonatkozik színre: 
Vörös-tenger, fehér könyv, zöld asztal, Червен Петко („a bor 
tréfás elnevezése'), Бяла Рада ('a pálinka tréfás elnevezése‟), 
Червено море, Бяло море. Az olyan kifejezések is, mint vörös 
brigád, fehér vicc, бял кахър, червени барети, червено щастие 
stb. csak metaforikusan értelmezendők. 
Nézzük sorra a három választott színnév alkalmazásait a 
magyar és a bolgár nyelvben. 
A piros szín két prototípushoz kötkető: a vérhez és a lángoló 
tűzhöz, így szimbolikájába ellentétes dolgok vegyülnek. A vér az 
élet, az erő és az egészség jelképe, az elfolyó vér azonban a 
halálé. A tűzhöz nem csak a szerelem kapcsolódik, hanem a 
veszély jelzése, a pusztítás is.
3
  
Brent Berlin és Paul Kay amerikai antropológus 98 nyelvre 
kiterjedő összevető kutatásai szerint szinte egyedül- állónak 
számít, hogy a magyar két önálló színnevet használ a vörös 
színtartományra: piros és vörös.
4
 A színnevek kapcsán a 
piros–vörös probléma az egyik legvitatottabb kérdés a magyar 
szakirodalomban. Feltűnő, hogy a kutatók eltérő, néha egymásnak 
ellentmondó következtetéseket vonnak le.
5
 A Színszótár szerint a 
                                                        
2 Ibid., 34. 
3  Koutny I. Mennyiben magyar színek a piros-fehér-zöld? Kontrasztív 
frazeológiai vizsgálat. – In: Maticsák S. (Ed.). Nyelv, nemzet, identitás II. 
Bp.–Debrecen, 2007, 232. 
4 Berlin, B., P. Kay. Basic Color Terms: Their Universality and Evolution. 
Berkeley–Los Angeles, 1969, 36.  
5 Erről részletesen lásd: Bálizs B. A huszadik század magyar színkutatói – 
nyelvészek. – In: Bene K., Sarlós I., Vitári Zs. (Eds.). Kutatási Füzetek 17. A 
Pécsi Tudományegyetem Interdiszciplináris Doktori Iskolájának kiadvány- 
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két elnevezés között némi árnyalatbeli különbség észlelhető: a 
piros világosabb, élénkebb, míg a vörös a vérrel való össze- 
függés következtében inkább mély árnyalatú, erősebb. Az 
elpirul-hoz képest az elvörösödik igét valamivel erősebbnek 
érzik, de több jelzős szerkezetben (vörös haj, vörös tégla, 
vöröshagyma stb.) a feltételezett szabály nem áll. A piros 
szamóca például lehet sötétebb, mint a vörös szikla, a nemzeti 
lobogók pirosa is mélyebb lehet, mint a munkásmozgalmi 
vörös zászló. Bogatkin Mari viszgálatai sem bizonyítják a fenti 
feltételezést. A szerő szerint a vörös a mai magyarban néhány 
kivételtől eltekintve „már csak az idiómákban és szólásokban 
fordul elő. Viszont a piros szóval napjainkban majdnem 
minden piros szín leírható”.6 
A piros és vörös közötti különbség inkább csak 
használatbeli és alig függ a színárnyalattól. A bohóc orra piros, 
a hóban-fagyban didergő vagy részeg emberé viszont vörös. 
Ha valaki nem mond igazat, a füle pirosra színeződik, ha nagyon 
fázik vörösre. A nyuszinak, valamint a fényképezőgépbe néző 
embernek piros a szeme, a kialvatlan és síró emberé vörös. Az 
alma, a cseresznye, a meggy piros, de az áfonya, a ribizli, a 
som vörös. A kicsattanó egészség jele a kipirosodott vagy a 
pirospozsgás arc. A vörös arcszín betegséget jelezhet, de erős 
haragot is, bár heves indulat következtében az arc pirosra is 
gyúlhat. Az egészséges, nem sápadt arc tehát piros színű, de 
melegtől, erőfeszítéstől, felháborodástól vörös. Annak ellenére, 
hogy Krisztus vérével hozható kapcsolatba a húsvéti tojás csak 
piros lehet, még ha színe mélyvörös is. A vöröset főleg harcias 
vagy erotikus vonásokkal ruházzák fel. A szovjet hadsereg, az 
ötágú csillag vörös. „Vörös csütörtök”-ként vált emlékezetessé 
                                                                                                          
sorozata. Pécsi Tudományegyetem, 2011, 13–34. 
6 Bogatkin, M. Värvinimed ungari keeles. Põhinimed, nende struktuur ja 
kujunemine (Színelvezések a magyar nyelvben: alapszínnevek, szerkezetük 
és keletkezésük). Tartu Ülikool, 2005, 129. 
http://dspace.utlib.ee/dspace/bitstream/handle/10062/1188/bogatkin.pdf 
(2015.05.08.) 
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a budapesti munkásság 1907. október 10.-i tömegstrájkja az 
általános választójogért. A fenyegető-rémisztő pokol is vörös. 
A vörös haj sokáig a boszorkányok „ismertetőjele” volt, ma (a 
vörös körmökkel együtt), inkább az erotika körébe tartozik, 
mint ahogy a vörös lámpás negyed is. Ha vki dühös, az arca 
pulykavörös vagy céklavörös.   
Egyes esetekben mindkét színelnevezés használatos: piros, 
mint a paprika, ~vörös, mint a paprika; tűzvörös~tűzpiros. Ezzel 
szemben a csak nyelvben létező színnevekben, mint a tulipiros és 
a jajvörös, amelyeknek nincs vizuális színjelentésük, a piros-vörös 
nem cserélhető fel egymással. Szégyenében vagy zavarában az 
ember elpirul vagy elvörösödik, de ha hőtől, erőfeszítéstől 
vagy indulattól elváltozik az arcszíne, csak az elvörösödik ige 
használható.  
A piros szín árnyalatainak érzékeltetésére mind a magyar, 
mind a bolgár különböző nyelvi kifejezésekkel él. Az esetek 
többségében összetett szót képez a színnévvel: cseresznyepiros, 
kakaspiros, lázpiros, pipacspiros, skarlátpiros, gránátvörös, 
rákvörös, rozsdavörös, vérvörös, ill. малиновочервено, 
винено-червено, огненочервено, кървавочервено, рубинено- 
червено, керемиденочервено, вишневочервенo. Egyes megneve- 
zésekből hiányzik a színnév, és csak a hasonlító elem 
önmagában vagy a -színű utótaggal együtt szolgál a szín 
kifejezésére: bordó, karmazsin, krapp, rőt, vörhenyes, hússzínű, 
csipkebogyószínű, eperszínű; рижаво, бордо, коралово stb. 
Fontos megemlíteni, hogy a bolgár nyelvben a piros szín 
szinonim elnevezéseit (пурпурно, алено, румено) stilisztikai 
differenciálás jellemzi a bennük foglalt konnotációktól 
függően, ezért a funkcionális megterheltségük sem egyforma. 
A пурпурно „bíborszínű‟ például a hatalommal, a nemes 
származással, a királyi uralkodással társul.  
Az árnyalat kifejezésének másik formája az össze- 
hasonlítás. A szóláshasonlatok a két nép asszociatív gondolkodását 
tárják fel, és kapcsolatban vannak gyakorlati tapasztalatukkal 
és kultúrtörténeti hagyományaikkal. A hasonlati tárgy kiválasztását 
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az embernek a környező világgal való kölcsönhatása határozza 
meg. Ezzel magyarázható, hogy a két nyelv eltéréseket mutat a 
hasonlított elemre vonatkozóan, ameleyek a tárgyak és a 
jelenségek közös jegyeinek és sajátosságainak különböző 
verbalizálására vezethetők vissza.  
A szóláshasonlatokban a jellemző referenseket találjuk: 
piros, mint a pipacs, ~a rózsa, ~az alma; vörös, mint a cékla, 
~a pulyka, ~a róka, ~a Júdás haja, ~a skarlátposztó; червен 
като рак, ~кръв, ~мак, ~ябълка, ~домат, ~пуяк, ~пламък, 
~огън, ~панджар, ~битолски просяк; червен~ален като 
божур; червен, ~румен като трендафил. 
A különböző referenciatárgyak a színintenzitás különböző 
fokait, a piros szín erősségét, eltérő árnyalatait jelzik. A több 
frazeológiai variáns megléte lehetővé teszi kicserélhetőségüket, 
és gazdagítja a két nyelv stilisztikai lehetőségeit. 
A szóláshasonlatok szemantikája azonos alakúságot mutat 
az összetett melléknevekkel, amelyek a megfelelő analitikus 
hasonlító szerkezetekre vezethetők vissza. Vö.: rákvörös ~ 
vörös, mint a rák.   
А piros~vörös színnévnek több szimbolikus jelentés 
tulajdonítható.
7
 Ez a szín a nagy intenzitású érzelmek mutatója, a 
szeretet, a szerelem, a vágy, a szenvedély színének tartják; 
gyakran valamilyen erotikus tartalomra is utal: piros rózsa, 
piros szív, piros körmök, vérvörös ajkak, червена роза, червено 
сърце, кървавочервени~яркочервени~аленочервени устни.  
A piros a tüzet, az aggodalmat jeleníti meg. Azt is jelzi, hogy 
veszély leselkedik ránk. Ez az asszociációs kapcsolat olyan kollo- 
kációkban nyilvánul meg, mint: vörös kakas, vörös lista, червена 
книга, червен бутон, червена лампичка, червена линия.  
A figyelmeztetésre, tiltásra is utalhat: piros lap, piros fény, 
piros tiltó táblák; piros lámpa, belehajt a pirosba, червен 
картон (във футбола), червена светлина, червен светофар, 
минавам на червено, червена точка по време на телеви- 
зионно предаване. 
                                                        
7 Ld. Koutny I., Op. cit., 233.  
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A piros hagyományosan a szocializmus és a kommu- 
nizmus színe. A politikai baloldallal, a harccal, a forrada- 
lommal hozzák összefüggésbe. Erről tanúskodnak az olyan 
nyelvi kifejezések is, mint például Vörös Gárda, Vörös 
Hadsereg, Vörös Brigádok, Vörös Khmerek, vöröskatona, 
vörösingesek, a vörösök, vörös csillag, vörös nyakkendő 
(úttörők jelvénye), vörös október, vörös diktatúra, Червена 
армия, червеноармеец, червена роза, червена звезда, пио- 
нерска червена връзка, червена диктатура, червени кхмери, 
червени бабички~боклуци „vörös vénasszonykák/ vörös szemét‟ 
(a kommunista/szocialista párt hívei), червени барети (a 
terrorizmus ellen harcoló osztagok).  
A vér, az egészség, az életerő, az energikus élet fogalmakhoz 
is kapcsolódik: ez olyan kifejezésekben tükrözódik, mint 
pirospozsgás arc, piros száj, piros nyelv, piros tojás, Vörös- 
kereszt, Vörös Félhold, Vörös Kristály mint a nemzetközi 
humanitárius szervezet jelképei, amelynek célja az emberi élet 
és egészség védelme, ill. червендалест, бял и червен, румено 
лице, румени бузи, алени устни, червено яйце, Червен 
кръст, червен полумесец, червен кристал. 
A vértolulás olyan fiziológiai reakció, amelyet ellenétes 
érzelmek válthatnak ki. Ezért nem véletlen, hogy a piros~vörös 
kétértelmű szín, amellyel mind pozitív, mind negatív dolgok 
fejezhetők ki. Pozitív töltésűek a piros pont, piros betűs ünnep, 
piros pünkösd, червена точка, червенея, руменея, червенее 
ми се гребенът, зачервил съм гребена. Negatív konnotációjú 
jelentései a haraghoz, a bűnbeeséshez, a testi szenvedélyek 
megbélyegzéséhez kapcsolódnak: vörös lett vkinek a feje, 
elönti a vörös köd~vörös köd ereszkedik a szeme elé; vörös, 
mint a pulyka; vörös posztó vkinek a szemében, почервенява 
от яд като домат~божур~чушка, червя се, изчервявам се; 
a piros ajkak, a piroslámpás ház, a vörölámpás negyed, a skarlát- 
vörös a “nagy babiloni parázna” színe. A bolgár nyelvben a 
piros szín „veszély‟ konceptuális jelentése gazdasági kontextusban 
veszteségre, pénzügyi nehézségekre is utalhat: на червено съм, 
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azaz rosszul megy neki, veszteséggel dolgozik. 
A fehér szín a fénnyel, a tisztasággal, a jósággal, az ártatlan- 
sággal, az egyszerűséggel, a békeszeretettel asszociálható.8 
Leginkább a tökételesség színéhez társítják. Prototípusa a fény 
és a hó.  
A fehér színnevet tartalmazó szóláshasonlatok között 
vannak olyanok, amelyek megegyeznek a két nyelvben: fehér, 
mint a fal, ~a hó, ~a gyolcs, ~a tej, ~a galamb, ~а hattyú, ~а 
liliom, ~az alabástrom, ~a kréta, ~a mész – бял като сняг, 
~платно, ~стена, ~мляко, ~гълъб, ~лебед, ~лилия, 
~алабастър, ~тебешир, ~вар. Olyanokat is találunk, 
amelyekben a hasonlatok csak az adott nyelvre jellemzők: 
fehér, mint a patyolat, ~mint Svatopluk lova, ~mint a bíbor, ~a 
tyúktojás, – бял като клавиши на роял, ~като смин, ~като 
сирене, ~като въглен, ~като катран, ~като на тенджера 
дъното. ~като на тиган дъното.  
A jeltárgy megnevezésében megmutatkozó eltérések a két 
nyelv között a következő kifejezésekben figyelhetők meg: бял 
кахър „jelentéktelen, múló, csekélyke gond‟, бяла чума „fehér 
pestis‟ (= kábítószer-élvezés metaforikus jelölése).  
A fehér szín a fény, a világosság színe, amely szemben áll 
a sötétséget jelképező feketével. E szimbolikus jelentés olyan 
szókapcsolatokban jut kifejezésre, mint fehér éjszakák „бели 
нощи‟, дохождам на бял свят „világra jön‟; виждам бял 
свят „napvilágot lát‟, посред бял ден „világos/fényes nappal‟, 
ясно като бял ден „világos, mint a nap‟. Az utóbbi két bolgár 
szókapcsolat magyar megfelelőiben nem a fehér, hanem a 
világos szó szerepel, ami szintén a fehér és a világos 
jelentésbeli viszonyára utal. Ugyanez a kapcsolat a húsvét 
utáni vasárnap magyar és bolgár elnevezésében is fellelhető: 
vö. Fehérvasárnap, ill. Cветла неделя. 
A fehér szín hagyományosan az élethez, a naphoz, a 
világhoz társul. Aki nehéz életet él, akinek rosszul megy a 
                                                        
8  Алмалех, М. Слово и цвят: психолингвистични и прагматични 
аспекти. – In: Год. на СУ - ФСФ, Т. 91, 2006, 80. 
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szénája, arról azt mondják a bolgárok, не вижда бял свят/бял 
ден „nem lát fehér napot/világot‟.    
A fehér pozitív töltéssel bír. A béke és a jóakarat 
kifejezője: erre utalnak olyan kifejezések, mint fehér galamb 
„бял гълъб‟, kitűzi~lengeti a fehér zászlót, развявам~вдигам 
бяло знаме, не ми дава бял ден „vki nem hagy békén vkit‟. 
A fehéret a tisztaság színének tartják: fehér mágia, бяла 
магия, оставям бяло поле. Az ártatlanságra is utalhat: fehér 
liliom, fehér lelkű, fehér vicc, fehérre mos vkit. 
A fehér politikával kapcsolatos kifejezésekben is előfordul: 
fehérterror, fehérgárdista, fehérgalléros bűnözés; бял терор, 
белогвардеец, бяла бюлетина „üres, érvénytelen szavazólap‟; 
бели якички (a hatalom, parlament, rendőrség bűnozői).  
A fehér az öröm hordozója. A родeн на бял покров „fehér 
leplen született‟, azaz burokban született szólásban a fehér 
színnév a boldogsággal, a szerencsével, a gondtalansággal 
társul. A fehér lepel elválaszthatatlan egységbe fonja össze az 
életet és a halált, így annak a jó sorsnak a jelképévé válik, 
amellyel az újszülött “áldott”.  
A fehér színt tartalmazó átkokban viszont, mint például Да 
не видиш бял ден! „Ne láss fehér napot‟, Под бяло да легнеш! 
„Feküdj fehér lepel alá‟, Да те забулят в бяло! „Fehérben 
fátyolózzanak le‟ („halj meg/pukkadj meg‟ jelentésben), Бяла 
коса да не видиш! („ne őszüljön a hajad‟ = halj meg 
fiatalon) fordított szimbolikát találunk – itt a fehér az életből a 
halálba való átmenetet jelképezi. E szimbolikus jelentés a 
keleti kultúrákkal való analógiával magyarázható meg, ahol a 
fehér a gyászhoz, a bánathoz, a halálhoz társul. A holttestet 
mindenütt fehér lepellel borítják, így az adott frazeologizmusok 
által felidézett kép a színszimbolika univerzális voltára utal.  
A fehér szerencsét hoz, a hosszú élettartamhoz, a sikehez 
fűződik. Ez olyan frazémákban fejeződik ki, mint вижда бяла 
бога „látja a fehér Istent‟ (sikeres az életben, boldogul), идвам 
на бял кон „fehér lovon jön‟, azaz sikert ér el vmiben, Да те 
видя на бял кон „hadd lássanak fehér lovon‟, azaz legyen sikered, 
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szerencséd, Вятър го вее на бял кон/бяла кобила „Szél fújja 
fehér lovon/fehér kancán‟, azaz gondtalanul él, връстник с 
белите орли „egykorú a fehér sasokkal‟, vagyis élemedett korú.  
A bolgárban a fehér szín a jóságot is jelölheti. A jóságos, 
szelíd emberről azt mondják, hogy: “сърце и бял дроб” („szív 
és a tüdő‟). 
A fehér valami ritka, kivételes dolgot is jelenthet, a 
váratlan boldogságot és a meglepetést: fehér holló, бяла врана, 
бяла лястовица, ellentétben a fekete macskával például, 
amelyet a népi hiedelemben baljós előjelnek tekintenek.   
Az ellentét olyan frazeologizmusokban nyilvánul meg 
legélénkebben, amelyek mind a két színt tartalmazzák: ha 
akarom fehér, ha akarom fekete; ha nem fehér, fekete; не 
казва ни черно, ни бяло „nem mond se fehéret, se feketét‟, 
vagyis se jót, se rosszat; на черното казва бяло „a feketét 
fehérnek mondja‟; не съм видял бял ли е, чер ли е “nem 
láttam fehér-e vagy fekete” vagyis én sem értettem, hogy ez jó 
vagy rossz; бели пари за черни дни „fehér pénz szűk napokra‟ 
(félreteszi a megtakarított pénzt, hogy meglegyen szükség esetén). 
Az olyan okszimoron hasonlatokra, mint бял като въглен. 
~като на тенджерата дъното, ~ като кюмюрджия, 
~циганин, ~егюптин, ~арапин 'fehér, mint a szén, ~a lábas 
feneke,~a szénégető, ~a cigány, ~a néger' jellemző, hogy az 
ellenkezőjét kell érteni annak, ami meg van nevezve. Éppen az 
egymást kizáró ellentétes fogalmak összekapcsolásából, a 
forma és a tartalom ellentmondásából ered e frazémák 
jelentésének ironikus színezete. 
A zöld szín a természet színe, az élet szimbóluma. A 
megújulást, a növekedést, a harmóniát, a termékenységet, a 




A zöld szimbolikus jelentései megegyeznek a két nyelvben, 
de szembetűnik, hogy egyes frazeológiai kifejezések magyar, 
ill. bolgár megfelelőjéből hiányzik a színnév. Pl.: zöldasztal 
                                                        
9 Koutny, I., Op. cit., 235. 
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mellett – официално, по пътя на преговори; zöld ágra 
vergődik – успешно се справям с нщ, провървява ми, 
преуспявам, излиза ми късметът; a szomszéd rétje mindig 
zöldebb – комшийската кокошка все по-големи яйца снася 
„a szomszéd tyúkja nagyobb tojásokat rak‟; kékre-zöldre ver – 
насинявам от бой; пращам за зелен хайвер 'elküld vkit zöld 
káviárra' – lóvá tesz; трай, коньо, за зелена трева “tűrj/várj, 
ló, zöld fűért” – várhatsz, babám, míg csak bele nem fáradsz.  
Több magyar összetett szó és kifejezés bolgár megfelelője 
sem tartalmazza a színnevet: zöldpetrezselyem – магданоз, 
zöldfőzelék – яхния от пресни зеленчуци, zöldvendéglő – 
ресторант градина stb. 
A zöld közvetlenül kapcsolódik a természethez, ill. a 
környezetvédelemhez: zöld párt/klub/hírek/oldal, zöldhatár, a 
zöldek, zöld főváros, zöld könyv; ill. Партия на 
зелените~Зелена партия, клуб на зелените, зелени новини, 
зелена страница, зелена столица, зелена книга. A 
környezetvédelmi kérdések, a környezetbarát gondolkodásmód 
előtérbe kerülésével manapság egyre több szókapcsolatban 
található a zöld színszó a bio/öko melléknév szinonimájaként: 
zöld projekt, zöld energia. A зелено училище „zöld iskola‟ 
kifejezésnek magyar megfelelője 'iskolai kirándulás a 
természetbe' nem tartalmazza a színnevet, de hasonló 
jelentéssel bírnak olyan kifejezések, mint a zöldbe kirándul, a 
zöldben tölti a hétvégét.  
A zöldnek az éretlenség, tapasztalatlanság, fiatalság, 
naivitás fogalmához köthető jelentése is van: zöld gyümölcs 
„éretlen‟, zöldbőr „frissen lefejtett állati bőr‟, zöldfülű, még 
zöld a szakmában, ill. млад и зелен, зелена глава „zöldfejű‟, 
azaz a bolgárok számára, a magyaroktól eltérően, a 
tapasztalatlan embernek a feje és nem a füle zöld. Az utóbbi 
szinonim szólásában más színnév és más testrész is 
szerepelhet a bolgár nyelvben: има още жълто по устата 
„van még sárga a szája körül‟, vagyis tejfölösszájú, rajta van 
még a tojáshéj. 
Liljána Lesznicskova 
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A jelzőlámpánál a zöld a piros szín ellentéte: piros – tilos, 
zöld – szabad. A szabadság, engedély szimbolikus jelentése 
olyan kifejezésekben is tükröződik, mint pl. zöld lámpa, 
zöldvonal (ingyenes telefon), zöld szám, zöldkártya 
(autósoknak), zöldhullám (a közlekedésben), zöldfolyosó (a 
repülőtéren), zöld utat ad/biztosít/kap, ill. зелен светофар, 
зелена светлина, зелена телефонна линия, зелен 
телефонен номер, зелена карта на автомобил, давам 
зелена улица, давам зелена светлина. 
A zöld színnév negatív felhangú is lehet: a méreg, a 
féltékenység, az ostobaság fogalmakhoz köthető. Gondoljunk 
csak a zöldhályog (glaukóma) betegségre – зелена звезда 
(глаукома), a féltékenységnek  Shakespeare Othello című 
művéből származó elnevezésére (a zöld szemű szörny – 
зеленооко чудовище); a harag, a felindulás, a betegség okozta 
sápadtságra: szép zöld vki, zöld lesz mérgében, az arca zöld a 
félelemtől, kékre-zöldre válik (dühében vagy ijedtében), ill. 
позеленява от яд/гняв. A zöldeket/zöldségeket beszél, sok 
zöldet összehord kifejezések bolgár megfelelői nem tartalmaznak 
színnevet: говоря врели-некипели, измишльотини, бабини 
деветини, небивалици, de magát a szimbolikus jelentést 
megtaláljuk a зелена кратуна „tökfilkó, tökfejű‟ frazémában.  
Összefoglalásul elmondhatjuk, hogy a nemzeti színlexémák 
jelentős szerephez jutnak a népek hétköznapi életében, 
történetében és hitvilágában, ezért fontos kategóriái a vizsgált 
nyelvek fogalmi rendszerének is. A piros, fehér, zöld színnevek 
produktívak mind a magyar, mint a bolgár nyelvben, számtalan 
összetett szó, ige és főnév képezhető belőlük, több frazeológiai 
egységben szerepelnek, színjelölő funkciói és szimbolikus 
jelentései erőteljesen áthatják mindennapi 
nyelvhasználatunkat.
10
 Az átvitt értelmű kifejezésekben a 
jelentésátvitel nemcsak metaforán, hanem metonímián is 
alapulhat: vörösingesek, zöldbenzin, zöldövezet, zöldkártya, 
zöldmezős beruházás, червеноризци, зелен бензин, зелена 
                                                        
10 Koutny, I., Op. cit., 237.  
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зона, зелена карта.  
A színárnyalatok különböző denotátumokról kapják a 
nevüket: a tapasztalati valóság, a környező világ, a mindennapi 
élet, a kultúrtörténeti hagyományok, „az adott ország (vagy 
nagyobb térség) klímájának, növényzetének, tágabb értelemben 
kultúrájának jellegzetességei nyomják rá bélyegüket,” így sok 
hasonlóság található az elnevezésekben, de némi különbség 
is.
11
 Vannak földrajzi eredetű színelnevezések (pl. burgundi 
vörös, írzöld, Himalája-fehér, бургундско червено, бордо, 
ирландско зелено), személy- vagy tulajdonnevekből képzett 
(pl. Mikulás-piros, Ferrari-piros, Rubens-vörös, Amazonas- 
zöld, Benetton-zöld) és kémiai vonatkozású színnevek is (pl. 
rézvörös, bronzvörös, ólomfehér, kadmiumzöld, медено/ 
бакъреночервено). Egyes konkrét elnevezésekben a magyar, 
másokban a bolgár használja több helyen a színt a név 
részeként és hasonló fajták megkülönböztetésére. A szólásokban 
és szóláshasonlatokban a színek sajátos gondolkodásmódot 
jeleznek. Bizonyos dolgokat a két nép más színben lát: itt 
főleg közel álló, ill. kevert színekre kell gondolni, amelyet az 
egyik kultúra az egyik színként, a másik a másikként értelmez. 
A frazeológiában is tükröződik, hogy a piros, fehér, zöld 
szimbolikája a prototipikus képviselőkhöz, illetve az ezekből 
levezethető fogalmakhoz kötődik. A magyar és a bolgár nyelv 
e három színnevet tartalmazó kifejezéseinek összevetése során 
a következő csoportok különíthetők el: 
Azonos szín – azonos vonatkozás: olyan szókapcsolatok 
kerülnek ide, amelyeknek azonos a denotatív és konnotatív 
jelentésük, és egybeesik a lexikális összetételük. Pl.: vörös, 
mint a rák/vér/láng/pulyka/ – червен като рак/кръв/пламък/пуяк; 
majd ha piros hó esik – като завали червен сняг; vmi vörös 
fonálként vonul végig – нещо преминавам като червена 
                                                        
11  Ibid., 231; Недкова, Е.  Съпоставителен лингвокултурологичен 
анализ  на фраземи с компоненти названия на цветове в български, 
сръбски и руски език. – В: Зборник Матице српске за славистику, т. 76, 
Нови Сад, 2009, 109–118. 
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нишка; vörös szőnyeget terít (valaki elé) – разгъвам червения 
килим/червената пътека пред някого, fehér, mint a 
hó/fal/gyolcs – бял като сняг/стена/платно; zöld, mint a fű 
– зелен като трева; zöld utat ad – давам зелена улица.  
E csoporton belül olyan hasonló alakú frazeológiai 
egységeket is találunk, amelyek között szemantikai különbségek 
figyelhetők meg a két nyelvben. A fehéren feketén szólás pl. a 
magyar nyelvben két jelentésű, a bolgárban csak a „dokumentálva 
van, írásban is létezik‟ jelentésben használatos, míg a „félreérthe- 
tetlenül, világosan‟ szinonimájaként való értelmezése nem ismert. 
Еltérő vonatkozás: A frazeologizmusok egy részében csak 
az adott nyelvre jellemző képeket találjuk, amelyeket a másik 
nyelv használói teljesen elfogadhatatlanoknak tartanak. Az 
esetek többségében az eltérések a frazeológiai kapcsolatok 
kultúrspecifikus összetevőire vezethetők vissza: vörös, mint a 
skarlátposztó, ~a Júdás haja – червен като божур „pünkösdi 
rózsa‟, ~като битолски просяк „bitoli koldus‟, ~ като 
калинка 'katicabogár'; felszáll/leszáll a vörös kakas vhova – 
пускам червената кобила „elereszti a vörös kancát‟, бял 
като клавиши на роял, ~сирене, ~въглен, ~катран, ~на 
тиган дъното „fehér, mint a brinza sajt, ~a zongora billentyűi, 
~a szén, ~a kátrány, ~a serpenyő feneke‟. 
Eltérő színhasználat: a két nyelv eltérő módon vonatkoztat 
egy-egy színt a valóságra. Például a vöröshagymát bolgárul 
vagy csak hagymának nevezik (кромид/кромид лук), vagy 
ritkábban жълт лук, azaz sárga hagymának, a lilahagyma 
pedig a bolgárok számára vörös (червен лук). A sárgászöld 
epéhez kapcsolódó irigység a magyarban sárgaként jelenik 
meg: sárga irigység, sárga vki az irigységtől, elönti/elfogja/megeszi 
a sárga irigység, belesárgul az irigységbe. A bolgár nép черна 
и бяла завист „fekete és fehér‟ irigységről beszél, az irigységtől 
az ember elzöldül (позеленява от завист).  
Színhiány: червен вятър (betegség) – orbánc; червенокож 
– rézbőrű; червено щастие – havibaj; червена мухоморка – 
légyölő galóca; vörösfenyő – лиственица; vörösgyűrű – 
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кучешки дрян; на червен Гергьовден~на червен понеделник 
„piros Györgynapon/piros hétfőn‟, vagyis majd, ha fagy; хванала 
ме е червената болест „elkapta a vörös betegséget‟, azaz vki 
betegnek tetteti magát; по бели гащи – ingben-gatyában, 
teljesen készületlenül; червен бан/мангър не се губи, ~ 
червена аспра не загива – rossz pénz nem vész el; червенее 
ми се гребена, зачервил съм гребена – jól megy a szénája; 
kimutatja a foga fehérét – показва си зъбите/рогата; зашит с 
бели конци – kilóg belőle a lóláb, látszik rajta a csalás; zöld 
disznóról mesét mond – говоря приказки от 1001 нощ.  
Minden szín sokrétű tapasztalattal köthető össze. A 
példaanyagból láthatóvá válik, hogy a piros, fehér, zöld 
színszavak nem szín értelemben is funkcionálhatnak, vagyis 
metaforizálhatók. Mindhárom aktívan vesz részt archetipikus 
és kulturális jelentések közvetítésében is. Az archetipikus 
jelentés az emberiség őstapasztalataihoz, évszázados 
hagyományaihoz nyúlik vissza, és hozzájárul a szín által 
kiváltott érzelmi és asszociatív reakciókhoz. Ilyen pl. a vörös 
és az izgatottság, a veszély kapcsolata. A piros kulturális 
jelentése a szeretet, a szerelem, a forradalom színe, a fehér a 
tisztaságé, a zöld – a remény színe, a közlekedésben pozitív 
tartalmú, a természetben az egészséges, friss növények színe. 
A vizsgálat alapján megállapítható, hogy a három tárgyalt 
színnév prizmáján keresztül bemutatott magyar és bolgár 
nyelvi világkép sok közös tulajdonságot mutat. A magyarok és 
a bolgárok hasonló dolgokat tekintenek piros-, fehér-, ill. zöld 
színűnek, ami a közös kulturális térséghez való hovatartozásukra 
vezethető vissza. Az asszociációs kapcsolatokban az univerzális 
dominál az etnospecifikus felett. A két nyelvben a színlexémáknak 
általánosan ismert szimbolikáját találjuk, amely egyúttal némi 
helyi színezettel jelenik meg a frazeológiában. A színek 
felfogásában és használatában fellelhető különbségek abból 
adódnak, hogy a valóság hasonló elemeinek nyelvi 
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